
英伟达堪称本轮人工智能浪潮的最大赢家,扮演着出售“铲子与镐”的硬件供应商角色。但如今,该公司希望依靠华尔街的资本运作,破解硬件采购环节的资金来源困局。
上周,英伟达宣布与阿波罗全球管理(Apollo)、贝莱德(BlackRock)、黑石(Blackstone)、博枫集团(Brookfield)、高盛(Goldman Sachs)和KKR达成合作,搭建融资平台,拟为人工智能基础设施撬动超5000亿美元资金。资金主要来自“第三方投资者”,英伟达客户可借此为芯片与数据中心项目融资,同时英伟达自身承担的风险维持在较低水平,相关风险也无需体现在公司资产负债表上。
各项合作的具体细节,例如每笔交易的规模,目前仍未披露。但分析师一直关注这类交易:把人工智能算力视作收费公路、发电厂这类基础设施资产,此类资产能够产生现金流,进而为债务融资提供支撑。在此之前,不少人担忧芯片更像是快速贬值、因而价值持续缩水的图形处理器,需不断追加资本投入才能维持运转。
“我们已经告别企业逐项目采购芯片、建设数据中心的时代,迈入可将人工智能工厂作为生产性基础设施进行融资的新时代。”英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋写道。按照黄仁勋的逻辑,前提很简单:“在人工智能领域,算力即收入。”
这场转型背后,还潜藏着另一重转变:究竟是谁在为人工智能热潮买单。
一年前,多数大型科技企业尚可宣称,其人工智能投入主要依托自身充裕的现金流——这些现金流源于数十年来软件业务以极低边际成本积累的巨额利润。但如今,债务融资已成为主流。高盛估算,当前人工智能相关融资规模已占美国投资级债券发行总量的近四分之一,本年度人工智能投资总额正逼近6000亿美元。
因此,英伟达正抢在这场危机全面爆发之前,寻找下一个资金池。整套运作逻辑十分清晰:设立独立融资主体募集资金,用于采购英伟达图形处理器及数据中心基础设施;人工智能企业向该主体租用算力,或承诺使用算力,由此产生持续现金流,融资主体可依托该现金流进行债务融资。阿波罗全球管理、KKR等机构负责设计或管理此类债务产品,并将其配置到自身管理的庞大机构资金池中,资金主要来自保险与养老金。
彭博专栏作家马特·莱文(Matt Levine)将这一长期愿景提炼为三个步骤:引导更多私人资本进入个人退休账户,募集规模极其庞大的私人信贷与基础设施基金,再用这笔资金建设供人工智能企业租用的数据中心。
这类资金池之所以具有吸引力,并非偶然现象。数据中心造价高昂、存续周期长、建设运营跨度久,需要跨多年度的资金支持。保险公司与养老基金恰好承担长期债务:可能持续兑付数十年的年金,或是数十年后才需兑付的退休金。因此,它们会寻求那些现金流能与这些负债相匹配的长期资产。私人信贷及基础设施基金管理人充当中间人,将数据中心这类项目转化为机构可持有的债务产品。
不过,英伟达表示将在这场押注中投入筹码。黄仁勋称,公司可能为部分项目提供最高25%的残值担保,这一安排实质上是承诺:若作为融资抵押物的芯片未来价值远低于贷方预期,英伟达将提供一定的兜底保障。
科技战略刊物《Stratechery》撰稿人本·汤普森(Ben Thompson)认为,“从某种意义上说,这相当于降价”:英伟达正用自身利润降低客户的资本成本,进而让依托其芯片搭建的数据中心更易完成融资。
这正是这笔交易耐人寻味之处。人工智能热潮最初由一批史上财力空前雄厚的企业动用自有现金推动,随后债券融资接棒成为主要资金来源。如今,英伟达正助力华尔街将算力本身转化为可投资资产,以此撬动保险浮存金、养老基金及其他长期储蓄资金。
华尔街将此视为积极信号。摩根士丹利分析师约瑟夫·穆尔(Joseph Moore)表示,该合作模式能够缓解市场对循环融资的担忧,因为绝大部分资金由第三方投资者提供,英伟达仅有限参与。美国银行(Bank of America)分析师维韦克·阿亚(Vivek Arya)基本认同这一看法,并补充道,英伟达芯片具备很强的融资适配性,原因在于图形处理器可在不同运营商之间调配,CUDA软件能延长芯片实际使用寿命。
但汤普森担忧的是,这些机构管理的资金池与风险投资或科技股有着本质区别:这类资金设立的初衷,至少在一定程度上,是追求安全性。
他写道:“动用全部自由现金流是一回事,向债务市场融资是另一回事。而引入以安全性为首要目标的资金,性质则全然不同、令人提心吊胆。”(财富中文网)
译者:中慧言-王芳
英伟达堪称本轮人工智能浪潮的最大赢家,扮演着出售“铲子与镐”的硬件供应商角色。但如今,该公司希望依靠华尔街的资本运作,破解硬件采购环节的资金来源困局。
上周,英伟达宣布与阿波罗全球管理(Apollo)、贝莱德(BlackRock)、黑石(Blackstone)、博枫集团(Brookfield)、高盛(Goldman Sachs)和KKR达成合作,搭建融资平台,拟为人工智能基础设施撬动超5000亿美元资金。资金主要来自“第三方投资者”,英伟达客户可借此为芯片与数据中心项目融资,同时英伟达自身承担的风险维持在较低水平,相关风险也无需体现在公司资产负债表上。
各项合作的具体细节,例如每笔交易的规模,目前仍未披露。但分析师一直关注这类交易:把人工智能算力视作收费公路、发电厂这类基础设施资产,此类资产能够产生现金流,进而为债务融资提供支撑。在此之前,不少人担忧芯片更像是快速贬值、因而价值持续缩水的图形处理器,需不断追加资本投入才能维持运转。
“我们已经告别企业逐项目采购芯片、建设数据中心的时代,迈入可将人工智能工厂作为生产性基础设施进行融资的新时代。”英伟达首席执行官黄仁勋写道。按照黄仁勋的逻辑,前提很简单:“在人工智能领域,算力即收入。”
这场转型背后,还潜藏着另一重转变:究竟是谁在为人工智能热潮买单。
一年前,多数大型科技企业尚可宣称,其人工智能投入主要依托自身充裕的现金流——这些现金流源于数十年来软件业务以极低边际成本积累的巨额利润。但如今,债务融资已成为主流。高盛估算,当前人工智能相关融资规模已占美国投资级债券发行总量的近四分之一,本年度人工智能投资总额正逼近6000亿美元。
因此,英伟达正抢在这场危机全面爆发之前,寻找下一个资金池。整套运作逻辑十分清晰:设立独立融资主体募集资金,用于采购英伟达图形处理器及数据中心基础设施;人工智能企业向该主体租用算力,或承诺使用算力,由此产生持续现金流,融资主体可依托该现金流进行债务融资。阿波罗全球管理、KKR等机构负责设计或管理此类债务产品,并将其配置到自身管理的庞大机构资金池中,资金主要来自保险与养老金。
彭博专栏作家马特·莱文(Matt Levine)将这一长期愿景提炼为三个步骤:引导更多私人资本进入个人退休账户,募集规模极其庞大的私人信贷与基础设施基金,再用这笔资金建设供人工智能企业租用的数据中心。
这类资金池之所以具有吸引力,并非偶然现象。数据中心造价高昂、存续周期长、建设运营跨度久,需要跨多年度的资金支持。保险公司与养老基金恰好承担长期债务:可能持续兑付数十年的年金,或是数十年后才需兑付的退休金。因此,它们会寻求那些现金流能与这些负债相匹配的长期资产。私人信贷及基础设施基金管理人充当中间人,将数据中心这类项目转化为机构可持有的债务产品。
不过,英伟达表示将在这场押注中投入筹码。黄仁勋称,公司可能为部分项目提供最高25%的残值担保,这一安排实质上是承诺:若作为融资抵押物的芯片未来价值远低于贷方预期,英伟达将提供一定的兜底保障。
科技战略刊物《Stratechery》撰稿人本·汤普森(Ben Thompson)认为,“从某种意义上说,这相当于降价”:英伟达正用自身利润降低客户的资本成本,进而让依托其芯片搭建的数据中心更易完成融资。
这正是这笔交易耐人寻味之处。人工智能热潮最初由一批史上财力空前雄厚的企业动用自有现金推动,随后债券融资接棒成为主要资金来源。如今,英伟达正助力华尔街将算力本身转化为可投资资产,以此撬动保险浮存金、养老基金及其他长期储蓄资金。
华尔街将此视为积极信号。摩根士丹利分析师约瑟夫·穆尔(Joseph Moore)表示,该合作模式能够缓解市场对循环融资的担忧,因为绝大部分资金由第三方投资者提供,英伟达仅有限参与。美国银行(Bank of America)分析师维韦克·阿亚(Vivek Arya)基本认同这一看法,并补充道,英伟达芯片具备很强的融资适配性,原因在于图形处理器可在不同运营商之间调配,CUDA软件能延长芯片实际使用寿命。
但汤普森担忧的是,这些机构管理的资金池与风险投资或科技股有着本质区别:这类资金设立的初衷,至少在一定程度上,是追求安全性。
他写道:“动用全部自由现金流是一回事,向债务市场融资是另一回事。而引入以安全性为首要目标的资金,性质则全然不同、令人提心吊胆。”(财富中文网)
译者:中慧言-王芳
Nvidia has been arguably the No. 1 profiteer of the AI boom, selling the picks and the shovels of the trade. But now it wants Wall Street to figure out how to keep paying for them.
On Monday, Nvidia announced partnerships with Apollo, BlackRock, Blackstone, Brookfield, Goldman Sachs, and KKR to create financing platforms intended to mobilize more than $500 billion for AI infrastructure. The money will largely come from “third-party investors,” allowing Nvidia customers to finance chips and data centers while keeping Nvidia’s own risk limited and off the balance sheet.
Details of the arrangements, like the extent of each deal, are still unknown. But analysts have been watching for a deal like this—that treats AI compute into an infrastructure asset, like a toll road or power plant—that produces cash flows and therefore can support debt. As of now, many have feared the chips instead look like a rapidly depreciating, and thus depleting, pile of graphics processors that will need more and more capital to finance.
“We have moved from an era in which companies bought chips and built data centers project by project to one in which AI factories can be financed as productive infrastructure,” Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang wrote Tuesday. In Huang’s formulation, the premise is simple: “In AI, compute is revenue.”
Underneath that transformation is a second one: who is actually paying for the AI boom.
A year ago, most of Big Tech could claim it was financing AI from its enormous cash flows, accrued from decades of executing software-level thin margins and massive profits. But now debt is taking over. Goldman Sachs estimates AI-related financing now accounts for nearly one-quarter of all gross U.S. investment-grade issuance, while AI investment itself is approaching $600 billion this year.
So Nvidia’s getting ahead of the whole debacle to find the next pool of money. The chain is straightforward. An independent financing vehicle can raise money to buy Nvidia GPUs and data-center infrastructure. An AI company then leases that compute or commits to using it, creating a stream of payments against whichthe vehicle can borrow. Apollo, KKR, and their peers can structure or manage that debt and place it with the enormous pools of institutional money—mostly insurance and retirement capital—that they oversee.
Bloomberg columnist Matt Levine distilled the long-term vision into three steps: Put more private investments into ordinary people’s retirement accounts, raise “a gazillion dollars” of private-credit and infrastructure funds, and use that money to build the data centers that AI will rent.
There is a reason those pools of money are attractive. Data centers are expensive, long-lived, and long-standing projects that require financing over many years. Insurers and pension funds, conveniently, have long-dated obligations—annuities that may pay for decades, or retirement benefits owed decades into the future—and therefore look for long-duration assets whose cash flows can be matched against those liabilities. Private-credit and infrastructure managers act as the middlemen, turning projects like data centers into debt those institutions can hold.
Nvidia, however, has said it’s putting something of its own behind the bet: Huang said the company may provide residual-value support of up to 25% for some projects—effectively promising some protection against the possibility that the chips backing a financing are worth much less in the future than lenders expected.
Ben Thompson, who writes the technology strategy publication Stratechery, calls that “in a certain sense, a price cut”: Nvidia is using its own profits to reduce customers’ cost of capital and make Nvidia-based data centers easier to finance.
And that is where the deal gets more interesting. The AI boom started with some of the richest corporations in history spending their own cash. Then came bonds. Now Nvidia is helping Wall Street turn compute itself into an investable asset capable of drawing on insurance floats, pension funds, and other long-duration savings.
Wall Street sees it as a positive sign. Morgan Stanley’s Joseph Moore said the arrangement alleviates concerns about circular financing because third-party investors would provide most of the capital, while Nvidia would participate only to a limited extent. Bank of America’s Vivek Arya mostly agreed and added Nvidia’s chips are unusually financeable because GPUs can be moved among operators and CUDA software can extend their own useful lives.
But Thompson’s concern is those pools of cash institutions have are fundamentally different from venture capital or tech stocks: They are designed, at least in part, to seek safety.
“It’s one thing to spend all of your free cash flow; it’s another thing to tap the debt markets,” he writes. “And, beyond that, it’s a completely new nerve-racking thing to bring safety-seeking assets to bear.”