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通用有望迎来女掌门

通用有望迎来女掌门

《财富》杂志 2012-12-19
现年51岁的玛丽·芭拉不到20岁就已经成为通用的工读生,如今已在通用工作了32年,可以说把一辈子都献给了通用。她从装配车间起步,一步步成长为高级副总裁,负责通用全球产品研发,成为公司级别最高的女性,在男性的传统领地站稳了脚跟,并成为通用未来CEO宝座的有力争夺者。

    自从30年代前轮驱动时代到来后,通用汽车公司一直深受一个坏习惯所害,就是必须按时、按预算地进行新车型的设计制造工作。而芭拉作为产品研发部门的负责人也正在努力纠正这个缺点。在这一点上,通用远远地落在了竞争对手的后头。大众集团巧妙地将各个不同品牌的元件重新利用,福特公司则将统一的设计在多个市场销售,而通用汽车的全球产品只有61%基于共同的核心架构生产。通用汽车总是努力想把成本挤压在可控范围内,在产品收关阶段避免昂贵的变动,并且尽量从紧张的预算中压榨出最大的价值。最近的例子是在芭拉到产品研发部门上任之前,由于通用公司急着把2013款迈瑞宝轿车提供给经销商,因此通用汽车给这款新车配了一个老式的轻度混合动力系统,影响了这款车型的销量。

    芭拉当前最重要的任务是消除重大意外因素,也就是变动、推迟、甚至取消发布新车型。芭拉指出,这些因素在2006年至2009年间导致通用汽车平均每年损失10亿美元。不少新车项目要么被推迟,要么被叫停,有的甚至从头再来——这是一种代价高昂而且破坏性很大的做法。材料和资本成本持续上升,设计工作量时常波动,造成了低效和返工。科技创新十分零散,进一步推高了成本。车型发布推迟意味着老款车型还要销售更长的时间,导致必须推出更大的优惠才能刺激人们购车,同时也降低了出货量。

    芭拉正在化繁为简、灌输纪律、提高总体效率等,希望通过这些方式降低重大意外因素的干扰。她努力在研发的早期阶段就把决策做好,然后在后面一直坚持这些决策。她的格言是:“晚到的好点子不一定好,因为它让顾客处于风险中。”最近她惊讶地发现,最该责备的恰恰是她的部门。近日她对一个员工团体说:“我本来深信,所有的意外因素都来自营销部门,我本来都敢赌上一个月的薪水。后来我们做了一次审计,发现所有的变化都来自工艺部门,于是我们不得不面对这个难堪的事实。”对于面前还有多少工作要做,芭拉的回答也很坦诚:“按一到十分算,我们只做了三分。”

    过去的通用汽车公司通过那群来自中西部地区的中年工程师的眼睛看世界,而芭拉则是站在顾客的角度去看新车型。她非常仔细地检查方向盘和换档杆等驾驶员需要与汽车接触的地方,以理解司机究竟是如何与汽车互动的。最近她发现,2013款别克维莱诺(Venrano)的座椅控制布置得太挤了,不易使用,甚至没有足够的空间拉安全带和调节座椅。分析完问题后,她发现之所以出现这个问题,是因为工程师们一个个都在为自己负责的零件找最合适的位置,而没有把他们的努力进行协调。她告诉工程师们这种做法是不正确的,她说:“我们要为顾客的利益对零件做出平衡。”

    芭拉把一生都奉献给了通用汽车。她生长在底特律郊区,她父亲在庞蒂克公司(Pontiac)当了39年的制模工。她第一次买车时,本来已经冲动地交了一辆火鸟牌轿车的订金,但后来还是买了一辆实用的雪佛兰克尔维特轿车。到了上大学的时候,她考上了位于弗林特的通用汽车学院【(General Motors Institute)现更名为凯特林大学(Kettering University)】,成了一名工读生(通用公司替她支付学费,她每年在通用公司工作半年)。18岁时,她在庞蒂克汽车的一个装配厂工作,负责检查庞蒂克Grand Prix轿车的发动机罩和挡泥板的质量,那时她就第一次发现了后来导致通用汽车在2009年破产的问题。

    As head of product development, Barra is trying to fix a process that has bedeviled GM since the beginning of the front-wheel-drive era 30 years ago: designing and engineering appealing new models on time and on budget. GM is way behind competitors. While Volkswagen skillfully reuses components in different brands, and Ford (F) sells single designs in multiple markets, only 61% of GM's global production is made on common core architectures. It struggles to keep costs under control, eliminate expensive last-minute changes, and squeeze the most out of tight budgets. Latest example: In a rush to get its 2013 Malibu to dealers, and before Barra moved into product development, GM equipped the new car with an older mild hybrid powertrain that has dampened sales.

    At the top of Barra's to do-list is eliminating churn -- the changes, delays, and cancellations that she figures cost GM $1 billion a year between 2006 and 2009. Vehicle engineering projects get delayed, or stopped and restarted -- a ruinously expensive practice. Material and capital costs creep up and engineering workload fluctuates, creating inefficiency and rework. Technology innovations are made piecemeal, driving up costs. Delays mean that outgoing models stay on sale longer, leading to higher incentives and lower volumes.

    Barra is attacking the interruptions by reducing complexity, instilling discipline, and improving overall efficiency. She tries hard to get decisions made early in the development process and then stick to them later on. Her mantra: "A great idea late is not necessarily great because it puts the customer at risk." She was surprised recently to discover that her closer associates were mostly to blame. "I was confident all the churn was coming from marketing," she told an employee group recently. "I would have bet a paycheck on it. So we did an audit and all the changes came from [engineering]. So we faced the ugly truth." Barra is candid about how much work lies ahead: "On a scale of one to ten, we're at a three."

    While old GM viewed the world through the prejudices of its middle-aged Midwestern engineers, Barra looks at new models through the eyes of the customer. She scrutinizes touch points like steering wheels and gearshifts to understand exactly how the driver interacts with the vehicle. She recently discovered that the seat controls on the 2013 Buick Verano, a compact sedan, were crowded and hard to use; there was no room to unspool the seat belt and adjust the seat. After analyzing the problem, she discovered the fault lay with individual engineers who each sought the best location for their particular part and didn't coordinate their efforts. Wrong call, she told them: "We compromise on our component for the benefit of the customer."

    Barra has been around GM all her life. She grew up in the Detroit suburbs, and her father was a die maker at Pontiac for 39 years. Her first car was a practical Chevy Chevette, bought after she impulsively put a deposit on a racier Firebird. When time came for college, she enrolled at the General Motors Institute (now Kettering University) in Flint as a co-op student (GM paid her annual tuition and, in exchange, she worked half of each year for the company). At 18, she found herself in a Pontiac plant, where she inspected poor-fitting hood and fender panels on the Grand Prix, and got her first hint of the problems that would drive GM into bankruptcy in 2009.

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