2004年6月25日,星期五,葡萄牙。欧洲杯四分之一决赛的第65分钟,赔率15:1的希腊队对阵本届夺冠大热门法国队。希腊队队长西奥多罗斯·扎戈拉基斯禁区传中,一道完美弧线划破里斯本的天空。安杰洛斯·查理斯特亚斯急速冲锋高高跃起,力压两名高大的法国后卫,一记势大力沉的头球越过呆立的守门员,轰入球网。
场面瞬间陷入疯狂。这支所有评论员轻视的黑马球队逆势取得了领先。坐拥齐内丁·齐达内和蒂埃里·亨利等巨星的法国队惊呆了。他们疯狂反击,发动一波又一波攻势,但希腊队顽强坚韧,防线始终没被击穿。终场哨声响起,卫冕冠军出局,这一结果震惊了足坛。
场外发生的事更让我震惊。接下来一周法国股市蒸发了100亿欧元。要知道,法国经济基本面并没有在一夜之间发生突变。当时我正在摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)的交易大厅,亲眼见证了这一切。一些公认全世界最聪明、最冷静的投资者明显心神不宁。他们情绪低落,一名交易员愤然离场,好几天都没返回。人们的判断力开始动摇,市场应声下挫。
当然,股价受诸多因素驱动,包括利率、能源价格、政治动荡等,但这些因素都是理性变量,影响销售、利润和股息,左右股票走势很合理。看着交易员们对一场足球比赛做出情绪化反应,我不禁思考:市场会不会同样被情绪塑造?
纽约的夏天结束后,我回到麻省理工学院(MIT)攻读金融学博士第二年。开学第一课是实证资产定价。这门课本该讲授所谓的市场运动定律,也就是决定股票、债券和货币涨跌的力量。但我们学的不是动物精神和人类心理学,而是莱陶-卢德维森消费-总财富比率以及耐用消费品与非耐用消费品之间的替代弹性。根据相关模型,投资者都是冷酷的分析机器,判断精准,会仔细甄别每一条可能带来优势的信息。
然而我刚刚亲眼所见完全是另一番景象。交易员做决策并非基于数据或基本面,而是国家队比赛的输赢。当然,法国队的比赛只是个例。但如果不是例外,而是普遍规律呢?我提出了看似荒谬的问题:足球比赛失利会不会导致一国股市下跌?
我不敢告诉教授我在研究什么。麻省理工学院可是数学金融学的梵蒂冈,史蒂夫·罗斯是该领域泰斗之一,是诺贝尔奖热门候选人。他当时正辗转全球各地发表演讲,宣扬有效市场理论,主张投资者理性,处理信息的速度快如闪电。我把想法告诉摩根士丹利的前同事时,他们一笑置之。华尔街精英怎么可能被足球比分左右?布雷利、迈尔斯和艾伦合著的《公司财务原理》(Principles of Corporate Finance)是当时领先的金融学教科书,我本科时学过,也是每个银行家的书架上必备的书,书中只将心理学放在某一章里孤零零的一小节,还直言无关紧要。
我没有气馁,搜集了39个国家750场比赛的数据,反复计算后发现了明确的模式,国家队输掉比赛后股市会持续下跌。然而即便证据摆在面前,我也相信没人会相信。
最终,我不得不在博士研讨会上展示研究。我做好了当众出丑的准备,尤其是看到教授们走进会场时。教师很少出席学生的演讲,我笃定他们是来看我搞砸演讲的。但他们心态开放,耐心倾听,令我松了一口气的是,演讲结束后还给出了肯定评价。这篇论文最终发表在金融学顶级期刊《金融杂志》上,还入围了最佳论文奖的决赛。令我惊讶的是,这项研究冲出了象牙塔。我陆续登上了美国消费者新闻与商业频道(CNBC)、娱乐与体育节目电视网(ESPN)和英国天空体育,《华尔街日报》、《金融时报》和《泰晤士报》也都报道了研究。
这项研究让我看到了全新的研究领域,古怪又创新,严谨而又稳健,这项研究揭示了即便最理性的头脑也会沦为情绪的俘虏。投资者哪怕熟练使用各种表格,深谙复杂工具,但终究是人。全球各地的人都会落入代价高昂的认知陷阱,多数人陷入困境,少数精明的人则能从混乱中获利。如今,心理学对市场的影响已成为主流议题。修订几个版本之后,《公司财务原理》作者由布雷利-迈尔斯-艾伦变成了布雷利-迈尔斯-艾伦-埃德曼斯,开始立足于真实生活中的金融运行逻辑。
我当初担心的难堪,变成了观察金融世界的新视角,即接纳人性而非否认人性。借助这一视角,我们能更清晰地看懂市场,做出更精明的决策,规避自身的认知偏差并捕捉他人的错误。相关知识不仅在理论上很有趣,实践中也可操作。
有个流行的观点因《群体的智慧》(The Wisdom of Crowds)等书而闻名,认为集体智慧会引导人们走向真相。我可能因为是埃隆·马斯克的狂热粉丝而看涨特斯拉。你可能因为受不了他的政治立场而看跌。我们的偏见相互抵消,市场反映现实。理论如此,但只有在错误均匀分布时才有效。就像该书开篇的例子中,县集市上人们猜测一头牛的重量。有些人猜得太高,其他人太低,取平均时就会接近目标。
市场不是县集市。没人会对一头牛的重量投入情感。然而在交易大厅里,情绪冲动根深蒂固,一旦情绪共振就会将所有人推向同一个方向。2004年欧洲杯法国队爆冷失利后,法国投资者集体士气低落、消沉且沮丧,市场随之跳水。
更糟的是,我们不是在真空中做决策。集市上可以独自猜测重量,秘密提交。但市场是另一种野兽。我们不断环顾四周,揣测别人掌握了什么自己不知道的信息,观察他们的行为,害怕错失机会。看到比特币飙升,谁都不想成为赶不上行情的傻瓜,于是跟风买入。买入推高了价格,吸引更多人加入狂热。就这样,狂热像病毒一样扩散。
本书探讨的正是这一主题,投资者犯的错误以及为何犯错。错误没有相互抵消,而是滚雪球般形成繁荣与萧条。情绪如何像病毒一样在金融市场蔓延,从华尔街传导至主普通大众。如何避免被感染,更进一步的是如何发现他人的失误,识别市场何时陷入疯狂,并从疯狂中获利。(财富中文网)
本文节选自《市场的疯狂》(The Madness of Markets)一书,经企鹅兰登书屋旗下皇冠出版集团授权转载。版权所有© 2026 亚历克斯·埃德曼斯。
译者:梁宇
审校:夏林
2004年6月25日,星期五,葡萄牙。欧洲杯四分之一决赛的第65分钟,赔率15:1的希腊队对阵本届夺冠大热门法国队。希腊队队长西奥多罗斯·扎戈拉基斯禁区传中,一道完美弧线划破里斯本的天空。安杰洛斯·查理斯特亚斯急速冲锋高高跃起,力压两名高大的法国后卫,一记势大力沉的头球越过呆立的守门员,轰入球网。
场面瞬间陷入疯狂。这支所有评论员轻视的黑马球队逆势取得了领先。坐拥齐内丁·齐达内和蒂埃里·亨利等巨星的法国队惊呆了。他们疯狂反击,发动一波又一波攻势,但希腊队顽强坚韧,防线始终没被击穿。终场哨声响起,卫冕冠军出局,这一结果震惊了足坛。
场外发生的事更让我震惊。接下来一周法国股市蒸发了100亿欧元。要知道,法国经济基本面并没有在一夜之间发生突变。当时我正在摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)的交易大厅,亲眼见证了这一切。一些公认全世界最聪明、最冷静的投资者明显心神不宁。他们情绪低落,一名交易员愤然离场,好几天都没返回。人们的判断力开始动摇,市场应声下挫。
当然,股价受诸多因素驱动,包括利率、能源价格、政治动荡等,但这些因素都是理性变量,影响销售、利润和股息,左右股票走势很合理。看着交易员们对一场足球比赛做出情绪化反应,我不禁思考:市场会不会同样被情绪塑造?
纽约的夏天结束后,我回到麻省理工学院(MIT)攻读金融学博士第二年。开学第一课是实证资产定价。这门课本该讲授所谓的市场运动定律,也就是决定股票、债券和货币涨跌的力量。但我们学的不是动物精神和人类心理学,而是莱陶-卢德维森消费-总财富比率以及耐用消费品与非耐用消费品之间的替代弹性。根据相关模型,投资者都是冷酷的分析机器,判断精准,会仔细甄别每一条可能带来优势的信息。
然而我刚刚亲眼所见完全是另一番景象。交易员做决策并非基于数据或基本面,而是国家队比赛的输赢。当然,法国队的比赛只是个例。但如果不是例外,而是普遍规律呢?我提出了看似荒谬的问题:足球比赛失利会不会导致一国股市下跌?
我不敢告诉教授我在研究什么。麻省理工学院可是数学金融学的梵蒂冈,史蒂夫·罗斯是该领域泰斗之一,是诺贝尔奖热门候选人。他当时正辗转全球各地发表演讲,宣扬有效市场理论,主张投资者理性,处理信息的速度快如闪电。我把想法告诉摩根士丹利的前同事时,他们一笑置之。华尔街精英怎么可能被足球比分左右?布雷利、迈尔斯和艾伦合著的《公司财务原理》(Principles of Corporate Finance)是当时领先的金融学教科书,我本科时学过,也是每个银行家的书架上必备的书,书中只将心理学放在某一章里孤零零的一小节,还直言无关紧要。
我没有气馁,搜集了39个国家750场比赛的数据,反复计算后发现了明确的模式,国家队输掉比赛后股市会持续下跌。然而即便证据摆在面前,我也相信没人会相信。
最终,我不得不在博士研讨会上展示研究。我做好了当众出丑的准备,尤其是看到教授们走进会场时。教师很少出席学生的演讲,我笃定他们是来看我搞砸演讲的。但他们心态开放,耐心倾听,令我松了一口气的是,演讲结束后还给出了肯定评价。这篇论文最终发表在金融学顶级期刊《金融杂志》上,还入围了最佳论文奖的决赛。令我惊讶的是,这项研究冲出了象牙塔。我陆续登上了美国消费者新闻与商业频道(CNBC)、娱乐与体育节目电视网(ESPN)和英国天空体育,《华尔街日报》、《金融时报》和《泰晤士报》也都报道了研究。
这项研究让我看到了全新的研究领域,古怪又创新,严谨而又稳健,这项研究揭示了即便最理性的头脑也会沦为情绪的俘虏。投资者哪怕熟练使用各种表格,深谙复杂工具,但终究是人。全球各地的人都会落入代价高昂的认知陷阱,多数人陷入困境,少数精明的人则能从混乱中获利。如今,心理学对市场的影响已成为主流议题。修订几个版本之后,《公司财务原理》作者由布雷利-迈尔斯-艾伦变成了布雷利-迈尔斯-艾伦-埃德曼斯,开始立足于真实生活中的金融运行逻辑。
我当初担心的难堪,变成了观察金融世界的新视角,即接纳人性而非否认人性。借助这一视角,我们能更清晰地看懂市场,做出更精明的决策,规避自身的认知偏差并捕捉他人的错误。相关知识不仅在理论上很有趣,实践中也可操作。
有个流行的观点因《群体的智慧》(The Wisdom of Crowds)等书而闻名,认为集体智慧会引导人们走向真相。我可能因为是埃隆·马斯克的狂热粉丝而看涨特斯拉。你可能因为受不了他的政治立场而看跌。我们的偏见相互抵消,市场反映现实。理论如此,但只有在错误均匀分布时才有效。就像该书开篇的例子中,县集市上人们猜测一头牛的重量。有些人猜得太高,其他人太低,取平均时就会接近目标。
市场不是县集市。没人会对一头牛的重量投入情感。然而在交易大厅里,情绪冲动根深蒂固,一旦情绪共振就会将所有人推向同一个方向。2004年欧洲杯法国队爆冷失利后,法国投资者集体士气低落、消沉且沮丧,市场随之跳水。
更糟的是,我们不是在真空中做决策。集市上可以独自猜测重量,秘密提交。但市场是另一种野兽。我们不断环顾四周,揣测别人掌握了什么自己不知道的信息,观察他们的行为,害怕错失机会。看到比特币飙升,谁都不想成为赶不上行情的傻瓜,于是跟风买入。买入推高了价格,吸引更多人加入狂热。就这样,狂热像病毒一样扩散。
本书探讨的正是这一主题,投资者犯的错误以及为何犯错。错误没有相互抵消,而是滚雪球般形成繁荣与萧条。情绪如何像病毒一样在金融市场蔓延,从华尔街传导至主普通大众。如何避免被感染,更进一步的是如何发现他人的失误,识别市场何时陷入疯狂,并从疯狂中获利。(财富中文网)
本文节选自《市场的疯狂》(The Madness of Markets)一书,经企鹅兰登书屋旗下皇冠出版集团授权转载。版权所有© 2026 亚历克斯·埃德曼斯。
译者:梁宇
审校:夏林
Portugal. Friday, 25 June 2004. The sixty-fifth minute of the European quarter-final. Greece, 15/1 outsiders, versus France, the tournament favourites. Greece captain Theodoros Zagorakis floats a cross into the penalty area, a perfect arc slicing through the Lisbon air. Angelos Charisteas charges forward, soars above two towering French defenders, and thunders a header past the frozen goalkeeper into the back of the net.
Cue pandemonium. The underdogs, dismissed by every pundit, have taken the lead against all the odds. France, packed with stars like Zinedine Zidane and Thierry Henry, are stunned. They fight back, launching wave upon wave of attack, but Greece, grim and gritty, refuse to break. The final whistle blows and the defending champions are out: a result that shocks the football world.
But what happened off the pitch shocked me even more. The very next week, €10 billion was wiped off the French stock market. And no, France’s economic fundamentals hadn’t suddenly changed overnight. I was on the trading floor at Morgan Stanley and I saw it with my own eyes: some of the world’s supposedly smartest, most level-headed investors were visibly rattled. Their mood darkened; one trader stormed off and didn’t return for days. Their judgement wavered. The market cracked.
Sure, many things drive share prices: interest rates, energy costs, political turmoil — but all those factors are rational. They affect sales, profits, and dividends, so they should sway stocks. But watching traders react emotionally to a football game made me wonder: might markets also be moulded by mood?
After my summer in New York was over, I returned to MIT for the second year of my PhD in finance. It kicked off with a course on Empirical Asset Pricing. This was where we’d learn the supposed laws of motion for markets: the forces that govern whether stocks, bonds, and currencies rise or fall. But instead of animal spirits and human psychology, we were fed a diet of the Lettau-Ludvigson consumption-aggregate wealth ratio and the elasticity of substitution between durable and nondurable goods. According to these models, investors were coldly analytical robots, operating with laser-like precision and scrutinizing every shred of information that might give them an edge.
Yet I’d just seen something very different. Traders making decisions based not on data or fundamentals, but on whether their national team had won or lost. Sure, the France game was just one anecdote. But what if it wasn’t the exception? What if it was the rule? And so I asked a question that seemed absurd: could a football defeat sink a nation’s stock market?
I didn’t dare tell my professors what I was working on. MIT was the Vatican of mathematical finance. Steve Ross, one of its towering figures and heavily tipped for the Nobel Prize, was jetting around the globe giving keynotes on efficient markets, arguing that investors were both logical and lightning-fast at processing information. When I told my former colleagues at Morgan Stanley, they laughed it off. Surely Wall Street’s finest couldn’t be swayed by a football scoreline? Even the leading finance textbook of the time, Principles of Corporate Finance by Brealey, Myers, and Allen — which I’d studied as an undergrad and which sat on every banker’s shelf — relegated psychology to a lonely subsection of a solitary chapter, and bluntly dismissed its relevance.
Undeterred, I hunted down data on 750 games across thirty-nine countries, crunched the numbers, and discovered an unmistakable pattern: stock markets consistently fell after the national team lost a match. Yet even as the evidence stared back at me, I was sure no one would believe it.
Eventually, I had to present my findings at a PhD seminar. I braced for humiliation, especially when I spotted professors slipping into the room. It was rare for faculty to turn up to a student talk and I was sure they’d come to watch a train wreck. But they listened with an open mind and, to my relief, were generous with their praise afterwards. The paper was eventually published in the Journal of Finance, the top outlet in the field, and was a finalist for its best-paper prize. To my astonishment, the story burst out of academia. I soon found myself on CNBC, ESPN, and Sky Sports, and in the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and The Times.
That study opened my eyes to a whole world of research — wacky and innovative, yet rigorous and robust — showing that even the most rational minds fall prey to emotion. Investors, for all their spreadsheets and sophistication, are human. And humans all over the world slip into the same expensive traps, causing most to flounder while a savvy few cash in on the chaos. The impact of psychology on the markets is now mainstream. A few editions later, Brealey-Myers-Allen became Brealey-Myers-Allen-Edmans, and now grounds itself in how finance actually works in real life.
The early embarrassment that I feared developed into a new lens on the financial world, one that embraces human nature rather than denies it. That lens helps us to see the world more clearly and to act more shrewdly, by avoiding our own mistakes and exploiting those of others. It’s not only theoretically intriguing, but practically actionable.
There’s a popular idea, made famous by books like The Wisdom of Crowds, that collective intelligence leads us to the truth. I might be bullish on Tesla because I’m an Elon Musk fanboy; you might be bearish because you can’t stand his politics. Our biases cancel out, and the market reflects reality. That’s the theory. Yet it only works when errors are evenly spread — like a county fair where people guess the weight of an ox, the opening example in that book. Some go too high, others too low, and when you average it all out, you land close to the mark.
But markets aren’t county fairs. No one gets emotionally attached to the weight of an ox. On the trading floor, impulses run deep and when they hit, they push everyone the same way. After France’s shock defeat in Euro 2004, French investors were deflated, demoralized, and dejected en masse, and the market took a dive.
Worse, we don’t make decisions in a vacuum. At the fair, you guess the weight on your own and submit it in secret. But markets are a different beast. We’re constantly looking over our shoulders, wondering what others know that we don’t, seeing how they act, and fearing that we’re missing out. If we see Bitcoin skyrocketing, we don’t want to be the idiot late to the party — so we buy in too. That pushes the price even higher, tempting more people to join the frenzy. And just like that, the mania goes viral.
That’s what this book is about. The mistakes investors make and why they make them. How those blunders don’t cancel out but snowball into booms and busts. How they spread like viruses through financial markets and ripple from Wall Street to Main Street. How to avoid getting infected — or, better still, how to spot others’ missteps, recognize when the market has lost its mind . . . and profit from the madness.
Excerpted from The Madness of Markets, in agreement with Crown Currency, an imprint of The Crown Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House LLC. Copyright © 2026 by Alex Edmans.