图片来源:Getty Images
知名经济学家肯特·斯梅特斯认为,美国正进入为期20年的债务倒计时周期,而联邦预算向婴儿潮一代的倾斜,正是问题的核心所在。
在最新分析报告中以及接受《财富》杂志采访时,宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院预算模型(Penn Wharton Budget Model,PWBM)主任斯梅特斯勾勒出美国联邦债务可能触及的上限,以及一种明显偏向老年群体的政治经济体系。而他最直白的一句话或许也是最能说明问题的一句:“就人均而言,美国政府在老年人身上的支出约为年轻人的十倍;而从总量来看,用于老年人的总支出也大约是年轻人的六倍。”
这意味着,作为一种政策选择,平均每位老年人获得的资源远多于年轻人。不过,由于年轻人口基数更大,将拨付各年龄群体的财政支出全部加总后,老年人获得的总额“仅仅”是年轻人的约六倍。PWBM今年4月发布的测算数据显示,65岁及以上退休人群获得的联邦支出达到2.7万亿美元,占联邦总支出的38.6%,占可按年龄分配支出的61.9%;26岁至64岁的劳动年龄人口获得1.2万亿美元,占可按年龄分配支出的27.9%;而26岁以下未成年人及青年群体获得4,490亿美元,仅占10.3%。
斯梅特斯还表示,他长期研究美国的政治经济运行机制,他得出的结论是:“其实,每代人都有强烈的动机,试图将巨额债务包袱转嫁给下一代。问题在于,这种做法还能维持多久?”
210%的上限与20年的倒计时
根据斯梅特斯及其团队的测算,从理性角度来看,美国联邦债务占GDP的比例不可能超过约210%。他指出,一旦越过这条红线,即使对劳动收入广泛征税,也无法在投资者要求的回报率水平下偿还利息。需要强调的是,这一数字只是一个“理论上限”,而非预测结果。用他的话说,这已经是“真正的极限”,金融市场绝不可能在国债高至这一水平时还能从容地提供融资。
更迫在眉睫的担忧是时间问题。按照PWBM所称的“历史水平”医疗成本超额增长情景,即人均医疗支出增速持续快于整体经济增速,美国大概率将在约20年内触及这一债务上限;且有四分之一的概率会在14年内提前触及。在模型的中位数情景下,如果医疗成本继续快速增长,所谓的“截止年份”,即政策制定者仍能通过可行税收方案恢复财政可持续性的最后时点,最早可能在2045年到来;即便按照较为乐观的假设,也仅能推迟至2051年。
斯梅特斯表示:“该模型假设,金融市场始终相信国会最终会采取行动解决问题,直到这种可能性从数学层面彻底不存在为止。经常有人问我:‘金融市场什么时候会彻底崩溃?’答案是,这种情况可能发生在今天,可能发生在明天,也可能发生在市场不再相信国会最终会采取行动解决问题的那一刻。”
当婴儿潮一代遇上债务上限
这些时间节点与婴儿潮一代逐渐退出政治经济权力中心的时间高度重合,难免令人感到不安。当被问及其所说的20年债务周期,是否恰好与婴儿潮一代主导国会和企业高层的最后时期重叠时,斯梅特斯措辞谨慎,但并未否认这种解读。
他认为,预算决策背后其实反映出一种更广泛的“所有权心理”。他指出,以社会保障和退休制度为例,美国人往往会把政府提供的福利视为完全属于个人的私有财产,即便其中绝大部分资金来自纳税人。
他在接受《财富》杂志采访时表示:“我们总是喜欢泛化‘所有权’的定义。我们的想法往往是:‘没错,哪怕政府提供了九成资金,而我只缴纳了一成,但我依然觉得有权动用整个账户的资金,比如我要翻新房顶,而且我觉得这个用钱理由合情合理。’”
斯梅特斯补充道,这种心态也深刻影响着围绕社会保障制度的争论。目前,用于支付退休人员福利的社会保障主信托基金预计将在2030年代初枯竭。他指出,他的团队比官方机构更早预判了收不抵支的“拐点”。他们预测主要养老基金将在2032年前后枯竭,这一判断此后也得到了社会保障信托基金受托委员会(Social Security Trustees)和美国国会预算办公室(Congressional Budget Office)的印证。
他估计,一旦信托基金耗尽,社会保障体系只能支付约83%的既定福利,而且这一比例未来还会继续下降。不过,他并不认为这一最后期限能够促使政界及时采取行动。
他表示:“上一次我们改革社会保障制度是在1983年,当时我们就一直拖到危机近在眉睫才动手。从历史经验来看,我们总是在拖延很久之后才真正采取行动。”
为什么那些看似简单的解决方案行不通
在当前的政治讨论中,迫在眉睫的社会保障资金缺口,正与一系列更加天马行空的构想交织在一起,包括为新生儿设立“特朗普账户”,以及通过某种“AI红利”机制将科技企业的利润返还给公众的方案等。
对此,斯梅特斯持怀疑态度。
他表示:“人们对AI充满期待,认为它将带来经济增长。但这其实是一种误解。即便AI带来的增长超过我们的预测,政府支出也会随之增加。认为AI只会扩大税基、却不会推高支出,这种想法并不成立。”他补充说,自己最担忧的问题之一是,许多人“对未来的进步和未来的增长存在严重误判”。
斯梅特斯私下一直在推动一项不那么吸睛、却更为激进的方案:取消针对401(k)和403(b)退休账户缴款的税收抵扣政策。根据他此前的研究,这项税收优惠代价高昂,在10年内造成的财政收入损失约为1.3万亿至1.4万亿美元。他建议将这笔资金转而用于为低收入劳动者设立无需个人缴费的退休账户,并与“劳动所得税抵免”制度挂钩。至关重要的是,他认为不应该允许个人自行向这些账户存钱,以此规避提前支取带来的政治压力——过去,正是这种政治压力让鼓励劳动者储蓄的努力付诸东流。
斯梅特斯所描述的这种心理其实并非新鲜事物。著名喜剧演员乔治·卡林几十年前就曾用一句话概括过这种心态:“我的东西是宝贝,你的东西是垃圾。”乔恩·斯图尔特称这是他最深刻的一个段子。这也让人回想起某位共和党选民针对联邦福利打出的一句充满矛盾意味的抗议标语:“别让政府插手我的医疗保险!”
而按照斯梅特斯的说法,即便退休账户里九成来自政府资金、只有一成由自己出资,人们仍然会觉得自己理应有权动用整个账户。因为正如他所说:“这些都是我的,与政府无关。”
华盛顿会迎来“利兹·特拉斯时刻”吗?
斯梅特斯强调,如果说债务数字和政治博弈听起来有些抽象,它们可能带来的后果却极其现实。当一个国家逼近财政承受极限时,受到冲击的绝不只是债券市场。
他表示:“当一个国家被债务压垮时,整个社会结构都将面临激烈的重组。”他举例称,从20世纪30年代初德国的崩溃,到近年来阿根廷的多次危机,都证明了这一点。他认为,财政体系崩溃会让选民更愿意将希望寄托于政治强人,或转向左右翼未经检验的激进政治力量。
斯梅特斯坦言,他总会把英国前首相利兹·特拉斯的短命政府视为前车之鉴。特斯拉因推出缺乏严谨论证的财政计划,在上任仅数周后便狼狈下台。正如英国媒体当时辛辣调侃的那样,她的政治寿命甚至比不上一颗生菜的保鲜期。
谈及美国的债务前景时,斯梅特斯表示:“我认为,在真正触及那个债务极限之前,金融市场就会率先出手约束我们。未来五到十年内,美国完全有可能迎来属于自己的‘利兹·特拉斯时刻’。”
支撑其观点的PWBM研究报告,则以更学术化的语言强调了同样的观点。该报告借鉴了经济学家哈罗德·科尔和蒂莫西·基欧的经典理论框架指出:一个国家即便远未达到数学意义上的偿付极限,当其债务水平处于中间区间时,就已经进入了“危机区间”。此时,只要投资者预期发生变化,就足以引发一场自我实现式债务挤兑。在这种“危机区间”里,市场不会等到政府耗尽最后一分融资能力,才开始要求更高利率,甚至可能直接拒绝为政府债务提供再融资。
斯梅特斯表示:“很多人没有意识到,当金融体系崩溃时,受到冲击的并不仅仅是金融市场本身。”他指出英国当前面临的问题在于税负已经处于较高水平,因此可供政策腾挪的“财政空间”十分有限。
他表示:“这正是婴儿潮一代带来的问题。随着时间推移,社会福利改革将面临异常巨大的阻力。”有时候,那些经年累月无法解决的庞大财政危机,“可能成为社会剧变的导火索,而这种变化带来的破坏力,将远远超出经济的范畴。”(财富中文网)
译者:刘进龙
审校:汪皓
知名经济学家肯特·斯梅特斯认为,美国正进入为期20年的债务倒计时周期,而联邦预算向婴儿潮一代的倾斜,正是问题的核心所在。
在最新分析报告中以及接受《财富》杂志采访时,宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院预算模型(Penn Wharton Budget Model,PWBM)主任斯梅特斯勾勒出美国联邦债务可能触及的上限,以及一种明显偏向老年群体的政治经济体系。而他最直白的一句话或许也是最能说明问题的一句:“就人均而言,美国政府在老年人身上的支出约为年轻人的十倍;而从总量来看,用于老年人的总支出也大约是年轻人的六倍。”
这意味着,作为一种政策选择,平均每位老年人获得的资源远多于年轻人。不过,由于年轻人口基数更大,将拨付各年龄群体的财政支出全部加总后,老年人获得的总额“仅仅”是年轻人的约六倍。PWBM今年4月发布的测算数据显示,65岁及以上退休人群获得的联邦支出达到2.7万亿美元,占联邦总支出的38.6%,占可按年龄分配支出的61.9%;26岁至64岁的劳动年龄人口获得1.2万亿美元,占可按年龄分配支出的27.9%;而26岁以下未成年人及青年群体获得4,490亿美元,仅占10.3%。
斯梅特斯还表示,他长期研究美国的政治经济运行机制,他得出的结论是:“其实,每代人都有强烈的动机,试图将巨额债务包袱转嫁给下一代。问题在于,这种做法还能维持多久?”
210%的上限与20年的倒计时
根据斯梅特斯及其团队的测算,从理性角度来看,美国联邦债务占GDP的比例不可能超过约210%。他指出,一旦越过这条红线,即使对劳动收入广泛征税,也无法在投资者要求的回报率水平下偿还利息。需要强调的是,这一数字只是一个“理论上限”,而非预测结果。用他的话说,这已经是“真正的极限”,金融市场绝不可能在国债高至这一水平时还能从容地提供融资。
更迫在眉睫的担忧是时间问题。按照PWBM所称的“历史水平”医疗成本超额增长情景,即人均医疗支出增速持续快于整体经济增速,美国大概率将在约20年内触及这一债务上限;且有四分之一的概率会在14年内提前触及。在模型的中位数情景下,如果医疗成本继续快速增长,所谓的“截止年份”,即政策制定者仍能通过可行税收方案恢复财政可持续性的最后时点,最早可能在2045年到来;即便按照较为乐观的假设,也仅能推迟至2051年。
斯梅特斯表示:“该模型假设,金融市场始终相信国会最终会采取行动解决问题,直到这种可能性从数学层面彻底不存在为止。经常有人问我:‘金融市场什么时候会彻底崩溃?’答案是,这种情况可能发生在今天,可能发生在明天,也可能发生在市场不再相信国会最终会采取行动解决问题的那一刻。”
当婴儿潮一代遇上债务上限
这些时间节点与婴儿潮一代逐渐退出政治经济权力中心的时间高度重合,难免令人感到不安。当被问及其所说的20年债务周期,是否恰好与婴儿潮一代主导国会和企业高层的最后时期重叠时,斯梅特斯措辞谨慎,但并未否认这种解读。
他认为,预算决策背后其实反映出一种更广泛的“所有权心理”。他指出,以社会保障和退休制度为例,美国人往往会把政府提供的福利视为完全属于个人的私有财产,即便其中绝大部分资金来自纳税人。
他在接受《财富》杂志采访时表示:“我们总是喜欢泛化‘所有权’的定义。我们的想法往往是:‘没错,哪怕政府提供了九成资金,而我只缴纳了一成,但我依然觉得有权动用整个账户的资金,比如我要翻新房顶,而且我觉得这个用钱理由合情合理。’”
斯梅特斯补充道,这种心态也深刻影响着围绕社会保障制度的争论。目前,用于支付退休人员福利的社会保障主信托基金预计将在2030年代初枯竭。他指出,他的团队比官方机构更早预判了收不抵支的“拐点”。他们预测主要养老基金将在2032年前后枯竭,这一判断此后也得到了社会保障信托基金受托委员会(Social Security Trustees)和美国国会预算办公室(Congressional Budget Office)的印证。
他估计,一旦信托基金耗尽,社会保障体系只能支付约83%的既定福利,而且这一比例未来还会继续下降。不过,他并不认为这一最后期限能够促使政界及时采取行动。
他表示:“上一次我们改革社会保障制度是在1983年,当时我们就一直拖到危机近在眉睫才动手。从历史经验来看,我们总是在拖延很久之后才真正采取行动。”
为什么那些看似简单的解决方案行不通
在当前的政治讨论中,迫在眉睫的社会保障资金缺口,正与一系列更加天马行空的构想交织在一起,包括为新生儿设立“特朗普账户”,以及通过某种“AI红利”机制将科技企业的利润返还给公众的方案等。
对此,斯梅特斯持怀疑态度。
他表示:“人们对AI充满期待,认为它将带来经济增长。但这其实是一种误解。即便AI带来的增长超过我们的预测,政府支出也会随之增加。认为AI只会扩大税基、却不会推高支出,这种想法并不成立。”他补充说,自己最担忧的问题之一是,许多人“对未来的进步和未来的增长存在严重误判”。
斯梅特斯私下一直在推动一项不那么吸睛、却更为激进的方案:取消针对401(k)和403(b)退休账户缴款的税收抵扣政策。根据他此前的研究,这项税收优惠代价高昂,在10年内造成的财政收入损失约为1.3万亿至1.4万亿美元。他建议将这笔资金转而用于为低收入劳动者设立无需个人缴费的退休账户,并与“劳动所得税抵免”制度挂钩。至关重要的是,他认为不应该允许个人自行向这些账户存钱,以此规避提前支取带来的政治压力——过去,正是这种政治压力让鼓励劳动者储蓄的努力付诸东流。
斯梅特斯所描述的这种心理其实并非新鲜事物。著名喜剧演员乔治·卡林几十年前就曾用一句话概括过这种心态:“我的东西是宝贝,你的东西是垃圾。”乔恩·斯图尔特称这是他最深刻的一个段子。这也让人回想起某位共和党选民针对联邦福利打出的一句充满矛盾意味的抗议标语:“别让政府插手我的医疗保险!”
而按照斯梅特斯的说法,即便退休账户里九成来自政府资金、只有一成由自己出资,人们仍然会觉得自己理应有权动用整个账户。因为正如他所说:“这些都是我的,与政府无关。”
华盛顿会迎来“利兹·特拉斯时刻”吗?
斯梅特斯强调,如果说债务数字和政治博弈听起来有些抽象,它们可能带来的后果却极其现实。当一个国家逼近财政承受极限时,受到冲击的绝不只是债券市场。
他表示:“当一个国家被债务压垮时,整个社会结构都将面临激烈的重组。”他举例称,从20世纪30年代初德国的崩溃,到近年来阿根廷的多次危机,都证明了这一点。他认为,财政体系崩溃会让选民更愿意将希望寄托于政治强人,或转向左右翼未经检验的激进政治力量。
斯梅特斯坦言,他总会把英国前首相利兹·特拉斯的短命政府视为前车之鉴。特斯拉因推出缺乏严谨论证的财政计划,在上任仅数周后便狼狈下台。正如英国媒体当时辛辣调侃的那样,她的政治寿命甚至比不上一颗生菜的保鲜期。
谈及美国的债务前景时,斯梅特斯表示:“我认为,在真正触及那个债务极限之前,金融市场就会率先出手约束我们。未来五到十年内,美国完全有可能迎来属于自己的‘利兹·特拉斯时刻’。”
支撑其观点的PWBM研究报告,则以更学术化的语言强调了同样的观点。该报告借鉴了经济学家哈罗德·科尔和蒂莫西·基欧的经典理论框架指出:一个国家即便远未达到数学意义上的偿付极限,当其债务水平处于中间区间时,就已经进入了“危机区间”。此时,只要投资者预期发生变化,就足以引发一场自我实现式债务挤兑。在这种“危机区间”里,市场不会等到政府耗尽最后一分融资能力,才开始要求更高利率,甚至可能直接拒绝为政府债务提供再融资。
斯梅特斯表示:“很多人没有意识到,当金融体系崩溃时,受到冲击的并不仅仅是金融市场本身。”他指出英国当前面临的问题在于税负已经处于较高水平,因此可供政策腾挪的“财政空间”十分有限。
他表示:“这正是婴儿潮一代带来的问题。随着时间推移,社会福利改革将面临异常巨大的阻力。”有时候,那些经年累月无法解决的庞大财政危机,“可能成为社会剧变的导火索,而这种变化带来的破坏力,将远远超出经济的范畴。”(财富中文网)
译者:刘进龙
审校:汪皓
Top economist Kent Smetters thinks the U.S. is on a 20‑year clock—and the tilt of the federal budget toward baby boomers is at the center of the story.
In a new analysis and in an interview with Fortune, the Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM) faculty director sketches an outer limit for U.S. federal debt and a political economy that heavily favors older Americans. His bluntest line may also be his simplest: “We do spend about 10x more per older person than we do per younger person. In total, we spend about 6x in aggregate on older people than younger people.”
This means means the average older person gets much more than the average younger person as a policy choice, but since there is a greater number of younger people, when you add up all dollars going to each group, the total to older people is “only” about six times. PWBM estimated in April retirees (adults age 65 and older) receive $2.7 trillion, equal to 38.6% of total federal outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending, while working-age adults (ages 26-64) receive $1.2 trillion (27.9% of age-assignable), and children and young adults (under age 26) receive $449 billion (10.3%).
Smetters added he works a lot on understanding the political economy of the U.S. and there’s just “a lot of incentive for every generation to try to pass a big bill to the next generation. The question is, how long can they get away with that?”
A 210% ceiling—and a 20‑year runway
Smetters and his team estimate U.S. federal debt cannot rationally exceed about 210% of GDP. Above that level, he argues, there is no feasible broad‑based tax on labor income that can cover the interest bill at the returns investors will demand. That figure is an “outer bound,” not a forecast: In his words, it is “really the upper limit,” not a target that markets will calmly finance.
The more immediate concern is timing. Under what PWBM labels “historical” excess health care cost growth—the pace at which health spending per person has tended to outrun the broader economy—the U.S. is likely to hit that outer bound within about 20 years, with a one‑in‑four chance of hitting it in just 14. In the model’s median scenario, the “closure year”—the last point at which policymakers can still restore sustainability with a feasible tax—is as early as 2045 if health care costs grow quickly, and 2051 under more optimistic assumptions.
“The assumption is that the financial markets are being set in a way where they keep believing that Congress will eventually get its act together up until the point where it’s mathematically impossible for that to be true anymore,” Smetters said. “Sometimes people ask me, ‘You know, when could financial markets unravel?’ And the answer is, well, that could happen today, it could happen tomorrow, it could happen whenever they stop believing that Congress will eventually get its act together.”
When baby boomers meet the debt ceiling
Those dates line up uncomfortably well with the gradual fading of the baby boomer generation from positions of economic and political power. Asked whether it is a coincidence his 20‑year horizon roughly overlaps with the last years of baby boomer dominance in Congress and the C‑suite, Smetters was cautious but open to the framing.
He connected the budget choices to a broader psychology of ownership. In the Social Security and retirement space, he says, Americans routinely treat government‑funded benefits as if they were purely private property—even when taxpayers have put up most of the cash.
“We always stretch out what ownership is,” he told Fortune. “We like to think: ‘Yeah, If the government put in 90% and I put in 10%, I still want access to the entire account because I need to replace my roof and I have a good reason [for needing the funds].”
That mindset shapes the debate over Social Security, he added, where the main trust fund that pays retired workers’ benefits is projected to run dry in the early 2030s. Smetters noted his team was earlier than official forecasters in calling the “crossover date” when benefits would exceed revenues, and their depletion date—around 2032 for the main old‑age fund—has since been confirmed by the Social Security Trustees and the Congressional Budget Office.
Once the trust fund is exhausted, he estimated, the program can pay only about 83% of scheduled benefits, and that fraction erodes further over time. But he doubts that deadline will force timely action.
“The last time we fixed Social Security in 1983, we waited very close for bad things to happen,” he said. “Based on past experience, we’ve waited pretty long … to take action.”
Why easy fixes fall short
In the current political debate, that looming Social Security shortfall has collided with a parade of more exotic ideas, from Trump Accounts for newborns to proposals for some kind of “AI dividend” that would redirect tech profits back to the public.
Smetters was skeptical.
“People are excited about AI and think it’s going to lead to all this economic growth. People are just misunderstanding it,” he said. “Even if it does lead to more growth than we’re projecting, spending is going to go up with it. It’s not true that AI will simply increase the tax base without increasing spending.” His biggest concern, he added, is how many of us are “really misguided in our understanding of future progress, future growth.”
Behind the scenes, Smetters has pushed a less flashy but more radical idea: Shut down the costly tax deduction for 401(k) and 403(b) contributions, which he estimates cost roughly $1.3 trillion to $1.4 trillion in forgone revenue over 10 years in earlier work, and reroute that money into non‑contributory retirement accounts for low‑income workers linked to the earned income tax credit. Crucially, he said, people would not be allowed to deposit their own money in those accounts at all, precisely to avoid the political pressure for early withdrawals that has undermined past efforts to nudge workers into saving more.
The psychology that Smetters describes isn’t new; the great comedian George Carlin captured it decades ago with the line Jon Stewart calls one of his most profound: “My shit is stuff; your stuff is shit.” It also recalls the paradoxical protest sign from a Republican voter about a federal benefit: “Keep your government hands off my Medicare!”
Smetters’ version is if the government funds 90% of your retirement account and you put in 10%, you still feel entitled to “the entire account” because, as he put it, “that’s all mine. It’s not yours.”
A Liz Truss warning for Washington
If the numbers and the politics sound abstract, Smetters insisted the consequences are not. When countries bump up against their fiscal limits, he said, the damage goes far beyond the bond market.
“You get this radical reordering when a country is overwhelmed with debt,” he said, pointing to episodes ranging from Germany’s collapse in the early 1930s to modern crises in Argentina. Fiscal crack‑ups, he argues, make voters more willing to gamble on strongmen or untested extremes on the left or right.
He said he keeps returning to Britain’s short‑lived Liz Truss government as a cautionary tale, referring to the prime minister whose unserious financial plan saw her ejected from office in less time than it took a head of lettuce to wilt, as the British press savagely noted.
“I think we’re actually going to see financial markets try to discipline us long before we hit that limit,” he said of the U.S. debt path. “We could easily have our Liz Truss moment in the United States within the next five, 10 years.”
The technical PWBM paper that underpins his concerns emphasizes the same point in more formal language, using a classic framework from economists Harold Cole and Timothy Kehoe: Even well before a country reaches its mathematical solvency limit, there is a “crisis zone” at intermediate debt levels where a shift in investor expectations alone can trigger a self‑fulfilling run. In that zone, markets don’t wait for the last dollar of capacity to be used up before demanding higher interest rates—or refusing to refinance government debt at all.
“What people don’t get is that when you have these financial collapses, it’s not just finance,” Smetters said. The problem the U.K. faces now, he said, is that they already have very high taxes so their “fiscal space” is quite limited in terms of what they can do now.
“That’s the problem with the baby boomer generation,” he added. “It’s going to be really hard to change benefits over time.” Sometimes when you have giant fiscal problems that keep going unsolved, year after year, “they can lead to really incredible changes in society that can be very disruptive, beyond just economics.”