逼空大战中，青山集团全身而退的秘密
北京时间3月8日下午2点08分，事态已经非常明朗，项光达重金押注镍价下跌的做法大错而特错。
彼时，镍期货价格刚刚飙升至每吨10万美元以上，项光达的账面损失超过100亿美元。在这种规模的亏损面前，不仅项光达的公司面临破产危机，甚至整个金属行业都有可能受到冲击，一如当年的雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）事件，伦敦金属交易所（London Metal Exchange）本身也可能因为这起事件而灰飞烟灭。
但项光达却很平静。在短短几个小时之内，已经有50多名银行家来到他的办公室，想听听他打算如何应对这场危机。他的回答很简单：“我相信我们能够战胜这场危机。”而他也确实做到了。
四个月之后的今天，镍价确实出现了下跌，一如项光达此前的预测。以摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase & Co.）为首、磨刀霍霍的银行集团也拿到了自己的报偿。据熟悉项光达的人士透露，他已经平仓几乎所有的镍空头头寸，亏损约为10亿美元，考虑到他的商业帝国在其他方面获得的收益，这个数字尚在其承受范围之内。
至关重要的是：以“大佬”绰号闻名中国大宗商品圈的项光达即将从这场危机中全身而退，他旗下价值数十亿美元的矿业和炼钢公司——青山控股集团不仅完好无损，甚至还实现了进一步扩张。
虽然对项光达而言，这场危机已经是过眼云烟，有人却不得不留下来替他收拾剩下的烂摊子。项光达之所以能够逃出生天，伦敦金属交易所功不可没，面对重重质疑，该机构毅然出手干涉市场，阻止镍价进一步上涨，并暂停了镍金属交易，直至项光达与合作银行达成协议方才恢复。
受此影响，项光达的交易对手损失达数十亿美元，自然对伦敦金属交易所感到无比愤怒。在危机爆发数月之后的今天，伦敦金属交易所官司缠身、不断遭受调查，而镍金属市场也仍未恢复元气。
对冲基金集团AQR Capital Management的创始人克利夫·阿斯内斯在推特（Twitter）上发了一条充满讽刺意味的推文：“很高兴看到摩根大通和‘大佬’可以几乎毫发无损的全身而退，真是一个暖心的故事。”
这是一篇有关项光达如何从这场扰动全球金属市场的逼空大战中脱身的故事，在撰写这篇文章的过程里，我们采访了诸多亲历者，相关人士均要求匿名。对于我们发出的多次置评请求，青山集团均未作回应。
逼空大作战
2021年年底至2022年年初，项光达买入了大量空头头寸，一方面为对冲风险，一方面是认为青山集团的大幅增产将会拉低镍价。但在俄乌冲突爆发后，全球市场出现震动，镍价开始攀升，起初增幅还较温和，随后进入暴走模式，两天飙升250%。
3月8日晚，一众资深银行家涌入青山集团总部，要求项光达就当前局势给出答复。无法到现场的则纷纷从伦敦或新加坡打来视频电话。在到场的银行家中，有些直到第二天上午才离开。
由于项光达持有的空头头寸涉及约十家银行和经纪商，所以当天晚上来了很多人（多年以来，青山集团一直是摩根大通等机构的优质客户）。但在3月7日镍价开始飙升之后，青山集团已经很难满足追加保证金的要求。当时，项光达欠各家机构的资金均已达到上亿美元。
在镍价触及10万美元几个小时之后，伦敦金属交易所最终选择出手干预市场，叫停镍金属交易。不仅如此，伦敦金属交易所还取消了数十亿美元的交易，将镍价拉回前一天收盘时的48078美元——项光达和青山集团的生命线。
为重启市场，伦敦金属交易所提出了一个解决方案：项光达应与多方达成协议，并按协议价平仓。但5万美元左右的价格相当于项光达买入空头头寸时的价格的两倍有余，如果接受这一提议，项光达就将损失数十亿美元。
现年60岁出头的项光达坚决不同意接受这一方案。起家于温州的项光达，从生产汽车门窗框架开始，一步步将青山集团建设成为全球最大的镍金属和不锈钢生产商，其商业帝国版图辽阔，从中国东部沿海地区的钢铁厂一直延伸到印度尼西亚偏远岛屿上的矿山。在缔造这一帝国的过程中，他为自己赢得了“富于远见”和“喜押重注”的名声。
在此之前，项光达也曾经引起过伦敦金属交易所的注意，2019年，青山集团身处逼空战的另一方，当时，该集团从伦敦金属交易所撤出了大量镍库存，导致镍价大涨。
这一次，项光达激进交易手法造成的影响比上一次要深远得多。
镍价飙升、交易冻结对下游公司（例如不锈钢工厂和电动汽车电池制造商）造成了巨大冲击，有些干脆不再接受新订单。在伦敦金属交易所这边，交易商们竭力从那些无力支付的客户处收回欠缴的追加保证金，至少有一家公司不得不向母公司寻求资金支持。
但在整个行业空前混乱的情况下，（3月9日凌晨仍然在面对其合作的银行家的）项光达拥有一个关键优势，那就是其他人比他更为恐惧。
如果项光达拒不还钱，则债主们就将只能在印度尼西亚和中国的法院对其进行追索。此外，项光达是通过一系列公司实体进行的相关镍金属交易，比如电池制造商——瑞普能源有限公司的香港分公司，当时上述银行甚至不清楚自己是否有权没收青山集团最有价值的那部分资产。
当时在场的一位人士回忆道，那些银行家很清楚，如果与项光达的交易出现问题，他们的职业生涯也就完了。
风险敞口最大的摩根大通扮演了领导者的角色。涉足相关交易的银行包括渣打银行（Standard Chartered Bank Plc）和法国巴黎银行（BNP Paribas SA）等一些国际机构，但也有许多是中国和新加坡的银行，后者几乎没有处理这种情况的经验。
个人担保
项光达告诉聚在自己办公室的银行家，他丝毫无意在5万美元价格附近平仓。几个小时后，他向伦敦金属交易所的首席执行官马修·张伯伦传达了同样的信息。他说，青山集团实力雄厚，（在这件事情上）不会让步。
相反，项光达列出了一份自己愿意用作抵押的资产清单：若干位于印度尼西亚的镍铁工厂。但对部分在场的银行家来说，这种抵押不足以让他们安心。受新冠疫情影响，未来几周甚至几个月的时间里他们都无法对这些位于印度尼西亚的资产进行任何尽职调查，即便那些与青山集团合作非常密切的合作伙伴也已经多年未造访过这些工厂。
因此，项光达再次让步，决定提供个人担保，如果青山集团未能偿付欠款，银行家们就可以将其赶出家门，此种做法不仅意味着项光达要拿出个人财富作为抵押，还是一种中国文化上放低姿态的表示，这也是他最后开出的条件，如果不接受就意味着谈判破裂。
银行家们并没有太多的选择。3月14日，在镍市陷入混乱一周之后，青山集团宣布与相关银行达成协议，根据协议，银行同意在一段时间内不再追究该公司所欠的数十亿美元债务。作为交换，项光达同意，在镍价跌到3万美元以下后，将在一系列位置进行减仓。
两天后，镍市重启，价格走低，项光达和相关银行的压力有所减轻。此后，镍价一度跌破3万美元，青山集团也趁机减持了约20%的空头头寸。
而伦敦金属交易所面临的压力却有增无减。相关监管机构开始对该交易所的治理和监管工作进行审查。美国达拉斯联邦储备银行（Dallas Federal Reserve）和国际货币基金组织（International Monetary Fund）加入了声讨伦敦金属交易所的大军，许多对冲基金也对伦敦金属交易所取消交易的决定感到愤怒不已。
掌管着67亿美元资金的荷兰算法基金Transtrend表示：“在我们意识到真正发生了什么的时候，我们感觉以后再也不能把客户的钱委托给伦敦金属交易所了。”随着交易商纷纷离场，该交易所六大主要金属合约的可用库存降至十多年以来的最低水平。
青山集团及其合作银行每个月都会对双方达成的暂停还款协议进行审查。在最初的下跌之后，镍价有很长时间一直在33000美元左右徘徊
那段时间，双方都绷紧了神经。由于当时青山集团仍然持有大量空头头寸，一旦镍价再次上涨（例如对俄制裁导致镍供应中断，截至目前尚未出现这种情况），青山集团及其合作银行仍然可能面临巨额亏损。
最后，在5月，由于中国的封控措施令金属市场热度大减，镍价跌穿3万美元的关键位置。此后几周，青山将其空头头寸（3月初曾经超过15万吨）减持至6万吨。
此时的镍价已经低于3月初青山集团停止追加保证金时的水平，也就是说，项光达与其合作银行间已经没有任何债务关系。于是他提议取消双方协议中个人担保的部分，认为相关规定是其身处财务困境时的无奈之举。部分合作银行愿意让步，但摩根大通表示反对，最终，双方同意，减少用作抵押的镍厂数量，但项光达仍然需要提供个人担保。摩根大通发言人拒绝对此事予以置评。
还有其他一些迹象也表明，这场危机已经损害了项光达与其合作银行之间的关系。今年6月，由于全球市场担心经济陷入衰退，项光达的空头头寸似乎将迎来转机。于是项光达要求合作银行给他一些灵活性，允许他不在协议到期时平仓，延长空头头寸持有时间。该请求再次遭到摩根大通拒绝。截至6月底，项光达已经完全平仓其在摩根大通及其他几家银行开立的头寸，剩余的空头头寸已经不到2万吨。
据知情人士估计，青山集团在相关交易中的损失约为10亿美元。对此，项光达并不在意。他手下的镍矿业务在这段时间产生的利润基本能够弥补上述亏损。相关暂停还款协议的期限原为三个月，经项光达延期后，将于7月中旬到期。
现在，“大佬”已经开始了全新生活，专注于规划青山集团（该集团去年营收达到560亿美元）的未来。至少就目前而言，他或许无法再像过去那样在伦敦金属交易所呼风唤雨，但他仍然可以在上海期货交易所进行交易。项光达仍然抱有扩张野心，不仅想在亚洲再进一步，还将目光投向了广袤的非洲大地。青山集团对镍金属市场的影响力一如既往，正如他预测的那样，镍价是否走低在相当程度上取决于其印度尼西亚工厂是否大幅增产。
不过，虽然项光达已经开启了人生的新篇章，但伦敦金属交易所仍然在收拾残局。监管机构指出，镍市出现混乱局面表明，大宗商品市场存有潜在风险，并呼吁加强对整个行业的监管。对冲基金——埃利奥特投资管理公司（Elliot Investment Management）和交易公司Jane Street已经对伦敦金属交易所发起诉讼，要求后者赔偿近5亿美元损失。
相关人士表示，镍市元气目前仍未恢复，由于许多交易商不再在合约中使用伦敦金属交易所价格，未平仓合约和交易量均远低于此前水平。据资深镍金属市场观察家、Red Door Research Ltd.的董事总经理吉姆·伦农估计，目前全球的镍产量中，只有不到25%以伦敦金属交易所价格出售，而在3月危机爆发前，这一数字为50%。
他说：“许多业内人士已经暂时退出伦敦金属交易所。目前市场仍在运转，只是情况不容乐观。”（财富中文网）
译者：梁宇
审校：夏林
北京时间3月8日下午2点08分，事态已经非常明朗，项光达重金押注镍价下跌的做法大错而特错。
彼时，镍期货价格刚刚飙升至每吨10万美元以上，项光达的账面损失超过100亿美元。在这种规模的亏损面前，不仅项光达的公司面临破产危机，甚至整个金属行业都有可能受到冲击，一如当年的雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）事件，伦敦金属交易所（London Metal Exchange）本身也可能因为这起事件而灰飞烟灭。
但项光达却很平静。在短短几个小时之内，已经有50多名银行家来到他的办公室，想听听他打算如何应对这场危机。他的回答很简单：“我相信我们能够战胜这场危机。”而他也确实做到了。
四个月之后的今天，镍价确实出现了下跌，一如项光达此前的预测。以摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase & Co.）为首、磨刀霍霍的银行集团也拿到了自己的报偿。据熟悉项光达的人士透露，他已经平仓几乎所有的镍空头头寸，亏损约为10亿美元，考虑到他的商业帝国在其他方面获得的收益，这个数字尚在其承受范围之内。
至关重要的是：以“大佬”绰号闻名中国大宗商品圈的项光达即将从这场危机中全身而退，他旗下价值数十亿美元的矿业和炼钢公司——青山控股集团不仅完好无损，甚至还实现了进一步扩张。
虽然对项光达而言，这场危机已经是过眼云烟，有人却不得不留下来替他收拾剩下的烂摊子。项光达之所以能够逃出生天，伦敦金属交易所功不可没，面对重重质疑，该机构毅然出手干涉市场，阻止镍价进一步上涨，并暂停了镍金属交易，直至项光达与合作银行达成协议方才恢复。
受此影响，项光达的交易对手损失达数十亿美元，自然对伦敦金属交易所感到无比愤怒。在危机爆发数月之后的今天，伦敦金属交易所官司缠身、不断遭受调查，而镍金属市场也仍未恢复元气。
对冲基金集团AQR Capital Management的创始人克利夫·阿斯内斯在推特（Twitter）上发了一条充满讽刺意味的推文：“很高兴看到摩根大通和‘大佬’可以几乎毫发无损的全身而退，真是一个暖心的故事。”
这是一篇有关项光达如何从这场扰动全球金属市场的逼空大战中脱身的故事，在撰写这篇文章的过程里，我们采访了诸多亲历者，相关人士均要求匿名。对于我们发出的多次置评请求，青山集团均未作回应。
逼空大作战
2021年年底至2022年年初，项光达买入了大量空头头寸，一方面为对冲风险，一方面是认为青山集团的大幅增产将会拉低镍价。但在俄乌冲突爆发后，全球市场出现震动，镍价开始攀升，起初增幅还较温和，随后进入暴走模式，两天飙升250%。
3月8日晚，一众资深银行家涌入青山集团总部，要求项光达就当前局势给出答复。无法到现场的则纷纷从伦敦或新加坡打来视频电话。在到场的银行家中，有些直到第二天上午才离开。
由于项光达持有的空头头寸涉及约十家银行和经纪商，所以当天晚上来了很多人（多年以来，青山集团一直是摩根大通等机构的优质客户）。但在3月7日镍价开始飙升之后，青山集团已经很难满足追加保证金的要求。当时，项光达欠各家机构的资金均已达到上亿美元。
在镍价触及10万美元几个小时之后，伦敦金属交易所最终选择出手干预市场，叫停镍金属交易。不仅如此，伦敦金属交易所还取消了数十亿美元的交易，将镍价拉回前一天收盘时的48078美元——项光达和青山集团的生命线。
为重启市场，伦敦金属交易所提出了一个解决方案：项光达应与多方达成协议，并按协议价平仓。但5万美元左右的价格相当于项光达买入空头头寸时的价格的两倍有余，如果接受这一提议，项光达就将损失数十亿美元。
现年60岁出头的项光达坚决不同意接受这一方案。起家于温州的项光达，从生产汽车门窗框架开始，一步步将青山集团建设成为全球最大的镍金属和不锈钢生产商，其商业帝国版图辽阔，从中国东部沿海地区的钢铁厂一直延伸到印度尼西亚偏远岛屿上的矿山。在缔造这一帝国的过程中，他为自己赢得了“富于远见”和“喜押重注”的名声。
在此之前，项光达也曾经引起过伦敦金属交易所的注意，2019年，青山集团身处逼空战的另一方，当时，该集团从伦敦金属交易所撤出了大量镍库存，导致镍价大涨。
这一次，项光达激进交易手法造成的影响比上一次要深远得多。
镍价飙升、交易冻结对下游公司（例如不锈钢工厂和电动汽车电池制造商）造成了巨大冲击，有些干脆不再接受新订单。在伦敦金属交易所这边，交易商们竭力从那些无力支付的客户处收回欠缴的追加保证金，至少有一家公司不得不向母公司寻求资金支持。
但在整个行业空前混乱的情况下，（3月9日凌晨仍然在面对其合作的银行家的）项光达拥有一个关键优势，那就是其他人比他更为恐惧。
如果项光达拒不还钱，则债主们就将只能在印度尼西亚和中国的法院对其进行追索。此外，项光达是通过一系列公司实体进行的相关镍金属交易，比如电池制造商——瑞普能源有限公司的香港分公司，当时上述银行甚至不清楚自己是否有权没收青山集团最有价值的那部分资产。
当时在场的一位人士回忆道，那些银行家很清楚，如果与项光达的交易出现问题，他们的职业生涯也就完了。
风险敞口最大的摩根大通扮演了领导者的角色。涉足相关交易的银行包括渣打银行（Standard Chartered Bank Plc）和法国巴黎银行（BNP Paribas SA）等一些国际机构，但也有许多是中国和新加坡的银行，后者几乎没有处理这种情况的经验。
个人担保
项光达告诉聚在自己办公室的银行家，他丝毫无意在5万美元价格附近平仓。几个小时后，他向伦敦金属交易所的首席执行官马修·张伯伦传达了同样的信息。他说，青山集团实力雄厚，（在这件事情上）不会让步。
相反，项光达列出了一份自己愿意用作抵押的资产清单：若干位于印度尼西亚的镍铁工厂。但对部分在场的银行家来说，这种抵押不足以让他们安心。受新冠疫情影响，未来几周甚至几个月的时间里他们都无法对这些位于印度尼西亚的资产进行任何尽职调查，即便那些与青山集团合作非常密切的合作伙伴也已经多年未造访过这些工厂。
因此，项光达再次让步，决定提供个人担保，如果青山集团未能偿付欠款，银行家们就可以将其赶出家门，此种做法不仅意味着项光达要拿出个人财富作为抵押，还是一种中国文化上放低姿态的表示，这也是他最后开出的条件，如果不接受就意味着谈判破裂。
银行家们并没有太多的选择。3月14日，在镍市陷入混乱一周之后，青山集团宣布与相关银行达成协议，根据协议，银行同意在一段时间内不再追究该公司所欠的数十亿美元债务。作为交换，项光达同意，在镍价跌到3万美元以下后，将在一系列位置进行减仓。
两天后，镍市重启，价格走低，项光达和相关银行的压力有所减轻。此后，镍价一度跌破3万美元，青山集团也趁机减持了约20%的空头头寸。
而伦敦金属交易所面临的压力却有增无减。相关监管机构开始对该交易所的治理和监管工作进行审查。美国达拉斯联邦储备银行（Dallas Federal Reserve）和国际货币基金组织（International Monetary Fund）加入了声讨伦敦金属交易所的大军，许多对冲基金也对伦敦金属交易所取消交易的决定感到愤怒不已。
掌管着67亿美元资金的荷兰算法基金Transtrend表示：“在我们意识到真正发生了什么的时候，我们感觉以后再也不能把客户的钱委托给伦敦金属交易所了。”随着交易商纷纷离场，该交易所六大主要金属合约的可用库存降至十多年以来的最低水平。
青山集团及其合作银行每个月都会对双方达成的暂停还款协议进行审查。在最初的下跌之后，镍价有很长时间一直在33000美元左右徘徊
那段时间，双方都绷紧了神经。由于当时青山集团仍然持有大量空头头寸，一旦镍价再次上涨（例如对俄制裁导致镍供应中断，截至目前尚未出现这种情况），青山集团及其合作银行仍然可能面临巨额亏损。
最后，在5月，由于中国的封控措施令金属市场热度大减，镍价跌穿3万美元的关键位置。此后几周，青山将其空头头寸（3月初曾经超过15万吨）减持至6万吨。
此时的镍价已经低于3月初青山集团停止追加保证金时的水平，也就是说，项光达与其合作银行间已经没有任何债务关系。于是他提议取消双方协议中个人担保的部分，认为相关规定是其身处财务困境时的无奈之举。部分合作银行愿意让步，但摩根大通表示反对，最终，双方同意，减少用作抵押的镍厂数量，但项光达仍然需要提供个人担保。摩根大通发言人拒绝对此事予以置评。
还有其他一些迹象也表明，这场危机已经损害了项光达与其合作银行之间的关系。今年6月，由于全球市场担心经济陷入衰退，项光达的空头头寸似乎将迎来转机。于是项光达要求合作银行给他一些灵活性，允许他不在协议到期时平仓，延长空头头寸持有时间。该请求再次遭到摩根大通拒绝。截至6月底，项光达已经完全平仓其在摩根大通及其他几家银行开立的头寸，剩余的空头头寸已经不到2万吨。
据知情人士估计，青山集团在相关交易中的损失约为10亿美元。对此，项光达并不在意。他手下的镍矿业务在这段时间产生的利润基本能够弥补上述亏损。相关暂停还款协议的期限原为三个月，经项光达延期后，将于7月中旬到期。
现在，“大佬”已经开始了全新生活，专注于规划青山集团（该集团去年营收达到560亿美元）的未来。至少就目前而言，他或许无法再像过去那样在伦敦金属交易所呼风唤雨，但他仍然可以在上海期货交易所进行交易。项光达仍然抱有扩张野心，不仅想在亚洲再进一步，还将目光投向了广袤的非洲大地。青山集团对镍金属市场的影响力一如既往，正如他预测的那样，镍价是否走低在相当程度上取决于其印度尼西亚工厂是否大幅增产。
不过，虽然项光达已经开启了人生的新篇章，但伦敦金属交易所仍然在收拾残局。监管机构指出，镍市出现混乱局面表明，大宗商品市场存有潜在风险，并呼吁加强对整个行业的监管。对冲基金——埃利奥特投资管理公司（Elliot Investment Management）和交易公司Jane Street已经对伦敦金属交易所发起诉讼，要求后者赔偿近5亿美元损失。
相关人士表示，镍市元气目前仍未恢复，由于许多交易商不再在合约中使用伦敦金属交易所价格，未平仓合约和交易量均远低于此前水平。据资深镍金属市场观察家、Red Door Research Ltd.的董事总经理吉姆·伦农估计，目前全球的镍产量中，只有不到25%以伦敦金属交易所价格出售，而在3月危机爆发前，这一数字为50%。
他说：“许多业内人士已经暂时退出伦敦金属交易所。目前市场仍在运转，只是情况不容乐观。”（财富中文网）
译者：梁宇
审校：夏林
By 2:08 p.m. Shanghai time on March 8, it was clear that Xiang Guangda’s giant bet on a fall in nickel prices was going spectacularly wrong.
Futures had just skyrocketed above $100,000 a ton and his trade was more than $10 billion underwater. It was threatening not only to bankrupt Xiang’s company, but to trigger a Lehman Brothers-like shock through the entire metals industry and possibly topple the London Metal Exchange itself.
But Xiang was calm. Within hours, more than 50 bankers had arrived at his office wanting to hear how he planned to respond to the crisis. He told them simply: “I’m confident that we will overcome this.”
And he did.
Four months on, the nickel price is falling, as Xiang had predicted. The coterie of banks led by JPMorgan Chase & Co. that were baying for his blood has been repaid. He has closed out nearly all his short position in nickel, making a loss on the trade of about $1 billion — a manageable sum given the profits being generated elsewhere in his business empire, say people who know him.
Crucially: the man nicknamed ‘Big Shot’ in Chinese commodities circles is poised to walk away from the fiasco with his multibillion-dollar mining and steelmaking company, Tsingshan Holding Group Co., intact and even expanding.
But while Xiang moves on, others are left dealing with the destruction wrought by the crisis. His miraculous escape was thanks in no small part to the actions of the LME, which controversially intervened to prevent prices from rising and then suspended trading until Xiang had struck a deal with his banks.
Those on the other side of the trade, who lost billions, were furious. Months later, the LME is dealing with a raft of investigations and lawsuits, and the nickel market is still reeling.
“Nice to see that @jpmorgan and The Big Shot got out of this whole thing with only scratches,” Cliff Asness, founder of AQR Capital Management, said last week in a tweet thick with sarcasm. “It’s just heart warming.”
This account of how Xiang extricated himself from a short squeeze that rocked the global metals markets is based on numerous interviews with people who were involved, all of whom requested anonymity. Multiple attempts to seek comment from Tsingshan were unsuccessful.
Massive Short Squeeze
Xiang had built up his massive short position in late 2021 and early 2022 partly as a hedge, partly as a bet that a planned jump in Tsingshan’s production this year would drag down prices. But when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine jolted global markets, nickel started climbing — gradually at first, before rocketing 250% in an epic squeeze.
On the evening of March 8, senior bankers crowded into a room at Tsingshan’s headquarters demanding answers. Others dialed in for video calls from London or Singapore. Of those present, some didn’t leave until early the next morning.
The crowd that night was so large because Xiang’s position was spread across about 10 banks and brokers — he had been a good client for many of them, including JPMorgan, for years. But after nickel started spiking on March 7, Tsingshan struggled to meet its margin calls. Now he owed each of them hundreds of millions of dollars.
The LME had eventually intervened to halt trading a couple of hours after nickel hit $100,000. It also canceled billions of dollars of transactions, bringing the price back to $48,078, where it closed the previous day, in what amounted to a lifeline for Xiang and Tsingshan.
To reopen the market, the LME proposed a solution: Xiang should strike a deal with holders of long positions to close out his trade. But a price of around $50,000 would be more than twice the level at which he had entered his short position, and would mean accepting billions of dollars in losses.
Xiang, who is in his early 60s, stood firm. From a start making frames for car doors and windows in Wenzhou, eastern China, he’d built Tsingshan into the world’s largest nickel and stainless steel producer, with an empire stretching from mines in remote Indonesian islands to steel mills on China’s east coast. Along the way, he’d acquired a reputation for visionary thinking and a taste for betting big.
He had caught the attention of the LME before, when in 2019 Tsingshan was on the other side of a short squeeze, withdrawing large amounts of nickel inventories from exchange warehouses and causing prices to jump.
This time, his aggressive approach to trading was having much wider ripple effects.
The spike in prices and the trading freeze caused havoc for companies that use nickel, like stainless steel mills and makers of batteries for electric vehicles. Some simply stopped taking new orders. On the LME, dealers were left frantically trying to recoup missed margin calls from clients who couldn’t pay, and at least one had to seek financial support from its parent company.
Yet with unprecedented chaos rippling through the industry, Xiang — still facing his bankers in the early hours of March 9 — had a key advantage. They were more terrified than he was.
If he refused to pay, they would have to chase him in courts in Indonesia and China. What’s more, he had executed his nickel trade through a variety of corporate entities – such as the Hong Kong branch of battery unit Ruipu Energy Co. – and it wasn’t clear the banks would even have the right to seize Tsingshan’s most valuable assets.
The bankers understood that if things went wrong, their careers would be over, one person who was in the room remembered.
JPMorgan, which had the biggest exposure, took the lead. The group included some international players like Standard Chartered Bank Plc and BNP Paribas SA, but many were Chinese and Singaporean banks that had little experience handling a situation like this.
Personal Guarantee
Xiang told the assembled bankers he had no intention of closing the position anywhere near $50,000. A few hours later he was delivering the same message to Matthew Chamberlain, chief executive of the LME. Tsingshan was a strong company, he said, and it had the support of the Chinese government. There would be no backing down.
Instead, he wrote a list of the assets he was willing to put up as collateral: a string of ferronickel plants in Indonesia. But for some of the bankers, that wasn’t enough. They wouldn’t be able to do any due diligence on the Indonesian assets for weeks or months, and even those who worked closely with Tsingshan hadn’t seen the facilities for years because of the pandemic.
So Xiang made a further concession that was both valuable and, in Chinese business culture, humbling: a personal guarantee. If Tsingshan didn’t pay its debts, the bankers could turf him out of his home. That was what he was willing to offer. Take it or leave it.
It wasn’t much of a choice. On March 14, a week after the chaos that engulfed the nickel market, Tsingshan announced a deal with its banks under which they agreed not to pursue the company for the billions it owed for a period of time. In exchange, Xiang agreed a series of price levels at which he would reduce his nickel position once prices dropped below about $30,000.
When the market reopened two days later, prices moved lower, easing the strain on Xiang and the banks. A brief dip below $30,000 allowed Tsingshan to cover about 20% of its short position.
The pressure on the LME was only intensifying, however. The exchange’s regulators launched reviews of its governance and oversight. The Dallas Federal Reserve and International Monetary Fund joined in a chorus of public criticism, and many hedge funds were still furious at the LME’s decision to cancel trades.
“The moment we realized what was really happening, we felt we could no longer entrust the LME with our clients’ money,” said Transtrend, a $6.7 billion Dutch algorithmic fund. Open interest across the exchange’s six main metals slid to the lowest in more than a decade as traders headed for the exit.
Each month, Tsingshan and its banks reviewed their standstill agreement. After the initial dip, nickel spent long stretches in limbo with prices hovering around $33,000.
It was a nervous time. Tsingshan still had a vast short position, meaning it and its banks could still be exposed to large losses if prices started rising again — for example, if sanctions against Russia led to an actual disruption in nickel supplies, which so far they hadn’t.
Finally, in May, prices tumbled decisively below the key $30,000 level after China’s lockdowns dented metals market sentiment. Over the following weeks, Tsingshan reduced its position — which in early March had been over 150,000 tons — to just 60,000 tons.
By this point, prices were below the level at which Tsingshan had stopped being able to pay its margin calls in early March, which meant Xiang no longer owed the banks any money. He proposed dropping the personal guarantee from the deal, seeing it as a humiliating concession to his earlier financial troubles. Some of the banks were willing to do so, but JPMorgan was not: the number of nickel plants used as collateral was reduced, but the personal guarantee would stay. A JPMorgan spokesman declined to comment.
It was not the only sign that the crisis had soured Xiang’s relationship with his banks. In June, as recessionary fears swept global markets, Xiang’s short position was beginning to look like a smart trade. He asked some of his banks for a little flexibility, allowing him to run the position for longer than had been envisaged under their deal. Again, JPMorgan said no, and by the end of June Xiang had exited his position entirely with JPMorgan and several other banks, leaving him with a remaining short of less than 20,000 tons.
People familiar with the matter estimate Tsingshan’s losses on the trade at around $1 billion. Xiang isn’t concerned. The loss has been roughly offset by the profits of his nickel operations over the same period. The standstill agreement, which Xiang extended from the initial three months, is set to expire in mid-July.
Now ‘Big Shot’ is moving on with his life, focusing on plans for the future at Tsingshan, which had revenues of $56 billion last year. His ability to trade on the LME may be reduced, for now at least, but he is still able to trade on the Shanghai Futures Exchange. He has ambitions to expand, not only in Asia, but also to Africa. And Tsingshan is as powerful as ever in the nickel market: a massive increase in production from his plants in Indonesia is one of the key factors driving prices lower, much as Xiang predicted.
But while Xiang may be moving on, the LME is still dealing with the fallout. Regulators have pointed to the chaos in nickel as a sign of the risks lurking in commodity markets, and called for greater oversight of the entire sector. Hedge fund Elliot Investment Management and trading firm Jane Street have launched legal action against the LME, seeking nearly $500 million.
And the nickel market is still broken, say people involved in it, with both open interest and trading volumes stuck at sharply lower levels as traders step away from using LME prices in their contracts. Jim Lennon, a veteran nickel market-watcher and managing director of Red Door Research Ltd., estimates that less than 25% of global nickel output is now being sold on the basis of LME prices, down from 50% before the crisis in March.
“A lot of the industry now has temporarily disengaged from the LME,” he says. “The market is still functioning, but it’s struggling.”
