纳斯达克的投资“大”风险

    聪明投资的原则之一是避免过度集中于一批极为昂贵的股票。如果有人沉醉于18个月来纳斯达克（Nasdaq）市场的高额回报，还认为最近的下跌是个介入机会，他就正好犯了这样的错误。人们也许不了解这一点，但如果持有价格过高的股票，情况就只会变得越来越糟。

    和另外两大指数相比，纳斯达克综合指数（Nasdaq Composite）确实落后许多。标普500指数（S&P 500）和道琼斯工业平均指数（Dow Jones Industrial Average）都在历史最高点附近徘徊；纳指却在3月6日达到4371点的14年新高后回落了6%。这波下跌行情丝毫没能弥补纳斯达克市场的一个重大缺陷，那就是追踪纳斯达克综合指数或者纳斯达克100指数（Nasdaq 100）的基金会把投资者的绝大部分资金投入少数几只很有吸引力的大盘股中。应该说，要实现投资者的殷切期望，这些股票必须拿出极佳的表现。

    纳斯达克综合指数和纳斯达克100指数都是市值加权指数。也就是说，一家公司的价值越高，它在这两个指数中的权重就越大。如果你购买了纳斯达克指数基金，后者就会把你一半的资金投入几只价格很高的生物科技、社交媒体和互联网个股。这种做法会提高你的投资价值，但同时也会带来风险。

    我们来看一下大盘股在这两个板块中所占的比重。互联网和社交媒体行业的大盘股包括苹果公司（Apple）、亚马逊公司（Amazon）、Facebook、谷歌（Google）、雅虎（Yahoo）和百度（Baidu）。生物科技权重股有安进公司（Amgen）、生物基因艾迪克（Biogen Idec）、Celgene、吉利德（Gilead）、迈兰（Mylan）、再生元（Regeneron）和Vertex。

    纳斯达克100指数由纳斯达克市场价值最高的100只股票组成，总市值为3.16万亿美元。上述13家公司的总市值为1.57万亿美元，占纳斯达克指数市值的进一半。也就是说，这几只互联网/社交媒体和生物科技股票占据了纳斯达克指数基金一半的仓位。

    2013年初以来，这种不平衡局面愈演愈烈。当时还没有把谷歌纳入纳斯达克100指数，其余的十二家公司占这只指数总市值的43%。从那时起，这些公司的表现一直稍好于整个指数——它们上升了39%，纳斯达克指数则上涨了37%，这些个股所占的比重因此略有提高。3月27日，谷歌成为纳斯达克100指数成分股，这些权重股在该指数中的比重随之达到近50%。

    那么，为什么要把这么多的资金投入这几只这么危险的高价股呢？部分原因在于，市场对这些重磅股的期望特别高。如果没有达到预期——这种情况看起来很有这种可能——股东就会遭到极为沉重的打击。

    其实，3月初纳斯达克指数创下历史新高后，这些公司的股价大多都出现了急剧下跌。（苹果公司股价大幅上涨基本上抵消了Facebook和亚马逊等公司股价的下跌，本轮下跌行情因此未能产生应有的震慑作用。）

    其次，这13只大盘股可能并不像投资者所想的那么大。虽然它们的市值将近整个指数的一半，但这些公司的总销售额在指数中的比重只有25%。盈利数据也具有一定的欺骗性。按过去四个季度公布的静态业绩计算，这13只个股的整体市盈率为20倍。虽然谈不上便宜，但也许可以称之为相当合理。问题在于，苹果公司占这些公司总利润的70%以上，而其他12只股票的整体市盈率高达40倍。

    因此，要投资于纳斯达克100指数，人们就得相信苹果公司的利润在创下460亿美元的历史纪录后仍然会继续适度上升，而且其他公司的业绩也都能达到市场预期的高水平。简而言之，人们得寄希望于就算这些公司的利润没有出现外界期待的强劲增长，它们高达40倍的市盈率也不会骤然下降。

    我该怎么说呢？我只能说，这种想法很美很天真。

    当然，纳斯达克市场曾经充满活力；而且，它当然有可能再现这样的活力。但就像2001年我们都看到的那样，即使最丰盛的宴席也有曲终人散的那一天。（财富中文网）

    译者：Charlie

    One of the tenets of smart investing is to avoid becoming excessively concentrated in a group of extremely expensive stocks. Anyone who's enthralled by the big returns in the Nasdaq over the last 18 months, and thinks the recent selloff is a buying opportunity, is making precisely that mistake. And you may not know it, but your share of overpriced merchandise is only getting worse.

    It's true that the Nasdaq is faring far worse than the two other marquee indexes. While the S&P 500 (SPX) and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (INDU) are hovering near all-time highs, the Nasdaq Composite (COMP) -- since reaching a 14-year high of 4371 on March 6 -- has tumbled 6%. That decline has done nothing to correct the Nasdaq's major drawback: the enormous portion of an investor's money that a Nasdaq Composite or Nasdaq 100 index fund allocates to a few, generally glamorous big-cap stocks. Stocks, it should be said, that need to perform brilliantly if the exalted expectations of investors are to be met.

    The Composite and the 100 are cap-weighted, meaning that the bigger a company's valuation, the higher its percentage weight in the index. If you own a Nasdaq fund, you've now got half of your money in a handful of pricey biotech, social media, and Internet stocks that spike your portfolio with risk.

    Let's look at the weighting of heavyweight companies in those two industries. In the case of Internet and social media stocks, we've got Apple (AAPL), Amazon (AMZN), Facebook (FB), Google (GOOG), Yahoo (YHOO), and search engine Baidu (BIDU) of China. The major biotech players are Amgen (AMGN), Biogen Idec (BIIB), Celgene (CELG), Gilead (GILD), Mylan (MYL), Regeneron (REGN), and Vertex (VRTX).

    The total capitalization of the Nasdaq 100, consisting of the 100 highest-valuation stocks in the Nasdaq universe, is $3.16 trillion. The 13 companies above account for nearly 50% of the 100's total valuation, or $1.57 trillion. So one in two dollars in a Nasdaq fund sits in a small group of Internet/social media and biotech names.

    The balance has gotten far more lopsided since the start of 2013. At that point, Google hadn't joined the Nasdaq, and the remaining dozen stocks represented 43% of the Nasdaq 100's total value. Since then, those companies have performed slightly better than the overall index, rising 39%, vs. 37% for the 100, and hence increasing their share just a bit. The arrival of Google on March 27 brought the group's share up to almost half of the Nasdaq 100's value.

    So why is having so much of your money in a few high-flyers so hazardous? The answer, in part, is because the market has outsized expectations for these bold-faced names. And if they fall short -- a strong possibility, it would seem -- shareholders will get severely punished.

    Shares in most of these companies, indeed, have fallen sharply since the Nasdaq reached its peak in early March. (A big gain in Apple pretty much offset the losses at the likes of Facebook and Amazon, so the fall wasn't as jarring as it could have been.)

    Secondly, the Big 13 may not be as big as investors think. While the group accounts for nearly half the market-cap weight of the index, total sales for these companies comprise 25% of the Nasdaq 100's revenues. The profit picture is also somewhat deceiving. The overall price-to-earnings ratio of our club of 13 is 20, based on four quarters of trailing, reported profits. While that's hardly cheap, it might be construed as fairly reasonable. The issue is that Apple alone accounts for over 70% of the group's total profits. For the remaining 12, the combined P/E stands at a staggering 40.

    So to put your money on the Nasdaq 100, you'd need to believe that Apple's earnings will keep growing modestly from today's record level of $46 billion, and that all the other companies will fulfill the market's epic expectations. In short, you're betting that the 40 P/E won't collapse like a soufflé if (or when) the hoped-for, gigantic earnings growth fails to materialize.

    How should I put this? That's sweet in its naiveté.

    Sure, the Nasdaq has been a great momentum play and, sure, the momentum could resume. But as we all learned in 2001, even the greatest of bashes doesn't last forever.