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商业 - 金融

监管部门出台方案,终结“大到不能倒”现象

Geoffrey Smith 2014年11月13日

金融稳定委员会代表20国集团主要经济体,协调全球监管机构共同应对2008年金融危机。该委员会表示,剔除风险因素后,全球系统性重要银行今后用于吸收损失的资本,必须达到自身总资产的16-20%。

    上周末,全球银行业监管部门公布一项新的重大方案,意在终结银行“大到不能倒”的现象。该方案提议,那些最重要的金融机构持有的资本金,至少应该和其他银行相当,以确保纳税人再也不需要向它们伸出援手。

    金融稳定委员会(Financial Stability Board)代表20国集团(G20)主要经济体,协调全球监管机构共同应对2008年金融危机。该委员会表示,剔除风险因素后,全球系统性重要银行(G-SIB)今后用于吸收损失的资本,必须达到自身总资产的16-20%。

    2011年出台的《巴塞尔协议III》(Basel III)对此类资本的要求是8%。这项计划正在全球范围内分阶段推进,预计到2018年全面落地。而金融稳定委员会提出的要求高了一倍多。同时,实际比例可能会更高,因为按照这个方案,如果各国监管部门认为有必要,还可以进一步提高对银行的资本支出要求。

    这项新规要求的资本金水平在一定程度上表明,监管部门基本上未能解决与处理【曾经的雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)】那样的全球性银行有关的法律和政治问题。此类银行倒闭后,债权人往往遍布各地,而且对倒闭银行的资产拥有同样的索赔权。

    这项新规定将影响被金融稳定委员会列为全球系统性重要银行的30家银行,包括摩根大通(JP Morgan Chase)、花旗集团(Citigroup)、高盛(Goldman Sachs)、摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)、道富集团(State Street)、富国银行(Wells Fargo)、所有欧洲和日本最大的银行,以及两家中国银行。

    周一,金融稳定委员会主席、英国央行行长马克•卡尼向英国广播公司(BBC)表示,金融危机前的机制迫使政府斥资数十亿美元救助银行业,以避免金融灾难,这“毫无公平可言”。

    卡尼说:“情况良好时,银行及其股东和债权人得到好处;而当他们犯了错误,却由公众和下几代人买单。必须结束这种局面。”

    《巴塞尔协议III》出台以来,银行方面一直怨声载道,称新的资本金要求将使其难以盈利。但这种说法已经失去了可信度,因为随着经济上行,银行业利润已经反弹,在美国这种现象尤为明显。

    新规定不一定意味着银行必须大量发行新股以稀释现有股东基数。就融资而言,银行对债券的依赖程度通常远远超过股票。更有可能出现的情况是,银行必须降低对“高级”债券的依赖,并更多地转向“次级”债券。如果银行的亏损规模超过了自身股本,监管机构可以把次级债券的价值减记为零。

    金融稳定委员会预计,银行至少可以利用此类“可自救”的债务证券,满足三分之一的资本金要求。

    按照金融稳定委员会的方案,银行满足新要求的最终期限是2019年。如果届时未能达到要求,监管部门就可能限制或禁止银行发放奖金或红利,直到后者达标。

    此项新规定稿前,金融稳定委员会还将根据银行方面的反馈,以及2015年初的“量化影响研究”结果,对相关要求进行微调。(财富中文网)

    译者:Charlie

    审校:Hunter

    The world’s banking regulators unveiled at the weekend their last great plan for ending the phenomenon of banks that are ‘too-big-to-fail’, proposing that the most important institutions should carry at least as much as capital as other banks to ensure that taxpayers don’t ever have to rescue them again.

    The Financial Stability Board, which coordinates the global regulatory response to the 2008 financial crisis on behalf of the Group of 20 major economies, said that Global Systemically Important Banks, or G-SIBs, should in future have to hold loss-absorbing capital equivalent to between 16%-20% of their total assets, adjusted for risk.

    That’s more than double the 8% ratio that was prescribed in the so-called “Basel III” accords in 2011, which are being phased in around the world by 2018. The actual ratio required may even be higher than the basic range of 16%-20% range, as the plan allows national regulators to add on further capital charges if they deem it necessary.

    The scale of the new requirements reflects, in part, the fact that regulators have largely failed to crack the legal and political problems of resolving a global bank (such as Lehman Brothers was), if its collapse leaves a trail of creditors in numerous jurisdictions, all with competing claims on its assets.

    The new requirements would hit 30 banks that the FSB considers G-SIBs. They include JP Morgan Chase Inc. JPM 0.75% , Citigroup C 0.26% , Goldman Sachs , Morgan Stanley MS 0.62% , State Street STT 0.40% and Wells Fargo Inc. WFC -0.02% , as well as all of the largest European and Japanese banks, plus two Chinese lenders.

    Mark Carney, chairman of the FSB and governor of the Bank of England, told the BBC Monday that the pre-crisis system, which forced governments to carry out multi-billion dollar bail-outs to avert financial disaster, had been “totally unfair.”

    “The banks and their shareholders and their creditors got the benefit when things went well,” Carney said. “But when they went wrong the…public and subsequent generations picked up the bill–and that’s going to end.”

    Banks have complained ever since the Basel III accords that stringent new capital requirements would make it difficult for them to turn a profit, but such claims have lost credence as bank profits–especially in the U.S.–have rebounded with the economic upturn.

    The new rules wouldn’t necessarily mean that banks will have to issue floods of new shares that would dilute their existing shareholder base. More likely is that banks–which typically depend to a far greater extent on bonds than equity to finance themselves–will have to rely less on “senior” debt, and switch more of it for “subordinated” debt that regulators can write down to zero if a bank’s losses exceed its equity base.

    The FSB said it expects that banks will be able to use such ‘bail-in-able’ debt securities to meet at least one-third of the requirement.

    Under the FSB’s proposals, banks would have until 2019 to meet the requirements. If they fail to do so, then regulators could restrict or ban bonus payments or dividends until a bank met them.

    The final terms of the requirement will be fine-tuned after feedback from the banks themselves, and from a ‘Quantitative Impact Study’ in early 2015.

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