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专栏 - 中国会计思考

全面透视中美会计跨境监管僵局

鲍大雷 2012年12月18日

鲍大雷博士是北京大学光华管理学院的特邀教授,並担任IMBA 项目联合主任。鲍博士是中国的会计和审计问题的著名专家。在加入北京大学之前,他是普华永道会计师事务所在美国,新加坡和中国的合伙人。其博客网站是www.chinaaccountingblog.com.
中美两国的会计跨境监管的问题如果迟迟得不到解决,最终受影响的可能不仅仅是相关的四大会计事务所及它们在中国的分支机构,还包括它们所服务的一大批跨国企业。

    注3:第(2)段定义里的“并表资产或营收的20%或以上”,应在发行人财年之初用上年数据先行确定,财年内只能确定一次。

    如果我们将这些规定套用于一家在华有业务的典型跨国公司,我们首先要问的问题是,中国会计师事务所的服务小时数或服务费在总量中的占比是否超过了20%。总服务小时数和总服务费用是指在全球范围内为这家公司提供的服务小时数和服务费用,包括母国团队的服务小时数和服务费用。如果中国会计师事务所的这些比率超过了20%,就必须具有美国上市公司会计监管委员会登记注册资格。

    如果规定没有要求这些比率低于20%的会计师事务所在美国上市公司会计监管委员会登记注册,接下来要看的是中国会计师事务所是否为占发行人并表资产或营收20%或更多的子公司、部门、分支机构或其他业务提供主要审计服务。由于大多数跨国公司在中国有很多子公司,这项测试可能很容易通过。即便中国的总资产或营收超过了跨国公司总量的20%,没有一家单独的子公司会触限。第一项测试可能是关键,不管中国会计师事务所是否占到全球服务小时数或服务费的20%以上。

    我相信即便跨国公司的中国会计师事务所被取消美国上市公司会计监管委员会注册资格,也很少会有跨国公司(如果还有)会对这条规定提出异议。跨国公司的服务小时数和服务费总是向总部倾斜。即便跨国公司的中国资产和营收占比可能超过20%,服务小时数和服务费占比可能仍不到20%。如果美国上市公司会计监管委员会提议取消这些事务所的注册资格,美国证券交易委员会应该会立即要求披露对跨国公司的影响,以便投资者能获得必要的信息。

    一项建议称,可以让香港成员所在报告上签字,绕过美国上市公司会计监管委员会限制。这个办法行不通。由于中国监管部门禁止美国上市公司会计监管委员会检查香港会计师事务所与中国相关的审计工作,承担中国业务的事务所可能会和内地事务所一样丧失注册登记资格。在中国经营的外资会计师事务所(包括香港会计师事务所)面临很多问题,可能导致其他外资会计师事务所也无法从事这项业务。

    截至今日,有45家中国内地的会计师事务所已在美国上市公司会计监管委员会注册登记。这些公司中只有8家发布过审计报告,7家报告称他们曾在发行人审计中承担关键角色,2家审计过一家交易经纪商,25家已经注册,但原因并不明显,4家没有报告。鉴于上述规定,我想7家声称承担关键角色的事务所需要再仔细看看是否真地承担了关键决策。那25家在美国上市公司会计监管委员会注册登记又是为了什么?如果他们没有一定的必要这么做,为什么非要接受这样的监管?我猜这些事务所可能是主动注册,相信这能提高他们的可信度,更容易推销服务。中国人喜欢积累文凭和证书,但在美国上市公司会计监管委员会注册登记与荣耀无关。

    Note 3: For purposes of determining "20% or more of the consolidated assets or revenues" under paragraph (2) of this Rule, this determination should be made at the beginning of the issuer's fiscal year using prior year information and should be made only once during the issuer's fiscal year.

    If we apply those rules to a typical MNC with operations in China, we first ask if the China auditor performs more than 20% of the total engagement hours or fees. The total engagement hours and fees would include all fees and hours around the world to audit the company, including the hours and fees of the home country team. If the China firm does more than 20% of those totals, it must be registered with the PCAOB.

    If it is not required to be registered under the 20% of total hours and fees rule, then we look to whether the China firm is performing the majority of audit procedures with respect to a subsidiary, division, branch or component that makes up 20% or more of the consolidated assets or revenues of such issuer. Because most MNCs have many subsidiaries in China, this test may be easy to pass since even when total China assets or revenue are over 20% of the MNC, no single subsidiary may trip the wire. The first test, whether the China accounting firm has more than 20% of the total worldwide fees or hours, is probably the key test.

    It is my belief that few, if any, MNCs will have a problem with this rule should their China accounting firm be deregistered. MNC fees and hours tend to be heavily weighted to the headquarters, so even where the MNC's China assets and revenues may be higher than 20%, the hours and fees are likely to be less than 20%. Should the PCAOB propose deregistering the firms, disclosure of the impact on MNCs should be required by the SEC immediately so that investors are properly informed.

    A suggestion has been made that the Hong Kong member firm could simply sign the reports to avoid the PCAOB issue. That won't work. Chinese regulators have forbid the PCAOB from inspecting Hong Kong firms with respect to China work, so those that do China work will likely be deregistered along with the mainland firms. There are a host of problems related to a foreign accounting firm (including Hong Kong firms) practicing in China that probably make it impossible for any other foreign accounting firm to do it either.

    As of today, there are 45 accounting firms from mainland China that have registered with the PCAOB. Only eight of these firms have issued reports, seven firms report that they played a substantial role in an audit, two firms audited a broker-dealer, 25 registered for no apparent reason, and 4 firms did not report. Based on the rules above, I think the seven who claim to play a substantial role ought to take another look as to whether they really do. Why are the 25 registered with the PCAOB? Why subject themselves to regulation if they are not required to do so? My guess is that these firms voluntarily registered because they thought it would give them more credibility, and make it easier to sell services. Chinese like to collect diplomas and certificates, but PCAOB registrations are poor wall ornaments.

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