
AI热潮支撑美国经济增长已一年有余。但高盛(Goldman Sachs)首席经济学家扬·哈祖斯表示,这股支撑力量即将见顶。阿波罗全球管理公司(Apollo)首席经济学家托尔斯滕·斯洛克则指出,原本指望接棒的回报,至今仍未见踪影。
斯洛克在上周六发布的报告中写道:“尽管人工智能领域投资巨大、炒作盛行,但对科技行业以外的美国企业而言,这项技术带来的财务回报为零。”
哈祖斯在周一向客户发布的研报中写道,AI热潮带来的增长动能预计将在2026年底或2027年初见顶,早在最近几周外界对AI投资热潮可持续性的担忧升温之前,他就已作出了这一判断。
哈祖斯认为,经济增长面临的风险正偏向下行,AI正是原因之一。由于市场担忧中东局势再度升级,汽油、柴油、航空燃油以及欧洲和亚洲的天然气价格已回升至今年3月和4月高点附近,部分品种甚至更高。利率方面,自2026年初以来,发达市场收益率曲线上的长期利率平均上升了约100个基点。哈祖斯将利率上升的部分原因归咎于巨额财政赤字和“AI相关借贷”,并估计若利率高位延续,将累计拖累GDP约0.6个百分点。
哈祖斯写道,AI投资仍在快速增长。但他预计,未来一年,其占GDP比重的增幅将有所放缓。这一因素,再加上去年美国提高折旧抵扣额度所带来的刺激效应逐渐消退,将拖累资本支出增长,尤其是在美国。[“大而美法案”(One Big Beautiful Bill)恢复了100%额外折旧优惠,允许企业将设备采购支出一次性全额税前扣除。]
AI热潮还通过股市提振了消费端。高盛估计,过去一年,AI带来的“财富效应”为美国消费支出增长贡献了0.4个百分点,相当于GDP的0.25%。哈祖斯预计,未来一年这一贡献将趋于减弱。如果股市表现符合高盛策略师“较为乐观”的预期,回落过程将相对平缓;但如果AI相关股票继续下跌,回落则会更加剧烈。
“标普493”
斯洛克的报告解释了为何AI的提振效应如此集中。“美股七雄”经通胀调整后的人均营收在增长,利润率也在上升;而标普500指数中其他493家公司的这两项指标则基本收平。斯洛克把后者称为“标普493”。他援引旧金山联储经利用率调整的全要素生产率指标指出,生产率增长同样未见AI的拉动作用。
斯洛克写道:“由于AI对盈利没有影响,美国主流企业正在收缩投入,并开始将词元支出视为拖累利润率的成本项,而非增长来源。”
相比之下,由风投支持的初创企业在词元上的开销却越来越多。斯洛克引用了Ramp AI指数的数据,以及Ramp首席经济学家阿拉·哈拉齐安的研究成果指出,美国主流企业“并不需要最新的模型,也不愿意为此付费”。
斯洛克写道:“只要智能体AI和词元支出仍局限在经济中的一小部分领域,AI的宏观经济影响就会非常有限。”
分歧所在
对于后续走势,两位经济学家产生了分歧。哈祖斯写道,高盛的基准情景是,AI投资“最终将兑现为更高的生产率和整体经济利润”。
斯洛克则远没有这么笃定。他写道,随着模型日益商品化,关键问题在于,主流企业能否把“越来越廉价的智能”转化为更高的营收和利润率。他写道:“这看似简单,实则并不容易。AI也许是一台很出色的计算器,但在商业世界里,智能主要体现为判断力。”
不过,哈祖斯的乐观判断附带一个重要前提。他写道,兑现这种回报的关键途径之一,是劳动力市场受到冲击,而这种冲击“在短期内会对宏观经济产生负面影响”。
哈祖斯表示,总体来看,发达经济体的劳动力市场目前依然稳健。但高盛已经看到更清晰的迹象:AI的影响正向科技行业以外蔓延。在美国非制造业中,日常业务职能中使用AI的企业占比,如今与就业增长呈统计上显著的负相关,与失业率则呈显著的正相关。(财富中文网)
本文使用了生成式AI进行研究辅助和/或文字转录。记者对文中的事实性内容进行了独立采访和核实,并由编辑在发表前完成人工审核。
译者:刘进龙
审校:汪皓
AI热潮支撑美国经济增长已一年有余。但高盛(Goldman Sachs)首席经济学家扬·哈祖斯表示,这股支撑力量即将见顶。阿波罗全球管理公司(Apollo)首席经济学家托尔斯滕·斯洛克则指出,原本指望接棒的回报,至今仍未见踪影。
斯洛克在上周六发布的报告中写道:“尽管人工智能领域投资巨大、炒作盛行,但对科技行业以外的美国企业而言,这项技术带来的财务回报为零。”
哈祖斯在周一向客户发布的研报中写道,AI热潮带来的增长动能预计将在2026年底或2027年初见顶,早在最近几周外界对AI投资热潮可持续性的担忧升温之前,他就已作出了这一判断。
哈祖斯认为,经济增长面临的风险正偏向下行,AI正是原因之一。由于市场担忧中东局势再度升级,汽油、柴油、航空燃油以及欧洲和亚洲的天然气价格已回升至今年3月和4月高点附近,部分品种甚至更高。利率方面,自2026年初以来,发达市场收益率曲线上的长期利率平均上升了约100个基点。哈祖斯将利率上升的部分原因归咎于巨额财政赤字和“AI相关借贷”,并估计若利率高位延续,将累计拖累GDP约0.6个百分点。
哈祖斯写道,AI投资仍在快速增长。但他预计,未来一年,其占GDP比重的增幅将有所放缓。这一因素,再加上去年美国提高折旧抵扣额度所带来的刺激效应逐渐消退,将拖累资本支出增长,尤其是在美国。[“大而美法案”(One Big Beautiful Bill)恢复了100%额外折旧优惠,允许企业将设备采购支出一次性全额税前扣除。]
AI热潮还通过股市提振了消费端。高盛估计,过去一年,AI带来的“财富效应”为美国消费支出增长贡献了0.4个百分点,相当于GDP的0.25%。哈祖斯预计,未来一年这一贡献将趋于减弱。如果股市表现符合高盛策略师“较为乐观”的预期,回落过程将相对平缓;但如果AI相关股票继续下跌,回落则会更加剧烈。
“标普493”
斯洛克的报告解释了为何AI的提振效应如此集中。“美股七雄”经通胀调整后的人均营收在增长,利润率也在上升;而标普500指数中其他493家公司的这两项指标则基本收平。斯洛克把后者称为“标普493”。他援引旧金山联储经利用率调整的全要素生产率指标指出,生产率增长同样未见AI的拉动作用。
斯洛克写道:“由于AI对盈利没有影响,美国主流企业正在收缩投入,并开始将词元支出视为拖累利润率的成本项,而非增长来源。”
相比之下,由风投支持的初创企业在词元上的开销却越来越多。斯洛克引用了Ramp AI指数的数据,以及Ramp首席经济学家阿拉·哈拉齐安的研究成果指出,美国主流企业“并不需要最新的模型,也不愿意为此付费”。
斯洛克写道:“只要智能体AI和词元支出仍局限在经济中的一小部分领域,AI的宏观经济影响就会非常有限。”
分歧所在
对于后续走势,两位经济学家产生了分歧。哈祖斯写道,高盛的基准情景是,AI投资“最终将兑现为更高的生产率和整体经济利润”。
斯洛克则远没有这么笃定。他写道,随着模型日益商品化,关键问题在于,主流企业能否把“越来越廉价的智能”转化为更高的营收和利润率。他写道:“这看似简单,实则并不容易。AI也许是一台很出色的计算器,但在商业世界里,智能主要体现为判断力。”
不过,哈祖斯的乐观判断附带一个重要前提。他写道,兑现这种回报的关键途径之一,是劳动力市场受到冲击,而这种冲击“在短期内会对宏观经济产生负面影响”。
哈祖斯表示,总体来看,发达经济体的劳动力市场目前依然稳健。但高盛已经看到更清晰的迹象:AI的影响正向科技行业以外蔓延。在美国非制造业中,日常业务职能中使用AI的企业占比,如今与就业增长呈统计上显著的负相关,与失业率则呈显著的正相关。(财富中文网)
本文使用了生成式AI进行研究辅助和/或文字转录。记者对文中的事实性内容进行了独立采访和核实,并由编辑在发表前完成人工审核。
译者:刘进龙
审校:汪皓
The AI boom has been propping up U.S. growth for more than a year. But Goldman Sachs chief economist Jan Hatzius says that support is about to crest, and Apollo chief economist Torsten Slok says the payoff that was supposed to replace it hasn’t shown up.
“Despite massive investments and widespread hype around artificial intelligence, the technology has delivered zero financial payoff to corporate America outside of tech,” Slok wrote in a note Saturday.
Hatzius wrote in a note to clients Monday that the growth impulse from the AI boom was set to peak in late 2026 or early 2027 “even before concerns around the sustainability of the AI investment boom intensified in recent weeks.”
AI is one of several reasons Hatzius sees risks to growth tilting downward. Gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and European and Asian natural gas prices are back near or above their March and April highs on fears of renewed Middle East escalation. Long-term interest rates are up about 100 basis points on average across developed-market yield curves since early 2026. Hatzius partly blames large deficits and “AI-linked borrowing” for that rise, and estimates it will subtract a cumulative 0.6% from GDP if it lasts.
AI investment is still rising rapidly, Hatzius wrote. But he expects the increase as a share of GDP to slow over the next year. That, plus the fading boost from last year’s increase in U.S. depreciation allowances, will weigh on capital spending growth, especially in the U.S. (The One Big Beautiful Bill restored 100% bonus depreciation, which lets companies write off equipment purchases immediately.)
The boom has also juiced consumers through the stock market. Goldman estimates the AI “wealth effect” added 0.4 percentage points to U.S. consumer spending growth over the past year, or 0.25% of GDP. Hatzius expects that to decline over the next year. The slide would be gradual if stocks perform in line with Goldman strategists’ “reasonably upbeat” expectations, and sharper if AI-related stocks keep falling.
The S&P 493
Slok’s note explains why the boost has been so concentrated. Inflation-adjusted revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the Magnificent 7 and flat for everyone else in the S&P 500, which he calls the S&P 493. Productivity growth shows no AI lift either, he wrote, citing the San Francisco Fed’s utilization-adjusted measure of total factor productivity.
“With no impact on the bottom line, mainstream corporate America is pulling back and starting to view token spending not as a source of growth but as a cost center that weighs on margins,” Slok wrote.
Venture-backed companies, meanwhile, are spending more and more on tokens, he wrote, pointing to Ramp AI Index data and work by Ramp chief economist Ara Kharazian. Mainstream corporate America “does not need the latest model and is unwilling to pay for it.”
“As long as agentic AI and token spending are confined to a small part of the economy, the macroeconomic effects of AI will be very limited,” Slok wrote.
Where they split
The two economists parted ways on what comes next. Goldman’s base case is that AI investment “will ultimately pay off in terms of higher productivity and economywide profits,” Hatzius wrote.
Slok was far less certain. The question, he wrote, is whether mainstream companies can turn “increasingly cheap intelligence” into higher revenue and margins as models get commoditized. “That may be harder than it sounds,” he wrote. “AI may be a great calculator, but in business, intelligence is mostly judgment.”
Hatzius’ optimism comes with a catch. One key channel for that payoff, he wrote, is labor-market disruption, “which has negative near-term macroeconomic effects.”
Labor markets in developed economies still look solid overall, he wrote. But Goldman is seeing clearer signs that AI’s impact is spreading beyond tech. Across U.S. nonmanufacturing industries, the share of firms using AI in regular business functions now has a statistically significant negative correlation with employment growth and a statistically significant positive correlation with unemployment.
Generative AI was used for research assistance and/or transcription of this article. The reporter independently reported and verified the factual claims in this article, and a human editor reviewed it before publication.