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希腊救助方案埋下更大祸根

希腊救助方案埋下更大祸根

Cyrus Sanati 2012-02-27
希腊第二轮救助方案可能会吓跑欧债投资者,导致危机进一步升级,将来通过市场融资无门的各国政府将会更加依赖欧洲央行的资金供应——但后者不一定总能提供充足的资金。

    希腊第二轮救助方案并没有让华尔街相信欧洲已控制住了债务危机。如果说这一方案起到了什么作用,那就是它强化了一种观点:在主权债券交易中,私营投资者是二等公民,信用违约掉期(CDS)提供不了什么保障。它将使私营投资者很难再相信欧洲主权债券,也给陷入困境的其他欧洲国家未来的救助方案埋下了伏笔,届时救助行动将变得更加棘手。

    周二,欧元区宣布将再拿出1,300亿欧元救助希腊,完全在市场的意料之中。如果能获得希腊国会批准,这一方案将是欧洲试图平息近三年来主权债务危机的最大努力。

    暂且不谈希腊届时可能无法履行其雄心勃勃的债务偿付计划,眼下这个救助方案将欧洲央行(European Central Bank)、欧元区各国政府与投资者对立起来,动摇了人们对于一度被视为零风险的主权债券市场所抱有的信心。

    具体来说,这一方案使得欧洲央行和其他目前持有希腊债券的各国央行不必像私营投资者那样按约定被迫削减本金53.5%。事实上,欧洲央行和各国央行根本就无需削减本金。他们持有的债券将保持平价,所有痛苦都由私营投资者承担。

    这等于出现了一个双层体系,欧元区各国政府和欧洲央行事实上持有了优先债券。虽然欧洲央行和欧元区各国政府已同意放弃希腊债券可能产生的收益,但它仍然传递出一个信号,即他们持有的是优先债券,而私营投资者持有的是后偿债券。

    由于这样的设计,选择持有CDS对冲主权债券风险的投资者们将拿不到任何现钱。本金减53.5%,从技术上而言是投资者的自愿行为,使他们放弃了收回贷款本金的权利。

    最后,该方案可能也无法重塑投资者对欧洲债券市场的信心。相反,它反而会让投资者停止继续买入主权债券,导致危机进一步升级,陷入困境的政府将比以往更加依赖欧洲央行的资金。

葡萄牙的问题

    但是,欧洲央行愿意充当抵御欧债危机的后盾吗?根据巴克莱(Barclays)的估算,欧洲央行和各国央行已持有约15%的欧洲主权债券。去年,为了稳定市场,欧洲央行根据干预应急计划Securities Markets Program,首次购入了欧元区边缘成员国的主权债券。

    The latest Greek bailout has done little to convince Wall Street that Europe has gotten a grip on its debt woes. If anything, the deal has cemented the view that private investors are second-class when it comes to sovereign debt deals and that credit default swaps offer little protection. This will make it very hard for private investors to trust European sovereign debt, setting the stage for further messy bailouts in other troubled European countries.

    It came as no surprise to the markets yesterday that the eurozone would be shelling out an additional 130 billion euros to bailout Greece. The deal, if approved by Greek lawmakers in the coming days, is supposed to be Europe's best attempt to calm the nearly three-year-old sovereign debt crisis.

    Putting aside for the moment that Greece will probably not live up to its new and ambitious debt repayment schedule, the deal has managed to pit investors against the European Central Bank and various eurozone governments, shattering the confidence in the once riskless sovereign debt market.

    Specifically, the deal was structured where the European Central Bank and other national central banks in the eurozone, which currently hold Greek debt, won't be forced to take the agreed upon 53.5% haircut on its principal, as is the case with private investors holding Greek debt. In fact, the ECB and the various national central banks (NCB) won't be taking a haircut at all. The value of their debt will stay at par, while private investors take all the pain.

    This has managed to create a two-tiered system in which the various eurozone governments and the ECB essentially hold senior debt. While the ECB and the NCBs have agreed to forgo any profits they may generate off their Greek debt holdings, it still sends a signal that they are to be considered the senior debt, while private investors hold the subordinated debt.

    Investors who chose to hedge their sovereign debt risk with credit default swaps won't be collecting any cash given the way the deal was structured. The 53.5% haircut is technically a voluntary move on behalf of investors, making them ineligible to collect the principal on their loans.

    At the end of the day, the deal will probably fail to bring back confidence in the battered European debt markets. In fact, it could cause investors to hold back from making additional sovereign debt purchases, further exacerbating the crisis. This will make the governments even more dependent on the ECB for funding.

The Portugal problem

    But will the ECB be there to backstop Europe's debt woes? The ECB and the various national central banks already control around 15% of the European sovereign debt market, according to estimates made by Barclays. The ECB first made those purchases of European peripheral debt last year as part of its Securities Markets Program, an emergency measure in which the ECB basically stepped in and bought up sovereign debt in an effort to stabilize the market.

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