《财富》独家对话中国经济唱衰者

2012年，国际油价还盘桓在每桶100美元的高价，中国GDP增速还处在10%以上的高速上。那时，你很难会想到跟谁预测中国经济会出现滑坡，导致大宗商品价格崩溃的，最终令全球陷入衰退。

除非有人一直在看迈克尔·佩蒂斯写的文章。佩蒂斯曾在华尔街做交易员，现任北京大学光华管理学院金融学教授。这些年，他一直在警告中国经济增长越来越失衡。早在2012年，他就预测大宗商品价格会崩盘。

佩蒂斯认为，中国经济正在重蹈许多国家的覆辙，比如二战后的苏联、上世纪70年代的巴西和80年代的日本。在这些例子中，政府通过出台一些人为促进投资、抑制消费的政策推动经济迅速增长，也累积了大规模的国际贸易顺差，但最终经济发展失衡导致衰退，中国就正在面临这个问题。

《财富》杂志最近采访了佩蒂斯，请他畅想中国经济接下来何去何从，及其将怎样影响美国、乃至全球经济。以下是此次采访的主要内容。

《财富》：你是在什么时候认识到中国经济增长模式不可持续的？

佩蒂斯：很早以前，到2006年就已经很明显了。

《财富》：你为什么认为，中国的增长模式会和巴西等国的试验一样？

佩蒂斯：经济学家亚历山大·格申克龙曾提出，投资驱动的经济繁荣有两大基石。首先必须强制推升储蓄率，可以通过限制家庭消费实现；然后必须引导投资过程。看一看所有投资增长奇迹的案例，无不遵循这种规律。

真正让我震惊的是，在创造增长奇迹期间，首先是增长率确实居高不下，高得令人震惊，然后在调整期增速迅速放缓，快得也让人大吃一惊。没有经济体能例外，始终如此。崛起之猛和陨落之快都令人大跌眼镜。

企业同样如此。以曾经的天然气与电力巨头安然公司就是个非常典型的例子。安然破产以前经历了惊人的飞速增长。我认为，在宣告倒闭之前十年里，安然有八年都是美国最令人仰慕的企业。然而，当一家公司或者一个国家的资产负债表出现结构错配时，比如，资产结构非但没有对冲风险，反而增加了波动性，那么，就会像在稳健的资产负债表上套一层投机性极强的资产负债表。这么做只会让财务基础恶化。

这就好比股市里赌上全部身家的股民。股市上扬时，这些股民比其他投资者斩获的收益多，于是大家开始认为他们是投资天才。然而，当股市下挫时，他们会陪得一干二净。在我看来，上述创造奇迹的经济体和这种投机者的做法极为相似。这些经济体的增速比我们预计的快得多，可在一夜之间，其经济增长又会以不可思议的速度急转直下。

《财富》：这些年你一直预计大宗商品价格会崩溃，而大多数经济学家认为此类崩盘不会伤害美国这类大经济体。为什么他们错了？

佩蒂斯：在中国和德国这样的经济体中，存在着较大的贫富收入差距，家庭收入占全国GDP的比重很低。贫富差距对经济有同样影响。贫富差距会推升储蓄率，因为富人比普通民众的储蓄多。这对经济是好事还是坏事？供给学派经济学家认为，储蓄率上升总是好的。凯恩斯主义经济学家则认为，必须增加需求。

事实上，这些经济学者都错了，或者说，在非常特定的情况下，他们都是对的。

在英国，贫富差距是绵延19世纪的“大问题”，储蓄率也一直太高。而在当时的美国，既可靠又亟需英国过剩的储蓄促进生产性投资。后来，过剩储蓄从英国流向美国，再后来英国人更富有，美国人也更有钱了。

如果一个国家有信用良好的生产性投资项目，却受制于储蓄不足，贫富差距对经济就有好处。可如果没有好项目，就会出现上世纪30年代的问题，储蓄过剩通过强迫提高消费压低了中产阶级的储蓄率，过剩的储蓄就会流入投机市场，造成股市上涨、楼市上涨，大家都觉得自己更有钱了，类似房地产泡沫期间的感觉。一旦因为负债累累，投机游戏被迫终止，人们不得不不平衡储蓄与投资。但是，因为无人投资，储蓄率必然要降低。降低储蓄率的方式就是解雇员工。

这就是当今世界的现状，从大宗商品产业开始，各行业都在裁员。美国前财长拉里·萨默斯说过，现在全球最渴望的就是需求。我觉得他所言不虚。

《财富》：你认为，这说明全球开始步入漫长的缓慢增长期？

佩蒂斯：没错，我们处于全球增长疲弱期，贸易会恶化，会有一波主权债务违约事件。我真正担心的是，欧洲人相当不负责任。德国的顺差大问题首先导致一些欧洲国家破产，然后向欧洲以外地区蔓延。中国有巨大的贸易顺差，日本也有顺差，还需要扩大规模。谁来填补这些顺差？过去几年，金属和能源生产国贸易逆差规模扩大，充当了“接盘侠”。可现在做不到了。巴西2016年将从上年的贸易逆差转变为贸易顺差。全球贸易格局必会发生变化。

用数学计算推测，只可能出现两种结果：要么中国和欧洲的贸易顺差缩减，要么其他国家地区的贸易逆差增加。顺差增加的通常是最开放的经济体，一般是允许资本流入的，例如美国、加拿大、澳大利亚和英国。我最最担心的是，如果美国贸易逆差飙升，可能让国内经济增长脱离正轨，而美国经济复苏是全球经济中唯一的亮点。

《财富》：那么，如果美国决策者制定贸易保护主义政策，防止贸易逆差大增，是不是合理的做法？

佩蒂斯：众所周知，经济学家大卫·李嘉图认为自由贸易促进国民福利，但上世纪20和30年代，有的国家并未创造国内需求，又试图扩大在全球需求中的比重，最后却削减了整体需求。假如降低本国的薪资或者让本币贬值，全球总需求实际上会减少，该国在全球需求中所占比例相应升高。如果陷入这个怪圈，上世纪30年代的悲剧就会重演。

最好的情况是，世界各国联合起来表示，不会让假设中的糟糕局面发生。不过，这太愚蠢了，我也没有多少把握他们会这样做。

《财富》：中国政府试图缓解经济着陆的影响，你怎么看这种尝试？

佩蒂斯：从抽象的角度看，很容易判断中国人的意图。必须推动与两大重要目标一致的改革，头号目标是，寻找新需求而且不能由负债催生，第二大目标是，降低债务水平。

中国需要增加家庭收入占GDP的比例。这个比例已经在缓慢上升，但还得加快。唯一的方法是将国有企业的财富转移至家庭。可众所周知，这方面政治阻力很大。

《财富》：你所说的将财富转移给中国家庭，具体要怎么做？

佩蒂斯：理论上说可以降低穷人的赋税，但穷人纳税本来就少，减税起不到多大作用。中国可以取消现行户籍制度，让贫穷的农民工迅速脱贫，因为取消城乡户籍差异以后，农民工能把孩子带到城里上学，找到收入更高的工作。不过，这在政治上很难实现。

中国也可以推行企业私有化，直接把股份转向家庭转移。此前，奥地利就成功实现过这种尝试。

中国还可以将国有企业股份转移到地方的社保系统。2015年3月山东省这样做了。问题在于，社保基金的信用很低。

回顾2013年中共中央第十八届三中全会公布的改革措施，你会发现几乎所有措施的目标都是促进消费。但要真正实现，就得减少某些方面的财富，猜猜看会影响谁的钱袋子吧？所以，改革面临的反对声浪很高。

经济学家顾问一直在提糟糕的建议，比如，要是能提高生产效率，经济状况就能改善。实际上，中国的经济学家必须认识到，如果改革不能削减负债，也不能增加财富，那就毫无意义。道理就这么简单。

即便中国的GDP增长速度比预期水平高出0.1个百分点，我们也不应该高兴。因为，只要增加债务就可以把GDP增速拉高。

奥巴马要是把芝加哥推倒重建，就能把美国经济增速提高到7%。但如此拉动增长愚不可及。（财富中文网）

译者：Pessy

校对：夏林

Back in 2012, when oil prices were above $100 per barrel and the Chinese economy was growing at over 10% per year you’d be hard pressed to convince anyone that a commodity price collapse, fueled by a sputtering China, would be the event that finally brought the world back into recession.

Unless, of course, that person followed the writings of Michael Pettis, a former Wall Street trader and professor of finance at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management. For years, Pettis has been warning of the growing imbalances in the Chinese economy, and he called the commodity price collapse as early as 2012.

Pettis argues that the Chinese economy is following the example of many countries that came before, like the Soviet Union following World War II, the Brazilian economy in the 1970s, and Japan in the 1980s. In each of these cases, national governments put forward policies that artificially boosted investment and suppressed consumption, policies that led to a fast buildup of growth and large trade surpluses. But eventually these imbalances go into reverse, and that is what is happening now. Fortune reached out to Pettis to get his take on what will happen next in China, and how it will affect the U.S. economy. The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Fortune: At what point did you recognize that China’s growth model was unsustainable?

Michael Pettis: Pretty early on—by 2006, it was obvious.

What made you realize that China’s growth model was like the failed experiments in places like Brazil?

[Economist] Alexander Gerschenkron argues that there are two fundamental parts to an investment-led boom. First, you have to force up the savings rate, which you do by constraining growth in household consumption. And next you have to direct the investment process. But if you look at all the investment growth miracles, they all did that.

One of the things that really struck me was that during the miracle periods, at first when growth rates are really high, everyone is shocked. And then during the adjustment period, it slows so quickly, we’re all shocked. There’s been no exceptions. It’s always like that. We’re shocked on the way up and shocked on the way down.

This happens to individual companies, too. Take a company like Enron, which is a very common story. Before Enron fell apart, it was just growing spectacularly. I think it was the most admired company in America eight out of 10 years before it went under. When a company or country has an inverted balance sheet [i.e. one with an asset structure that doesn’t hedge bets, but amplifies them] it’s really like you have your correct balance sheet with a very speculative overlay on top of it. All you’re doing is exacerbating underlying conditions.

It’s like if you invest in the stock market, but you margin write it to the hilt. If the market goes up, you make more money than anybody else, and you and everyone else start to think you’re a genius. And when the market goes down, you get wiped out. And it seemed to me that these economies were doing something very similar. They were growing much more quickly than we had any right to expect. And then suddenly they were slowing much more quickly than anyone believed possible.

For years, you have been predicting a collapse in commodity prices. Most economists don’t see the crash infecting large economies like the United States. Why are they wrong?

In places like China and Germany, we’re seeing high income inequality while the household share of GDP is quite low. The inequality has the same impact. It pushes up the savings rate because the rich save more than ordinary people. Is that good or bad? Supply siders tell us that it’s always good to increase the savings rate. Keynsians will tell us no, we have to increase demand.

The truth is they are wrong, or that they are both right only under very specific conditions.

For much of the 19th century, there was a huge “problem” of income inequality in England, and so the savings rate was too high. But you had … the United States, which was credible and urgently needed excess savings from England to fund productive investments. That’s where the excess savings went, and the English got richer, and we got richer.

If you have productive investment that’s credible and that’s being constrained by the lack of savings, then income inequality is actually good for the economy. But if you don’t, then you have the problems that you saw in the 1930s, where excess savings forced down the savings rate in the middle class by forcing up consumption. The savings go into speculative markets. Stock markets go up, real estate goes up, we all feel richer, just like during the real estate bubble. But once that game stops because of debt, then you still have to balance savings and investment. But because nobody is investing, then you’ve got to bring savings down. And the way you bring savings down is firing workers.

And that’s what we’re seeing around the globe, with job losses beginning in the commodity sector. I think Larry Summers is right in saying that the globe is starved for demand.

You see this as the beginning of a long period of slow global growth?

Yes, we’re in a period of weak global growth, in which trade is going to get worse. And we’re going to see a wave of sovereign defaults. What really worries me is that the Europeans have been incredibly irresponsible. The huge German problems, which first bankrupted Europe, were then forced abroad. And China also has a huge surplus, Japan has and needs a rising surplus. Who’s going to absorb it? In the last few years it has been the metal producers and the energy producers—their trade deficits grew. But they can’t do that anymore. In fact, Brazil will run a surplus this year from a deficit last year. So something’s gotta happen. And arithmetically, only two things can happen: either the surpluses of Europe and China go down, or somebody else’s deficit has to go up. And that country is always the most open economy that allows capital inflows: The United States, Canada, Australia, and the U.K. And my really big concern is that we’re going to see a soaring trade deficit in the U.S. which could derail the U.S. economy, which is the only bright spot right now.

Would it be rational for American policy makers to enact protectionist policies to prevent a soaring trade deficit?

We all know from [economist David] Ricardo that free trade is wealth enhancing, but in the 1920s and 1930s, when countries, rather than create domestic demand, tried to expand their share of global demand, they actually ended up reducing overall demand. If you lower wages or depreciate your currency, total global demand actually goes down but you get a bigger share of global demand. And when you get caught up in that spiral, you get yourself caught up in what happened in the 1930s.

The best thing would be for the world to get together and say we can’t allow this to happen, it would be incredibly stupid. But I’m not confident that this will happen.

How do you feel about the Chinese government’s attempt to soften the landing?

From an abstract point of view, it’s easy to tell the Chinese what to do. You must put forward reforms that are consistent with the two most important objectives. Objective No. 1 has to be to find a new source of demand that doesn’t come from debt, and objective No. 2 is to bring debt levels down.

They need to increase the household share of GDP. It’s rising slowly, but they need to speed it up, and the only way to do that is to transfer wealth from the state sector. But as you know, politically, that is really tough.

How do you practically transfer wealth to Chinese households?

In principle, you could cut taxes on the poor, but they don’t pay a lot of taxes so that’s not going to help much. You could eliminate the hukou system. That would make poor migrants immediately richer because now they can send their kids to school and find better paying jobs. That’s really politically tough to do.

You could privatize corporations and simply give the shares to households, as they did successfully in Austria.

You could transfer ownership shares to the local social safety net. Shandong province did that in March. The problem is that the pension fund has very low credibility.

If you look at the 3rd plenum reforms in 2013, almost all of them aim to [boost consumption] But to actually accomplish these goals, you have to reduce somebody’s wealth, and guess whose wealth it is? The government and the wealthy. So there’s a lot of opposition.

The economists keep giving the administration terrible advice, like if you improve the efficiency of, say the peanut business, that’s going to make a difference. They have to recognize that reforms that don’t reduce debt or increase household wealth are simply not going to matter. And that’s the end of the story.

If GDP growth is 1/10th of a point higher than expected, instead of applauding, we should be groaning. You can get any level of growth you want as long as you increase debt. Obama could get 7% growth if he wanted, if he tore Chicago to the ground and rebuilt it. It’s just a stupid way of getting growth.