财务分析告诉你，微软收购LinkedIn不值

微软的收购回报率差是出了名的。2007年买下在线广告公司aQuantive，2014年买下手机制造商诺基亚，一共给它造成了139亿美元的资产减记。2011年收购Skype花了它85亿美元，虽说至今没有做减记，但它也未能证明这笔收购物有所值。

当然，搞这些不赚钱的并购的，是前CEO史蒂夫•巴尔默。可如今，他的继任者萨特亚•纳德拉拿出262亿美元买下社交媒体公司LinkedIn，吹响了微软这个并购专业户的新时代号角。

这是微软历史上最大的一笔交易，也是科技史上最昂贵的收购之一。也许，收购LinkedIn可以让微软提供差异化的体验，从而扩大潜在市的规模。但对股东来说，这些都是浮云，重要的是数据。而数据表明，要让这笔交易取得财务上的成功，微软要么大幅提升LinkedIn的利润，要么让LinkedIn的上亿用户都来使用它的产品。它成功的机会很小。

为什么呢？让我们来看看到微软目前给投资者创造的收益率，再看看它必须做些什么，才能让资产负债表上因为收购LinkedIn而增加的新资产创造出同样高的收益率。今年第一季度末，LinkedIn的股东权益（也叫资产净值，即资产价格减去负债和未付款）为46亿美元，微软为了这点净资产花262亿美元，还承担了其他杂七杂八的26亿美元债务。也就是说，微软了账目上多出了288亿美元的LinkedIn资产。

为了做分析，我们要用到《分析师会计观察》一书的作者杰克•切谢尔斯基（Jack Ciesielski）提出一个指标，叫“资产的现金运营回报率”，简称COROA，即公司每年创造的全部现金（含息税）除以为创造这些现金而对软件、营运资金、客户清单等其他资产的投入。去年，LinkedIn的营运资产基数是69亿美元（基于当年的平均资产额得出），创造的营运现金流是8.27亿美元。COROA达到了12%，相当不错。

但对于新东家来微软说，让LinkedIn达标的门槛大幅提高了，因为它支付了超高的溢价，被纳入微软旗下的LinkedIn的收益率就不再以69亿美元进行测算，但是而微软要支付的价格，即288亿美元来测算。LinkedIn的盈利能力其实不如比它大得多的微软。LinkedIn的COROA是12%，微软则高达15.2%。也就是说，微软在每一美元资产上创造了15美分以上的现金。

所以，如果微软想把LinkedIn的业绩提升到自己的水平，就得创造44亿的运营现金流，也就是288亿美元的15.2%，这可是LinkedIn目前能创造的现金的5倍啊！

这个难度实在太大了，难怪微软在公告后面的文件里只是泛泛地宣扬LinikedIn的影响力，闭口不提公司会追加多少投入，以及新的投入会给股东带来怎样的回报。

这不是说，LinkedIn是另一个诺基亚，也不是说这笔交易注定要失败。微软也许能控制住LinkedIn无度的开销（比如高额的股权奖励），说不定会利用LinkedIn的用户推动自己的服务。

和以前一样，我们不知道微软会做些什么，但我们知道，如果让股东获益，微软必须做些什么。因为这次交易，LinkedIn的股价在6月13日大涨50%，投资者大发横财。但他们的收益极可能成为微软投资者的损失。 (财富中文网)

作者：Shawn Tully

译者：天逸

Microsoft has a poor record of making acquisitions pay. The software giant took a combined $13.9 billion in writedowns on its acquisitions of online ad company aQuantive (2007) and phone maker Nokia (2014). What’s more, Mr. Softy has little to show for its $8.5 billion purchase of Skype (2011), though it doesn’t appear to have ever taken a writedown for that acquisition.

Of course, it was former CEO Steve Ballmer who spearheaded those mergers, and failed to make them profitable. Now, his successor Satya Nadella is effectively trumpeting a new era of Microsoft MSFT -0.62% as an expert acquirer and integrator by announcing the purchase of social media icon Linkedin LNKD -0.37% for $26.2 billion in cash.

It’s the biggest deal in Microsoft’s history. It’s also one of the most expensive transactions in the annals of technology. What matters to shareholders isn’t the happy talk about how “the likelihood of seizing more of the TAM (total addressable market) will increase through differentiated experiences,” but the numbers. And those numbers show that Microsoft will need to either generate gigantic improvements in Linkedin’s profits, or steer many millions of Linkedin customers to its own products, to make the deal a financial success. The chances are slim.

To see why, let’s examine the returns Microsoft generates today, and what it must do to generate the same margins on all the new assets its piling on its balance sheet via the purchase of Linkedin. At the end of the first quarter, Linkedin had shareholders’ equity or net worth—the difference between what it paid for its assets and what it owes to lenders and suppliers—of $4.6 billion. Microsoft is paying $26.2 billion for that equity, and assuming another $2.6 billion for miscellaneous liabilities not included in that number. Hence, it’s piling a total of $28.8 billion in new Linkedin assets on its books.

For this analysis, we’ll use a measure developed by Jack Ciesielski, author of The Analyst’s Accounting Observer, called “cash operating return on assets,” or COROA. It’s essentially the total cash a company generates each year before taxes and interest, divided by dollars invested in the software, working capital, customer lists, and all the other assets that produce that cash. Last year, Linkedin produced operating cash flows of $827 million on its then asset base of $6.9 billion (based on average assets for the year). That’s a decent return, or COROA, of 12%.

But for the new acquirer, the bar just rose enormously. Because it’s paying a super-rich price, Microsoft’s returns on LinkedIn, once it becomes a unit of the software giant, will be measured not on $6.9 billion in assets, but on what Microsoft is paying for all those new assets, that $28.8 billion. LinkedIn is actually running its business less profitably than the far larger Microsoft. Linkedin’s COROA is 12%, while Microsoft’s is 15.2%, meaning it generates just over $0.15 in cash on each dollar of assets.

So for Microsoft to lift Linkedin’s performance to match its own, Linkedin’s basic business, or that business plus the improvement it brings to Microsoft, would need to generate operating cash flows of $4.4 billion, or 15.2% of $28.8 billion. The problem: That’s more than five times the cash that Linkedin is making right now.

Given the size of these hurdles, it’s unsurprising that the slide deck that accompanied the announcement is long on generalities extolling the power of social media, and short on disclosing what Microsoft is adding in new capital, and what it takes to make that load of new capital pay for its shareholders.

That’s not to say the deal is another Nokia, or necessarily destined for failure. Microsoft may tame what looks like undisciplined spending at Linkedin, including huge equity awards, and could use Linkedin’s customer list to boost sales of its own services.

As usual, we don’t know what Microsoft will do, but we do know what Microsoft needs to do, if shareholders are to benefit. The deal is a gigantic windfall for Linkedin’s investors, who watched their shares jump 50% on June 13. The best bet is that their gain will be Microsoft investors’ loss.