
拉凯什·库马尔感叹:“我不想夸耀自己‘早有预言’,但眼下的局势确实印证了我的判断。”
库马尔是伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校(University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)电气与计算机工程教授,也是《芯片时代:半导体如何成为全球最具战略价值的资源》(Chip Age: How Semiconductors Became the World’s Most Powerful Resource)一书的作者。过去四年里,他一直是学术界对华盛顿遏制中国芯片产业这一政策最坚定的批评者之一。
2022年10月,拜登政府出台针对先进芯片和芯片制造设备的大规模出口管制措施,此后又多次扩大了管制范围。然而,早在管制措施出台前几天,库马尔就在《财富》杂志撰文警告称,这种打压不会奏效。他当时写道:“你不可能指望靠绊倒对手来赢下一场关键比赛,尤其是在这么做本身需要付出高昂代价的情况下。更好的策略,是让自己跑得更快。”
四年过去了,这些管制措施似乎确实未能奏效。中国产处理器与美国竞争对手的差距日益缩小,中国的AI模型也已经能够与美国顶尖模型相媲美。
库马尔首先提出的问题是:这些管制措施究竟想达到什么目的?他对《财富》杂志表示:“大多数AI应用根本不需要最先进的芯片。”
机器人、智能摄像头等广泛落地的AI应用,都不需要最先进的半导体晶圆。而美国对华断供,反而倒逼中国全力打造自主替代方案。库马尔表示:“出口管制促使中国投入大量资金,建立起一套独立的生态系统,足以满足这些应用的需求。从这个意义上说,出口管制不仅徒劳无功,反而适得其反。”
在美国制裁下濒临绝境的华为(Huawei),如今却频频推出高端智能手机和AI处理器。10月13日,华为表示,自2023年以来,搭载其自研麒麟(Kirin)处理器的设备出货量已经超过1亿台。
中国在软件生态方面也在迎头赶上。库马尔指出,中国的模型“在性能上已非常接近美国的顶尖模型”。
中国AI实验室深度求索(DeepSeek)和初创公司智谱华章(Z.ai)已对各自的旗舰模型进行了适配,使其能够在华为昇腾(Ascend)处理器上运行。中国外卖巨头美团(Meituan)今年6月表示,公司已经完全使用国产芯片训练出一个拥有1.6万亿参数的AI模型。据路透社援引IDC数据报道,2026年上半年,英伟达(Nvidia)在中国数据中心芯片市场的份额降至34%,其AI加速器出货量也同比下降44%。
在存储芯片领域,中国芯片厂商甚至展现出领跑态势。中国领先的存储芯片制造商长鑫存储(ChangXin Memory Technologies,简称CXMT)上周末在上海举行的一场行业会议上表示,将在今年年底前推出一种全新的存储芯片架构——如果该技术得到验证,将使其领先于当前的行业龙头三星(Samsung)、SK海力士(SK Hynix)和美光(Micron)。
华盛顿方面公开表述的出口管制目标也已发生变化。美国官员如今较少谈论遏制中国AI发展,而更强调让美国继续保持技术领先。
穷尽现有条件的潜能
库马尔解释说:“如果这是战略目标或军事目标,确实需要拥有最先进的模型,要在AI能力上与对方平起平坐,我认为实现这一目标的途径有很多。”
中国可以通过算法技术、开源以及先进封装,补足在先进芯片制造设备上的短板。他表示:“这样做成本可能更高,但如果决策者认为这对于国家至关重要,就会甘愿承担这种成本。”
中国芯片制造商一直无法进口荷兰芯片设备巨头阿斯麦(ASML)生产的极紫外(EUV)光刻机。这类设备能够在最先进的芯片上刻出最微小的结构。自2019年以来,在美国施压下,荷兰政府始终未发放相关出口许可证。中国最大芯片制造商中芯国际(Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp.,简称 SMIC)等晶圆厂,被迫依赖技术水平相对较低的深紫外(DUV)光刻机,并设法从这些较老的设备中挖掘出更高的性能。
库马尔表示:“这种做法的可扩展性有多强?良率究竟有多高?这些问题目前依然没有答案。”
华为放弃了在单层硅片上塞入更多晶体管的传统路线,转而采用三维堆叠芯片的方式。今年5月,华为半导体业务负责人何庭波公布了公司对摩尔定律的另一种解法——韬缩放定律。这一思路关注的重点,不再只是晶体管能做得多小,而是信号在整个计算系统中传输得有多快。按照华为的目标,到2031年,基于韬定律的高端芯片晶体管密度将达到1.4纳米制程的同等水平。
战略成功,不等于商业成功
不过,尽管中国在芯片自主方面取得了战略上的成功,却未必实现了商业上的成功。
库马尔坦言:“中国企业能否在推理服务领域与西方供应商竞争?至少在短期内,答案可能是否定的。”
这听起来或许有些违背常理,因为中国的开源模型凭借低成本在全球广受赞誉,且中国的电力成本较低。但库马尔指出,目前最大的推理服务提供商仍然不是中国企业。他表示:“模型在中国开发出来,最终却是在美国用美国芯片提供服务。”
他补充说:“如果中国企业也能以更低成本提供这些词元的推理服务,他们就会直接从中国输出。所有人都会通过中国基础设施使用这些模型。但现实并非如此。”
华为和其他中国芯片制造商努力从技术水平相对较低的硬件中挖掘更多性能,这些尝试令人印象深刻;但与英伟达或超微半导体(AMD)所拥有的技术自由度相比,这些做法目前仍是权宜之计。库马尔解释说:“仅靠芯片制程微缩,往往就能更快提升成本效率和性能;其效果通常高于影响系统整体成本和性能的其他因素。”
“从某种意义上说,AI正在拯救芯片行业”
《芯片时代》(The Chip Age)主要讲述的是,半导体如何成为全球最重要的商品之一。但这本书同时也是一种警示。
库马尔表示,如今制造每个新晶体管的成本已开始上升,而晶圆代工行业也高度集中,仅台积电(Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.)一家就在先进制程芯片制造领域占据主导地位。
在谈到芯片行业曾经的竞争对手时,他表示:“有些电影里会有一个团队,主角们接连倒下。在我看来,这个行业的演变就像这样一部电影。”
半导体本就是繁荣与低迷交替的强周期行业。在ChatGPT横空出世之前,芯片制造商正面临新冠疫情后的芯片过剩。
库马尔表示:“从某种意义上说,AI正在拯救芯片行业。”
那么,如果像Anthropic首席执行官达里奥·阿莫代伊所主张的那样,前沿实验室放缓发展速度,是否会打击芯片需求?库马尔的回答是:“不会造成巨大的冲击。半导体需求增长,不只是因为某一个客户的芯片需求增长,更因为客户数量在增多。”毕竟,OpenAI和Anthropic并不是推动半导体需求增长的唯一力量。
这并不意味着库马尔不担心芯片行业长期陷入停滞。如果AI需求逐渐减弱,或者芯片制造的经济性最终使制程微缩难以为继,西方的领先优势就不会继续扩大。他表示:“如果芯片制程微缩明显放缓,或者应用层面的需求动力不足以支撑芯片制造成本继续上升,中国就有可能最终追赶上来。”
他补充道:“永远不要低估人类创新的能力。在无法获得先进芯片的情况下,中国AI模型已经几乎和部分美国模型一样强大,这本身就已经足够说明问题。”(财富中文网)
《财富》“亚洲议程”(Asia Agenda)专栏每月推出至少两期高端访谈。我们深入对话亚洲顶尖商业领袖,探讨他们如何为未来进行战略布局,以及在这片全球增长最快、最具活力的地区领导企业的心得与启示。点击此处查看该专栏的全部人物报道。
译者:刘进龙
审校:汪皓
拉凯什·库马尔感叹:“我不想夸耀自己‘早有预言’,但眼下的局势确实印证了我的判断。”
库马尔是伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校(University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)电气与计算机工程教授,也是《芯片时代:半导体如何成为全球最具战略价值的资源》(Chip Age: How Semiconductors Became the World’s Most Powerful Resource)一书的作者。过去四年里,他一直是学术界对华盛顿遏制中国芯片产业这一政策最坚定的批评者之一。
2022年10月,拜登政府出台针对先进芯片和芯片制造设备的大规模出口管制措施,此后又多次扩大了管制范围。然而,早在管制措施出台前几天,库马尔就在《财富》杂志撰文警告称,这种打压不会奏效。他当时写道:“你不可能指望靠绊倒对手来赢下一场关键比赛,尤其是在这么做本身需要付出高昂代价的情况下。更好的策略,是让自己跑得更快。”
四年过去了,这些管制措施似乎确实未能奏效。中国产处理器与美国竞争对手的差距日益缩小,中国的AI模型也已经能够与美国顶尖模型相媲美。
库马尔首先提出的问题是:这些管制措施究竟想达到什么目的?他对《财富》杂志表示:“大多数AI应用根本不需要最先进的芯片。”
机器人、智能摄像头等广泛落地的AI应用,都不需要最先进的半导体晶圆。而美国对华断供,反而倒逼中国全力打造自主替代方案。库马尔表示:“出口管制促使中国投入大量资金,建立起一套独立的生态系统,足以满足这些应用的需求。从这个意义上说,出口管制不仅徒劳无功,反而适得其反。”
在美国制裁下濒临绝境的华为(Huawei),如今却频频推出高端智能手机和AI处理器。10月13日,华为表示,自2023年以来,搭载其自研麒麟(Kirin)处理器的设备出货量已经超过1亿台。
中国在软件生态方面也在迎头赶上。库马尔指出,中国的模型“在性能上已非常接近美国的顶尖模型”。
中国AI实验室深度求索(DeepSeek)和初创公司智谱华章(Z.ai)已对各自的旗舰模型进行了适配,使其能够在华为昇腾(Ascend)处理器上运行。中国外卖巨头美团(Meituan)今年6月表示,公司已经完全使用国产芯片训练出一个拥有1.6万亿参数的AI模型。据路透社援引IDC数据报道,2026年上半年,英伟达(Nvidia)在中国数据中心芯片市场的份额降至34%,其AI加速器出货量也同比下降44%。
在存储芯片领域,中国芯片厂商甚至展现出领跑态势。中国领先的存储芯片制造商长鑫存储(ChangXin Memory Technologies,简称CXMT)上周末在上海举行的一场行业会议上表示,将在今年年底前推出一种全新的存储芯片架构——如果该技术得到验证,将使其领先于当前的行业龙头三星(Samsung)、SK海力士(SK Hynix)和美光(Micron)。
华盛顿方面公开表述的出口管制目标也已发生变化。美国官员如今较少谈论遏制中国AI发展,而更强调让美国继续保持技术领先。
穷尽现有条件的潜能
库马尔解释说:“如果这是战略目标或军事目标,确实需要拥有最先进的模型,要在AI能力上与对方平起平坐,我认为实现这一目标的途径有很多。”
中国可以通过算法技术、开源以及先进封装,补足在先进芯片制造设备上的短板。他表示:“这样做成本可能更高,但如果决策者认为这对于国家至关重要,就会甘愿承担这种成本。”
中国芯片制造商一直无法进口荷兰芯片设备巨头阿斯麦(ASML)生产的极紫外(EUV)光刻机。这类设备能够在最先进的芯片上刻出最微小的结构。自2019年以来,在美国施压下,荷兰政府始终未发放相关出口许可证。中国最大芯片制造商中芯国际(Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp.,简称 SMIC)等晶圆厂,被迫依赖技术水平相对较低的深紫外(DUV)光刻机,并设法从这些较老的设备中挖掘出更高的性能。
库马尔表示:“这种做法的可扩展性有多强?良率究竟有多高?这些问题目前依然没有答案。”
华为放弃了在单层硅片上塞入更多晶体管的传统路线,转而采用三维堆叠芯片的方式。今年5月,华为半导体业务负责人何庭波公布了公司对摩尔定律的另一种解法——韬缩放定律。这一思路关注的重点,不再只是晶体管能做得多小,而是信号在整个计算系统中传输得有多快。按照华为的目标,到2031年,基于韬定律的高端芯片晶体管密度将达到1.4纳米制程的同等水平。
战略成功,不等于商业成功
不过,尽管中国在芯片自主方面取得了战略上的成功,却未必实现了商业上的成功。
库马尔坦言:“中国企业能否在推理服务领域与西方供应商竞争?至少在短期内,答案可能是否定的。”
这听起来或许有些违背常理,因为中国的开源模型凭借低成本在全球广受赞誉,且中国的电力成本较低。但库马尔指出,目前最大的推理服务提供商仍然不是中国企业。他表示:“模型在中国开发出来,最终却是在美国用美国芯片提供服务。”
他补充说:“如果中国企业也能以更低成本提供这些词元的推理服务,他们就会直接从中国输出。所有人都会通过中国基础设施使用这些模型。但现实并非如此。”
华为和其他中国芯片制造商努力从技术水平相对较低的硬件中挖掘更多性能,这些尝试令人印象深刻;但与英伟达或超微半导体(AMD)所拥有的技术自由度相比,这些做法目前仍是权宜之计。库马尔解释说:“仅靠芯片制程微缩,往往就能更快提升成本效率和性能;其效果通常高于影响系统整体成本和性能的其他因素。”
“从某种意义上说,AI正在拯救芯片行业”
《芯片时代》(The Chip Age)主要讲述的是,半导体如何成为全球最重要的商品之一。但这本书同时也是一种警示。
库马尔表示,如今制造每个新晶体管的成本已开始上升,而晶圆代工行业也高度集中,仅台积电(Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.)一家就在先进制程芯片制造领域占据主导地位。
在谈到芯片行业曾经的竞争对手时,他表示:“有些电影里会有一个团队,主角们接连倒下。在我看来,这个行业的演变就像这样一部电影。”
半导体本就是繁荣与低迷交替的强周期行业。在ChatGPT横空出世之前,芯片制造商正面临新冠疫情后的芯片过剩。
库马尔表示:“从某种意义上说,AI正在拯救芯片行业。”
那么,如果像Anthropic首席执行官达里奥·阿莫代伊所主张的那样,前沿实验室放缓发展速度,是否会打击芯片需求?库马尔的回答是:“不会造成巨大的冲击。半导体需求增长,不只是因为某一个客户的芯片需求增长,更因为客户数量在增多。”毕竟,OpenAI和Anthropic并不是推动半导体需求增长的唯一力量。
这并不意味着库马尔不担心芯片行业长期陷入停滞。如果AI需求逐渐减弱,或者芯片制造的经济性最终使制程微缩难以为继,西方的领先优势就不会继续扩大。他表示:“如果芯片制程微缩明显放缓,或者应用层面的需求动力不足以支撑芯片制造成本继续上升,中国就有可能最终追赶上来。”
他补充道:“永远不要低估人类创新的能力。在无法获得先进芯片的情况下,中国AI模型已经几乎和部分美国模型一样强大,这本身就已经足够说明问题。”(财富中文网)
《财富》“亚洲议程”(Asia Agenda)专栏每月推出至少两期高端访谈。我们深入对话亚洲顶尖商业领袖,探讨他们如何为未来进行战略布局,以及在这片全球增长最快、最具活力的地区领导企业的心得与启示。点击此处查看该专栏的全部人物报道。
译者:刘进龙
审校:汪皓
“I’m not going to say ‘I told you so,'” says Rakesh Kumar. “But it really is ‘I told you so.'”
Kumar, a professor of electrical and computer engineering at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign and author of Chip Age: How Semiconductors Became the World’s Most Powerful Resource, has spent four years as one of Washington’s most persistent academic critics of its attempt to freeze China’s chip industry.
Days before the Biden administration unveiled its sweeping export controls on advanced chips and chipmaking equipment in October 2022—restrictions that have been expanded repeatedly since—he warned in Fortune that the crackdown would not work. “You can’t win an important race by hoping to trip your opponent, especially when there are significant costs to doing so,” he wrote. “A far better strategy is to run faster.”
Four years later, the controls don’t seem to have worked. Chinese processors are closing the gap with their U.S. rivals; the country’s AI models already match some of the U.S.’s best models.
Kumar’s first question is what the controls were ever supposed to achieve. “For most applications of AI, you don’t need the most advanced chips,” he tells Fortune.
Robotics, smart cameras, and other widely used AI applications don’t require the most advanced silicon. And by cutting China off, Washington gave Beijing every reason to build its own alternatives. “Export controls spurred China to invest all this money to set up an ecosystem where they can now serve these applications by themselves,” Kumar says. “Not only have export controls failed in that sense, but they’ve had the opposite effect.”
Huawei—once on the brink of death under U.S. sanctions—is now releasing premium smartphones and AI processors. On Oct. 13, it said it had shipped more than 100 million devices powered by its homegrown Kirin processors since 2023.
China is catching up on the software side, too. Chinese models are “very, very close, in terms of performance, to the models from the U.S.,” Kumar notes.
Chinese AI lab DeepSeek and startup Z.ai have adapted their flagship models to run on Huawei’s Ascend processors. Meituan, China’s food delivery giant, said in June it had trained a 1.6-trillion-parameter AI model entirely on domestically made chips. Nvidia’s share of data center chips in China fell to 34% in the first half of 2026, while shipments of its AI accelerators dropped by 44% compared to a year earlier, according to IDC data cited by Reuters.
In memory chips, Chinese chipmakers even claim to be ahead. ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT), China’s leading memory chipmaker, said at an industry conference in Shanghai over the weekend that it would debut a new memory chip architecture by the end of the year—one that, if proven, would put it ahead of current leaders Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron.
Washington’s stated goal has changed. U.S. officials talk less about stopping Chinese AI development than about keeping the U.S. at the frontier. They point to a growing list of workarounds: Nvidia’s top-end B200 and B300 processors, barred from export, keep turning up inside China; Anthropic and OpenAI accuse DeepSeek and other Chinese labs of “distilling” American models (training on a rival’s outputs to close the gap cheaply).
Squeezing more out of what they have
“If it’s a strategic goal or a military goal—where you really need to have the most advanced models, need to be at par in terms of AI—then I think there are all these different ways in which you can achieve that goal,” Kumar explains.
China can offset what it lacks in advanced chipmaking equipment with algorithmic techniques, open-sourcing, and advanced packaging. “You may be doing that at higher cost, but that’s a cost that you’re willing to swallow if you think that this is important for the country,” he says.
Chinese chipmakers have never been able to import the extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines built by Dutch chip-equipment giant ASML—the tools that print the tiniest features on the most advanced chips—because the Dutch government, under U.S. pressure, has withheld an export license since 2019. That has forced fabs such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC), China’s largest chipmaker, to rely on less sophisticated deep ultraviolet (DUV) machines, squeezing out better performance from older machines.
“How scalable is it? How much yield can you get out of it? Those are questions that we still don’t know the answer to,” Kumar says.
Rather than cram more transistors onto a single layer of silicon, Huawei is stacking chips in three dimensions. In May, He Tingbo, president of Huawei’s semiconductor business unit, unveiled the company’s answer to Moore’s Law: the “Tau Scaling Law,” which focuses on how fast signals move across a computing system over how small its transistors are, with a target of 1.4-nanometer-equivalent chip density by 2031.
Strategic vs. commercial
But while China’s chip self-sufficiency is a strategic success, it’s not necessarily a commercial one.
“Can Chinese companies be competitive against Western inference providers? The answer would likely be no, at least in the short term,” Kumar concedes.
That may sound counterintuitive, given that Chinese open-source models have won plaudits worldwide for their low costs—and that China has cheap power. But the biggest inference providers are still not Chinese, he points out. “These models get developed in China, but then they’re getting served on American chips, in America.”
“If the Chinese could also serve these tokens cheaper than the Americans, well, they would just serve these tokens from China,” he adds. “Everybody would access these models on Chinese infrastructure. But that’s not what’s happening.”
The efforts by Huawei and other Chinese chipmakers to squeeze more performance out of less sophisticated hardware are impressive—but the results are still workarounds compared with the freedom Nvidia or AMD have. “The rate at which you get cost efficiency and performance benefits just from scaling the chips tends to be much higher than the other factors that contribute to overall cost and performance of systems,” Kumar explains.
‘AI is, in some sense, saving the chip industry’
The Chip Age is primarily a story about how semiconductors became one of the world’s most important commodities. But it’s also a warning.
According to Kumar, the cost of building each new transistor has started rising, and the foundry business has consolidated to the point where one company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., dominates advanced chip manufacturing.
“There are these movies where you have a team and a set of protagonists, and they all end up dying one by one,” he says of the industry’s one-time rivals. “That’s how the movie played out in my mind.”
Semiconductors are a boom-and-bust industry. Before ChatGPT came on the scene, chipmakers were staring at a post-COVID chip glut.
“AI is, in some sense, saving the chip industry,” Kumar says.
So would a deliberate slowdown at the frontier labs—as pushed by Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei—put a dent in chip demand? “Not a strong one,” Kumar says. “The demand for semiconductors increases not only because a given customer needs more chips, but because the number of customers keeps increasing.” OpenAI and Anthropic, after all, aren’t the only drivers of semiconductor demand.
That doesn’t mean he’s not worried about a long-term stagnation in the chip sector. If demand for AI tapers, or the economics of chipmaking finally stall miniaturization, the West’s lead stops growing. “If chip scaling significantly slows down, or if the application drivers aren’t strong enough to sustain the increased cost of chipmaking, then that’s one scenario in which China may just catch up,” he says.
“Never underestimate the ability of humanity to innovate,” he adds. “The fact that these Chinese AI models are nearly as powerful as some of the American models, without access to these advanced chips, already tells you something.”
In Fortune’s Asia Agenda column, released at least twice a month, we speak with Asia’s top business leaders about how they are building for the future and the lessons they’ve drawn from leading companies in one of the world’s fastest growing and most dynamic regions. Explore all of our profiles here.