近50年来,有一项数据几乎纹丝不动。综合社会调查每隔一两年就会调研美国人的幸福程度。从1972年到2018年,“非常幸福”与“不太幸福”的受访者比例差长期保持稳定。但疫情来袭后,这一数值暴跌。
芝加哥大学布斯商学院(University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business)经济学家萨姆·佩尔兹曼(Sam Peltzman)耗费数年时间追踪这一数据。他在接受《财富》杂志采访时表示:“这是一场剧变。该数值未来仍有回升空间,我们也盼着它转好。但截至目前,净差值约为-20,实属前所未有。”
2020年跌幅达25个点,此后仅回升5个点。他将此次幸福感崩塌与多数美国人经历的上一次冲击——大衰退——作对比:“大衰退时期最多跌了10个点,之后很快反弹。”
人们的第一反应,往往是将问题归咎于经济因素,但佩尔兹曼表示事情没那么简单。诚然,食品杂货和汽油价格飙升,但如果最不幸福的美国人就是那些受生活成本挤压最严重的人,那么将原因归结为生活成本危机才站得住脚。
但佩尔兹曼的数据却给出相反结论:2020年后幸福感下滑最严重的,恰恰是原本处境最好的群体——白人、高收入、受过大学教育、政治立场偏右的美国人。“生活负担问题主要困扰低收入群体,而非高收入群体。但这次幸福感崩塌中,受冲击最重的却是高收入群体。”
佩尔兹曼称:“任何将问题归因于社会不平等的说法,都与事实相悖。”
“我们身处一个按婚姻划分的幸福感隔离社会”
已婚人群的净差值仍为正。占美国成年人口约45%的未婚人群,如今的净差值为负。佩尔兹曼指出:"就幸福感而言,唯一拥有正净差值的群体,就是已婚人群。我们已经形成了按婚姻状态划分的幸福感隔离社会。"
下一个显而易见的问题是:这是否仅仅因为结婚率下降,而幸福感崩塌只是反映了这一趋势?答案是否定的。过去15年,结婚率基本没有变化,"始终维持55%已婚、45%未婚",佩尔兹曼说道。上世纪70年代至21世纪初,结婚率持续走低,佩尔兹曼在早期论文中提出,结婚率下滑是疫情之前美国人幸福感下降的主要诱因。
但早在2020年之前,这一下滑趋势就已趋于平稳。幸福感崩塌发生时,美国已婚与未婚成年人占比与当下并无二致。变化的并非婚姻人口的规模,而是未婚人群的主观体验显著恶化,而已婚人群的幸福感则大体保持稳定。
虽然两个群体都受到了冲击,"但如果非要说的话,未婚人群受冲击更大一些,"佩尔兹曼说道。已婚受访者的净差值从约+30升至+50;未婚受访者则从接近平衡点降至约-15。不过他也强调,"无法推断因果关系。"
在另一篇题为《婚姻幸福感剖析》(The Anatomy of Marital Happiness,2025年)的论文中,他发现,几乎在所有测试群体中,婚姻都能带来幸福感增益,且这一增益不受年龄、种族、收入、教育水平或性取向影响。同居伴侣也能获得类似的增益,但幅度较小,约为10个点。“幸福的人更容易步入婚姻,而婚姻又会让人变得更幸福。切勿仅基于这一数据就仓促做出个人人生抉择。”
家庭研究所(Institute for Family Studies)高级研究员、“结婚倡议”负责人布拉德·威尔科克斯(Brad Wilcox)表示,经济悲观情绪是幸福感下滑的一大诱因,年轻人担忧,通胀和高房价早已让美国梦变得遥不可及。
他补充道:“社交媒体的负面偏向,以及社交、约会、婚姻等社会联结的弱化,对此次幸福感崩塌的影响更为突出。客观来看,近几十年,年轻人的社会联结弱化程度,远远超过其经济处境的恶化。”
家庭研究所基于同一套综合社会调查数据绘制的图表,解释了年轻人格外值得关注的原因。2000至2019年间,各年龄组中自认“不太幸福”的受访者比例始终稳定在10%至15%之间,波动甚微。
但2021至2024年间,18—35岁人群的这一比例飙升至26%;中年群体为20%,56岁及以上成年人为21%。不过佩尔兹曼指出,年轻人本身就是波动极大的群体。
他的研究还发现,另一个数据与幸福感同步走低:美国人是否相信他人会公平对待自己。该数据同样在疫情爆发当年大幅下滑,降幅规模相当。他感慨:“维系社会的纽带,似乎正在瓦解。”(财富中文网)
译者:中慧言-王芳
近50年来,有一项数据几乎纹丝不动。综合社会调查每隔一两年就会调研美国人的幸福程度。从1972年到2018年,“非常幸福”与“不太幸福”的受访者比例差长期保持稳定。但疫情来袭后,这一数值暴跌。
芝加哥大学布斯商学院(University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business)经济学家萨姆·佩尔兹曼(Sam Peltzman)耗费数年时间追踪这一数据。他在接受《财富》杂志采访时表示:“这是一场剧变。该数值未来仍有回升空间,我们也盼着它转好。但截至目前,净差值约为-20,实属前所未有。”
2020年跌幅达25个点,此后仅回升5个点。他将此次幸福感崩塌与多数美国人经历的上一次冲击——大衰退——作对比:“大衰退时期最多跌了10个点,之后很快反弹。”
人们的第一反应,往往是将问题归咎于经济因素,但佩尔兹曼表示事情没那么简单。诚然,食品杂货和汽油价格飙升,但如果最不幸福的美国人就是那些受生活成本挤压最严重的人,那么将原因归结为生活成本危机才站得住脚。
但佩尔兹曼的数据却给出相反结论:2020年后幸福感下滑最严重的,恰恰是原本处境最好的群体——白人、高收入、受过大学教育、政治立场偏右的美国人。“生活负担问题主要困扰低收入群体,而非高收入群体。但这次幸福感崩塌中,受冲击最重的却是高收入群体。”
佩尔兹曼称:“任何将问题归因于社会不平等的说法,都与事实相悖。”
“我们身处一个按婚姻划分的幸福感隔离社会”
已婚人群的净差值仍为正。占美国成年人口约45%的未婚人群,如今的净差值为负。佩尔兹曼指出:"就幸福感而言,唯一拥有正净差值的群体,就是已婚人群。我们已经形成了按婚姻状态划分的幸福感隔离社会。"
下一个显而易见的问题是:这是否仅仅因为结婚率下降,而幸福感崩塌只是反映了这一趋势?答案是否定的。过去15年,结婚率基本没有变化,"始终维持55%已婚、45%未婚",佩尔兹曼说道。上世纪70年代至21世纪初,结婚率持续走低,佩尔兹曼在早期论文中提出,结婚率下滑是疫情之前美国人幸福感下降的主要诱因。
但早在2020年之前,这一下滑趋势就已趋于平稳。幸福感崩塌发生时,美国已婚与未婚成年人占比与当下并无二致。变化的并非婚姻人口的规模,而是未婚人群的主观体验显著恶化,而已婚人群的幸福感则大体保持稳定。
虽然两个群体都受到了冲击,"但如果非要说的话,未婚人群受冲击更大一些,"佩尔兹曼说道。已婚受访者的净差值从约+30升至+50;未婚受访者则从接近平衡点降至约-15。不过他也强调,"无法推断因果关系。"
在另一篇题为《婚姻幸福感剖析》(The Anatomy of Marital Happiness,2025年)的论文中,他发现,几乎在所有测试群体中,婚姻都能带来幸福感增益,且这一增益不受年龄、种族、收入、教育水平或性取向影响。同居伴侣也能获得类似的增益,但幅度较小,约为10个点。“幸福的人更容易步入婚姻,而婚姻又会让人变得更幸福。切勿仅基于这一数据就仓促做出个人人生抉择。”
家庭研究所(Institute for Family Studies)高级研究员、“结婚倡议”负责人布拉德·威尔科克斯(Brad Wilcox)表示,经济悲观情绪是幸福感下滑的一大诱因,年轻人担忧,通胀和高房价早已让美国梦变得遥不可及。
他补充道:“社交媒体的负面偏向,以及社交、约会、婚姻等社会联结的弱化,对此次幸福感崩塌的影响更为突出。客观来看,近几十年,年轻人的社会联结弱化程度,远远超过其经济处境的恶化。”
家庭研究所基于同一套综合社会调查数据绘制的图表,解释了年轻人格外值得关注的原因。2000至2019年间,各年龄组中自认“不太幸福”的受访者比例始终稳定在10%至15%之间,波动甚微。
但2021至2024年间,18—35岁人群的这一比例飙升至26%;中年群体为20%,56岁及以上成年人为21%。不过佩尔兹曼指出,年轻人本身就是波动极大的群体。
他的研究还发现,另一个数据与幸福感同步走低:美国人是否相信他人会公平对待自己。该数据同样在疫情爆发当年大幅下滑,降幅规模相当。他感慨:“维系社会的纽带,似乎正在瓦解。”(财富中文网)
译者:中慧言-王芳
For nearly 50 years, one number barely moved. Every year or two, the General Social Survey asks Americans how happy they are, and for decades the balance between “very happy” and “not too happy” held steady, from 1972 through 2018. But as soon as the pandemic hit, it came cratering down.
Sam Peltzman, an economist at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, has spent several years tracking that number. “It’s a huge change,” he told Fortune. “It always can come back more, and we hope that it does. But so far, it’s like a net of minus 20, which is utterly unprecedented.”
The 2020 drop was 25 points, but the rebound has been only five points. He compared it to the last shock most Americans lived through: the Great Recession, which he said “was maximum 10 points, and came back right away.”
The first instinct is to blame money, but Peltzman says it’s not that simple. Yes, while grocery bills and gas prices have soared, blaming the affordability crisis would make sense if the unhappiest Americans were the ones getting squeezed hardest.
But Peltzman’s data says the opposite. The people who fell furthest after 2020 were the ones who had the most going in: white, high-income, college-educated, right-leaning Americans. “The affordability business is not an upper-income kind of concern,” he said. “It’s a lower-income kind of concern, and the upper-income people have been hit hardest in the happiness crash.
“Any story which says that it’s inequality,” Peltzman said, “those kind of stories are not consistent with the facts.”
‘We have a happiness-segregated society by marriage’
Married people are still, on net, happy. Unmarried people, about 45% of American adults, are now, on net, unhappy. “The only people who are positive, where there’s a clear positive balance in happiness, are married people,” Peltzman said. “We have a happiness-segregated society by marriage.”
The obvious next question is whether this is just the marriage rate falling and the crash is only picking that up. It isn’t. The marriage rate itself hasn’t moved in 15 years: “It’s 55/45, and it’s been that way,” Peltzman said. Marriage rates did decline for decades, from the 1970s through the early 2000s, and in an earlier paper, Peltzman found that decline explained most of the happiness slide that came before the pandemic.
But that slide had already leveled off well before 2020. The country’s split between married and unmarried adults going into the crash is the same split as today. What changed was not how many people are married, but how much worse it now feels to be unmarried, while married people mostly held their ground.
While both groups took a hit, “if anything, the unmarried were hit a little bit more,” Peltzman said. Married respondents went from roughly +30 to +50; unmarried respondents went from near breakeven to about -15. But still, “you can’t infer what’s causing what.”
In another paper, titled The Anatomy of Marital Happiness (2025), he found the same marital premium holds across nearly every group he tested: age, race, income, education, sexual orientation. Cohabiting couples get a smaller version of the same boost, about 10 points. “Happy people get married, and married people become happy,” he said. “So don’t run out and make any personal decisions on the basis of this.”
Brad Wilcox, senior fellow and director of the Get Married Initiative at the Institute for Family Studies (IFS), said economic pessimism is a likely contributor to the increase in unhappiness as young people fear inflation and housing costs have put the American Dream out of reach.
“But the negativity bias of social media and declines in socializing, dating, and marriage loom larger in this happiness crash,” he added. “That’s because, objectively, young adults’ social ties have declined much more than their economic position in recent decades.”
An IFS chart built from the same General Social Survey data shows why young adults draw special attention. From 2000 through 2019, unhappiness across every age group tracked in a tight band, roughly 10% to 15% reporting “not too happy.”
But from 2021 to 2024, 18-to-35-year-olds jumped to 26%, against 20% for the middle-aged and 21% for adults 56 and up, though Peltzman noted younger people are a very volatile group.
His research turned up one more data point that moved in step with happiness: whether Americans believe other people treat them fairly. That number crashed the same year, by the same scale. “It’s like the social glue is coming apart,” he said.