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FTX之后,谁能成为加密货币世界的新明星?

FTX之后,谁能成为加密货币世界的新明星?

Jeff John Roberts 2022-12-17
那些真正为普通人而非内部人设计产品的创业者们。

7月,大型加密货币衍生品交易所FTX看起来就像是稳定的支柱。在所谓的“加密货币之冬”期间,该公司及其懒散却别具时尚风格的创始人萨姆·班克曼-弗里德踌躇满志,泰然自若,甚至出手拯救实力较弱的竞争对手。

在11月的短短几天时间里,这样的假象就化为乌有了。首先,FTX的内部代币价值大幅缩水;然后,FTX正与竞争对手进行收购谈判;随后,随着竞争对手退出,该公司宣告破产。对于一家估值超过300亿美元的公司来说,这是惊人的转折,这家公司曾被视为可以将加密货币带入美国金融主流的最佳公司。

最糟糕的情况还在后面。FTX似乎参与了一场大规模欺诈,欺骗投资者,掠夺客户资金,而所有这些都是在没有董事会监督,甚至没有基本财务控制的情况下进行的。时年30岁的班克曼-弗里德赢得了投资者、政客和媒体(包括《财富》杂志:他是 《财富》杂志 2022年8-9月刊的封面人物)的青睐,但满头卷发的他,后来被视为伊丽莎白·霍姆斯(Elizabeth Holmes)和伯尼·麦道夫(Bernie Madoff)的混合体。

在本文付印时,大量监管和刑事调查正在进行中。(班克曼-弗里德在社交媒体上说,他“搞砸了”,但坚称自己一无所知,并非邪恶之人。)然而,在投资者和监管机构急于查明一起大规模欺诈案是如何在他们眼皮底下发生的之际,现在评估我们所了解的情况还为时过早。

惨重的教训

事后很容易发现这是骗局,就FTX而言,各种迹象都有:没有董事会,拒绝与媒体或财务支持者分享基本的会计文件,首席执行官在投资者会议期间沉迷于玩《英雄联盟》。更难的问题是,那些本应了解更多情况的人——包括像著名风险投资公司红杉资本(Sequoia Capital)和安大略省教师养老金计划的那些经验丰富的人——是如何错过这些危险信号的。

最好的答案是,在急于从下一个大事件中分一杯羹的过程中,基本的保障措施和怀疑态度被丢到了一边。投资公司不愿意错过热门交易,在审查方面走了捷径。红杉资本在FTX的B轮融资中投资了2.1亿美元,并委托媒体撰写了一篇14000字的华而不实的公司特写,题为“萨姆·班克曼-弗里德有救世主情结——也许你也应该如此”。现在,该公司可能希望当初能把部分营销资金花在法务会计上。(红杉资本向投资者道歉,并表示将加强审计工作;安大略省教师养老金计划在一份声明中说,“任何尽职调查程序都无法发现所有风险”)。

如今,显而易见的是,向班克曼-弗里德公司砸钱的公司本应做单调的尽职调查工作,并要求参与监督这家公司。但FTX的大部分融资是在2021年筹集的,当时加密货币的价格似乎只会上涨。在这种情况下,创始人很容易在没有任何附加条件的情况下获得资金。

与此同时,媒体和政客们轻信了班克曼-弗里德的表面形象——也许是因为他是民主党事业的主要捐赠者。他的“有效利他主义”捐赠计划听起来诚心实意,但却像雾里看花一样,这也使他令人耳目一新,与人们对加密货币兄弟的刻板印象形成鲜明对比。至于FTX的客户,他们损失了数百万储蓄,很难指责他们,这是因为该公司曾在超级碗投放广告,并获得了汤姆·布雷迪(Tom Brady)、斯蒂芬·库里(Steph Curry,)和拉里·大卫(Larry David)等人的背书。

此外还有透明度问题——这是FTX和许多同行明显缺乏的。具有讽刺意味的是,区块链是一项可以让账簿和账户实现前所未有的可见度的技术。然而,尽管如此,FTX还是能够通过130个离岸实体的网络掩盖其许多不当行为。作为对这次垮台的回应,加密货币世界中出现了一种要求公司提供“储备金证明”的呼声——这种标准至少应该要求公司以一种不需要密码学博士学位才能理解的方式来证明客户资金的安全性。

接下来会发生什么?

白宫、国会议员和机构负责人已经发誓要将加密货币行业纳入规范,一些激进人士表示,他们很愿意一劳永逸地摧毁加密货币。但是,应该有可能制定应对措施,防止出现另一个FTX,同时允许区块链的最佳部分蓬勃发展。业内倡导者认为,美国证券交易委员会目前的“执法监管”策略,被许多人谴责为含糊不清、难以预测,应该用明确界定加密货币何时会成为一种证券的规则来取代。

另一大有助于加密货币以更安全的方式蓬勃发展的举措是允许基于加密货币的金融产品,如交易所交易基金(ETFs)和有息贷款存在,尽管会有明确规则来管理它们如何运作。

FTX丑闻带来的财务损失将远远超出其自身客户的范围;加密货币贷款机构BlockFi和其他一系列加密货币公司,尤其是提供贷款的集中式加密货币公司,预计将申请破产。但相对来说,Coinbase破产的可能性微乎其微。即使在FTX蚕食其市场份额的情况下,这家公开交易的交易所也一直在追求缓慢而呆板的发展路线。该公司的收入和股价在“加密货币之冬”期间暴跌,但它与美国监管机构关系良好,并避免了采用班克曼-弗里德部署的离岸计划和自营交易花招。

从FTX的垮台中可以获得更大的一个启示。抛开不光彩的做法不谈,太多加密货币企业都过于关注非标准金融化产品,并都引入了代币,主要目的是为了让内部人士致富。但还有许多加密货币企业家关心的是开发普通人真正想要使用的产品,是时候让这些创新者站在聚光灯下了。(财富中文网)

译者:中慧言-王芳

7月,大型加密货币衍生品交易所FTX看起来就像是稳定的支柱。在所谓的“加密货币之冬”期间,该公司及其懒散却别具时尚风格的创始人萨姆·班克曼-弗里德踌躇满志,泰然自若,甚至出手拯救实力较弱的竞争对手。

在11月的短短几天时间里,这样的假象就化为乌有了。首先,FTX的内部代币价值大幅缩水;然后,FTX正与竞争对手进行收购谈判;随后,随着竞争对手退出,该公司宣告破产。对于一家估值超过300亿美元的公司来说,这是惊人的转折,这家公司曾被视为可以将加密货币带入美国金融主流的最佳公司。

最糟糕的情况还在后面。FTX似乎参与了一场大规模欺诈,欺骗投资者,掠夺客户资金,而所有这些都是在没有董事会监督,甚至没有基本财务控制的情况下进行的。时年30岁的班克曼-弗里德赢得了投资者、政客和媒体(包括《财富》杂志:他是 《财富》杂志 2022年8-9月刊的封面人物)的青睐,但满头卷发的他,后来被视为伊丽莎白·霍姆斯(Elizabeth Holmes)和伯尼·麦道夫(Bernie Madoff)的混合体。

在本文付印时,大量监管和刑事调查正在进行中。(班克曼-弗里德在社交媒体上说,他“搞砸了”,但坚称自己一无所知,并非邪恶之人。)然而,在投资者和监管机构急于查明一起大规模欺诈案是如何在他们眼皮底下发生的之际,现在评估我们所了解的情况还为时过早。

惨重的教训

事后很容易发现这是骗局,就FTX而言,各种迹象都有:没有董事会,拒绝与媒体或财务支持者分享基本的会计文件,首席执行官在投资者会议期间沉迷于玩《英雄联盟》。更难的问题是,那些本应了解更多情况的人——包括像著名风险投资公司红杉资本(Sequoia Capital)和安大略省教师养老金计划的那些经验丰富的人——是如何错过这些危险信号的。

最好的答案是,在急于从下一个大事件中分一杯羹的过程中,基本的保障措施和怀疑态度被丢到了一边。投资公司不愿意错过热门交易,在审查方面走了捷径。红杉资本在FTX的B轮融资中投资了2.1亿美元,并委托媒体撰写了一篇14000字的华而不实的公司特写,题为“萨姆·班克曼-弗里德有救世主情结——也许你也应该如此”。现在,该公司可能希望当初能把部分营销资金花在法务会计上。(红杉资本向投资者道歉,并表示将加强审计工作;安大略省教师养老金计划在一份声明中说,“任何尽职调查程序都无法发现所有风险”)。

如今,显而易见的是,向班克曼-弗里德公司砸钱的公司本应做单调的尽职调查工作,并要求参与监督这家公司。但FTX的大部分融资是在2021年筹集的,当时加密货币的价格似乎只会上涨。在这种情况下,创始人很容易在没有任何附加条件的情况下获得资金。

与此同时,媒体和政客们轻信了班克曼-弗里德的表面形象——也许是因为他是民主党事业的主要捐赠者。他的“有效利他主义”捐赠计划听起来诚心实意,但却像雾里看花一样,这也使他令人耳目一新,与人们对加密货币兄弟的刻板印象形成鲜明对比。至于FTX的客户,他们损失了数百万储蓄,很难指责他们,这是因为该公司曾在超级碗投放广告,并获得了汤姆·布雷迪(Tom Brady)、斯蒂芬·库里(Steph Curry,)和拉里·大卫(Larry David)等人的背书。

此外还有透明度问题——这是FTX和许多同行明显缺乏的。具有讽刺意味的是,区块链是一项可以让账簿和账户实现前所未有的可见度的技术。然而,尽管如此,FTX还是能够通过130个离岸实体的网络掩盖其许多不当行为。作为对这次垮台的回应,加密货币世界中出现了一种要求公司提供“储备金证明”的呼声——这种标准至少应该要求公司以一种不需要密码学博士学位才能理解的方式来证明客户资金的安全性。

接下来会发生什么?

白宫、国会议员和机构负责人已经发誓要将加密货币行业纳入规范,一些激进人士表示,他们很愿意一劳永逸地摧毁加密货币。但是,应该有可能制定应对措施,防止出现另一个FTX,同时允许区块链的最佳部分蓬勃发展。业内倡导者认为,美国证券交易委员会目前的“执法监管”策略,被许多人谴责为含糊不清、难以预测,应该用明确界定加密货币何时会成为一种证券的规则来取代。

另一大有助于加密货币以更安全的方式蓬勃发展的举措是允许基于加密货币的金融产品,如交易所交易基金(ETFs)和有息贷款存在,尽管会有明确规则来管理它们如何运作。

FTX丑闻带来的财务损失将远远超出其自身客户的范围;加密货币贷款机构BlockFi和其他一系列加密货币公司,尤其是提供贷款的集中式加密货币公司,预计将申请破产。但相对来说,Coinbase破产的可能性微乎其微。即使在FTX蚕食其市场份额的情况下,这家公开交易的交易所也一直在追求缓慢而呆板的发展路线。该公司的收入和股价在“加密货币之冬”期间暴跌,但它与美国监管机构关系良好,并避免了采用班克曼-弗里德部署的离岸计划和自营交易花招。

从FTX的垮台中可以获得更大的一个启示。抛开不光彩的做法不谈,太多加密货币企业都过于关注非标准金融化产品,并都引入了代币,主要目的是为了让内部人士致富。但还有许多加密货币企业家关心的是开发普通人真正想要使用的产品,是时候让这些创新者站在聚光灯下了。(财富中文网)

译者:中慧言-王芳

IN JULY, THE GIANT cryptocurrency derivatives exchange FTX looked like a pillar of stability. The company and its slacker-chic founder, Sam Bankman-Fried, projected calm and confidence during so-called Crypto Winter, even swooping in to rescue weaker rivals.

That facade crumbled in just a few days in November. First, the value of FTX’s in-house token cratered; then FTX was in talks to be acquired by a rival; then it declared bankruptcy as the rival walked away. It was a stunning turn of events for a company that had been valued at over $30 billion, one regarded as a best-in-breed firm that could bring crypto into the mainstream of American finance.

The worst was still to come. FTX appears to have engaged in a massive fraud, lying to investors and looting customer funds, all while operating without board oversight or even basic financial controls. The 30-year-old Bankman-Fried had charmed investors, politicians, and the media (including, yes, Fortune: We put him on our August/ September 2022 cover), but he came to be seen as a curly-headed cross between Elizabeth Holmes and Bernie Madoff.

Numerous regulatory and criminal investigations were underway as this story went to press. (Bankman-Fried has said on social media that he “fucked up,” but insisted he was naive, not nefarious.) Still, as investors and regulators scramble to determine how a massive fraud occurred right under their noses, it’s not too early to take stock of what we’ve learned.

HARD LESSONS

It’s easy to spot a scam in hindsight, and with FTX, the signs were all there: the lack of a board, the refusal to share basic accounting documents with the press or financial backers, a CEO who reveled in playing League of Legends during investor meetings. The harder question is how people who should have known better—including experienced hands like those at prestigious VC firm Sequoia Capital and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan—missed those red flags.

The best answer is that in the rush to snag a piece of the next big thing, basic safeguards and skepticism were thrown aside. Investment firms, reluctant to miss a hot deal, cut corners on vetting. Sequoia invested $210 mil- lion in an FTX Series B round and commissioned a puffy 14,000-word profile titled “Sam Bankman-Fried Has a Savior Complex—and Maybe You Should Too.” Now the firm is probably wishing it had spent some of that marketing money on a forensic accountant. (Sequoia apologized to investors and said it would beef up its auditing; OTPP said in a statement, “no due diligence process can uncover all risks.”)

It’s obvious now that the firms throwing money at Bankman-Fried should have done the humdrum work of due diligence and demanded a hand in overseeing the company. But FTX raised most of its financing in 2021, when it seemed like crypto prices could only go up. Under such circumstances, it’s all too easy for founders to get funded with few or no strings attached.

Media and politicians, meanwhile, gullibly accepted Bankman-Fried at face value—perhaps because he was a major contributor to Democratic causes. His earnest-sounding but fuzzy plans to give his money away through “effective altruism” also made him a refreshing contrast to the crypto-bro stereotype. As for FTX customers, who have lost millions in savings, it is hard to fault them, given that the company had run Super Bowl ads and gathered endorsements from the likes of Tom Brady, Steph Curry, and Larry David.

Then there is the question of transparency— something that FTX and many of its peers conspicuously lack. Blockchain, ironically, is a technology that can allow an unprecedented level of visibility into ledgers and accounts. Yet FTX nonetheless was able to conceal its many misdeeds through a web of 130 offshore entities. In response to the debacle, there is a clamor in the crypto world for companies to furnish “proof of reserves”—a standard that at a minimum should require firms to show that customer funds are safe, in a way that does not require a Ph.D. in cryptography to understand.

WHAT COMES NEXT

The White House, members of Congress, and agency heads have vowed to bring the crypto industry to heel, and some progressives have suggested they would be happy to destroy crypto once and for all. But it should be possible to fashion a response that will prevent another FTX while allowing the best parts of blockchain to flourish. Industry advocates argue that the SEC’s current “regulation by enforcement” tactics, which many decry as vague and unpredictable, should be replaced with clear rules that define when a crypto-currency is a security.

Another move that could help crypto thrive in a safer way: allowing crypto-based financial products like ETFs and interest-bearing loans to exist, albeit under clear rules governing how they operate.

The financial toll of the FTX scandal will reach far beyond its own customers; crypto-lender BlockFi and a series of other crypto firms, especially centralized ones that offer loans, are expected to file for bankruptcy. But one unlikely winner, relatively speaking, may be Coinbase. That publicly traded exchange pursued a slow, stodgy course even as FTX ate into its market share. Its revenue and shares have plummeted during Crypto Winter, but it’s playing nice with U.S. regulators, and it avoided the offshore schemes and proprietary trading sleight-of-hand that Bankman-Fried deployed.

There’s a larger take-away from the FTX meltdown. Shady practices aside, far too many crypto ventures revolve around exotic financialization and the introduction of tokens whose prime purpose is to enrich insiders. There are plenty of crypto entrepreneurs who care about building products that normal people would actually want to use. It’s time to give those innovators more of the spotlight.

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