经历退市和破产危机，中国咖啡“灭霸”瑞幸打算卷土重来
2020年夏天，中国咖啡连锁店瑞幸咖啡看起来奄奄一息，不久于世。当年4月，瑞幸承认虚假夸大销售额超过3亿美元。中国执法人员突击调查瑞幸总部。债券和股票投资者以欺诈罪起诉了该公司。瑞幸董事会罢免公司高管。在纳斯达克（Nasdaq）上市的瑞幸股价暴跌超过90%。2020年7月，纳斯达克的官员将瑞幸踢出美国交易所。“这是一场大规模欺诈。”总部位于北京的研究公司Asia Waypoint的创始人亨里克·博克表示。“账目都是假的。人人都觉得瑞幸要完了。”
但现在还不到两年，瑞幸咖啡正在努力打企业史上最大胆的翻身仗。最近，瑞幸超过星巴克（Starbucks），成为中国最大的咖啡连锁店。目前，瑞幸在中国的门店有6024家，星巴克只有5654家。5月22日，瑞幸公布2022年第一季度财报，财报显示，今年第一季度，瑞幸总净收入同比增长89.5%，季度经营利润首次转正。最近，瑞幸聘请中国滑雪运动员和奥运明星谷爱凌作为新任广告代言人，多家媒体报道称，公司正酝酿在中国香港上市，甚至在纳斯达克重新上市。瑞幸否认希望在香港上市，但表示还是“主要关注美国资本市场”，其美国存托凭证（ADR）仍然在场外交易。
瑞幸居然考虑重返华尔街，让人意想不到。
在美国国会，瑞幸的造假行为引发了关于对中国在美上市公司监管松懈的激烈辩论，批评人士谴责中国和香港公司的审计和披露标准比来自其他市场的公司宽松。令人震惊的瑞幸造假案曝光后，2020年《外国公司担责法案》（Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act）在美国的参众两院迅速一致通过，该法案规定如果美国上市公司会计监督委员会（U.S. Public Accounting Oversight Board）无法审核所有文档，对相关公司在美国以外的业务进行审计，那么未来三年，200多家中国公司就可能被迫从美国交易所退市。
在瑞幸争取华尔街原谅之际，中国的一些金融高层决策者也在广泛推动全球投资者恢复对中国企业的信心。近几周，国务院副总理刘鹤领导的一群顶尖经济规划师努力安抚国内外行业高管，表示两年来政府针对瑞幸、打车平台滴滴、电商巨头阿里巴巴，以及移动游戏和信息领袖腾讯控股等公司的闪电行动已经结束。
5月17日，在北京与数十位高管和行业专家高调举行的会议上，刘鹤重申中国政府“必须支持平台经济，保障民营经济健康发展”。他补充道，中国要“处理好政府和市场的关系，支持数字企业在国内外资本市场上市”。
但政策的利好对瑞幸有多大提振作用，专家们意见不一。华尔街传统观点仍然认为，名誉扫地的瑞幸不可能在纳斯达克重新上市。不过一些反对者认为瑞幸能够成功翻身，理由是公司的新管理团队得力，推出一系列创新产品，以及“消费者民族主义”在中国兴起，哪怕只是一杯咖啡。
崩塌
2018年，星巴克在北京前门南郊开设了1000平方米的臻选店。旗舰店三层，位于中国最繁华的旅游景点之一故宫正南的历史街区，地理位置优越。商店一层有“互动咖啡吧”，铜质天花板，墙上装饰着专门委托制作的咖啡豆艺术品。二楼是星巴克的高端茶品牌茶瓦纳（Teavana），而三楼则供应咖啡味酒精饮料。
瑞幸咖啡前门店就在星巴克的对面，店面里只有单调的柜台，四周放着几张简单的桌椅，一群顾客和送货司机挤着取订单，跟美国竞争对手的大店面简直毫无相同之处。
上海中欧国际商学院营销学助理教授陈林表示，装修简陋的瑞幸前门店在数千家门店中很典型，没有高档物业和高级装潢，专门在不起眼的地点经营，主要将门店当作取货中心。
瑞幸重技术和低成本的商业模式正是钱治亚的愿景，她曾经在中国最大的汽车租赁公司神州租车担任高管，认为租车行业的成功策略可以复制到咖啡行业，打破星巴克的主导地位。2017年，瑞幸在南部沿海城市厦门推出，价格远低于竞争对手：星巴克美式咖啡售价约为30元，瑞幸则是15元左右，甚至更低。瑞幸的资金主要来自钱治亚在神州租车的老板，身价不菲的亿万富翁陆正耀，他最出名的是带领2007年成立的神州租车，还有2015年在深圳成立的网约车公司神州优车迅速增长。陆正耀曾持有瑞幸30%的股份，他的妹妹持有12%股份，他担任董事长后公司快速扩张。第一年瑞幸便开设了2000多家门店，2019年又增加了2500家门店。
远在华尔街的投资者也闻到了咖啡飘香。瑞幸上市之前的几轮融资中，陆正耀和钱治亚从贝莱德（Blackrock）、新加坡政府投资公司（GIC）和路易达孚（Louis Dreyfus）等行业巨头募集到5亿多美元。2019年5月，瑞幸在纳斯达克上市时，共募集了6.51亿美元，成立两年的公司估值超过50亿美元。瑞幸股价达到顶峰时，市值一度超过130亿美元。
然而一些分析人士开始怀疑，瑞幸的一夜成功有些咖啡因过量。
2020年1月，总部位于美国旧金山的做空方浑水研究（Muddy Waters Research）发布了一份89页的报告，称报告作者为从事私下调查业务的外部研究实体。浑水拒绝透露研究公司的名字，但声称报告结果来自1500多名调查人员在600多家瑞幸零售店跟踪销售额并录制的数千小时视频。该报告称，瑞幸在纳斯达克上市后接连夸大销售额。后来《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）报道称，调查方是中国对冲基金雪湖资本（Snow Lake Funds）。雪湖拒绝就是否参与调查发表评论。
刚开始，瑞幸“明确否认”报告结果。但随后债务和股权投资者以欺诈罪将公司告上法庭，瑞幸才同意内部审计。当年4月，瑞幸公开承认首席运营官刘剑及下属2019年虚增了3.37亿美元销售额，约占当年业务的四分之一。5月，公司罢免了钱治亚和刘剑。到6月中旬，瑞幸股票暴跌90%，市值缩水110亿美元。纳斯达克当月宣布将瑞幸摘牌。7月，瑞幸董事会罢免了陆正耀董事长一职，由瑞幸早期员工郭谨一接替，郭谨一也接替了钱治亚，担任首席执行官。
中国市场监管机构单独调查了瑞幸，2020年9月得出结论称公司确实伪造财务记录误导了消费者和投资者。中国监管机构对瑞幸等45家涉案公司处以6100万元的罚款。四个月后，美国证券交易委员会（U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission）严厉批评了瑞幸的不当行为，并决定再罚1.8亿美元。2021年2月，瑞幸根据《破产法》第15章，即允许外国债务人在美国法院系统争取债权人保护的法律文件申请破产保护。
东山再起？
身处动荡中，郭谨一、新管理团队和一些关键的财务支持者都在努力维持瑞幸生存并谋划复苏。2021年4月，瑞幸向私募股权公司大钲资本（Centurium Capital）募集了2.4亿美元。大钲资本总部位于北京，负责人为华平投资（Warburg Pincus）的前高管黎辉。黎辉在华平期间，曾经负责向神州租车和神州优车投资，还曾经短暂担任神州优车的副总裁。但在瑞幸欺诈事件曝光后，黎辉与陆正耀断绝了关系。今年早些时候，黎辉告诉《华尔街日报》，他认为瑞幸财务造假行为是“巨大的背叛”。
大钲资本是瑞幸最早期的投资者之一，一直积极帮助公司重组清算会计问题。今年1月，大钲资本宣布组织财团收购两位联合创始人之前持有的股份，成为瑞幸控股的股东。
瑞幸正在以惊人速度走出破产程序。2021年10月，申请破产保护仅8个月后，瑞幸就投资者提出的1.75亿美元集体诉讼索赔达成和解。
同样令人惊讶的是，在丑闻笼罩下以及新冠疫情期间，瑞幸的基本业务表现得十分出色。该公司表示，2019年12月至2020年12月，门店亏损仅12%。瑞幸上市之前和期间从投资者募集了16亿美元，现在仍然有7.8亿美元现金储备，推动了公司的发展。
分析人士指出，瑞幸财务骗局对中国消费者没有多大影响。“中国消费者向来非常务实，瑞幸没有食品安全问题，他们就不认为是骗局。”陈林说。消费者认为瑞幸的问题“与会计有关”，“不会像投资者一样感觉被出卖”。
陈林表示，在今年的冬奥会期间，瑞幸决定签下中国滑雪运动员谷爱凌作为发言人，也是吸引爱国消费者的“聪明之举”。
很多中国消费者并不知道这起丑闻。上海博圣轩咨询公司的副总监胡宇万表示，瑞幸欺诈是“大新闻”，但在上海和北京以外的小城市“不算什么大事”。
丑闻发生后，瑞幸还以其他方式自我调整。胡宇万指出，瑞幸放弃了跟星巴克竞争，转而选择关注较低层次的消费者。“瑞幸（针对）大众市场且价格非常实惠，该策略很有帮助。”她说。
分析师称，瑞幸结合了大幅折扣与创新产品。“他们发现中国人并没有那么喜欢传统的美式咖啡。”陈林说。他指出，现在瑞幸的“热门产品”是椰云拿铁和红丝绒拿铁，比起星巴克拿铁更像中式奶茶。
救赎
虽然瑞幸努力安抚投资者和监管机构，但与外部会计师事务所关系紧张造成了一些影响。瑞幸退市之前，由四大会计师事务所中安永华明会计师事务所（Ernst & Young Hua Ming）负责审计。安永拒绝对瑞幸的欺诈销售行为负责。2020年9月，瑞幸找纽约的麦楷博平会计师事务所（Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk）代替了安永。但没到几个月麦楷博平便选择退出，抱怨无法收集“足够的第三方数据”完成审计。2021年4月，香港的中正达会计师事务所（Centurion ZD CPA）接替麦楷博平作为瑞幸的独立审计师。
前任审计师“显然无法完成工作，要么是不愿做。”中正达会计师事务所接手瑞幸审计业务时，Quo Vadis Capital的分析师约翰·佐利迪斯在一份报告中表示。“瑞幸是资本市场最罕见的案例之一……到现在也仍然如此。”
至于瑞幸宣称的业绩，位于上海的咨询机构AgencyChina的高级研究分析师迈克尔·诺里斯仍然持谨慎态度。他指出，去年四季度，瑞幸公布的同店销售增长率为44%，而星巴克为-14%。诺里斯说，差距如此之大“令人惊讶”。“我也不相信瑞幸新管理层……已经杜绝了欺诈行为。”瑞幸拒绝了《财富》杂志的置评请求。
5月19日，瑞幸咖啡的股价为8.20美元，较丑闻后的低点1.40美元有所回升，但仍然远低于2020年1月50.02美元的峰值。
博克表示，现在判断瑞幸翻身成功与否还为时过早。但他认为，瑞幸可能有机会迎来救赎。
“就像从监狱获释的罪犯一样，”博克说，“也许应该给瑞幸第二次机会。”（财富中文网）
译者：夏林
2020年夏天，中国咖啡连锁店瑞幸咖啡看起来奄奄一息，不久于世。当年4月，瑞幸承认虚假夸大销售额超过3亿美元。中国执法人员突击调查瑞幸总部。债券和股票投资者以欺诈罪起诉了该公司。瑞幸董事会罢免公司高管。在纳斯达克（Nasdaq）上市的瑞幸股价暴跌超过90%。2020年7月，纳斯达克的官员将瑞幸踢出美国交易所。“这是一场大规模欺诈。”总部位于北京的研究公司Asia Waypoint的创始人亨里克·博克表示。“账目都是假的。人人都觉得瑞幸要完了。”
但现在还不到两年，瑞幸咖啡正在努力打企业史上最大胆的翻身仗。最近，瑞幸超过星巴克（Starbucks），成为中国最大的咖啡连锁店。目前，瑞幸在中国的门店有6024家，星巴克只有5654家。5月22日，瑞幸公布2022年第一季度财报，财报显示，今年第一季度，瑞幸总净收入同比增长89.5%，季度经营利润首次转正。最近，瑞幸聘请中国滑雪运动员和奥运明星谷爱凌作为新任广告代言人，多家媒体报道称，公司正酝酿在中国香港上市，甚至在纳斯达克重新上市。瑞幸否认希望在香港上市，但表示还是“主要关注美国资本市场”，其美国存托凭证（ADR）仍然在场外交易。
瑞幸居然考虑重返华尔街，让人意想不到。
在美国国会，瑞幸的造假行为引发了关于对中国在美上市公司监管松懈的激烈辩论，批评人士谴责中国和香港公司的审计和披露标准比来自其他市场的公司宽松。令人震惊的瑞幸造假案曝光后，2020年《外国公司担责法案》（Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act）在美国的参众两院迅速一致通过，该法案规定如果美国上市公司会计监督委员会（U.S. Public Accounting Oversight Board）无法审核所有文档，对相关公司在美国以外的业务进行审计，那么未来三年，200多家中国公司就可能被迫从美国交易所退市。
在瑞幸争取华尔街原谅之际，中国的一些金融高层决策者也在广泛推动全球投资者恢复对中国企业的信心。近几周，国务院副总理刘鹤领导的一群顶尖经济规划师努力安抚国内外行业高管，表示两年来政府针对瑞幸、打车平台滴滴、电商巨头阿里巴巴，以及移动游戏和信息领袖腾讯控股等公司的闪电行动已经结束。
5月17日，在北京与数十位高管和行业专家高调举行的会议上，刘鹤重申中国政府“必须支持平台经济，保障民营经济健康发展”。他补充道，中国要“处理好政府和市场的关系，支持数字企业在国内外资本市场上市”。
但政策的利好对瑞幸有多大提振作用，专家们意见不一。华尔街传统观点仍然认为，名誉扫地的瑞幸不可能在纳斯达克重新上市。不过一些反对者认为瑞幸能够成功翻身，理由是公司的新管理团队得力，推出一系列创新产品，以及“消费者民族主义”在中国兴起，哪怕只是一杯咖啡。
崩塌
2018年，星巴克在北京前门南郊开设了1000平方米的臻选店。旗舰店三层，位于中国最繁华的旅游景点之一故宫正南的历史街区，地理位置优越。商店一层有“互动咖啡吧”，铜质天花板，墙上装饰着专门委托制作的咖啡豆艺术品。二楼是星巴克的高端茶品牌茶瓦纳（Teavana），而三楼则供应咖啡味酒精饮料。
瑞幸咖啡前门店就在星巴克的对面，店面里只有单调的柜台，四周放着几张简单的桌椅，一群顾客和送货司机挤着取订单，跟美国竞争对手的大店面简直毫无相同之处。
上海中欧国际商学院营销学助理教授陈林表示，装修简陋的瑞幸前门店在数千家门店中很典型，没有高档物业和高级装潢，专门在不起眼的地点经营，主要将门店当作取货中心。
瑞幸重技术和低成本的商业模式正是钱治亚的愿景，她曾经在中国最大的汽车租赁公司神州租车担任高管，认为租车行业的成功策略可以复制到咖啡行业，打破星巴克的主导地位。2017年，瑞幸在南部沿海城市厦门推出，价格远低于竞争对手：星巴克美式咖啡售价约为30元，瑞幸则是15元左右，甚至更低。瑞幸的资金主要来自钱治亚在神州租车的老板，身价不菲的亿万富翁陆正耀，他最出名的是带领2007年成立的神州租车，还有2015年在深圳成立的网约车公司神州优车迅速增长。陆正耀曾持有瑞幸30%的股份，他的妹妹持有12%股份，他担任董事长后公司快速扩张。第一年瑞幸便开设了2000多家门店，2019年又增加了2500家门店。
远在华尔街的投资者也闻到了咖啡飘香。瑞幸上市之前的几轮融资中，陆正耀和钱治亚从贝莱德（Blackrock）、新加坡政府投资公司（GIC）和路易达孚（Louis Dreyfus）等行业巨头募集到5亿多美元。2019年5月，瑞幸在纳斯达克上市时，共募集了6.51亿美元，成立两年的公司估值超过50亿美元。瑞幸股价达到顶峰时，市值一度超过130亿美元。
然而一些分析人士开始怀疑，瑞幸的一夜成功有些咖啡因过量。
2020年1月，总部位于美国旧金山的做空方浑水研究（Muddy Waters Research）发布了一份89页的报告，称报告作者为从事私下调查业务的外部研究实体。浑水拒绝透露研究公司的名字，但声称报告结果来自1500多名调查人员在600多家瑞幸零售店跟踪销售额并录制的数千小时视频。该报告称，瑞幸在纳斯达克上市后接连夸大销售额。后来《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）报道称，调查方是中国对冲基金雪湖资本（Snow Lake Funds）。雪湖拒绝就是否参与调查发表评论。
刚开始，瑞幸“明确否认”报告结果。但随后债务和股权投资者以欺诈罪将公司告上法庭，瑞幸才同意内部审计。当年4月，瑞幸公开承认首席运营官刘剑及下属2019年虚增了3.37亿美元销售额，约占当年业务的四分之一。5月，公司罢免了钱治亚和刘剑。到6月中旬，瑞幸股票暴跌90%，市值缩水110亿美元。纳斯达克当月宣布将瑞幸摘牌。7月，瑞幸董事会罢免了陆正耀董事长一职，由瑞幸早期员工郭谨一接替，郭谨一也接替了钱治亚，担任首席执行官。
中国市场监管机构单独调查了瑞幸，2020年9月得出结论称公司确实伪造财务记录误导了消费者和投资者。中国监管机构对瑞幸等45家涉案公司处以6100万元的罚款。四个月后，美国证券交易委员会（U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission）严厉批评了瑞幸的不当行为，并决定再罚1.8亿美元。2021年2月，瑞幸根据《破产法》第15章，即允许外国债务人在美国法院系统争取债权人保护的法律文件申请破产保护。
东山再起？
身处动荡中，郭谨一、新管理团队和一些关键的财务支持者都在努力维持瑞幸生存并谋划复苏。2021年4月，瑞幸向私募股权公司大钲资本（Centurium Capital）募集了2.4亿美元。大钲资本总部位于北京，负责人为华平投资（Warburg Pincus）的前高管黎辉。黎辉在华平期间，曾经负责向神州租车和神州优车投资，还曾经短暂担任神州优车的副总裁。但在瑞幸欺诈事件曝光后，黎辉与陆正耀断绝了关系。今年早些时候，黎辉告诉《华尔街日报》，他认为瑞幸财务造假行为是“巨大的背叛”。
大钲资本是瑞幸最早期的投资者之一，一直积极帮助公司重组清算会计问题。今年1月，大钲资本宣布组织财团收购两位联合创始人之前持有的股份，成为瑞幸控股的股东。
瑞幸正在以惊人速度走出破产程序。2021年10月，申请破产保护仅8个月后，瑞幸就投资者提出的1.75亿美元集体诉讼索赔达成和解。
同样令人惊讶的是，在丑闻笼罩下以及新冠疫情期间，瑞幸的基本业务表现得十分出色。该公司表示，2019年12月至2020年12月，门店亏损仅12%。瑞幸上市之前和期间从投资者募集了16亿美元，现在仍然有7.8亿美元现金储备，推动了公司的发展。
分析人士指出，瑞幸财务骗局对中国消费者没有多大影响。“中国消费者向来非常务实，瑞幸没有食品安全问题，他们就不认为是骗局。”陈林说。消费者认为瑞幸的问题“与会计有关”，“不会像投资者一样感觉被出卖”。
陈林表示，在今年的冬奥会期间，瑞幸决定签下中国滑雪运动员谷爱凌作为发言人，也是吸引爱国消费者的“聪明之举”。
很多中国消费者并不知道这起丑闻。上海博圣轩咨询公司的副总监胡宇万表示，瑞幸欺诈是“大新闻”，但在上海和北京以外的小城市“不算什么大事”。
丑闻发生后，瑞幸还以其他方式自我调整。胡宇万指出，瑞幸放弃了跟星巴克竞争，转而选择关注较低层次的消费者。“瑞幸（针对）大众市场且价格非常实惠，该策略很有帮助。”她说。
分析师称，瑞幸结合了大幅折扣与创新产品。“他们发现中国人并没有那么喜欢传统的美式咖啡。”陈林说。他指出，现在瑞幸的“热门产品”是椰云拿铁和红丝绒拿铁，比起星巴克拿铁更像中式奶茶。
救赎
虽然瑞幸努力安抚投资者和监管机构，但与外部会计师事务所关系紧张造成了一些影响。瑞幸退市之前，由四大会计师事务所中安永华明会计师事务所（Ernst & Young Hua Ming）负责审计。安永拒绝对瑞幸的欺诈销售行为负责。2020年9月，瑞幸找纽约的麦楷博平会计师事务所（Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk）代替了安永。但没到几个月麦楷博平便选择退出，抱怨无法收集“足够的第三方数据”完成审计。2021年4月，香港的中正达会计师事务所（Centurion ZD CPA）接替麦楷博平作为瑞幸的独立审计师。
前任审计师“显然无法完成工作，要么是不愿做。”中正达会计师事务所接手瑞幸审计业务时，Quo Vadis Capital的分析师约翰·佐利迪斯在一份报告中表示。“瑞幸是资本市场最罕见的案例之一……到现在也仍然如此。”
至于瑞幸宣称的业绩，位于上海的咨询机构AgencyChina的高级研究分析师迈克尔·诺里斯仍然持谨慎态度。他指出，去年四季度，瑞幸公布的同店销售增长率为44%，而星巴克为-14%。诺里斯说，差距如此之大“令人惊讶”。“我也不相信瑞幸新管理层……已经杜绝了欺诈行为。”瑞幸拒绝了《财富》杂志的置评请求。
5月19日，瑞幸咖啡的股价为8.20美元，较丑闻后的低点1.40美元有所回升，但仍然远低于2020年1月50.02美元的峰值。
博克表示，现在判断瑞幸翻身成功与否还为时过早。但他认为，瑞幸可能有机会迎来救赎。
“就像从监狱获释的罪犯一样，”博克说，“也许应该给瑞幸第二次机会。”（财富中文网）
译者：夏林
In the summer of 2020, Chinese coffeehouse chain Luckin Coffee languished on what appeared to be its deathbed. In April, the firm had confessed to falsely inflating its sales by over $300 million. Chinese police had raided the company's headquarters. Debt and equity investors were suing the company for fraud. Luckin's board ejected the company's top executives. The price of the company's shares, which traded over Nasdaq plummeted by more than 90%. In July, Nasdaq officials banished Luckin from the U.S. exchange. “It was quite a massive fraud,” says Henrik Bork, founder of Beijing-based research firm Asia Waypoint. “They cooked their books. Nobody expected they could survive.”
But now, less than two years later, Luckin Coffee is attempting one of the most audacious turnarounds in corporate history. The coffee chain recently overtook Starbucks as the largest coffee chain in China by store count. Luckin now claims 6,024 stores in China compared to Starbucks' 5,654. The company has never operated at a profit. But last year, Luckin narrowed losses to $86 million, down from $406 million in 2020, while revenues soared 80% compared to the previous year, according to Luckin's unaudited quarterly earnings statement. Luckin has recently enlisted Chinese snowboarder and Olympic star Eileen Gu as the face of a new ad campaign and, according to several media reports, is hatching plans to list in Hong Kong or even re-list on Nasdaq. Luckin denies that it is pursuing a Hong Kong listing. But the company, whose American Depository Receipts (ADRs) still trade over the counter, says it remains "committed to U.S. capital markets."
That Luckin can even contemplate a return to Wall Street is extraordinary.
The Chinese coffee chain's fabrications poured fuel on a fiery debate in the U.S. Congress about lax regulation of U.S.-listed Chinese firms. Critics who decried the failings of a system that subjected Chinese and Hong Kong-based firms to looser auditing and disclosure standards than firms from other markets cited the Luckin debacle as "Exhibit A." The company's spectacular implosion helped speed passage, by unanimous vote in both houses, of the 2020 Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, which could potentially force more than two hundred Chinese companies off of U.S. exchanges over the next three years if they fail to allow the U.S. Public Accounting Oversight Board to review all work documents for audits of the company's non-U.S. operations.
Luckin's bid for forgiveness on Wall Street comes amid a broader push by some of China's most senior financial policymakers to restore the confidence of global investors in Chinese firms. In recent weeks, a gaggle of top economic planners led by vice-premier Liu He has sought to reassure industry executives at home and abroad that Beijing is backing off from a two-year regulatory blitzkrieg designed to weaken the power of consumer-facing internet companies like Luckin, ride-hailing platform Didi Global, e-commerce giant Alibaba Group Holding, and mobile gaming and messaging leader Tencent Holdings.
In a high-profile meeting Tuesday with dozens of executives and industry experts in Beijing, Liu affirmed that China's government "must support the platform economy and sustain the healthy development of the private economy." He added that China should better "balance the relationship between the government and the market, and support digital companies to list on domestic and foreign exchanges."
Experts differ as to whether Liu's rhetoric signals a genuine policy shift—and if it does, how much that shift might benefit Luckin. On Wall Street, the conventional wisdom remains that the disgraced coffee company's attempt to win reinstatement to Nasdaq is a long shot. Even so, a handful of contrarians—hailing the company's new management team, a flurry of innovative new product offerings, and the rise of "consumer nationalism" in China even for something as basic as a cup of coffee—insist Luckin's turnaround is real.
The crash
In 2018, Starbucks opened a lavish 1,000-square-meter Reserve Roastery in Beijing's southern neighborhood of Qianmen. The three-story flagship store occupies a prime location—in a historic district directly south of the Forbidden City—that is one of China's busiest tourist destinations. The store's first floor features an "interactive coffee bar," copper ceilings, and walls adorned with specially-commissioned coffee bean artwork. The second floor is dedicated to Starbucks' tea brand Teavana, while the third serves coffee-infused alcoholic drinks.
Luckin Coffee's Qianmen outlet is just down the street from Starbucks'. But the Chinese chain's store—a dowdy counter surrounded by a few simple tables and chairs where a scrum of customers and delivery drivers jostle to pick up orders—couldn't be more different than its American rival's grand emporium.
Luckin's no-frills shop in Qianmen is typical of its thousands of other outlets, says Chen Lin, assistant professor of marketing at the China Europe International Business School in Shanghai. The company eschews prime properties and upscale interiors and operates instead from nondescript locations, using stores mainly as online hubs for delivery orders.
Luckin's tech-forward and cost-efficient business model reflects the vision of Jenny Qian, a former executive at Car Inc., China's largest car rental company, who thought she could disrupt Starbucks' coffee dominance using the same strategy that had worked for her in the rent-a-car industry. Luckin, launched in 2017 in the southern coastal city of Xiamen, offered drastically lower prices than its competitor: where an americano at Starbucks costs roughly $5, Luckin's version is $3 or less. Luckin was largely bankrolled by Qian's former Car Inc. boss, hard-charging billionaire Charles Lu, who was famous for pushing for growth above all both at Car Inc., which he founded in 2007, and Ucar, a Shenzhen-based ride hailing venture he launched in 2015. At Luckin, Lu took a 30% stake, secured another 12% for his sister, assumed the company’s chairmanship, and pushed expansion at a blistering pace. The venture opened over 2,000 outlets in its first year and added another 2,500 in 2019.
On Wall Street, investors woke up and smelled the coffee. Lu and Qian raised over $500 million in pre-IPO funding rounds from heavy hitters like Blackrock, GIC, and Louis Dreyfus. In May 2019, when Luckin debuted on Nasdaq, the company raised $651 million, valuing the two-year-old venture at over $5 billion. At the peak of its share price, Luckin's market value topped $13 billion.
And yet, a few analysts began to suspect Luckin's overnight success was over-caffeinated.
In January 2020, Muddy Waters Research, a San Francisco-based short seller that had bet heavily on Luckin's demise, published an 89-page report the short seller said had been produced by an outside research entity operating undercover. Muddy Waters declined to identify the research firm but claimed the report to be the product of over 1,500 investigators tracking sales and recording thousands of hours of video at over 600 Luckin retail outlets. The document alleged Luckin had been systematically inflating sales figures since its Nasdaq debut. The Wall Street Journal later reported that Chinese hedge fund Snow Lake Capital was behind the investigation; Snow Lake has declined to comment on its involvement.
Luckin “categorically denied” the report—at first. But as debt and equity investors dragged the company to court on fraud charges, Luckin agreed to conduct an internal audit. In April, Luckin publicly acknowledged that its chief operating officer Liu Jian and his subordinates had faked $337 million of 2019 sales—about a quarter of the company's business during that year. In May, the company ousted Qian and Liu. By mid-June, Luckin's stock had plunged 90%, erasing $11 billion in market value. Nasdaq announced that it would delist the company that same month. In July, Luckin's board pushed out Lu as chairman and replaced him with Jinyi Guo, an early Luckin employee who also took over for Qian as CEO.
China’s market regulator conducted a separate probe of Luckin which concluded in September 2020 that the company had indeed falsified financial records and misled consumers and investors. The Chinese agency let Luckin off with a wrist slap: a fine of just $9 million. But four months later, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission issued a scathing assessment of misconduct at the Chinese coffee chain and fined the company another $180 million. In February 2021, Luckin filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy, a legal filing that allows foreign debtors to seek protection from creditors in the U.S. court system.
The comeback?
Amid the turmoil, Guo, the new management team, and a handful of key financial backers have scrambled to keep Luckin afloat and plot the chain's resurrection. In April 2021, Luckin raised $240 million from private equity firm Centurium Capital, a Beijing-based private equity firm led by former Warburg Pincus executive David Li. At Warburg, Li oversaw the global private equity firm's investments Car Inc. and Ucar, and served briefly as Ucar's vice chairman. But in the wake of revelations of fraud at Luckin, Li has cut ties with Lu, telling the Wall Street Journal earlier this year he considered the company's fabrications "an enormous betrayal."
Centurium was one of Luckin's earliest investors and has been actively involved in trying to help the company restructure and straighten out its accounting practices. In January, Centurium announced that it had become Luckin's controlling shareholder by organizing a consortium to acquire shares held previously by two of the company's co-founders.
Luckin is emerging from bankruptcy court proceedings with remarkable speed. In October 2021, only eight months after filing for bankruptcy protection, the Chinese chain reached a $175 million settlement of class-action claims against it by investors.
Equally surprising is how well Luckin's underlying business operations weathered both the scandal and the outbreak of a global pandemic. The company says it lost only 12% of its stores between December 2019 to December 2020. It helped that Luckin still had $780 million in cash reserves left over from the $1.6 billion it raised from investors before and during its IPO.
Analysts say Luckin's financial shenanigans don't matter much to Chinese consumers. "Chinese consumers have been very pragmatic in the sense that because Luckin does not have a food safety problem they do not consider it a scam," says Lin. Consumers view Luckin's problems as "related to accounting" and "do not feel betrayed" in the same way investors might.
Lin argues Luckin's decision to sign Chinese snowboarder Eileen Gu as company spokesperson during the Winter Olympics was also a "smart play" to attract patriotic consumers.
Many Chinese consumers are unaware of the scandal. The coffee chain's fraud was "big news," but it was "not as big of a deal" in smaller cities outside Shanghai and Beijing, says Yuwan Hu, associate director of Daxue Consulting in Shanghai.
Luckin has re-invented itself in other ways since the scandal. The company has given up on trying to compete with Starbucks and has instead chosen to double down on a lower tier of consumers, according to Hu. "They are benefiting from [pursuing] mass markets and using very affordable pricing," she says.
Analysts say Luckin combined deep discounts with innovative products. "They realized that Chinese people are not that into traditional, American coffee that much," says Lin, who points out that Luckin's "killer products" are now a coconut milk latte and a red velvet latte, drinks more similar to Chinese milk tea than Starbucks lattes.
Redemption
Luckin's effort to reassure investors and regulators has been marred by tempestuous relationships with outside accounting firms. Prior to Luckin's delisting, the company's auditor was Ernst & Young Hua Ming, the China-based practice of the Big Four accounting firm. EY has denied responsibility for Luckin's fraudulant sales practices. In September 2020, Luckin replaced EY with New York-based auditor Marcum Bernstein & Pinchuk. But Marcum quit within months, complaining that it could not gather "sufficient third-party data" to complete an audit. In April 2021, Centurion ZD CPA, a Hong Kong-based auditor, took over auditing duties from Marcum.
The previous auditor was "apparently unable or unwilling to complete the job," John Zolidis, an analyst at Quo Vadis Capital, said in a note when Centurion ZD CPA took over as auditor. “Luckin was already one of the most unusual situations we’d ever seen... this continued today.”
Michael Norris, senior research analyst at Shanghai-based consultancy AgencyChina, remains wary of Luckin's claims about its financial performance, noting that in the fourth quarter of last year, Luckin reported 44% growth in same-store sales compared to -14% from Starbucks. That disparity is "eyebrow-raising," Norris says. “I'm not yet convinced that Luckin's new management…has parted with previous fraudulent practices.” Luckin declined Fortune's request for comment.
Shares in Luckin Coffee were priced at $8.20 on May 19, better than their post-scandal low of $1.40, but still far below their peak of $50.02 in January 2020.
Bork says it's too early to tell if Luckin's turnaround will work. But he thinks the company may have a shot at redemption.
"Just like a criminal who gets released from prison," Bork says, Luckin "may just deserve a second chance."
