
高盛(Goldman Sachs)追踪了过去40年间因技术变革而失业的美国劳动者。该投行在上周四发布的一份研报中指出,首批受AI冲击而遭裁员的劳动者,其当前处境正展现出与历史高度相似的特征。
高盛经济学家皮耶尔弗兰切斯科·梅伊研究发现,自2025年以来,因所在岗位受AI冲击而失业的劳动者,重新找到新工作平均要比其他失业者多耗费约一个月;在失业满一年后,该群体仍处于失业状态的比例也高出了约10个百分点。梅伊在报告中强调,这些冲击在程度上与高盛在以往几轮技术变革中观察到的情况“相当”,并称此前几轮技术变革所带来的损害“长期存在”。
正如以往历次技术浪潮一样,年长劳动者在此次冲击中处境更为艰难。数据显示,在因AI失业的人群中,35岁及以上的劳动者重新找到全职工作平均要多花约五周时间;相比之下,35岁以下人群则多花约三周。
覆盖全社会所有被裁劳动者(不限于受AI冲击的岗位)的政府数据,同样呈现出这种明显的年龄断层。美国劳工统计局(Bureau of Labor Statistics)8月公布的数据显示,高盛采用的劳工部调查共统计了2023年至2025年间740万名失业劳动者,高于上一轮调查(2021年至2023年)的630万人。在原岗位任职满三年的受访者中,截至2026年1月,25岁至54岁群体的再就业率为72.9%,55岁至64岁群体降至57.3%,而65岁及以上人群的再就业率更是仅有38.6%。
就业咨询机构Challenger, Gray & Christmas的9月报告显示,企业在公布的120,136起裁员计划中明确将AI归为主因,约占裁员总数的21%,AI也由此成为企业援引最多的第一大裁员事由。
40年技术性裁员的影响
高盛早前的研究调取了可追溯至1979年的个体层面数据。研究发现,因技术冲击而失业的劳动者,其后续的实际收入增长普遍慢于其他类型的失业者,且再次遭遇失业的风险也长期居高不下。
这种薪酬缩水的现象,在范围更广的宏观数据中已初显端倪。美国劳工统计局数据显示,2023年至2025年间失去全职工作、但随后重新找到全职工作的资深员工中,约49%的人薪水能达到或超过原先水平,明显低于上一轮调查中的62%。
然而,技术带来的阵痛分布并不均衡。失业后的十年间,年轻、拥有大学学历以及居住在城市的劳动者,累计实际工资损失约为其他因技术变革失业者的一半。此外,在原岗位任职年限较短的人群受影响也相对较小。梅伊对此解释称,这“可能是因为他们的技能缺乏特定职业的专用性,因而更容易进行跨行业迁移”。
年龄鸿沟再度显现
从年龄维度拆解最新数据,同样能看到类似的规律。面对AI带来的失业冲击,年轻劳动者不仅能更快重返全职岗位,在此期间经历的过渡性临时岗位也更少;即便落实了新的全职工作,他们兼任第二份工作的概率也相对更低。
梅伊在报告中写道,年轻劳动者“或许能更灵活地适应AI冲击”。他认为,这是一个“令人鼓舞的信号,因为此前有人担心,AI导致的失业可能对应届毕业生造成格外沉重的打击”。 高盛还观察到,越来越多的大学生在选报专业时,开始偏向那些受AI冲击较小且具有更高增长潜力的行业领域。
高盛同时警示称,现在就“评估所有这些维度的影响仍为时过早”,例如教育程度和地理位置等因素的长期作用仍需观察。
另有研究指出,年轻求职者所受到的真实冲击,实际上发生在另一个关口:招聘端。斯坦福大学(Stanford)数字经济实验室(Digital Economy Lab)今年8月发布的一项基于ADP薪资数据的研究表明,在受AI冲击最显著的职业中,22岁至25岁年轻人的就业人数比预期水平低了约19%(该预期水平以受AI影响较小的同龄人群就业增速为基准推算得出)。
研究作者埃里克·布林约尔松、巴拉特·钱达尔和陈如玉写道:“资深员工并未出现类似差距。”他们强调,这种调整“似乎主要通过缩减年轻员工招聘来实现,而非直接扩大解雇规模”。
需要说明的是,高盛的统计数据仅涵盖了那些“曾经拥有工作而后失业”的人群。
高盛的统计口径
上述数据来自美国人口普查局当前人口调查(Current Population Survey)下设的“被裁劳动者补充调查”(Displaced Worker Supplement)。这项调查每两年开展一次,旨在跟踪过去三年中遭遇非自愿失业群体的后续生计。高盛分析了2016至2025年间失业的1.5万多名劳动者,其中包括新公布的2023年至2025年数据。高盛表示,这一群体“很可能正是第一波因AI失业的劳动者”。
由于原始调查问卷并未直接设问“是否因AI失业”,高盛为此综合岗位的受AI冲击程度、所在行业的AI采用率,以及岗位是否被裁撤等因素,构建了一套评分体系,并将得分前30%的受访者划定为高概率因AI失业群体。高盛发现,在AI应用全面加速的2023年之前,高评分与低评分两组人群在失业率上并无显著差异。
不过,并非人人都认为AI已经重塑了整体劳动力市场。斯坦福研究人员写道,他们“尚未观察到由AI引发的、覆盖全经济领域的普遍性失业”。据《财富》杂志记者萨莎·罗格尔伯格今年2月报道,一直基于当前人口调查数据跟踪该课题的耶鲁大学预算实验室(Yale Budget Lab)发现,受AI影响程度、自动化和技术增强三项指标,“未展现出与就业或失业率变化存在直接关联的迹象”。
历史模式重现
在以往几轮技术变革中,因技术原因失业的劳动者再就业后,更容易转入更程式化、复杂度更低的岗位。究其原因,导致其失业的技术变革往往也贬低了他们既有技能的市场价值。然而,恰恰是这类重复性工作,最容易在下一波技术迭代中被彻底取代。
高盛再次捕捉到了这种旧模式的早期迹象。因AI冲击而失业的劳动者,更有可能彻底离开原来的职业和行业。但当他们重新获得聘用时,有相当比例的人——“特别是年长求职者”——却重新从事受AI影响程度类似甚至更高的岗位。(财富中文网)
本文使用了生成式AI进行研究辅助和/或文字转录。记者对文中的事实性内容进行了独立采访和核实,并由编辑在发表前完成人工审核。
作者:刘进龙
审校:汪皓
高盛(Goldman Sachs)追踪了过去40年间因技术变革而失业的美国劳动者。该投行在上周四发布的一份研报中指出,首批受AI冲击而遭裁员的劳动者,其当前处境正展现出与历史高度相似的特征。
高盛经济学家皮耶尔弗兰切斯科·梅伊研究发现,自2025年以来,因所在岗位受AI冲击而失业的劳动者,重新找到新工作平均要比其他失业者多耗费约一个月;在失业满一年后,该群体仍处于失业状态的比例也高出了约10个百分点。梅伊在报告中强调,这些冲击在程度上与高盛在以往几轮技术变革中观察到的情况“相当”,并称此前几轮技术变革所带来的损害“长期存在”。
正如以往历次技术浪潮一样,年长劳动者在此次冲击中处境更为艰难。数据显示,在因AI失业的人群中,35岁及以上的劳动者重新找到全职工作平均要多花约五周时间;相比之下,35岁以下人群则多花约三周。
覆盖全社会所有被裁劳动者(不限于受AI冲击的岗位)的政府数据,同样呈现出这种明显的年龄断层。美国劳工统计局(Bureau of Labor Statistics)8月公布的数据显示,高盛采用的劳工部调查共统计了2023年至2025年间740万名失业劳动者,高于上一轮调查(2021年至2023年)的630万人。在原岗位任职满三年的受访者中,截至2026年1月,25岁至54岁群体的再就业率为72.9%,55岁至64岁群体降至57.3%,而65岁及以上人群的再就业率更是仅有38.6%。
就业咨询机构Challenger, Gray & Christmas的9月报告显示,企业在公布的120,136起裁员计划中明确将AI归为主因,约占裁员总数的21%,AI也由此成为企业援引最多的第一大裁员事由。
40年技术性裁员的影响
高盛早前的研究调取了可追溯至1979年的个体层面数据。研究发现,因技术冲击而失业的劳动者,其后续的实际收入增长普遍慢于其他类型的失业者,且再次遭遇失业的风险也长期居高不下。
这种薪酬缩水的现象,在范围更广的宏观数据中已初显端倪。美国劳工统计局数据显示,2023年至2025年间失去全职工作、但随后重新找到全职工作的资深员工中,约49%的人薪水能达到或超过原先水平,明显低于上一轮调查中的62%。
然而,技术带来的阵痛分布并不均衡。失业后的十年间,年轻、拥有大学学历以及居住在城市的劳动者,累计实际工资损失约为其他因技术变革失业者的一半。此外,在原岗位任职年限较短的人群受影响也相对较小。梅伊对此解释称,这“可能是因为他们的技能缺乏特定职业的专用性,因而更容易进行跨行业迁移”。
年龄鸿沟再度显现
从年龄维度拆解最新数据,同样能看到类似的规律。面对AI带来的失业冲击,年轻劳动者不仅能更快重返全职岗位,在此期间经历的过渡性临时岗位也更少;即便落实了新的全职工作,他们兼任第二份工作的概率也相对更低。
梅伊在报告中写道,年轻劳动者“或许能更灵活地适应AI冲击”。他认为,这是一个“令人鼓舞的信号,因为此前有人担心,AI导致的失业可能对应届毕业生造成格外沉重的打击”。 高盛还观察到,越来越多的大学生在选报专业时,开始偏向那些受AI冲击较小且具有更高增长潜力的行业领域。
高盛同时警示称,现在就“评估所有这些维度的影响仍为时过早”,例如教育程度和地理位置等因素的长期作用仍需观察。
另有研究指出,年轻求职者所受到的真实冲击,实际上发生在另一个关口:招聘端。斯坦福大学(Stanford)数字经济实验室(Digital Economy Lab)今年8月发布的一项基于ADP薪资数据的研究表明,在受AI冲击最显著的职业中,22岁至25岁年轻人的就业人数比预期水平低了约19%(该预期水平以受AI影响较小的同龄人群就业增速为基准推算得出)。
研究作者埃里克·布林约尔松、巴拉特·钱达尔和陈如玉写道:“资深员工并未出现类似差距。”他们强调,这种调整“似乎主要通过缩减年轻员工招聘来实现,而非直接扩大解雇规模”。
需要说明的是,高盛的统计数据仅涵盖了那些“曾经拥有工作而后失业”的人群。
高盛的统计口径
上述数据来自美国人口普查局当前人口调查(Current Population Survey)下设的“被裁劳动者补充调查”(Displaced Worker Supplement)。这项调查每两年开展一次,旨在跟踪过去三年中遭遇非自愿失业群体的后续生计。高盛分析了2016至2025年间失业的1.5万多名劳动者,其中包括新公布的2023年至2025年数据。高盛表示,这一群体“很可能正是第一波因AI失业的劳动者”。
由于原始调查问卷并未直接设问“是否因AI失业”,高盛为此综合岗位的受AI冲击程度、所在行业的AI采用率,以及岗位是否被裁撤等因素,构建了一套评分体系,并将得分前30%的受访者划定为高概率因AI失业群体。高盛发现,在AI应用全面加速的2023年之前,高评分与低评分两组人群在失业率上并无显著差异。
不过,并非人人都认为AI已经重塑了整体劳动力市场。斯坦福研究人员写道,他们“尚未观察到由AI引发的、覆盖全经济领域的普遍性失业”。据《财富》杂志记者萨莎·罗格尔伯格今年2月报道,一直基于当前人口调查数据跟踪该课题的耶鲁大学预算实验室(Yale Budget Lab)发现,受AI影响程度、自动化和技术增强三项指标,“未展现出与就业或失业率变化存在直接关联的迹象”。
历史模式重现
在以往几轮技术变革中,因技术原因失业的劳动者再就业后,更容易转入更程式化、复杂度更低的岗位。究其原因,导致其失业的技术变革往往也贬低了他们既有技能的市场价值。然而,恰恰是这类重复性工作,最容易在下一波技术迭代中被彻底取代。
高盛再次捕捉到了这种旧模式的早期迹象。因AI冲击而失业的劳动者,更有可能彻底离开原来的职业和行业。但当他们重新获得聘用时,有相当比例的人——“特别是年长求职者”——却重新从事受AI影响程度类似甚至更高的岗位。(财富中文网)
本文使用了生成式AI进行研究辅助和/或文字转录。记者对文中的事实性内容进行了独立采访和核实,并由编辑在发表前完成人工审核。
作者:刘进龙
审校:汪皓
Goldman Sachs has tracked four decades of Americans who lost their jobs to technology. The first workers laid off from AI-exposed jobs are starting to look a lot like them, the investment bank wrote in a note published Thursday.
Goldman economist Pierfrancesco Mei found that workers displaced from AI-exposed jobs since 2025 took about a month longer to find a new job than other displaced workers. They were also roughly 10 percentage points more likely to still be unemployed a year after losing their job. Those effects are “comparable in magnitude” to what Goldman found in earlier waves of technological change, he wrote, calling the damage from those waves “long-lasting.”
As in those waves, older workers are having the harder time so far. AI-displaced workers 35 and older took about five weeks longer than other displaced workers to get back to full-time work. For those under 35, it was about three weeks.
The government’s numbers for all laid-off workers, not just those in AI-exposed jobs, show the same age gap. The Labor Department survey Goldman used counted 7.4 million workers displaced from 2023 through 2025, up from 6.3 million in the prior survey, which covered 2021 through 2023, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported in August. Among those who had held their jobs at least three years, 72.9% of workers ages 25 to 54 were working again by January 2026, compared with 57.3% of those 55 to 64 and 38.6% of those 65 and older.
Employers have cited AI in 120,136 announced job cuts through September, about 21% of all cuts and the top reason given, according to Challenger, Gray & Christmas’ September report.
What four decades of tech layoffs did
Goldman’s earlier research used individual-level data going back to 1979. It found that in the years after losing a job to technology, workers’ real earnings grew more slowly than those of other displaced workers. Their odds of another spell of unemployment stayed persistently higher.
The pay hit is already showing up in the broader data. Of long-tenured workers who lost full-time jobs from 2023 through 2025 and found full-time work again, about 49% were earning as much as or more than before, down from about 62% in the prior survey, according to BLS.
The damage wasn’t spread evenly. Younger, college-educated and urban workers saw cumulative real earnings losses about half as large as other technology-displaced workers over the 10 years after losing their jobs. Workers with less time at the job they lost also did better, “likely because their skills were less occupation-specific and therefore more transferable,” Mei wrote.
The age split is showing up again
The new data shows a similar pattern by age. Besides getting back to full-time work faster, younger AI-displaced workers cycled through fewer temporary jobs along the way. They were also less likely to hold a second job alongside their new full-time one.
Mei wrote that younger workers “may be able to adapt more flexibly to AI disruption.” He called that “an encouraging sign given concerns that AI-driven job losses could disproportionately affect recent graduates.” Goldman also found that college students are increasingly choosing majors that lead to jobs with lower AI exposure and stronger growth.
Goldman cautioned it’s “still too early to assess the impact along all of these dimensions,” such as education and geography.
Other research suggests young workers are getting hit somewhere else: at the front door. Stanford’s Digital Economy Lab, using ADP payroll data, found in August that employment for workers ages 22 to 25 in the most AI-exposed occupations is about 19% below where it would be if it had kept pace with similarly aged workers in less-exposed jobs.
“Experienced workers show no comparable gap,” wrote Erik Brynjolfsson, Bharat Chandar, and Ruyu Chen. The adjustment “appears to operate primarily through reduced hiring of young workers rather than increased separations,” they wrote.
Goldman’s data only covers people who had a job to lose.
How Goldman counted
The data comes from the Current Population Survey’s Displaced Worker Supplement. It’s a survey run every two years that asks people who lost a job involuntarily over the prior three years what happened next. Goldman analyzed more than 15,000 displaced workers who lost jobs between 2016 and 2025. That includes newly released data on 2023 to 2025 job losses, a group Goldman said “likely captures the first wave of AI-displaced workers.”
No survey question asks whether AI cost someone their job. So Goldman built a score from the occupation’s AI exposure, the industry’s AI adoption rate and whether the position was eliminated, and treated the top 30% as likely AI-displaced. Goldman found no significant gap between the two groups for job losses before 2023, the year AI adoption began to rise.
Not everyone sees AI moving the overall job market yet. The Stanford researchers wrote they “do not see widespread, economy-wide job displacement associated with AI.” The Yale Budget Lab, which tracks the question with Current Population Survey data, has found that measures of AI exposure, automation, and augmentation “show no sign of being related to changes in employment or unemployment,” as Fortune’s Sasha Rogelberg reported in February.
The old pattern, again
In past waves, workers who lost jobs to technology were more likely to get rehired into more routine, less complex work, likely because the change that cut their jobs had also lowered the value of their skills. That’s the kind of work the next round of technology could take.
Goldman sees early signs of that again. AI-displaced workers are more likely to leave their old occupation and industry altogether. But when they get rehired, more of them, “especially older ones,” are moving into roles with similar or even higher AI exposure.
Generative AI was used for research assistance and/or transcription of this article. The reporter independently reported and verified the factual claims in this article, and a human editor reviewed it before publication.