这是个错误。法国和希腊的新政府需要明白，经济增长和政府紧缩并不排斥。通过政府支出取得的经济增长，尤其是就业增加，必须要有私营部门相应足够快的增长给予支撑，才能持续。否则，任何经济增长都是暂时的，而且还会增加债务负担。这涉及到资源的有效利用。花费数十亿欧元重新雇佣几千名对法国整体经济产生不了多少价值的政府工作人员，效果自然不同于花费数十亿欧元打造可自我持续的经济增长引擎，如研究基地或向种子初创公司提供资金。

    但所有这些关于“增长－紧缩”的探讨涉及到的只是希腊、法国和欧元区其他国家的短期经济困境，忽略了造成主权债务危机的首要结构性问题。如果欧元区17个成员国不能实现财政货币政策的完全整合，这个危机就永远不会解决。当然，这意味着大幅的主权出让，可能很难被大多数欧元区政府所接受。

    不过，奥朗德表示，他赞成欧洲央行（European Central Bank）发行“欧元债券”来支持那些难以在公开市场融资的欧元区成员国。这可以作为欧洲央行“长期再融资操作计划”（LTRO）的替代选择；LTRO目前的做法是给银行提供大量低息现金、用于购买主权债务，间接作为很多欧元区政府的融资机制。目前，LTRO计划是阻止葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利等主权债券利率达到不可维持高水平的唯一制约因素。

    但LTRO计划只是一个临时性措施，如果持续实施，必将引发超高通胀。在所有17个成员国的支持下发行欧元债券将是一个更为持续的解决方案，但如果所有成员国不构建起一个联合财政体制，这也行不通。因为这意味着欧元区债务的相互融合和风险转移。这种信任只有在欧元区所有成员国在支出上保持一致的基础才能建立。

    因此，奥朗德支持发行欧元债券是正确的，因为这将是巩固共同货币联盟而走出的真正第一步，但还不清楚他是否有任何想法将此变为现实。为此，他不仅需要说服本国政府放弃财政控制权，还要说服包括德国在内的其他欧元区国家也这么做，而眼下德国强烈反对这一建议。在此之前，他还需要让市场和其他欧元区成员确信，法国是值得信赖的，法国承诺恢复财政体系秩序。这意味着法国新任总统在重启法国经济增长引擎的过程中需要有节制地使用他的“国家信用卡”。

    译者：早稻米

    That would be a mistake. The new governments in France and Greece need to understand that economic growth and government austerity are not mutually exclusive. The type of growth that comes through government spending, especially employment growth, can only be sustained if the private sector grows at a fast enough pace to support it. If not, then any gains would be temporary and just add to the debt load. It is all about the efficient use of resources. Spending billions of euros hiring back thousands of unproductive government workers who produce little value to the country's overall economy isn't the same as spending billions building engines of economic growth that are self sustaining, like a research campus or a fund to seed startup companies.

    But all of this talk of growth versus austerity addresses only the short-term economic woes impacting Greece, France and the rest of the eurozone and skips over the structural problems that created the sovereign debt crisis in the first place. This crisis will never end until the 17 members of the euro fully integrate their fiscal and monetary policies. This, of course, would mean a massive transfer of sovereignty that most of the eurozone governments would find unpalatable.

    Yet Hollande says he is in favor of the European Central Bank issuing "eurobonds," to support eurozone members that are having trouble funding themselves in the open market. This would be an alternative to the ECB's LTRO program, which currently works by flooding the banks with cheap cash to buy sovereign bonds as a pass through funding mechanism for many eurozone governments. The LTRO program is the only thing keeping the interest rates on the sovereign bonds of countries like Portugal, Spain and Italy from hitting unsustainably high levels.

    But the LTRO program is only a temporary measure, one that cannot possibly continue without eventually triggering hyperinflation. The issuing of eurobonds, backed by all 17 members would be a more lasting solution, but it can never work unless all the members have a joint fiscal regime. That's because it would mean the co-mingling of debt and a transfer of risk across the eurozone. That kind of trust can only occur if all eurozone members were on the same page in terms of spending.

    So, Hollande is right to support eurobonds as it would be the first real step to solidifying the currency union, but it is unclear if he has any idea what it would take to make it a reality. He would not only need to convince his own government to give up fiscal control but also convince all the other eurozone members to do so as well, including Germany, which is vehemently opposed to the idea. But before all that he will need to reassure the markets and other eurozone members that France is creditworthy and committed to getting its fiscal house in order. That means France's new president will need to use the national credit card sparingly as he tries to rekindle the fire in country's economic growth engine.