巴克莱丑闻可能拔出萝卜带出泥

    美国商品期货交易委员会和其他监管机构的调查显示，这些银行在金融危机期间提交的利率远低于实际借贷成本。原因很简单：它们害怕如果透露的数字远高于竞争对手，可能引发流动性危机传言。2007年，巴克莱提供的准确数据显示，其借贷成本高于竞争对手，令其担心既然竞争对手一直在捏造数字，真实数据可能引起投资者和监管机构的警惕    戴蒙德周三将接受英国议会负责LIBOR丑闻调查的一个委员会的质询，他在写给该委员会主席的一封信中谈到了这个问题。“围绕巴克莱流动性的无端猜测源于巴克莱提交的LIBOR相对高于其他银行。巴克莱认为，基于市场环境，这些银行提交的数字太低。这引发了巴克莱对LIBOR设定流程可靠性的怀疑。”

    美国司法部的和解文件显示，2007年8月巴克莱开始故意报低数字。一位“报价者”称，巴克莱需要“随行就市”。另一位则告诫称，不能“出头”，因为“枪打出头鸟”。

    上述委员会肯定会问到的是2008年10月29日戴蒙德与英国央行（Bank of England）副行长的一次谈话。谈话细节已在巴克莱提交给委员会的报告中列明。这位副行长当时担心巴克莱提交的较高利率可能预示着压力将至。戴蒙德的谈话后记录显示，“虽然他（副行长）知道我们不需要建议，但我们的数字不需要总是像近来那么高。”

    巴克莱的文件显示，戴蒙德与巴克莱投资银行业务的首席营运官杰里•德尔米西耶讨论了上述对话。戴蒙德不认为英国央行是在指示他报低利率，也否认指使德尔米西耶调低这些数据。但德尔米西耶的“结论是，英国央行指示不要将LIBOR保持在这么高的水平，并向报价者传达了这个精神。”

    巴克莱的文件将这一事件描述为戴蒙德和德尔米西耶之间的误解。

    但一切听起来显然就像是英国央行在鼓励巴克莱调低LIBOR报价。这一丑闻可能超越戴蒙德，直达银行监管机构本身。敬请关注鲍勃•戴蒙德唱主角的英国议会听证会，届时必将有更多信息曝光。

    译者：早稻米

    During the financial crisis, according to the findings of the CFTC and other authorities, many of the banks were submitting rates far lower than their actual borrowing costs. The reason was simple: They feared that by showing rates far above those of their competitors, they'd spark rumors they were facing a liquidity crisis. In 2007, Barclays was providing accurate data that showed higher borrowing costs than its peers, and was alarmed that those numbers would alarm investors and regulators since its peers were cooking their numbers。    

     Diamond addressed the issue in a letter to the Chairman of the committee he'll face on Wednesday. "The unwarranted speculation regarding Barclays liquidity was as a result of its LIBOR submissions being high relative to those of other banks. At the time, Barclays opinion was that those banks' submissions were too low given market circumstances. This raised questions for the bank about the integrity of the LIBOR setting process."

    According to the U.S. Department of Justice settlement, Barclays adopted a policy of submitting artificially low numbers in August of 2007. One "submitter" stated that the bank needed to be "part of the pack" and another cautioned the importance of holding its "head below the parapet" so that it did not get "shot off."

    What's certain to attract questions from the panel is a conversation between Diamond and a Deputy Governor of the Bank of England on October 29th, 2008. The details are given in a report Barclays submitted to the committee. The bank official was concerned that Barclays relatively high submissions might signal distress. According to a note Diamond made after the conversation, the official stated that "while he was certain we did not need advice, that it did not always need to be the case that we appeared as high as we have recently."

    According to Barclays documents, Diamond discussed the conversation with his chief operating officer of the investment bank, Jerry del Missier. Diamond did not think he had received instructions to artificially lower submissions from the Bank of England. He also denies instructing del Missier to lower the data. But del Missier "concluded that an instruction had been passed down from the Bank of England not to keep LIBOR so high. He passed down an instruction to that effect to the submitters."

    The Barclays documents portray the incident as a case as a misunderstanding between Diamond and del Missier.

    But it certainly sounds as if the Bank of England encouraged Barclays to lower its LIBOR submissions. The scandal could potentially reach beyond Diamond to the bank-skewering regulators themselves. The incident will undoubtedly provide still more material for what's been a regular spectacle, high drama in Parliament, with Bob Diamond at center stage.