
联合国于周二发布的报告指出,伊朗战争的影响远不止推高国际油价、中断霍尔木兹海峡航运通道——在本世纪20年代余下的时间里,这场冲突或将显著推高全球饥饿人口规模,仅亚洲与非洲合计就将新增近1900万。
联合国五大机构联合发布的《2026年世界粮食安全和营养状况》(SOFI)报告,围绕今年中东冲突后续影响的持续时间构建多组假设情景,推演截至2030年全球饥饿形势的演变趋势。在最悲观情景下,波斯湾油气基础设施遭袭后需数年才能修复;报告测算,2030年全球食物不足人口将达到5.22亿,而冲突爆发前的基准预测值为5.03亿。
新增的1880万长期饥饿人口几乎全部集中在两大区域:亚洲预计较无冲突情景新增1000万饥饿人口,非洲新增800万,其余增量来自拉丁美洲及加勒比地区。
这一数字低于世界粮食计划署(WFP,本次报告的联合发布机构之一)在冲突初期发出的预警。该机构3月的分析显示,若冲突持续发酵且油价维持在每桶100美元以上,到2026年年中,突发重度粮食不安全人口最多将新增4500万。但两者统计口径不同:世界粮食计划署聚焦短期突发性危机,而新版《世界粮食安全和营养状况》报告追踪的是截至2030年的长期食物不足状况。
综合所有情景来看,相较于冲突爆发前的预期趋势,霍尔木兹海峡相关危机到2030年或将导致全球新增800万至1900万食物不足人口。
即便如此,最糟糕情景下1800万的增量在任何语境下都堪称触目惊心。该增量是乌克兰大饥荒(Holodomor,这场由苏联政策引发的饥荒在1932年至1933年造成约350万至1000万人死亡)死亡人数下限估值的四倍有余,同时也是爱尔兰马铃薯饥荒死亡人数(约100万至150万人)的十倍有余。这一对比并不严谨——《世界粮食安全和营养状况》报告统计的是截至2030年新增长期饥饿人口,而非死亡人数,但足以凸显这场冲击的规模堪比人类历史上的数次重大饥荒。
联合国粮食及农业组织(FAO)首席经济学家马克西莫·托雷罗·库伦(Máximo Torero Cullen)通过邮件向《财富》杂志表示,霍尔木兹海峡危机“将大幅侵蚀全球减饥工作本可取得的进展”。
爱丁堡大学(University of Edinburgh)全球粮食安全高级讲师彼得·亚历山大(Peter Alexander)长期研究能源与化肥冲击对粮食体系的传导机制。他指出,伊朗战争与饥饿之间的核心传导链条是化肥——化肥生产依赖天然气,同时也深受供需格局的影响。
亚历山大向《财富》杂志表示,化肥是全球大宗商品,因此任何地区出现供给冲击都会推高全球化肥价格,与该国是否从海湾地区采购化肥或天然气并无直接关联。农户将根据价格信号调整生产:减少化肥施用量、改种低投入作物,甚至弃种部分作物,最终导致全球粮食供给收缩。
“供需规律决定了,粮食商品的市场供给减少,粮价就会上涨,”亚历山大表示,“供给缺口出现在哪里其实并不重要,价格波动会传导至全球各地。”
亚历山大解释道,非洲与亚洲承受的冲击更为严重,原因在于这些地区居民的食品支出占收入的比重远高于其他地区,且粮食需求缺乏弹性。
他对《财富》杂志表示:“当食品价格上涨,人们无力负担充足的营养膳食时,全球贫困地区就会出现这些负面后果。”
亚历山大指出,北美地区基本不受影响,因为其经济实力足以承受价格冲击,不会出现营养状况恶化的情况。
报告评估伊朗冲突影响的背景是全球粮食安全形势整体向好。基准数据显示,全球饥饿人口占比已连续第三年下降,从2022年的8.6%降至2025年的7.8%,对应约6.45亿人。(财富中文网)
译者:中慧言-王芳
联合国于周二发布的报告指出,伊朗战争的影响远不止推高国际油价、中断霍尔木兹海峡航运通道——在本世纪20年代余下的时间里,这场冲突或将显著推高全球饥饿人口规模,仅亚洲与非洲合计就将新增近1900万。
联合国五大机构联合发布的《2026年世界粮食安全和营养状况》(SOFI)报告,围绕今年中东冲突后续影响的持续时间构建多组假设情景,推演截至2030年全球饥饿形势的演变趋势。在最悲观情景下,波斯湾油气基础设施遭袭后需数年才能修复;报告测算,2030年全球食物不足人口将达到5.22亿,而冲突爆发前的基准预测值为5.03亿。
新增的1880万长期饥饿人口几乎全部集中在两大区域:亚洲预计较无冲突情景新增1000万饥饿人口,非洲新增800万,其余增量来自拉丁美洲及加勒比地区。
这一数字低于世界粮食计划署(WFP,本次报告的联合发布机构之一)在冲突初期发出的预警。该机构3月的分析显示,若冲突持续发酵且油价维持在每桶100美元以上,到2026年年中,突发重度粮食不安全人口最多将新增4500万。但两者统计口径不同:世界粮食计划署聚焦短期突发性危机,而新版《世界粮食安全和营养状况》报告追踪的是截至2030年的长期食物不足状况。
综合所有情景来看,相较于冲突爆发前的预期趋势,霍尔木兹海峡相关危机到2030年或将导致全球新增800万至1900万食物不足人口。
即便如此,最糟糕情景下1800万的增量在任何语境下都堪称触目惊心。该增量是乌克兰大饥荒(Holodomor,这场由苏联政策引发的饥荒在1932年至1933年造成约350万至1000万人死亡)死亡人数下限估值的四倍有余,同时也是爱尔兰马铃薯饥荒死亡人数(约100万至150万人)的十倍有余。这一对比并不严谨——《世界粮食安全和营养状况》报告统计的是截至2030年新增长期饥饿人口,而非死亡人数,但足以凸显这场冲击的规模堪比人类历史上的数次重大饥荒。
联合国粮食及农业组织(FAO)首席经济学家马克西莫·托雷罗·库伦(Máximo Torero Cullen)通过邮件向《财富》杂志表示,霍尔木兹海峡危机“将大幅侵蚀全球减饥工作本可取得的进展”。
爱丁堡大学(University of Edinburgh)全球粮食安全高级讲师彼得·亚历山大(Peter Alexander)长期研究能源与化肥冲击对粮食体系的传导机制。他指出,伊朗战争与饥饿之间的核心传导链条是化肥——化肥生产依赖天然气,同时也深受供需格局的影响。
亚历山大向《财富》杂志表示,化肥是全球大宗商品,因此任何地区出现供给冲击都会推高全球化肥价格,与该国是否从海湾地区采购化肥或天然气并无直接关联。农户将根据价格信号调整生产:减少化肥施用量、改种低投入作物,甚至弃种部分作物,最终导致全球粮食供给收缩。
“供需规律决定了,粮食商品的市场供给减少,粮价就会上涨,”亚历山大表示,“供给缺口出现在哪里其实并不重要,价格波动会传导至全球各地。”
亚历山大解释道,非洲与亚洲承受的冲击更为严重,原因在于这些地区居民的食品支出占收入的比重远高于其他地区,且粮食需求缺乏弹性。
他对《财富》杂志表示:“当食品价格上涨,人们无力负担充足的营养膳食时,全球贫困地区就会出现这些负面后果。”
亚历山大指出,北美地区基本不受影响,因为其经济实力足以承受价格冲击,不会出现营养状况恶化的情况。
报告评估伊朗冲突影响的背景是全球粮食安全形势整体向好。基准数据显示,全球饥饿人口占比已连续第三年下降,从2022年的8.6%降至2025年的7.8%,对应约6.45亿人。(财富中文网)
译者:中慧言-王芳
The Iran war has done more than send oil prices spiking and shut down shipping through the Strait of Hormuz—it could reshape how many people go hungry through the rest of the decade to nearly 19 million more across Asia and Africa combined, according to a UN report released Tuesday.
The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2026 report, published jointly by five UN agencies, modeled what happens to global hunger through 2030 under competing assumptions about how long the fallout from this year’s conflict in the Middle East lasts. In the most pessimistic scenario, in which strikes on oil and gas infrastructure in the Persian Gulf take years to repair, the report projects 522 million people will be undernourished in 2030 compared to the 503 million in a pre-conflict baseline.
That gap, 18.8 million additional people pushed into chronic hunger, is driven almost entirely by two regions: Asia, where the report projects 10 million more hungry people than it would have without the war, and Africa, with 8 million more, with Latin America and the Caribbean making up the difference.
That figure is narrower than what the World Food Programme, one of the agencies involved in the report, warned of earlier in the war. In a March analysis, WFP projected that up to 45 million more people could be pushed into acute food insecurity by mid-2026 if the conflict persisted and oil stayed above $100 a barrel. However, that number measures something different: an acute, near-term crisis rather than the longer-run undernourishment the new SOFI report tracks through 2030.
In all the scenarios taken together, the Hormuz-related crisis could leave between 8 million and 19 million additional people undernourished in 2030 compared with the trajectory expected before the conflict.
But 18 million as a worst-case scenario is a striking number under any circumstance. It’s more than four times low-end estimates of the death toll from the Holodomor, the Soviet-engineered famine that killed an estimated 3.5 million to 10 million Ukrainians in between 1932 and 1933, and more than ten times the roughly 1 million to 1.5 million people who died in Ireland’s potato famine. The comparison isn’t exact—SOFI counts people pushed into chronic hunger by 2030, not deaths—but it underscores the scale of a shock that rivals some of history’s greatest famines.
Máximo Torero Cullen, the chief economist of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, told Fortune over email that the Hormuz-related crisis “erodes a significant part of the progress that would otherwise have occurred” in reducing global hunger.
The direct link from the Iran war and hunger is fertilizer, which is sourced from natural gas, and also fertilizer’s demand and supply dynamics, according to Peter Alexander, a senior lecturer in global food security at the University of Edinburgh who has studied how energy and fertilizer shocks ripple through food systems.
Alexander told Fortune that because fertilizer trades on a global market, a supply shock anywhere raises prices everywhere, regardless of whether a given country ever bought a bag of fertilizer or gas from the Gulf. Farmers then act on that price signal—using less fertilizer, switching to less input-intensive crops, or not planting certain crops at all—and that shrinks global food supply.
“Supply and demand would tell you that if there is less supply entering the market for food commodities, then we’re going to see higher food prices,” Alexander said. “It sort of doesn’t really matter where the shortfall occurs. The price gets transmitted everywhere.”
Alexander explained the pain lands harder in Africa and Asia because people in those regions spend a far higher share of their income on food, and food demand is inelastic.
“When you’re not able to afford a sufficient nutritious diet because it’s become more expensive, then that’s why you end up having those negative consequences in the poorer regions of the world,” he told Fortune.
North America, Alexander noted, is largely insulated because it is wealthy enough to absorb the price shock without nutritional consequences.
The report’s Iran war impact findings arrive against an otherwise improving backdrop. Its baseline data show global hunger has declined for a third straight year, from 8.6% of the world’s population in 2022 to 7.8% in 2025, or about 645 million people.