小空头大能量：小小“做空”机构成为股市警长
“痴迷的挖掘者”：做空者内森•安德森逐帧分析并重新制作，终于揭穿了做空公司误导性营销视频的真相。图片来源：JOHNNY MILANO
投资者内森•安德森的做空目标是Nikola公司（Nikola Corp.），今年夏天，他想到了一条妙计。
6月4日，总部位于菲尼克斯的电动汽车制造商Nikola通过反向并购成功上市。这一年市场对成长股（尤其是电动汽车制造商）需求旺盛，Nikola表现突出。看好的人们相信Nikola能够像特斯拉（Tesla）一样引领氢动力汽车长足发展。尽管Nikola连一辆车都没有卖出去，但一周里投资者就将该公司的市值推高到超过340亿美元，已然超过了福特（Ford）和菲亚特克莱斯勒（Fiat Chrysler）。
举报者并不买账。36岁的安德森也不信，他是特许金融分析师（CFA），后来转为吹哨人，最后成了专业做空者。
安德森是投资研究公司Hindenburg Research的创始人，公司只有五个人，没有客户，没有管理投资者资金的许可证，网站上也没有电话号码或联系地址。安德森收到举报后开始联系曾经与Nikola合作过的两家商业伙伴。线人提供了一堆短信、电子邮件和照片，对Nikola及创始人特雷弗•米尔顿就该公司在开发电池和氢燃料电池技术进展方面发表的各种公开声明提出质疑。
各项指控都很吸引人，但其中一项指控让安德森震惊，他觉得这条指控太过直接，简直很难接受。指控是针对2018年1月Nikola在YouTube上发布的一段视频，主要内容是卡车原型车Nikola One半挂型卡车头在盐湖城外的高原沙漠巡航。开头是一段长镜头，Nikola One高速冲向镜头方向，在宽阔的山谷中疾驰。挡风玻璃和锃亮的白色车顶在阳光下闪闪发亮。
这段视频的标题为“行驶中的Nikola One电动半挂型卡车”，网络浏览量达数十万，还吸引了汽车媒体的广泛关注。2018年，在庆祝Nikola的新工厂落地亚利桑那州的仪式上，该州的州长道格•杜西观看了视频，并滔滔不绝地说：“Nikola汽车公司（Nikola Motor Company）来到亚利桑那州了。视频就是昭告天下！”
知情人则称，这个视频的内容全部都是摆拍。他们告诉安德森，卡车并不是依靠自身动力行驶。车先被拖到山顶。驾驶者调到空档后，车缓慢下坡，然后加速。
安德森知道，即便Nikola说谎也并不算彻底的欺诈，因为视频并未明确声称卡车依靠自身动力前进。不过，揭露噱头真相可以彰显出该公司喜欢大张旗鼓炒作的风格。安德森面临的问题是：如何才能证明视频内容造假？
安德森自称“痴迷的挖掘者”，他使用互联网最具怀疑精神的人们做开放调查时经常见到的技术，一帧一帧地放慢YouTube视频的速度，将照片与谷歌街景（Google Street View）上找到的图片交叉验证。之后确定拍摄视频的位置，精确到Nikola卡车停下的英里标志以及开始之处。他打电话给犹他州的联系人并提出了特殊要求，即前往该处重新拍摄卡车前进的视频。联系人照做了，尽管用的是2017款的本田（Honda）Pilot SUV。卡车在空档状态下行驶了2.1英里（约3.38千米），最高时速达到了56英里（约90.12千米）。
成功了。
手握证据之后，安德森就能够展示Nikola公司如何完成这段视频，也证明了Nikola在不遗余力地误导公众。他用大量照片和地图记录了这一发现，并表示“只是很想百分百确证”。
给有意做空者的提示一
如果想做空一只大盘股，就要从小处着手。
今年9月10日，Hindenburg Research发表了与Nikola相关的长达67页的报告，全是硬核指控。“今天的报告将揭示为何我们相信Nikola存在复杂的欺诈行为，创始人及执行主席特雷弗•米尔顿的职业生涯中撒了许多谎。”报告开头便写道。开篇第一页定下了基调：文中包括24个要点，对公司声称正在开发专利电池技术，以及破解廉价氢燃料的说法泼了冷水。报告中一再抨击米尔顿，还揭示了Nikola One穿越沙漠视频造假的秘密。
第二天，Nikola回应称，报告中充斥着“虚假和误导性陈述”，已经聘请律师“评估法律追索权的可能性”。此外，公司补充道：“这是在贪婪的驱使下，为赚取卖空利润的狙击行为。”但三天后，Nikola给出了更加详细的回应，明确指出Nikola One并非“依靠自身推进力前进”。
破坏性很快显现。股价暴跌，投资者诉讼开始增多。在今年11月的一份监管文件中，Nikola透露美国司法部（Justice Department）已经对公司和米尔顿发出了大陪审团传票，美国证券交易委员会（Securities and Exchange Commission）着手调查Nikola是否存在误导投资者行为。Nikola透露：“公司因为与Hindenburg Report相关的监管和法律事务承担了大笔费用。”（Nikola多次拒绝了就此事置评的请求。今年9月通过公司发言人联系到米尔顿后，他称该报告“虚假且有欺骗性”，但拒绝进一步置评。）
在报告面世后，Nikola的股价下跌了30%，米尔顿宣布辞职。但也有一些人从失败的卡车项目中获益。根据追踪空头活动的公司S3 Partner提供的数据，截至今年11月中旬，按照市值计算，包括安德森在内的做空者在Nikola的暴跌过程中赚取了2.63亿美元利润。很显然，这群人还想获得更多的收益，因为Nikola超过三分之一的流通股均由空头持有。
俗话说，牛市不听坏消息。如果不看今年年初的黑天鹅事件，即新冠肺炎疫情引发的崩盘，从近12年前的金融危机以来，美国股指一直在牛市里。尽管如此，在激进投资人士中，有一股虽小但有影响的力量，不仅关注坏消息，还积极传播，并且从中获利。
安德森的公司就是其中之一，这群人对自己有很多种称呼，有些华而不实（“卖空的激进人士”）；有些自认为正直（“吹哨卖空者”）；有些看似平庸（“激进研究人员”）。此类投资者研究有可疑行为的目标，然后揭露并做空。
其实做空者与规模大大小小的金融家的DNA相似，从吉姆•查诺斯做空安然（Enron）并警告会计造假，到低调押注次贷泡沫的反向投资者，再到美国消费者新闻与商业频道（CNBC）宠爱的对冲基金经理比尔•阿克曼和丹尼尔•勒布，行事套路都差不多。
新出现的小型大空头之所以能够脱颖而出，主要是因为这些人专门吹哨并做空。近来，上市巨头对做空专业户启动了反击，对做空者极尽口诛笔伐，在社交媒体和商业媒体上迅速传播。除了少数例外，做空者都是为自身利益，并不代表客户。他们用自己的钱下注，也就是说不受诸多法规影响。整个夏天，安德森都在搭建Nikola的空头头寸，因为他确信可以搞垮这家公司。他说：“对我们来说，这是巨大的胜利。”但他拒绝透露具体获利规模。批评人士愤怒地认为，空头的行为存在明显的利益冲突。空头反击称，没错，没有冲突就没有利益。
卡森•布洛克说，在他于今年发表第一份做空报告时，他并没有打算把做空当成职业。但在金融危机爆发后的几年里，投资者对成长股的兴趣推生出了巨额估值，布洛克因此看到了巨大的危险信号。曾经担任律师的布洛克后来成为了浑水公司（Muddy Waters）的创始人和首席投资官，这家激进的做空公司的座右铭是：“行华尔街不为之事”。浑水依靠成功揭露欺诈行为从中获利，吸引了许多跟风者，很多人还大闹投资者留言板。
自2010年以来，浑水已经做空38家公司，最出名的是做空在北美上市的中国公司，然后在线发布免费的负面研究报告，从而实施毁灭性打击。2011年，浑水与在多伦多上市的中国木材公司嘉汉林业对簿公堂，指责该公司虚增收入和夸大持股。做空报告重创了嘉汉林业的股价，一年后该公司宣布破产。嘉汉林业对布洛克的指控矢口否认，但加拿大的监管机构最终发现该公司的领导者犯有欺诈罪，后来该公司应付了一大堆投资者诉讼。今年的早些时候，布洛克盯上了瑞幸咖啡。后来瑞幸咖啡向美国证券交易委员提交文件，承认2019年销售额虚增了3.2亿美元，成本虚报了2亿美元。该公司的首席执行官和首席运营官被解雇，纳斯达克（Nasdaq）因为瑞幸咖啡的行为不当而将其摘牌。
尽管布洛克主要关注中国企业，但他认识到在这些企业里发现的问题随处可见。“利益冲突、无能还有懒惰，导致一些空壳公司在美国融资并且按照正常估值交易。我的意思是，其中的问题都是全球性的。”他解释道。
浑水的总部位于加州，最出名的一起做空案其实是在美国本土。2016年初，雅培公司（Abbott Laboratories）宣布斥资250亿美元收购St. Jude Medical公司，300亿美元的“心力衰竭设备”市场上两家领先的公司从此合并。但在当年8月，浑水“弹药充足”地出现，宣布已经在St. Jude建立空头头寸，还声称该公司的一些起搏器和除颤器很容易受到攻击。消息披露后，St. Jude的股价单日下跌10%。
从一开始，激进分子的做空活动明显充满敌意，风格就像一堆会计基础知识加上摔角狂的精神。做空报告从上至下指控企业存在普遍性欺诈。“抢钱”是经常出现在报告中的术语。一家中国运动服公司不仅做假账，还往“拳击场里扔大粪”，浑水的报告如此声称。
疯狗般的用词都经过刻意选择。（以做空出名的对冲基金经理阿克曼已经磨练出技术。）卖空者不必言辞华丽。只要读到的人们采取行动集体抛售股票，研究就达到了目的。
提示二
准备战斗，别装腔作势。
似乎每个激进分子的做空报告里都有出名的恐怖故事，比如差点毁了他们的“白鲸”，摊上诉讼，侵犯个人信息与隐私，不友好的监管者，死亡威胁。Viceroy Research的创始人弗雷泽•佩林说，有一次他的做空目标之一派打手到自己英国老家企图绑架他的女儿。（《财富》杂志无法证实他的说辞。）“有段时间，厨房里有窃听器，树篱里也有监控摄像头。就像小说里写的一样。”他说。
“过去十年里，做空这行里的人们来来往往。”布洛克说，“人们想：‘哦，哇，挺简单的。这么赚钱挺好。’事实并非如此。比起做多，想依靠做空赚每一美元都要付出更多的努力。”
做空股票确实不适合胆小鬼。比方说有一名投资者相信某只股票会下跌，借入1,000股Nikola股票建“空头”头寸。他把股票卖掉换回现金，最后还得买1,000股Nikola股票归还给出借人。这就是所谓的“空头平仓”，从开盘到收盘，下跌越多，下注赢到的钱就越多。
赚钱简单，亏钱同样容易。“做空时最多只能赚100%。”佩林解释说。如果股价从20美元跌到0美元，差额是每股20美元。但如果价格翻倍，损失就加倍。如果价格上涨三倍，损失就变成三倍。诸如此类。（这也是为何众多空头在特斯拉的身上输得精光，截至今年11月19日，特斯拉的股价已经上涨近6倍。）
Viceroy只有三个人，每年仅可以调查几家公司。佩林说，Wirecard绝对是最成功的一次。德国支付服务提供商Wirecard目前已经资不抵债，在该公司的前首席执行官马库斯•布劳恩身陷囹圄后，股价从今年6月中旬的104欧元暴跌至12月的60欧分。2019年，吹哨人、记者和佩林之类的卖空者指控Wirecard有不法行为时，德国的证券监管机构德国联邦金融监管局（BaFin）转而调查告密者。德国联邦金融监管局还临时宣布卖空Wirecard股票是非法行为。“做空攻击对市场诚信形成风险。”德国联邦金融监管局称。但进一步调查证明批评方的说法没有错误，从而引发全国谴责德国保守的投资者文化。
“Wirecard是一场战争，一场长达四年半的狗屁战争。”佩林叹息道。有一次他说，“我曾经负债百万。不是吹牛。”
47岁的佩林说，直到2020年才等来转机，主要依靠Wirecard，还有今年9月发布报告揭发德国租赁公司Grenke。Viceroy的主要指控是Grenke利用收购来掩盖账面现金干涸。Grenke在一份声明中称Viceroy的指控“毫无根据”，尽管如此还是损失惨重。在报告发布后，Grenke的股价下跌了三分之一，创始人也退出了董事会。与此同时，德国金联邦融监管局在Viceroy发布报告几天后就展开了对Grenke的调查。截至本文发稿时，调查仍然在进行中。
佩林为做空以及市场外行为也付出了很多代价。八年前他曾经是一名社会工作者，因为被指控伪造文件而被禁止在英国继续从业。（他起诉了前雇主并最终和解。）2018年，南非的一家商业集团委托撰写报告，指控Viceroy在做空南非控股公司Steinhoff期间“大篇幅”抄袭对冲基金报告。佩林对批评者不屑一顾。“如果你担心自己不够自负，就不要干做空这行。”他说。
当被问及Viceroy的财务状况时，佩林只说外部有一位支持者，但不愿意透露姓名。“我们从未评论过本公司的利润。”他补充道，“因为不管怎样，我们最好的业绩其实就是最新的一份报告。”布洛克继续说道：“今年的情况更是如此。每次Nikola之类成功的背后，都有五次不成功的尝试。”
提示三
跟好莱坞一样，卖空也是受到点击率驱动的骗局。
社交控集合。散户大军聚集。600亿美元空白支票推动IPO热潮。2020年各方看涨力量将灾祸预言家们逼到市场边缘。在纽约证券交易所（NYSE）的上市公司的累计空头头寸通常在流通股的4%至6%之间。到2020年11月初，空头头寸已经降至不到1%。
尽管现实是美国正在经历最严重的经济衰退和劳动力市场崩溃，企业债务不断增加，企业效益大幅下降，但股市的热情依然不减。很多散户投资者信任的银行和经纪商的分析师们并未表现出怀疑。根据FactSet计算，分析师对标准普尔500指数（S&P 500）的成份股给出的10,322个评级中，只有6.2%是“卖出”。似乎在新冠肺炎疫情期间，人人都加强了警惕，华尔街却没有。
即便Nikola有各种问题，也可以跟着不断上涨的市场维持。Hindenburg报告发表前不久，通用汽车（General Motors）表示将收购Nikola的股份，还同意合作开发燃料电池和皮卡。通用汽车在公开场合表示，合作关系仍然在进行中。不过，通用汽车在11月30日缩减了参与规模，并表示最终不会入股。
身处放纵时代，空头自视为向善的必要力量。在荒野的西部，他们就是警长，只不过开的是奥迪（Audi）汽车。Hindenburg的安德森说：“我认为现在的欺诈行为比以往都要普遍。”他补充说，在监管机构和审计人员跟上公司造假步伐之前，“我们会继续看到有更多的人加入做空行列。”
提示四
不要迁怒于报信者，至少也要看完报告再说。
Nikola并不是安德森捅出的第一条大独家，但这次比较特别。以往他的报告会激怒多头，而且能够听到咒骂。“我们收到的充满愤怒的电子邮件，还有威胁杀我和我的全家的死亡威胁都越来越多。”他说。但这次不一样。事实上，顽固的多头齐声喊出：做空的伙伴。佩林钦佩地说：“这份关于Nikola的报告，实在是无懈可击。”（财富中文网）
本文另一版本登载于《财富》杂志2020年12月/2021年1月刊，标题为《小型大空头：股市狂野西部的警长》。
译者：夏林
投资者内森•安德森的做空目标是Nikola公司（Nikola Corp.），今年夏天，他想到了一条妙计。
6月4日，总部位于菲尼克斯的电动汽车制造商Nikola通过反向并购成功上市。这一年市场对成长股（尤其是电动汽车制造商）需求旺盛，Nikola表现突出。看好的人们相信Nikola能够像特斯拉（Tesla）一样引领氢动力汽车长足发展。尽管Nikola连一辆车都没有卖出去，但一周里投资者就将该公司的市值推高到超过340亿美元，已然超过了福特（Ford）和菲亚特克莱斯勒（Fiat Chrysler）。
举报者并不买账。36岁的安德森也不信，他是特许金融分析师（CFA），后来转为吹哨人，最后成了专业做空者。
安德森是投资研究公司Hindenburg Research的创始人，公司只有五个人，没有客户，没有管理投资者资金的许可证，网站上也没有电话号码或联系地址。安德森收到举报后开始联系曾经与Nikola合作过的两家商业伙伴。线人提供了一堆短信、电子邮件和照片，对Nikola及创始人特雷弗•米尔顿就该公司在开发电池和氢燃料电池技术进展方面发表的各种公开声明提出质疑。
各项指控都很吸引人，但其中一项指控让安德森震惊，他觉得这条指控太过直接，简直很难接受。指控是针对2018年1月Nikola在YouTube上发布的一段视频，主要内容是卡车原型车Nikola One半挂型卡车头在盐湖城外的高原沙漠巡航。开头是一段长镜头，Nikola One高速冲向镜头方向，在宽阔的山谷中疾驰。挡风玻璃和锃亮的白色车顶在阳光下闪闪发亮。
这段视频的标题为“行驶中的Nikola One电动半挂型卡车”，网络浏览量达数十万，还吸引了汽车媒体的广泛关注。2018年，在庆祝Nikola的新工厂落地亚利桑那州的仪式上，该州的州长道格•杜西观看了视频，并滔滔不绝地说：“Nikola汽车公司（Nikola Motor Company）来到亚利桑那州了。视频就是昭告天下！”
知情人则称，这个视频的内容全部都是摆拍。他们告诉安德森，卡车并不是依靠自身动力行驶。车先被拖到山顶。驾驶者调到空档后，车缓慢下坡，然后加速。
安德森知道，即便Nikola说谎也并不算彻底的欺诈，因为视频并未明确声称卡车依靠自身动力前进。不过，揭露噱头真相可以彰显出该公司喜欢大张旗鼓炒作的风格。安德森面临的问题是：如何才能证明视频内容造假？
安德森自称“痴迷的挖掘者”，他使用互联网最具怀疑精神的人们做开放调查时经常见到的技术，一帧一帧地放慢YouTube视频的速度，将照片与谷歌街景（Google Street View）上找到的图片交叉验证。之后确定拍摄视频的位置，精确到Nikola卡车停下的英里标志以及开始之处。他打电话给犹他州的联系人并提出了特殊要求，即前往该处重新拍摄卡车前进的视频。联系人照做了，尽管用的是2017款的本田（Honda）Pilot SUV。卡车在空档状态下行驶了2.1英里（约3.38千米），最高时速达到了56英里（约90.12千米）。
成功了。
手握证据之后，安德森就能够展示Nikola公司如何完成这段视频，也证明了Nikola在不遗余力地误导公众。他用大量照片和地图记录了这一发现，并表示“只是很想百分百确证”。
给有意做空者的提示一
如果想做空一只大盘股，就要从小处着手。
今年9月10日，Hindenburg Research发表了与Nikola相关的长达67页的报告，全是硬核指控。“今天的报告将揭示为何我们相信Nikola存在复杂的欺诈行为，创始人及执行主席特雷弗•米尔顿的职业生涯中撒了许多谎。”报告开头便写道。开篇第一页定下了基调：文中包括24个要点，对公司声称正在开发专利电池技术，以及破解廉价氢燃料的说法泼了冷水。报告中一再抨击米尔顿，还揭示了Nikola One穿越沙漠视频造假的秘密。
第二天，Nikola回应称，报告中充斥着“虚假和误导性陈述”，已经聘请律师“评估法律追索权的可能性”。此外，公司补充道：“这是在贪婪的驱使下，为赚取卖空利润的狙击行为。”但三天后，Nikola给出了更加详细的回应，明确指出Nikola One并非“依靠自身推进力前进”。
破坏性很快显现。股价暴跌，投资者诉讼开始增多。在今年11月的一份监管文件中，Nikola透露美国司法部（Justice Department）已经对公司和米尔顿发出了大陪审团传票，美国证券交易委员会（Securities and Exchange Commission）着手调查Nikola是否存在误导投资者行为。Nikola透露：“公司因为与Hindenburg Report相关的监管和法律事务承担了大笔费用。”（Nikola多次拒绝了就此事置评的请求。今年9月通过公司发言人联系到米尔顿后，他称该报告“虚假且有欺骗性”，但拒绝进一步置评。）
在报告面世后，Nikola的股价下跌了30%，米尔顿宣布辞职。但也有一些人从失败的卡车项目中获益。根据追踪空头活动的公司S3 Partner提供的数据，截至今年11月中旬，按照市值计算，包括安德森在内的做空者在Nikola的暴跌过程中赚取了2.63亿美元利润。很显然，这群人还想获得更多的收益，因为Nikola超过三分之一的流通股均由空头持有。
俗话说，牛市不听坏消息。如果不看今年年初的黑天鹅事件，即新冠肺炎疫情引发的崩盘，从近12年前的金融危机以来，美国股指一直在牛市里。尽管如此，在激进投资人士中，有一股虽小但有影响的力量，不仅关注坏消息，还积极传播，并且从中获利。
安德森的公司就是其中之一，这群人对自己有很多种称呼，有些华而不实（“卖空的激进人士”）；有些自认为正直（“吹哨卖空者”）；有些看似平庸（“激进研究人员”）。此类投资者研究有可疑行为的目标，然后揭露并做空。
其实做空者与规模大大小小的金融家的DNA相似，从吉姆•查诺斯做空安然（Enron）并警告会计造假，到低调押注次贷泡沫的反向投资者，再到美国消费者新闻与商业频道（CNBC）宠爱的对冲基金经理比尔•阿克曼和丹尼尔•勒布，行事套路都差不多。
新出现的小型大空头之所以能够脱颖而出，主要是因为这些人专门吹哨并做空。近来，上市巨头对做空专业户启动了反击，对做空者极尽口诛笔伐，在社交媒体和商业媒体上迅速传播。除了少数例外，做空者都是为自身利益，并不代表客户。他们用自己的钱下注，也就是说不受诸多法规影响。整个夏天，安德森都在搭建Nikola的空头头寸，因为他确信可以搞垮这家公司。他说：“对我们来说，这是巨大的胜利。”但他拒绝透露具体获利规模。批评人士愤怒地认为，空头的行为存在明显的利益冲突。空头反击称，没错，没有冲突就没有利益。
卡森•布洛克说，在他于今年发表第一份做空报告时，他并没有打算把做空当成职业。但在金融危机爆发后的几年里，投资者对成长股的兴趣推生出了巨额估值，布洛克因此看到了巨大的危险信号。曾经担任律师的布洛克后来成为了浑水公司（Muddy Waters）的创始人和首席投资官，这家激进的做空公司的座右铭是：“行华尔街不为之事”。浑水依靠成功揭露欺诈行为从中获利，吸引了许多跟风者，很多人还大闹投资者留言板。
自2010年以来，浑水已经做空38家公司，最出名的是做空在北美上市的中国公司，然后在线发布免费的负面研究报告，从而实施毁灭性打击。2011年，浑水与在多伦多上市的中国木材公司嘉汉林业对簿公堂，指责该公司虚增收入和夸大持股。做空报告重创了嘉汉林业的股价，一年后该公司宣布破产。嘉汉林业对布洛克的指控矢口否认，但加拿大的监管机构最终发现该公司的领导者犯有欺诈罪，后来该公司应付了一大堆投资者诉讼。今年的早些时候，布洛克盯上了瑞幸咖啡。后来瑞幸咖啡向美国证券交易委员提交文件，承认2019年销售额虚增了3.2亿美元，成本虚报了2亿美元。该公司的首席执行官和首席运营官被解雇，纳斯达克（Nasdaq）因为瑞幸咖啡的行为不当而将其摘牌。
尽管布洛克主要关注中国企业，但他认识到在这些企业里发现的问题随处可见。“利益冲突、无能还有懒惰，导致一些空壳公司在美国融资并且按照正常估值交易。我的意思是，其中的问题都是全球性的。”他解释道。
浑水的总部位于加州，最出名的一起做空案其实是在美国本土。2016年初，雅培公司（Abbott Laboratories）宣布斥资250亿美元收购St. Jude Medical公司，300亿美元的“心力衰竭设备”市场上两家领先的公司从此合并。但在当年8月，浑水“弹药充足”地出现，宣布已经在St. Jude建立空头头寸，还声称该公司的一些起搏器和除颤器很容易受到攻击。消息披露后，St. Jude的股价单日下跌10%。
浑水的报告在很大程度上依赖于网络安全研究公司MedSec收集的证据。MedSec先向布洛克团队提供了细致信息，而不是按照美国食品与药品管理局（Food and Drug Administration）的规定通知St. Jude。St. Jude因此而控告浑水和MedSec诽谤。几个月后，美国食品与药品管理局和美国国土安全部（Department of Homeland Security）证实，相关设备确实存在漏洞并发布召回令。空头大赚一笔，诽谤诉讼最终也被驳回。
从一开始，激进分子的做空活动明显充满敌意，风格就像一堆会计基础知识加上摔角狂的精神。做空报告从上至下指控企业存在普遍性欺诈。“抢钱”是经常出现在报告中的术语。一家中国运动服公司不仅做假账，还往“拳击场里扔大粪”，浑水的报告如此声称。
疯狗般的用词都经过刻意选择。（以做空出名的对冲基金经理阿克曼已经磨练出技术。）卖空者不必言辞华丽。只要读到的人们采取行动集体抛售股票，研究就达到了目的。
提示二
准备战斗，别装腔作势。
似乎每个激进分子的做空报告里都有出名的恐怖故事，比如差点毁了他们的“白鲸”，摊上诉讼，侵犯个人信息与隐私，不友好的监管者，死亡威胁。Viceroy Research的创始人弗雷泽•佩林说，有一次他的做空目标之一派打手到自己英国老家企图绑架他的女儿。（《财富》杂志无法证实他的说辞。）“有段时间，厨房里有窃听器，树篱里也有监控摄像头。就像小说里写的一样。”他说。
“过去十年里，做空这行里的人们来来往往。”布洛克说，“人们想：‘哦，哇，挺简单的。这么赚钱挺好。’事实并非如此。比起做多，想依靠做空赚每一美元都要付出更多的努力。”
做空股票确实不适合胆小鬼。比方说有一名投资者相信某只股票会下跌，借入1,000股Nikola股票建“空头”头寸。他把股票卖掉换回现金，最后还得买1,000股Nikola股票归还给出借人。这就是所谓的“空头平仓”，从开盘到收盘，下跌越多，下注赢到的钱就越多。
赚钱简单，亏钱同样容易。“做空时最多只能赚100%。”佩林解释说。如果股价从20美元跌到0美元，差额是每股20美元。但如果价格翻倍，损失就加倍。如果价格上涨三倍，损失就变成三倍。诸如此类。（这也是为何众多空头在特斯拉的身上输得精光，截至今年11月19日，特斯拉的股价已经上涨近6倍。）
Viceroy只有三个人，每年仅可以调查几家公司。佩林说，Wirecard绝对是最成功的一次。德国支付服务提供商Wirecard目前已经资不抵债，在该公司的前首席执行官马库斯•布劳恩身陷囹圄后，股价从今年6月中旬的104欧元暴跌至12月的60欧分。2019年，吹哨人、记者和佩林之类的卖空者指控Wirecard有不法行为时，德国的证券监管机构德国联邦金融监管局（BaFin）转而调查告密者。德国联邦金融监管局还临时宣布卖空Wirecard股票是非法行为。“做空攻击对市场诚信形成风险。”德国联邦金融监管局称。但进一步调查证明批评方的说法没有错误，从而引发全国谴责德国保守的投资者文化。
“Wirecard是一场战争，一场长达四年半的狗屁战争。”佩林叹息道。有一次他说，“我曾经负债百万。不是吹牛。”
47岁的佩林说，直到2020年才等来转机，主要依靠Wirecard，还有今年9月发布报告揭发德国租赁公司Grenke。Viceroy的主要指控是Grenke利用收购来掩盖账面现金干涸。Grenke在一份声明中称Viceroy的指控“毫无根据”，尽管如此还是损失惨重。在报告发布后，Grenke的股价下跌了三分之一，创始人也退出了董事会。与此同时，德国金联邦融监管局在Viceroy发布报告几天后就展开了对Grenke的调查。截至本文发稿时，调查仍然在进行中。
佩林为做空以及市场外行为也付出了很多代价。八年前他曾经是一名社会工作者，因为被指控伪造文件而被禁止在英国继续从业。（他起诉了前雇主并最终和解。）2018年，南非的一家商业集团委托撰写报告，指控Viceroy在做空南非控股公司Steinhoff期间“大篇幅”抄袭对冲基金报告。佩林对批评者不屑一顾。“如果你担心自己不够自负，就不要干做空这行。”他说。
当被问及Viceroy的财务状况时，佩林只说外部有一位支持者，但不愿意透露姓名。“我们从未评论过本公司的利润。”他补充道，“因为不管怎样，我们最好的业绩其实就是最新的一份报告。”布洛克继续说道：“今年的情况更是如此。每次Nikola之类成功的背后，都有五次不成功的尝试。”
提示三
跟好莱坞一样，卖空也是受到点击率驱动的骗局。
社交控集合。散户大军聚集。600亿美元空白支票推动IPO热潮。2020年各方看涨力量将灾祸预言家们逼到市场边缘。在纽约证券交易所（NYSE）的上市公司的累计空头头寸通常在流通股的4%至6%之间。到2020年11月初，空头头寸已经降至不到1%。
尽管现实是美国正在经历最严重的经济衰退和劳动力市场崩溃，企业债务不断增加，企业效益大幅下降，但股市的热情依然不减。很多散户投资者信任的银行和经纪商的分析师们并未表现出怀疑。根据FactSet计算，分析师对标准普尔500指数（S&P 500）的成份股给出的10,322个评级中，只有6.2%是“卖出”。似乎在新冠肺炎疫情期间，人人都加强了警惕，华尔街却没有。
即便Nikola有各种问题，也可以跟着不断上涨的市场维持。Hindenburg报告发表前不久，通用汽车（General Motors）表示将收购Nikola的股份，还同意合作开发燃料电池和皮卡。通用汽车在公开场合表示，合作关系仍然在进行中。不过，通用汽车在11月30日缩减了参与规模，并表示最终不会入股。
身处放纵时代，空头自视为向善的必要力量。在荒野的西部，他们就是警长，只不过开的是奥迪（Audi）汽车。Hindenburg的安德森说：“我认为现在的欺诈行为比以往都要普遍。”他补充说，在监管机构和审计人员跟上公司造假步伐之前，“我们会继续看到有更多的人加入做空行列。”
提示四
不要迁怒于报信者，至少也要看完报告再说。
Nikola并不是安德森捅出的第一条大独家，但这次比较特别。以往他的报告会激怒多头，而且能够听到咒骂。“我们收到的充满愤怒的电子邮件，还有威胁杀我和我的全家的死亡威胁都越来越多。”他说。但这次不一样。事实上，顽固的多头齐声喊出：做空的伙伴。佩林钦佩地说：“这份关于Nikola的报告，实在是无懈可击。”（财富中文网）
本文另一版本登载于《财富》杂志2020年12月/2021年1月刊，标题为《小型大空头：股市狂野西部的警长》。
译者：夏林
This summer, investor Nathan Anderson got a juicy tip. The subject: Nikola Corp.
On June 4, the Phoenix-based electric-vehicle maker had gone public through a reverse merger. In a year of euphoric demand for growth stocks, particularly EV makers, this one stood out. Nikola bulls believed the company would do for hydrogen-powered, long-haul trucking what Tesla has done for electric cars. Within a week, investors had pushed its market cap above $34 billion, enough to overtake Ford and Fiat Chrysler even though the upstart had yet to sell a single vehicle.
The tipster wasn’t buying the hype. Neither was Anderson, a 36-year-old CFA turned whistleblower turned short-seller.
The source put Anderson, the founder of Hindenburg Research—a five-person investment research firm with no clients, no license to manage investors’ money, and no phone number or address on its website—in contact with two former business partners of Nikola. The informants turned over a cache of text messages, emails, and photographs that cast doubts on, among other things, various public statements made by Nikola and its founder Trevor Milton about the company’s progress in developing battery and hydrogen fuel cell technology.
These were tantalizing allegations. But one accusation struck Anderson as almost too flat-out crazy to take at face value. It had to do with a video Nikola posted to YouTube in January 2018 featuring the Nikola One semi, its original prototype rig. The video shows the truck cruising through the high desert outside Salt Lake City. It opens with a long shot of the Nikola One rolling toward the camera at high speed, barreling across a wide valley. The sun glistens off the windshield and the gleaming white roof as it zips across the frame.
Nikola titled the video “Nikola One Electric Semi Truck in Motion.” It generated hundreds of thousands of views online and got wide pickup from the automotive press. At a 2018 ceremony to celebrate Nikola’s new Arizona manufacturing facility, Gov. Doug Ducey watched the video and then gushed, “Nikola Motor Company is coming to Arizona. This is a huge announcement!”
The insiders claimed the whole thing had been staged. The truck wasn’t traveling under its own power, they told Anderson. Instead, it had been towed to the top of a hill. The person at the wheel then popped it into neutral and started it on its journey downhill—slowly at first, then accelerating.
The idea that Nikola was pulling a fast one wouldn’t count as outright fraud, Anderson knew, because the video didn’t explicitly claim the truck was self-propelled. But exposing the gimmick would demonstrate the kind of razzmatazz the company was engineering to sustain its hype. Anderson’s problem: How could he prove the video was a ruse?
A self-described “obsessive digger,” Anderson used a technique that’s common to the open-source investigations in the Internet’s most skeptical corners. He slowed the YouTube video down, frame by frame, and cross-referenced those stills with images he found on Google Street View. That helped him establish the precise location of the video shoot, down to the exact mile marker where the Nikola truck came to rest and the starting point of its journey. He called one of his contacts in Utah with an unusual request: Go to that very spot and re-create the truck roll, and film the entire thing. The contact did so, albeit in a 2017 Honda Pilot SUV. It rolled for 2.1 miles and reached a maximum speed of 56 miles per hour—entirely in neutral.
Bingo.
With that, Anderson could show how the company had pulled off the video—a proof point of Nikola going to great lengths to mislead the public. He wrote up his findings, replete with photos and maps. “You just want to be 100% on those things,” he notes.
Tip No. 1 for would-be shorts
If you’re going to take down a big stock, sweat the small stuff.
On Sept. 10, Hindenburg Research published a 67-page report on Nikola—a huge dump of damning allegations. “Today, we reveal why we believe Nikola is an intricate fraud built on dozens of lies over the course of its Founder and Executive Chairman Trevor Milton’s career,” the report began. The opening page set the tone: It included 24 bullet points that poured cold water on the company’s claims that it was developing proprietary battery technology, and that it had cracked the code on cheap hydrogen fuel production. The report took repeated swipes at Milton. And it laid bare how the company gave the Nikola One a push to get across the desert floor.
Nikola responded the following day, saying the report contained “false and misleading statements” and that it had hired counsel to “evaluate potential legal recourse.” For good measure, it added, “This was a hit job for short sale profit driven by greed.” But three days later, Nikola delivered a more detailed response—in which it copped that the Nikola One was not built to “drive on its own propulsion.”
The damage was swift. The stock cratered, and investor lawsuits began to mount. In a regulatory filing in November, the company revealed that the Justice Department had issued grand jury subpoenas against Nikola and Milton, and that the Securities and Exchange Commission was investigating whether Nikola had misinformed investors. “We have incurred significant expenses as a result of the regulatory and legal matters relating to the Hindenburg Report,” Nikola disclosed. (Nikola declined multiple requests to answer questions on the matter. Reached through a spokesperson, Milton, who called the report “false and deceptive” in September, would not comment further.)
Since the report dropped, Nikola’s stock has fallen 30%, and Milton has resigned. But one cohort has walked away the better from the truck wreck. As of mid-November, short-sellers—Anderson among them—had earned $263 million in mark-to-market profits from Nikola’s plunge, according to S3 Partners, a firm that tracks short activity. And they clearly expect to earn more: More than a third of all Nikola shares outstanding were held by shorts.
*****
Bull markets, the saying goes, ignore bad news. And if you set aside the black-swan pandemic-driven crash of early 2020, U.S. stock indexes have been in bull mode since the financial crisis, almost 12 years ago. Still, there’s a small but influential force in activist investing that is not only paying attention to bad news but also promulgating and profiting from it.
Anderson’s firm is part of a cadre who identify themselves by many names—some flashy (“short activists”); some self-righteous (“whistleblowing short-sellers”); some deceptively banal (“activist researchers”). These investors research targets suspected of shady behavior, then expose them and short them.
They share gimlet-eyed DNA with financiers large and small who’ve done the same—from Jim Chanos, who shorted Enron while warning about its accounting skulduggery, to the low-profile contrarians who bet against the subprime bubble, to CNBC-darling hedge fund managers like Bill Ackman and Daniel Loeb.
The new breed—the little big shorts—stand out because, by and large, whistleblowing and shorting is all they do. Lately, they’ve delivered plenty of pelts from publicly traded Goliaths, powered by meticulously reported jeremiads whose details rocket across social media and the business press. And with few exceptions, they do it for themselves, not for clients: They place bets with their own dough, which means many regulations don’t affect them. Anderson built a personal short position in Nikola through the summer as he became convinced he could take the company down. “It’s a big win for us,” he says, though he declines to specify how big. Critics fume that the shorts’ actions represent a blatant conflict of interest. Precisely, they fire back—no conflict, no interest.
Carson Block says he didn’t see short-selling as a profession when he published his first short report in 2010. But in the years following the financial crisis, as investor appetite for growth stocks drove mammoth valuations, it raised mammoth red flags for Block. The former attorney went on to become founder and chief investment officer of Muddy Waters, an activist short firm with the motto: “Doing the work Wall Street won’t.” His firm’s success in exposing fraud—and profiting from it—attracted copycats, many of whom were already raising hell on investor message boards.
Since 2010, Muddy Waters has published short attacks on 38 companies. It came to fame by shorting Chinese firms listed in North America, then delivering devastating haymakers in the form of free oppo research published online. In 2011, Muddy Waters took on Sino-Forest, a Chinese timber firm listed in Toronto, accusing the company of inflating revenues and exaggerating its holdings. The report torpedoed the firm’s shares, and it went bankrupt a year later. Sino-Forest denied Block’s allegations, but Canadian regulators eventually found that its leaders had committed fraud, and the company settled an avalanche of investor lawsuits. Earlier this year, Block went after Luckin Coffee. The company later disclosed in an SEC filing that it had inflated its 2019 sales by $320 million and costs by $200 million. Its CEO and COO were fired, and the Nasdaq delisted the company for its misbehavior.
Though Chinese firms were Block’s first focus, he realized that the flaws he found in those companies could be found everywhere. “The conflicts of interest, the ineptitude, the laziness that enabled these empty boxes to raise money in the U.S. and trade at real valuations—I mean, those are global issues,” he explains.
One of the California-based firm’s best-known takedowns came closer to home. In early 2016, Abbott Laboratories announced a $25 billion bid to buy St. Jude Medical, combining the two top players in the $30 billion market for “heart failure devices.” But in August of that year, Muddy Waters entered the scene with guns blazing, announcing a short position in St. Jude and alleging that some of its pacemakers and defibrillators were vulnerable to hacking. The disclosure pushed St. Jude shares down 10% in a single day.
The Muddy Waters report relied heavily on evidence compiled by MedSec, a cybersecurity research firm. MedSec had approached Block’s team first with the juicy information, rather than alerting St. Jude per Food and Drug Administration guidelines. St. Jude sued Muddy Waters and MedSec for defamation. But a few months later, the FDA and Department of Homeland Security confirmed that the devices were indeed vulnerable, and they issued a recall. The shorts cashed in; the defamation suit was eventually dismissed.
*****
From the jump, activist short campaigns are decidedly antagonistic—the tone is Accounting 101 meets WrestleMania. The shorts allege endemic fraud at the highest levels. “Money grab,” is a term that appears often in the reports. A Chinese sportswear company is not just cooking its books, it’s dropping “turds in the punch bowl,” blares one Muddy Waters report.
The attack-dog language is deliberate. (Ackman, the hedge-fund manager famed for his short bets, has honed it to a fine art.) Short-sellers get no points for prosecuting a good argument. Their research pays off only if the reader takes action, dumping her shares.
Tip No. 2
Expect a fight, and don’t play nice.
It seems every activist short has horror stories they could dine out on: the white whale that nearly ruined them, the lawsuits, the PIs and PRs, the hostile regulators, the death threats. Fraser Perring, founder of Viceroy Research, says one of his short targets sent heavies to his native England in a clumsy attempt to kidnap his daughter. (Fortune could not verify this claim.) “At one stage there were bugs in the kitchen, cameras in the hedge. It was something out of a novel,” he says.
“A lot of guys have come and gone in short activism” over the past decade, Block says. “People thought, ‘Oh, wow, this is really easy. It’s a great way to make money.’ And it’s not. Relative to being on the long side, it takes a lot more effort to make each dollar.”
Shorting stock is indeed not for the faint of heart. Believing a stock will fall, an investor opens “short” position by borrowing shares—say, 1,000 shares of Nikola. He sells them for cash. He’ll eventually have to buy 1,000 NKLA shares to return to the lender. That’s called “closing out the short.” The more the share price falls between opening and closing, the more money the bet makes.
It can all easily backfire. “You can only ever make 100% of your equity on a short,” Perring explains. If the share price falls from $20 to zero, the difference—$20 per share—is your take. But if the price doubles, your losses double. If the price triples, your losses triple. And so on. (This is one reason so many shorts have lost their shirts on Tesla, a stock that was up almost sixfold year to date as of Nov. 19.)
Viceroy, a three-person shop, has the manpower to research only a few firms per year. Wirecard was far and away its biggest score, Perring says. The share price of the now-insolvent German payments provider collapsed from €104 in mid-June to 60¢ this month following an accounting scandal that landed former CEO Markus Braun in jail. When whistleblowers, journalists, and short-sellers like Perring leveled allegations of malfeasance at Wirecard in 2019, Germany’s securities regulator, BaFin, investigated the tattlers instead. BaFin also temporarily outlawed short-selling of Wirecard shares: “Short attacks,” it said, “posed a risk to market integrity.” But further investigation vindicated the critics, igniting a national reckoning in Germany’s conservative investor culture.
“Wirecard was a war, a four-and-a-half-year fucking war,” Perring groans. At one point, he says, “I was negative millions. And that’s not bragging.”
The 47-year-old says his ship came in in 2020, thanks to Wirecard and his muckraking behind Grenke, a German leasing company that Viceroy came after in a report in September. Viceroy’s central charge is that Grenke used acquisitions to obscure how little cash it had on its books. Viceroy’s accusations are “completely unfounded,” Grenke said in a statement; still, the damage has been severe. Grenke shares are down one-third since the report came out, and its founder stepped aside from the board. BaFin, meanwhile, opened an investigation into Grenke days after Viceroy’s report hit; it was ongoing at press time.
Perring has taken plenty of arrows for his short attacks, as well as for his conduct outside the market. A former social worker, he was barred from such work in England eight years ago following allegations he forged documents. (He sued his former employer and won a settlement in that case.) A 2018 report commissioned by a South African business group accused Viceroy of “substantially” plagiarizing a hedge fund report in its efforts to take down Steinhoff, a South African holding company. Perring shrugs off his critics. “If you’re worried about your ego, don’t get into short-selling,” he says.
When pressed on Viceroy’s finances, Perring would only say he has one outside backer, whom he would not name. “We’ve never commented on our profit,” he adds, “because we’re only as good as our last report anyway.” That’s even truer in 2020, Block adds; for every Nikola, there “are probably five really frustrating results.”
Tip No. 3
Like Hollywood, short-selling is a hits-driven racket.
FOMO rallies. The retail-investor army. The $60 billion boom in blank-check IPOs. These bullish forces have pushed the Cassandras to the fringes of the market in 2020. Cumulative short positions held on NYSE-listed firms generally hover between 4% and 6% of shares outstanding; by early November, they had fallen to less than 1%.
The exuberance persists despite the reality that we’re enduring the worst recession and labor-market collapses in living memory; that companies are piling on debt; that earnings have collapsed. Analysts at banks and brokers—the go-to research source for many retail investors—aren’t exactly playing the skeptic. FactSet calculates that of the 10,322 analyst ratings affixed to the stocks in the S&P 500, only 6.2% are a “sell.” It seems as if we’ve all bought a dog to get us through the pandemic, and yet Wall Street can’t find any.
Even Nikola, for all its flaws, has been able to stay afloat on the rising tide: Shortly before the Hindenburg report was published, General Motors said it would buy a stake in the company and would agree to collaborate with Nikola on fuel-cell and pickup-truck development. Publicly, GM says the partnership remains a go, though on Nov. 30 the Detroit automaker scaled back its involvement and said it wouldn't take an equity stake after all.
In this permissive era, the shorts see themselves as a necessary force for good. In the Wild West, they’re sheriffs—sheriffs who drive Audis, mind you. “I think fraud is more pervasive than at any time I’ve been in the market, certainly,” says Hindenburg’s Anderson. Until regulators and auditors step up their game, he adds, “we’re going to continue to see a proliferation of short actors.”
Tip No. 4
Don’t shoot the messenger, at least until after you’ve read the report.
Nikola isn’t Anderson’s first big scoop, but it stands out. Usually, his reports enrage long investors, and he hears from them. “We get more angry emails, or death threats to murder me and my entire family,” he says. But not this time. In fact, kudos have been coming in from a tough crowd: fellow shorts. “The Nikola report,” Perring says admiringly, is “bulletproof.”
A version of this story appears in the December 2020/January 2021 issue of Fortune with the headline, "Little big shorts: Sheriffs in a Wild West market."
