
如果你之前从未听说过霍尔木兹海峡,现在想必已有所耳闻。伊朗实际上封锁了这条通常承载全球约20%石油天然气运输的水道,对全球经济造成严重压力。
如今一些分析师警告称,新的冲突爆发或将出现,就是曼德海峡。
原因在于,控制也门北部大片地区并与伊朗结盟的军事组织胡塞武装3月28日正式参战。伊朗战争爆发以来,胡赛首次向以色列发射了导弹。
也门扼守海峡一侧,胡塞武装此前就曾袭击过红海的船只,在2023年底和2024年引发大规模航运混乱。
彭博社(Bloomberg)最新报道称,伊朗已接触胡塞武装,准备开展类似行动。
以下是为何全球目光再度聚焦胡塞武装、曼德海峡和红海,以及第二条核心航道受阻对世界经济意味着什么。
曼德海峡在哪?
曼德海峡最窄处约30公里,东北侧是阿拉伯半岛的也门,西侧是非洲厄立特里亚及吉布提。
海峡航行条件以凶险著称,所以其名称在阿拉伯语中直译为“泪之门”(Gate of Tears)。
该海峡战略位置至关重要,因为与埃及的苏伊士运河相连,船只可经红海和亚丁湾,直接往返地中海和印度洋。
19世纪苏伊士运河开通之前,船只必须绕行非洲南端才能抵达两处。
举个例子,一艘油轮离开沙特阿拉伯前往荷兰,如果走红海航线只需航行12,000公里,绕行非洲南部则需航行超过20,000公里。
可想而知,走红海速度也会快得多。据美国能源信息署(EIA)的数据,绕远路从阿拉伯海到荷兰需要34天,经红海航线可缩短至仅需19天。
哪些物资经此通行?
正常情况下,全球约14%的海上贸易需途经曼德海峡。
曼德海峡通行货物的详细数据较为有限,但化石燃料是主要品类。
国际能源署(IEA)估算,2025年每天约有420万桶原油和石油液体经曼德海峡运输,约占全球产量的5%。
由于大多数船只同时会通过苏伊士运河,苏伊士运河管理局的官方数据可清晰反映绘出红海航运全貌。
2025年四季度,通过苏伊士运河的3,426艘船只中,约40%运输化石燃料:(1,330艘油轮,88艘液化天然气船)。
散货和普通货物占了另外40%(1,339艘船),主要运输玉米、小麦和大豆等农产品,以及煤炭和铁矿石。集装箱船约占总交通量的13%(459艘)。
值得注意的是,尽管袭击已基本停止,2023年底和2024年胡塞武装袭击船只以来,红海通行船只总量还是大幅减少。
海峡能被封锁吗?
曼德海峡无法完全“封锁”,其最窄处水域仍然相当宽阔。而且与霍尔木兹海峡不同,曼德海峡不是“死胡同”,不会出现一端封闭,仅有一个出口的情况。船只仍可通过苏伊士运河驶往地中海。
但这对前往亚洲的船只来说并不算安慰,那些船不得不绕行非洲,航程增加数周。
值得一提的是,沙特早已制定避开霍尔木兹海峡的“B计划”,即东西输油管道。该管道连接北部的阿布盖格和红海沿岸的延布,为应对此次冲突,已接近满负荷输油。
但从这一新出口运往亚洲的石油仍须通过曼德海峡才能避免绕远路,也就说还是可能受到干扰。
已有前车之鉴
想了解胡塞武装可能如何再扰乱航运,只需回顾最近的红海危机。
据国际海事组织(IMO)数据,2023年11月至2024年9月期间记录了67起袭击事件。部分船只遭受轻微设备损坏。另一些船只遭导弹或无人机击中后发生严重火灾、洪水和结构损坏。
不过,2024年以来袭击相对减少。严格来说,海峡本身从未被完全“封锁”,危机期间始终有船只持续通行。
仅威胁便已足够
胡赛可能会沿用相同战术。但对航运公司来说,仅是袭击的威胁就足以导致航运减缓或受限。平民船员则有生命危险。
除此之外,保险成本可能飙升至难以承受的水平,从而事实上关闭这条航线。2024年危机前,保险成本约占船上货物价值的0.6%。红海危机后,比例一度高达2%。
如果霍尔木兹海峡和曼德海峡同时被实质封锁,全球供应链和全球经济将面临严重冲击。(财富中文网)
弗拉维奥·马考,副教授——商业与法学院,伊迪丝科文大学
本文从The Conversation转载,已经过知识共享许可协议授权。
译者:夏林
如果你之前从未听说过霍尔木兹海峡,现在想必已有所耳闻。伊朗实际上封锁了这条通常承载全球约20%石油天然气运输的水道,对全球经济造成严重压力。
如今一些分析师警告称,新的冲突爆发或将出现,就是曼德海峡。
原因在于,控制也门北部大片地区并与伊朗结盟的军事组织胡塞武装3月28日正式参战。伊朗战争爆发以来,胡赛首次向以色列发射了导弹。
也门扼守海峡一侧,胡塞武装此前就曾袭击过红海的船只,在2023年底和2024年引发大规模航运混乱。
彭博社(Bloomberg)最新报道称,伊朗已接触胡塞武装,准备开展类似行动。
以下是为何全球目光再度聚焦胡塞武装、曼德海峡和红海,以及第二条核心航道受阻对世界经济意味着什么。
曼德海峡在哪?
曼德海峡最窄处约30公里,东北侧是阿拉伯半岛的也门,西侧是非洲厄立特里亚及吉布提。
海峡航行条件以凶险著称,所以其名称在阿拉伯语中直译为“泪之门”(Gate of Tears)。
该海峡战略位置至关重要,因为与埃及的苏伊士运河相连,船只可经红海和亚丁湾,直接往返地中海和印度洋。
19世纪苏伊士运河开通之前,船只必须绕行非洲南端才能抵达两处。
举个例子,一艘油轮离开沙特阿拉伯前往荷兰,如果走红海航线只需航行12,000公里,绕行非洲南部则需航行超过20,000公里。
可想而知,走红海速度也会快得多。据美国能源信息署(EIA)的数据,绕远路从阿拉伯海到荷兰需要34天,经红海航线可缩短至仅需19天。
哪些物资经此通行?
正常情况下,全球约14%的海上贸易需途经曼德海峡。
曼德海峡通行货物的详细数据较为有限,但化石燃料是主要品类。
国际能源署(IEA)估算,2025年每天约有420万桶原油和石油液体经曼德海峡运输,约占全球产量的5%。
由于大多数船只同时会通过苏伊士运河,苏伊士运河管理局的官方数据可清晰反映绘出红海航运全貌。
2025年四季度,通过苏伊士运河的3,426艘船只中,约40%运输化石燃料:(1,330艘油轮,88艘液化天然气船)。
散货和普通货物占了另外40%(1,339艘船),主要运输玉米、小麦和大豆等农产品,以及煤炭和铁矿石。集装箱船约占总交通量的13%(459艘)。
值得注意的是,尽管袭击已基本停止,2023年底和2024年胡塞武装袭击船只以来,红海通行船只总量还是大幅减少。
海峡能被封锁吗?
曼德海峡无法完全“封锁”,其最窄处水域仍然相当宽阔。而且与霍尔木兹海峡不同,曼德海峡不是“死胡同”,不会出现一端封闭,仅有一个出口的情况。船只仍可通过苏伊士运河驶往地中海。
但这对前往亚洲的船只来说并不算安慰,那些船不得不绕行非洲,航程增加数周。
值得一提的是,沙特早已制定避开霍尔木兹海峡的“B计划”,即东西输油管道。该管道连接北部的阿布盖格和红海沿岸的延布,为应对此次冲突,已接近满负荷输油。
但从这一新出口运往亚洲的石油仍须通过曼德海峡才能避免绕远路,也就说还是可能受到干扰。
已有前车之鉴
想了解胡塞武装可能如何再扰乱航运,只需回顾最近的红海危机。
据国际海事组织(IMO)数据,2023年11月至2024年9月期间记录了67起袭击事件。部分船只遭受轻微设备损坏。另一些船只遭导弹或无人机击中后发生严重火灾、洪水和结构损坏。
不过,2024年以来袭击相对减少。严格来说,海峡本身从未被完全“封锁”,危机期间始终有船只持续通行。
仅威胁便已足够
胡赛可能会沿用相同战术。但对航运公司来说,仅是袭击的威胁就足以导致航运减缓或受限。平民船员则有生命危险。
除此之外,保险成本可能飙升至难以承受的水平,从而事实上关闭这条航线。2024年危机前,保险成本约占船上货物价值的0.6%。红海危机后,比例一度高达2%。
如果霍尔木兹海峡和曼德海峡同时被实质封锁,全球供应链和全球经济将面临严重冲击。(财富中文网)
弗拉维奥·马考,副教授——商业与法学院,伊迪丝科文大学
本文从The Conversation转载,已经过知识共享许可协议授权。
译者:夏林
If you’d never heard of the Strait of Hormuz before, you probably have by now. Iran’s effective closure of the waterway, which usually carries about 20% of the world’s oil and gas, has put severe pressure on the global economy.
Now, some analysts are warning a new flashpoint could emerge: the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
That’s because on March 28, the Houthis, a military group that controls large parts of northern Yemen and is aligned with Iran, entered the war, launching missiles towards Israel for the first time since the war with Iran began.
Yemen is situated on one side of the strait, and the Houthis have previously attacked shipping in the Red Sea, causing major disruption in late 2023 and 2024.
Bloomberg now reports Iran has approached the Houthis to prepare for a similar campaign.
Here’s why all eyes will be back on the Houthis, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, and what disruption of a second major chokepoint could mean for the world economy.
What is the Bab el-Mandeb Strait?
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is about 30 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. It is situated between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula to the northeast and Eritrea and Djibouti in Africa on the west.
Its name literally means “Gate of Tears” in Arabic, after its famously treacherous sailing conditions.
It has become so important because, along with the Suez Canal in Egypt, it allows ships to transit directly between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean by passing through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Before the Suez Canal’s opening in the 19th century, ships had to travel all the way around the southern tip of Africa to join these two points.
An oil tanker leaving Saudi Arabia to go to the Netherlands, for example, only has to travel 12,000 kilometres if it goes via the Red Sea, compared with more than 20,000 kilometres going south around Africa.
As you’d expect, that’s much faster too. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), a trip between the Arabian Sea and the Netherlands that takes 34 days the long way around is shortened to just 19 days.
What passes through it?
In normal times, as much as 14% of global maritime trade goes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Detailed data on what passes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is somewhat limited. But fossil fuels are a major component.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that in 2025 about 4.2 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum liquids crossed the Bab al-Mandeb Strait per day. That’s about 5% of global production.
Given most ships use the Suez Canal as well, official data from the Suez Canal Authority allow us to paint a detailed picture of Red Sea shipping.
In the final quarter of 2025, about 40% of the 3,426 ships passing through the Suez Canal transported fossil fuels: (1,330 oil tankers, 88 liquefied natural gas (LNG) ships).
Bulk and general cargo made up another 40% (1,339 ships), typically transporting agricultural commodities such as corn, wheat and soybeans, and also coal and iron ore. Container ships made about 13% of the traffic (459 ships).
Notably, total traffic through the Red Sea has declined considerably since Houthi attacks on shipping in late 2023 and 2024, even though these attacks have largely stopped.
Can the strait be closed?
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait can’t be “closed” entirely. Its narrowest point is still a considerably wide waterway. And unlike the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is not a “cul-de-sac”, where the passage is closed at one end with only one way out. Ships can still exit to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal.
That’s little comfort for those bound for Asia, which would then have to round Africa to do so, adding weeks to the journey.
Notably, Saudi Arabia had already built a “Plan B” to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, called the East-West pipeline. This pipeline connects Abqaiq in the north with Yanbu on the Red Sea, and had already begun pumping oil at almost full capacity in response to the conflict.
But oil bound for Asia from this new exit point still has to pass through Bab el-Mandeb to avoid the long way around, meaning it could be disrupted.
We’ve been here before
To get a sense of how the Houthis could disrupt shipping again, we can look to the most recent Red Sea crisis.
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 67 incidents were recorded between November 2023 and September 2024. Some ships only suffered minor equipment damage. But others faced severe fires, flooding and structural damage after being hit by missiles or drones.
However, there have been relatively few attacks since 2024. And the strait was never totally “closed” per se: some ships continued to pass through throughout the crisis.
The mere threat of attacks
These same tactics would probably apply today. But for shipping companies, the mere threat of attacks may be enough to slow or restrict shipping. There are significant risks to civilian crew, who face a threat to life.
Adding to this, insurance costs could become prohibitive enough to close the route in practical terms. Back in 2024, insurance costs were about 0.6% of the value of the cargo on a ship. After the Red Sea crisis, this rose as high as 2%.
The effective closure of both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb at the same time would be severely disruptive to global supply chains and the global economy.
Flavio Macau, Associate Dean – School of Business and Law, Edith Cowan University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.