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疫情、创始人和黑客多面夹击,易捷航空要如何走出泥潭?

疫情、创始人和黑客多面夹击,易捷航空要如何走出泥潭?

Jeremy Kahn 2021-05-26
易捷航空与其他廉价航空公司的不同之处在于,它一直在欧洲顶级机场运营。但易捷航空努力从新冠疫情中恢复之际,该战略也造成了更高的成本负担。

2020年10月31日,柏林勃兰登堡机场(Berlin Brandenburg Airport)正式开放期间,停机坪上的易捷航空飞机。图片来源:Hannibal Hanschke—Pool/AFP via Getty Images

欧洲最大廉价航空公司之一易捷航空(EasyJet)的首席执行官约翰·隆格伦是Flightradar24的粉丝。网站上有世界地图,根据雷达和应答器数据,每架飞行中的飞机都会显示成图标。将鼠标移到图标上就能够看到飞机型号,属于哪家航空公司,往返何地,甚至飞行高度和速度。

隆格伦说,之所以喜欢Flightradar24,是因为航空公司只能诚实。如果乘客可以清楚地看到飞机还没有从上一个目的地起飞,航空公司就不能采用传统做法,像挤牙膏似的一点点通知坏消息,逐渐宣布延误时间拖长。还有一个原因是,易捷航空能够轻松地收集竞争对手航空公司的情报。

尽管如此,4月下旬的一个星期二早上,隆格伦看到Flightradar24之后肯定很不满意。因为空中只有两架易捷航空的飞机,一架从伦敦盖特威克机场(London’s Gatwick Airport)飞往法国里昂,另一架从贝尔法斯特飞往英吉利海峡的泽西岛。通常情况下空中飞机都接近100架。但是自从2020年3月23日以来,易捷航空再也没有正常过。当日由于新冠病毒日益蔓延,英国政府首次建议海外的英国人在旅行限制措施实施前尽快归国。

如今已经过去了一年多,新冠疫情仍在肆虐,包括英国在内的很多国家都在收紧旅行限制,防止变异病毒传入,航空业对市场早日恢复的盼望落空,比易捷航空的总部卢顿机场(Luton Airport)最后进场的空客(Airbus)A320降落得还快。虽然欧洲对休闲旅游的乐观情绪重新燃起,近日英国也宣布重启少数几个目的地的国际旅行,但由于夏季重现旅行旺季的可能性不大,易捷航空面临的潜在风险仍然巨大。

 
2020年10月,柏林,首席执行官约翰·隆格伦站在易捷航空的空客A320飞机前。图片来源:Christoph Soeder—Picture Alliance via Getty Images

总体而言,航空公司已经走出史上最惨的一年。根据国际航空运输协会(International Air Transport Association)的数据,受新冠疫情影响,2020年航空业共亏损1180亿美元。随着疫苗在全球各地推广,今年预计航空公司损失将达到约380亿美元。但新出现的传染性更强而且有可能耐疫苗的变异病毒激增,导致各种预测存疑。

在疫情之前,易捷航空的业绩比多家航空公司都好,盈利能力强、资产负债表强劲、债务水平相对较低。作为主营欧洲境内短途航班的廉价航空公司,易捷比长途航空公司调整航班更灵活,取消航班时不必担心失去联系或违反联盟协议。不过,易捷还是未能逃过行业整体衰败的命运。2019年,易捷航空的收入为89亿美元,实现利润6亿美元。2020年销售额减少超过50%,为42亿美元,也是有史以来首次出现年度亏损,税前亏损近18亿美元,相当于一架大型喷气式客机。与易捷航空类似的欧洲廉价航空公司瑞安航空(Ryanair)在上周宣布,过去12个月亏损约10亿美元。

危机之中,54岁的隆格伦也要应付竞争对手没有的麻烦,比如斯特里奥斯·哈吉-约安努一样不受欢迎的“超重行李”。1995年,哈吉-约安努创建了易捷航空,并以此为基础打造了品牌帝国,涉及领域从租车和送比萨饼,还扩展到大麻业务。哈吉-约安努现年54岁,是希腊塞浦路斯人,自2002年卸任董事长以来没有在航空公司担任正式管理职务,但他仍然是公司的大股东。疫情之前他持有公司超过三分之一的股份。他并不是好相处的股东,十年来跟易捷航空的历任首席执行官和董事会争吵不停,指责其制定的扩张计划野心太大、成本也太高,向制造业巨头空客买了太多的新飞机。新冠疫情爆发时,哈吉-约安努决定再次施压,说服公司放弃收购,还发起委托代理战,想罢免董事会成员。

疫情之前,易捷航空公司看起来可能成为欧洲航空旅行最大赢家之一。易捷航空在欧洲跟美国西南航空公司(Southwest Airlines)相当,主营点对点航线,不像欧洲大型国家航空公司一样采用昂贵的枢纽辐射模式。与此同时,由于易捷航空经常提供优惠,而且常驻一线机场,形象比起瑞安航空和维兹航空(Wizz)等廉价航空公司略显高端,所以可以吸引到一些商务旅客。隆格伦于2017年年末接手公司,计划在差异经营基础上结合有望盈利的新业务,包括度假套餐、向商务旅客提供更多福利,以及新的忠诚计划。

当然,疫情中的商务和休闲旅行均受到重创。隆格伦动用各种财务杠杆确保易捷航空安全。如今面临传统的夏季旅行旺季,也是易捷航空大量利润来源,不管是易捷航空还是首席执行官都面临着孤注一掷的时刻。如果新冠疫情不能迅速消退,休闲旅行就无法像预期一样反弹,易捷航空的亏损只会越发严重,增长计划可能无限期搁置。疫情之前一直跻身航空业前列的易捷航空到底命运如何,可能昭示着整个行业的未来。如果易捷航空都做不到东山再起,哪家航空公司还能够做到?

停飞、借钱

“我们要集中精力控制可以控制的事情。降低成本、管理现金消耗、获取流动性。”隆格伦在去年11月接受美国消费者新闻与商业频道(CNBC)采访时说。为了实现目标,隆格伦采取了比较激进的手段。2020年3月底,易捷航空将所有飞机停飞。6月15日才复飞。公司宣布计划将15000员工裁员30%。截至2021年1月底,约有1400名员工解雇或买断工龄。

公司与工会谈判,为更多的飞行员和机组人员提供季节合同,如此一来公司就方便为夏季调配更多的资源,因为夏天的利润更多。公司之前在英国三个外包机场维修飞机,还跟几个机场的地面勤务公司重新谈判了合同,从而降低成本。

在实施种种举措后,截至2020年9月30日期间,易捷航空将一年运营成本(不含燃油)降低了31%左右。公司还实现了一系列小改进,座位燃油成本提升了2.9%:例如让飞行员滑行时只用一台发动机,爬升时尽快到达巡航高度,因为高海拔水平飞行更省油。但种种节约措施并未遏制公司现金流出血,2019年,易捷航空的运营收入超过10亿美元。2020年则变成亏损逾10亿美元。

 
2020年6月9日,伦敦盖特威克机场停机坪上停飞的易捷航空飞机。图片来源:Photo by Chris J Ratcliffe/Getty Images

有些人怀疑,向来以好人著称的隆格伦到底会不会大刀阔斧削减成本,这是疫情期间运营廉价航空特别需要的魄力。“廉价航空公司一定要激进、无情且粗暴。”金融研究公司晨星(Morningstar)的航空业分析师乔基姆·科策说。科策比较了隆格伦和竞争对手、经营瑞安航空的首席执行官迈克尔·奥利里,奥利里向来以严酷控制开支且好斗闻名。“他经营公司时尽可能精干,当好人可做不到。”科策说。(隆格伦拒绝就本文置评。)

由于易捷航空现金消耗巨大,需要更快筹集更多资金。易捷航空在欧洲很多竞争对手都是载旗航空公司,例如法国航空(Air France)、荷兰皇家航空(KLM)、汉莎航空(Lufthansa)、北欧航空(SAS)、西班牙航空(Iberia)、葡萄牙航空(TAP Air Portugal)、瑞士航空(Swiss Air)和英国航空(British Airways)等。虽然现在多是私人所有,但其中多家公司曾经是国有,而且有些公司里政府仍然持有规模不小的股份。因此不少公司承载着国家的自豪,工作岗位和养老金支付也能够获得帮助。新冠疫情重创航空业时,多国政府对求助作出了回应。2020年3月起,欧洲政府对航空业援助超过322亿美元。据汇丰银行(HSBC)的一份报告分析,援助主要通过拨款、贷款和债转股等方式。“大型航空公司规模庞大,对很多经济体非常重要,所以各国政府尽一切可能让航空公司活下去。”波士顿咨询公司(Boston Consulting Group)的旅游业顾问德克-马尔滕·莫勒纳表示。

对于像易捷航空一样独立运营的公司来说,寻找资金更为困难,尤其是因为英国政府在刚开始不愿意为航空业制定救助计划。2020年4月,易捷航空通过英国政府为大型雇主提供的新冠肺炎企业融资工具(COVID Corporate Finance Facility)获得8.45亿美元贷款。易捷航空还充分利用循环信用额度筹集到5亿美元现金。公司还获得了5.63亿美元的两笔定期贷款,2022年2月到期。

最后,2021年2月,易捷航空也利用了投资者信心突然回升的时机,当时有消息称英国疫苗接种顺利,夏季末可能重新开放国际旅游。易捷航空发行7年期债券筹集到15亿美元,年利率为1.875%。债券超额认购多达6倍,显示市场对易捷航空的前景信心十足。据经纪公司Liberum的交通行业分析师杰拉德·邱分析,之所以认购如此火热,也因为易捷航空是目前全球仅有四家仍然被评为投资级别的航空公司之一。(另外三家包括竞争对手瑞安航空和维兹航空,以及美国西南航空,易捷刚开始学习的便是美国西南航空的商业模式。)

与一些低成本航空对手相比,易捷航空直接拥有的飞机更多。自疫情开始以来,易捷航空卖掉并租赁58架飞机,从中融资21亿美元。现在公司直接拥有的飞机仅占总数略超过一半,较2019年的70%有所下降,拥有飞机当中10架有6架已经贷款抵押。但是,易捷航空对机队的安排很快激发了与创始人之间长期存在的矛盾。

与创始人斗争

同时,公司也在处理飞机筹集现金,将其他飞机在“埋骨地”长期存放,公司仍然将接收14架全新的空客A320和A321 Neo。因此尽管疫情导致旅行低迷,2020年年末,易捷航空的机队飞机数量比年初还有所增加。易捷航空与航空巨头空客签订了长期合同,约定要购买100多架新飞机,2024年之前至少包括55架。合同中都是空客最省油的机型,可以为易捷航空节省长期运营成本。但合同也规定,易捷航空在2023年之前支付至少60亿美元,远远超过了公司目前的市值。

自2013年易捷航空与空客签署合作协议以来,哈吉-约安努一直反对,此次购买合同让他大为恼火。2020年1月,空客同意推迟与法国、美国和英国的起诉协议,还要为多年来贿赂航空公司高管以签署合同的指控支付数十亿美元罚款,哈吉-约安努的愤怒更是加剧。

新冠疫情爆发时,愤愤不平的哈吉-约安努终于找到迫使易捷航空放弃协议的机会。2020年3月,他给易捷航空公司的董事长约翰·巴顿写信,要求公司以不可抗力为由终止合同。他威胁称,如果做不到就每七周投票罢免一名董事,直到董事会同意为止。他还威胁称,如果因为向空客支付款项而导致破产,就将对公司提起诉讼。

 
易捷航空的创始人斯特里奥斯·哈吉-约安努利用公司最大股东的身份,就公司升级机队的计划与管理层展开了旷日持久的斗争。图片来源:Chris Ratcliffe—Bloomberg via Getty Images

隆格伦和董事会都深受打击。首席执行官隆格伦告诉英国《金融时报》(Financial Times),哈吉-约安努的行为“非常不受欢迎”、“毫无作用”,而且会“分散注意力”。易捷航空指出,合同中没有不可抗力条款。此外,合同里还涉及易捷航空的现有机队维护和航空电子设备支持。航空公司不能简单地背弃合同,否则危机结束时可能错过快速复苏的机会。

隆格伦还认为合同具有长期战略意义。在消费者和政府可能越发要求航空公司为气候影响负责之际,省油型飞机能够帮助易捷航空减少碳足迹。隆格伦在易捷航空努力塑造新世界方面一直是行业领导者。2019年,易捷航空就开始为所有航班排放的二氧化碳购买碳补偿。“当消费者开始考虑环保做出选择时,我认为迟早有那么一天,届时在可持续性方面的投入会获得回报。”波士顿咨询公司的顾问莫勒纳表示,“易捷航空一直在为此做准备。”

当易捷航空的董事会拒绝哈吉-约安努的要求时,他不断威胁,还要求召开特别会议,就董事会成员安德烈亚斯·比尔沃思免职进行表决。比尔沃思曾经是奥地利航空公司(Austrian Airlines)和汉莎航空公司的高管,哈吉-约安努称其为“空客的朋友”。董事会以技术原因否决该诉求时,哈吉-约安努再次提出,要求免去首席财务官安德鲁·芬德利的职务。这一次,他成功地安排在2020年5月22日投票。

2020年4月,易捷航空宣布已经与空客达成协议推迟交付24架飞机,意味着2021年不再购入新飞机。目前尚不清楚哈吉-约安努施加的压力在这一决定中发挥了什么作用。但推迟并不意味着取消合同,所以毫不奇怪,哈吉-约安努并不满意。他指出,易捷航空未能说明推迟对易捷航空的烧钱计划具体有何影响,还表示易捷航空未披露细节,而且对公司的收入和利润恢复情况预测过于乐观,可能参与了“市场操纵”。他将巴顿和隆格伦列入了希望赶走的“无赖”名单。

哈吉-约安努不断加大赌注。他悬赏700万美元给可以提供“有用信息”从而取消空客合同的“告密者”。他声称发现易捷航空的高层高管跟一名律师在瑞士举行了由空客安排的秘密会议,根据巴拿马文件(Panama Papers)透露,这名律师可能曾经通过离岸空壳公司帮助客户逃避国际制裁。哈吉-约安努暗示这是一直以来他指控的腐败证据。易捷航空否认该会面存在。哈吉-约安努还指控易捷航空的三家少数股东,包括资产管理公司Invesco、Phoenix Asset Management和Ninety One都是空客秘密控制的“稻草人”,因为三家公司都帮助空客管理部分员工养老金资产。

但最终,哈吉-约安努的积极活动并未引起其他投资者的注意。三家在代理投票中为股东提供建议的知名公司,ISS、 Glass Lewis和Pirc都反对支持他的提议。5月的摊牌投票中,这位满心不满的创始人努力遭逢彻底失败,不归他和家人持有的股份中有99%反对罢免董事。哈吉-约安努宣称结果被人为操纵,他认为有空客养老金业务的基金公司不应该有投票资格。

易捷航空的董事长巴顿希望将该事件尽快翻篇,他公开表示希望易捷航空能够建设性地与创始人重新接触,但“负面头条新闻和宣传为敬业的管理团队施加了不必要的压力,对在英国和欧洲知名的品牌声誉造成了负面影响。”尽管隆格伦的管理团队在谈判投票中获胜,但还是受到了影响。投票后的几周里,易捷航空的首席财务官芬德利表示有意辞职,分析人士猜测,除了疫情造成的压力,哈吉-约安努活动的压力也是重要原因。“总是挑动股东找管理层麻烦并没有什么帮助。”晨星的分析师科策指出。芬德利只是表示,在易捷航空工作近六年之后,“现在适合把财务控制权交给有助于帮易捷航空进入下一篇章的人,”隆格伦则称“(芬德利)离开让他很遗憾。”

去年6月,易捷航空找到了巧妙的方法,可以同时缓解现金短缺和哈吉-约安努带来的压力,公司发行了相当于已发行股本15%的新股,筹集到超过6.31亿美元帮助公司挺过疫情。此举也将哈吉-约安努的持股比例从2019年年初的超过34%稀释到略低于30%,之后易捷航空董事会想无视这位爱发牢骚的创始人也就更容易。这并不是说要赶走他。事实上,哈吉-约安努还在不断施压,指称空客合同暗藏腐败,还说7月和12月的易捷航空股东大会上将提出问题。但与此同时,哈吉-约安努和家人卖掉了一部分股份,到2020年5月持有股份总数不到27%。从实际角度来看,他对隆格伦构成的威胁已经消退。

挤出来的旅行

击退了哈吉-约安努之后,隆格伦和易捷航空的管理层面临着其他无法控制的敌人。2020年5月中旬,公司透露遭到黑客攻击。攻击者窃取了900多万名客户的邮件地址和旅行详细信息,还“访问”了2200多名客户的信用卡和借记卡详细信息。更糟糕的是,公司早在1月就发现了黑客攻击,却直到4月才通知信用卡信息泄露的人,现在才通知其他客户。隐瞒行为导致易捷航空面临着更大的风险,既有英国主要数据保护监管机构的巨额罚款,也有客户的集体诉讼。如今,易捷航空宣布泄露事件已经一年,却仍然笼罩在种种风险中。

最大的风险还是新冠病毒。2020年6月15日,易捷航空恢复飞行,仅限英国和法国航线。像各家复工的航空公司一样,易捷航空规定了新流程,加大清洁力度、强制乘客和机组人员戴口罩、不提供餐食。公司希望种种措施能够让公众重新乘坐飞机充满信心。公司宣布,计划到8月,逐步提高到正常运力的75%。

事实证明,公司并没有办法增加航班。依赖休闲市场的廉价航空公司大部分利润集中在4月到8月。然而在2020年里的这几个月中,情况相当糟糕。英国政府决定对所有抵英的人强制实行两周隔离期,2020年夏初恢复的希望破灭了。在航空公司的压力下,后来英国取消了对欧洲一些国家的隔离政策,但随着西班牙和法国的感染率再次飙升,隔离政策重新启动。从2020年6月15日易捷航空恢复飞行开始到9月,载客人数为950万人次,而之前一年同期为3710万人次。

盖特威克机场空无一人的易捷航空值机柜台。2020年6月至9月,易捷航空共运送950万乘客,比2019年同期减少近75%。图片来源:Photo by Leon Neal/Getty Images

隆格伦并未完全沮丧。在允许预订以及隔离规定不受限制的地方,还是有不少乘客。随着新的也更具传染性的变异新冠病毒在欧洲迅速蔓延,10月英国很多地区,从赫尔辛基到特拉维夫都重新实施隔离政策。易捷航空宣布,截至2020年9月的12个月,公司已经损失10亿美元。之后一个季度也没有好多少。11月,英国在全境禁飞,临近圣诞时短暂放松管控后,12月末再次收紧限制。易捷航空运力仅为2019年的18%。对饱受打击的易捷航空来说,恨不得2020年赶快过去。

摆脱廉价航空的形象

要了解易捷航空的前景,重要的是要了解其战略定位。虽然易捷航空与位于都柏林的瑞安航空和新兴的匈牙利航空公司维兹航空通常被分类为“欧洲廉价航空公司”,但易捷航空与其他几家存在一些关键区别。“易捷航空一直是低成本航空公司,肯定不是最便宜的廉价航空。”Liberum的分析师邱在谈到易捷航空时说,“易捷航空的定位是物有所值,而不是拼命变成市场上最便宜的一家。”

瑞安航空和维兹航空基本上只服务休闲旅客,往返二级甚至三级机场,在小机场里控制多数登机口,也可以在机场费、地勤人员和行李人员工资方面费劲地谈判价格。主要开拓东欧新市场,一直努力降低座位成本。而另一方面,易捷航空的航线较少但更多在较大型机场,重点放在西欧。易捷航空还提供乘客更多额外服务,例如免费在机场办理值机手续(瑞安航空向不在线值机的乘客收取手续费),还有能够享受优先登机权的忠诚度计划。如此一来,易捷航空的直接竞争对手更偏向欧洲传统航空公司。

隆格伦表示,希望易捷航空在入驻的每家机场市场份额都可以跻身第一或第二。他积极采取行动,在认为重要的市场上抢占更多机会。当2017年竞争对手欧洲廉价航空公司柏林航空(Air Berlin)破产时,隆格伦斥资4800万美元收购了其在德国几家机场的业务,还购买了25架飞机。“我一直说,英国、德国、法国和意大利是我们重点关注的四个核心市场。”收购柏林航空的交易之后不久,他在2018年的世界旅游市场会议(World Travel Market conference)上表示。

不过,西欧主要机场的费用要贵一些。因此,不管是定价还是成本,易捷航空在欧洲航空公司里采取了中间定位。2019年不算燃料和固定汇率的话,易捷航空的座位公里成本为4.45欧分,这是业内关键的成本指标。瑞安航空为2.25欧分,而英国航空公司约为5欧分,法国航空和荷兰皇家航空为5.37欧分。券商Raymond James & Associates的航空公司分析师萨凡提·赛斯称,易捷航空用飞机抵押贷款以撑过疫情,意味着一旦将债务纳入计算范围,成本基础将升高:“公司是用未来飞机成本上涨换取当下的流动性。”

实际上,这意味着易捷航空几乎没有机会在航线和定价上击败瑞安航空或维兹航空。但易捷航空有可能从传统提供全面服务的航空公司手里抢走越来越多的市场份额。业内领先的德世国际航空咨询公司(Alton Aviation Consultancy)的董事总经理莉亚·瑞恩表示,不少传统航空公司靠着政府资助苦苦支撑,债务可能永远还不清。

易捷航空相较于服务全面的竞争对手还有其他优势。因为传统航空公司更依赖商务旅行,多位分析师预测,2024年之前可能都无法完全恢复,甚至可能永远没法恢复。波士顿咨询公司的莫勒纳表示,很多全面服务型航空公司深陷枢纽辐射的飞行网络中,限制了调整的灵活性。而易捷航空之类的经济型航空公司主营点对点飞行,能够通过降价促销和广告,然后调整航班时间表处理新预订,更容易刺激需求。“举个例子,廉价航空可以轻易将运力从西班牙转移到希腊,从而应对新的旅行限制。”他说。

隆格伦之前在领先的欧洲包价旅游公司德国途易集团(TUI Group)工作,后来入职易捷航空,希望将业务拓展到包价旅游。2019年12月,就在新冠疫情爆发之前的几个月,易捷航空的新度假部门刚刚成立。然而隆格伦表示仍将推进相关策略,他告诉贸易刊物《旅行周刊》(Travel Weekly),“度假将引领旅游业复苏。”Liberum的分析师邱指出,进入包价度假业务具有战略意义。“之前几乎没有做过这块,很有机会从零开始做出点成绩。”他谈到假期旅游时说。但他也表示,之前多数廉价航空公司的执行力较低,才妨碍包价度假推动利润增长。

隆格伦的恢复计划取决于欧洲整体的感染情况,很多地方仍然不太乐观,而且欧洲大部分地区的疫苗接种率严重落后于美国、英国和以色列等。1月底,易捷航空宣布,通过5年期贷款又获得了19亿美元担保,贷款抵押物还是飞机。该笔贷款能够帮助易捷航空再多撑一段时间。公司也继续坚持,在旅游业大屠杀中看到了获胜的机会,毕竟欧洲的传统航空公司损失比易捷航空还糟,所以折扣航空公司在巴黎、米兰、伦敦盖特威克和日内瓦等主要机场有机会争取新航班。

跟几乎所有航空公司一样,易捷航空对2021年夏季的希望寄托在疫苗接种上。英国进展良好,去年12月已经批准两款疫苗,分别来自辉瑞制药(Pfizer)和阿斯利康(AstraZeneca),1月初又批准了Moderna进口的第三种疫苗。到5月中旬,至少68%的成年人已经注射一剂。瑞安航空甚至想在营销中将疫苗接种与旅行联系起来,今年1月推出了“打完疫苗就出发”的广告语,由于没有倡导负责任行为遭到英国广告标准局(Britain’s Advertising Standards Authority)的反对,之后不得不撤回。不过,二者关联对航空公司来说至关重要。“复苏的速度将取决于疫苗接种率。”德世国际航空咨询公司的瑞恩说。

易捷航空面临的问题是,几乎所有航线都涉及欧洲,而欧洲大陆在疫苗接种方面远远落后。5月中旬,多数欧洲国家只有三分之一成人注射了一剂疫苗,主要因为疫苗供应严重短缺,而且有人担心阿斯利康和强生(Johnson & Johnson)的疫苗会导致罕见但十分危险的凝血副作用。

如果不加快接种疫苗,欧洲可能出现第三波感染。与此同时,英国宣布了5月17日恢复国际旅行,但将按照“红绿灯系统”操作,来自红色、黄色或绿色国家的旅客须遵守不同的要求。在热门度假目的地中,只有葡萄牙和直布罗陀被列入第一批绿色名单,回国后无需隔离。欧洲大部分地区都是黄色,回国需要隔离10天,而且英国政府仍然不建议休闲旅行。至少有一个重要度假地土耳其列入了红色名单,也就是说前往旅游的人回国后必须在酒店隔离10天。

综合来看,种种限制意味着2021年夏季的旅游前景越发难测。

隆格伦抱怨称,英国政府的旅行规定仍然过于严格。英国甚至要求从“绿色”国家返回的人登机前以及返回的两天内都要接受核酸检测。政府还表示,第二次必须是更精确的PCR检测,每位乘客可能要多花219英镑(302美元)。隆格伦对英国广播公司(BBC)说,这意味着只有富人才能够度假,因为检测费用“远远超过易捷航空机票平均费用”。易捷航空与一家医保公司达成协议,以正常成本的一半的费用提供检测,每次60英镑。费用确实可以减少,但对四口之家来说仍然是很大的负担。由于不确定性太多,休闲旅客推迟预订夏季航班,易捷航空仍然在泥潭中挣扎。

忧郁曲调

在易捷航空大枢纽之一盖特威克机场郊区的巨大机库里,有一排五个先进的吊舱,上面涂着易捷航空标志性的橙色和白色。每个吊舱都装在液压腿上,登几级金属楼梯便可以钻到门里。这些飞行模拟器都是空客A320的仿真驾驶舱。易捷航空的飞行员在此练习和保持技术。即使在疫情期间,模拟机也几乎24小时不停忙碌,因为易捷航空一直努力让飞行员获得必要的认证,为重新飞行做好准备。

不过,培训中心是易捷航空在盖特威克唯一仍然在运行的部门。距离模拟机不远的停机坪上,十几架真正的A320闲置着。往常引擎轰鸣声、机场摆渡车和行李车隆隆作响,如今只有呜呜吹过的风声。

不管哪家航空公司的首席执行官,看到这一幕都难免沮丧。1月接受伦敦媒体《标准晚报》(Evening Standard)采访时,隆格伦声音低沉,他承认很想念经常去西班牙马略卡岛旅行,他在那有栋房子,跟朋友还有一间录音室。他之前是长号手,还受过正统训练,曾经表示之所以经商,只是因为没由考进伦敦皇家音乐学院(London’s Royal Academy of Music),但最近好久没有演奏过,“因为没有灵感。”他说最近在重读海明威的《老人与海》(The Old Man and the Sea),希望提升自己的坚韧精神,也许是在主人公类似约伯的命运和自己的困境之间找到了相似之处。隆格伦告诉记者:“书中讲述了老人面对一个又一个挑战,但他总能调整情绪重新站起来。要记住,尽管无法控制遭遇,但总能控制自己的反应,这点很有帮助。感觉无能为力是最糟糕的感觉之一,不仅商界如此。”

易捷航空面临的困境堪称全行业的典型范本。公司用尽努力抵御新冠疫情造成的压力,让乘客相信飞行的安全性,前路却依然风雨飘摇,不知还要应付多少意外和动荡。(财富中文网)

译者:冯丰

审校:夏林

欧洲最大廉价航空公司之一易捷航空(EasyJet)的首席执行官约翰·隆格伦是Flightradar24的粉丝。网站上有世界地图,根据雷达和应答器数据,每架飞行中的飞机都会显示成图标。将鼠标移到图标上就能够看到飞机型号,属于哪家航空公司,往返何地,甚至飞行高度和速度。

隆格伦说,之所以喜欢Flightradar24,是因为航空公司只能诚实。如果乘客可以清楚地看到飞机还没有从上一个目的地起飞,航空公司就不能采用传统做法,像挤牙膏似的一点点通知坏消息,逐渐宣布延误时间拖长。还有一个原因是,易捷航空能够轻松地收集竞争对手航空公司的情报。

尽管如此,4月下旬的一个星期二早上,隆格伦看到Flightradar24之后肯定很不满意。因为空中只有两架易捷航空的飞机,一架从伦敦盖特威克机场(London’s Gatwick Airport)飞往法国里昂,另一架从贝尔法斯特飞往英吉利海峡的泽西岛。通常情况下空中飞机都接近100架。但是自从2020年3月23日以来,易捷航空再也没有正常过。当日由于新冠病毒日益蔓延,英国政府首次建议海外的英国人在旅行限制措施实施前尽快归国。

如今已经过去了一年多,新冠疫情仍在肆虐,包括英国在内的很多国家都在收紧旅行限制,防止变异病毒传入,航空业对市场早日恢复的盼望落空,比易捷航空的总部卢顿机场(Luton Airport)最后进场的空客(Airbus)A320降落得还快。虽然欧洲对休闲旅游的乐观情绪重新燃起,近日英国也宣布重启少数几个目的地的国际旅行,但由于夏季重现旅行旺季的可能性不大,易捷航空面临的潜在风险仍然巨大。

总体而言,航空公司已经走出史上最惨的一年。根据国际航空运输协会(International Air Transport Association)的数据,受新冠疫情影响,2020年航空业共亏损1180亿美元。随着疫苗在全球各地推广,今年预计航空公司损失将达到约380亿美元。但新出现的传染性更强而且有可能耐疫苗的变异病毒激增,导致各种预测存疑。

在疫情之前,易捷航空的业绩比多家航空公司都好,盈利能力强、资产负债表强劲、债务水平相对较低。作为主营欧洲境内短途航班的廉价航空公司,易捷比长途航空公司调整航班更灵活,取消航班时不必担心失去联系或违反联盟协议。不过,易捷还是未能逃过行业整体衰败的命运。2019年,易捷航空的收入为89亿美元,实现利润6亿美元。2020年销售额减少超过50%,为42亿美元,也是有史以来首次出现年度亏损,税前亏损近18亿美元,相当于一架大型喷气式客机。与易捷航空类似的欧洲廉价航空公司瑞安航空(Ryanair)在上周宣布,过去12个月亏损约10亿美元。

危机之中,54岁的隆格伦也要应付竞争对手没有的麻烦,比如斯特里奥斯·哈吉-约安努一样不受欢迎的“超重行李”。1995年,哈吉-约安努创建了易捷航空,并以此为基础打造了品牌帝国,涉及领域从租车和送比萨饼,还扩展到大麻业务。哈吉-约安努现年54岁,是希腊塞浦路斯人,自2002年卸任董事长以来没有在航空公司担任正式管理职务,但他仍然是公司的大股东。疫情之前他持有公司超过三分之一的股份。他并不是好相处的股东,十年来跟易捷航空的历任首席执行官和董事会争吵不停,指责其制定的扩张计划野心太大、成本也太高,向制造业巨头空客买了太多的新飞机。新冠疫情爆发时,哈吉-约安努决定再次施压,说服公司放弃收购,还发起委托代理战,想罢免董事会成员。

疫情之前,易捷航空公司看起来可能成为欧洲航空旅行最大赢家之一。易捷航空在欧洲跟美国西南航空公司(Southwest Airlines)相当,主营点对点航线,不像欧洲大型国家航空公司一样采用昂贵的枢纽辐射模式。与此同时,由于易捷航空经常提供优惠,而且常驻一线机场,形象比起瑞安航空和维兹航空(Wizz)等廉价航空公司略显高端,所以可以吸引到一些商务旅客。隆格伦于2017年年末接手公司,计划在差异经营基础上结合有望盈利的新业务,包括度假套餐、向商务旅客提供更多福利,以及新的忠诚计划。

当然,疫情中的商务和休闲旅行均受到重创。隆格伦动用各种财务杠杆确保易捷航空安全。如今面临传统的夏季旅行旺季,也是易捷航空大量利润来源,不管是易捷航空还是首席执行官都面临着孤注一掷的时刻。如果新冠疫情不能迅速消退,休闲旅行就无法像预期一样反弹,易捷航空的亏损只会越发严重,增长计划可能无限期搁置。疫情之前一直跻身航空业前列的易捷航空到底命运如何,可能昭示着整个行业的未来。如果易捷航空都做不到东山再起,哪家航空公司还能够做到?

停飞、借钱

“我们要集中精力控制可以控制的事情。降低成本、管理现金消耗、获取流动性。”隆格伦在去年11月接受美国消费者新闻与商业频道(CNBC)采访时说。为了实现目标,隆格伦采取了比较激进的手段。2020年3月底,易捷航空将所有飞机停飞。6月15日才复飞。公司宣布计划将15000员工裁员30%。截至2021年1月底,约有1400名员工解雇或买断工龄。

公司与工会谈判,为更多的飞行员和机组人员提供季节合同,如此一来公司就方便为夏季调配更多的资源,因为夏天的利润更多。公司之前在英国三个外包机场维修飞机,还跟几个机场的地面勤务公司重新谈判了合同,从而降低成本。

在实施种种举措后,截至2020年9月30日期间,易捷航空将一年运营成本(不含燃油)降低了31%左右。公司还实现了一系列小改进,座位燃油成本提升了2.9%:例如让飞行员滑行时只用一台发动机,爬升时尽快到达巡航高度,因为高海拔水平飞行更省油。但种种节约措施并未遏制公司现金流出血,2019年,易捷航空的运营收入超过10亿美元。2020年则变成亏损逾10亿美元。

有些人怀疑,向来以好人著称的隆格伦到底会不会大刀阔斧削减成本,这是疫情期间运营廉价航空特别需要的魄力。“廉价航空公司一定要激进、无情且粗暴。”金融研究公司晨星(Morningstar)的航空业分析师乔基姆·科策说。科策比较了隆格伦和竞争对手、经营瑞安航空的首席执行官迈克尔·奥利里,奥利里向来以严酷控制开支且好斗闻名。“他经营公司时尽可能精干,当好人可做不到。”科策说。(隆格伦拒绝就本文置评。)

由于易捷航空现金消耗巨大,需要更快筹集更多资金。易捷航空在欧洲很多竞争对手都是载旗航空公司,例如法国航空(Air France)、荷兰皇家航空(KLM)、汉莎航空(Lufthansa)、北欧航空(SAS)、西班牙航空(Iberia)、葡萄牙航空(TAP Air Portugal)、瑞士航空(Swiss Air)和英国航空(British Airways)等。虽然现在多是私人所有,但其中多家公司曾经是国有,而且有些公司里政府仍然持有规模不小的股份。因此不少公司承载着国家的自豪,工作岗位和养老金支付也能够获得帮助。新冠疫情重创航空业时,多国政府对求助作出了回应。2020年3月起,欧洲政府对航空业援助超过322亿美元。据汇丰银行(HSBC)的一份报告分析,援助主要通过拨款、贷款和债转股等方式。“大型航空公司规模庞大,对很多经济体非常重要,所以各国政府尽一切可能让航空公司活下去。”波士顿咨询公司(Boston Consulting Group)的旅游业顾问德克-马尔滕·莫勒纳表示。

对于像易捷航空一样独立运营的公司来说,寻找资金更为困难,尤其是因为英国政府在刚开始不愿意为航空业制定救助计划。2020年4月,易捷航空通过英国政府为大型雇主提供的新冠肺炎企业融资工具(COVID Corporate Finance Facility)获得8.45亿美元贷款。易捷航空还充分利用循环信用额度筹集到5亿美元现金。公司还获得了5.63亿美元的两笔定期贷款,2022年2月到期。

最后,2021年2月,易捷航空也利用了投资者信心突然回升的时机,当时有消息称英国疫苗接种顺利,夏季末可能重新开放国际旅游。易捷航空发行7年期债券筹集到15亿美元,年利率为1.875%。债券超额认购多达6倍,显示市场对易捷航空的前景信心十足。据经纪公司Liberum的交通行业分析师杰拉德·邱分析,之所以认购如此火热,也因为易捷航空是目前全球仅有四家仍然被评为投资级别的航空公司之一。(另外三家包括竞争对手瑞安航空和维兹航空,以及美国西南航空,易捷刚开始学习的便是美国西南航空的商业模式。)

与一些低成本航空对手相比,易捷航空直接拥有的飞机更多。自疫情开始以来,易捷航空卖掉并租赁58架飞机,从中融资21亿美元。现在公司直接拥有的飞机仅占总数略超过一半,较2019年的70%有所下降,拥有飞机当中10架有6架已经贷款抵押。但是,易捷航空对机队的安排很快激发了与创始人之间长期存在的矛盾。

与创始人斗争

同时,公司也在处理飞机筹集现金,将其他飞机在“埋骨地”长期存放,公司仍然将接收14架全新的空客A320和A321 Neo。因此尽管疫情导致旅行低迷,2020年年末,易捷航空的机队飞机数量比年初还有所增加。易捷航空与航空巨头空客签订了长期合同,约定要购买100多架新飞机,2024年之前至少包括55架。合同中都是空客最省油的机型,可以为易捷航空节省长期运营成本。但合同也规定,易捷航空在2023年之前支付至少60亿美元,远远超过了公司目前的市值。

自2013年易捷航空与空客签署合作协议以来,哈吉-约安努一直反对,此次购买合同让他大为恼火。2020年1月,空客同意推迟与法国、美国和英国的起诉协议,还要为多年来贿赂航空公司高管以签署合同的指控支付数十亿美元罚款,哈吉-约安努的愤怒更是加剧。

新冠疫情爆发时,愤愤不平的哈吉-约安努终于找到迫使易捷航空放弃协议的机会。2020年3月,他给易捷航空公司的董事长约翰·巴顿写信,要求公司以不可抗力为由终止合同。他威胁称,如果做不到就每七周投票罢免一名董事,直到董事会同意为止。他还威胁称,如果因为向空客支付款项而导致破产,就将对公司提起诉讼。

隆格伦和董事会都深受打击。首席执行官隆格伦告诉英国《金融时报》(Financial Times),哈吉-约安努的行为“非常不受欢迎”、“毫无作用”,而且会“分散注意力”。易捷航空指出,合同中没有不可抗力条款。此外,合同里还涉及易捷航空的现有机队维护和航空电子设备支持。航空公司不能简单地背弃合同,否则危机结束时可能错过快速复苏的机会。

隆格伦还认为合同具有长期战略意义。在消费者和政府可能越发要求航空公司为气候影响负责之际,省油型飞机能够帮助易捷航空减少碳足迹。隆格伦在易捷航空努力塑造新世界方面一直是行业领导者。2019年,易捷航空就开始为所有航班排放的二氧化碳购买碳补偿。“当消费者开始考虑环保做出选择时,我认为迟早有那么一天,届时在可持续性方面的投入会获得回报。”波士顿咨询公司的顾问莫勒纳表示,“易捷航空一直在为此做准备。”

当易捷航空的董事会拒绝哈吉-约安努的要求时,他不断威胁,还要求召开特别会议,就董事会成员安德烈亚斯·比尔沃思免职进行表决。比尔沃思曾经是奥地利航空公司(Austrian Airlines)和汉莎航空公司的高管,哈吉-约安努称其为“空客的朋友”。董事会以技术原因否决该诉求时,哈吉-约安努再次提出,要求免去首席财务官安德鲁·芬德利的职务。这一次,他成功地安排在2020年5月22日投票。

2020年4月,易捷航空宣布已经与空客达成协议推迟交付24架飞机,意味着2021年不再购入新飞机。目前尚不清楚哈吉-约安努施加的压力在这一决定中发挥了什么作用。但推迟并不意味着取消合同,所以毫不奇怪,哈吉-约安努并不满意。他指出,易捷航空未能说明推迟对易捷航空的烧钱计划具体有何影响,还表示易捷航空未披露细节,而且对公司的收入和利润恢复情况预测过于乐观,可能参与了“市场操纵”。他将巴顿和隆格伦列入了希望赶走的“无赖”名单。

哈吉-约安努不断加大赌注。他悬赏700万美元给可以提供“有用信息”从而取消空客合同的“告密者”。他声称发现易捷航空的高层高管跟一名律师在瑞士举行了由空客安排的秘密会议,根据巴拿马文件(Panama Papers)透露,这名律师可能曾经通过离岸空壳公司帮助客户逃避国际制裁。哈吉-约安努暗示这是一直以来他指控的腐败证据。易捷航空否认该会面存在。哈吉-约安努还指控易捷航空的三家少数股东,包括资产管理公司Invesco、Phoenix Asset Management和Ninety One都是空客秘密控制的“稻草人”,因为三家公司都帮助空客管理部分员工养老金资产。

但最终,哈吉-约安努的积极活动并未引起其他投资者的注意。三家在代理投票中为股东提供建议的知名公司,ISS、 Glass Lewis和Pirc都反对支持他的提议。5月的摊牌投票中,这位满心不满的创始人努力遭逢彻底失败,不归他和家人持有的股份中有99%反对罢免董事。哈吉-约安努宣称结果被人为操纵,他认为有空客养老金业务的基金公司不应该有投票资格。

易捷航空的董事长巴顿希望将该事件尽快翻篇,他公开表示希望易捷航空能够建设性地与创始人重新接触,但“负面头条新闻和宣传为敬业的管理团队施加了不必要的压力,对在英国和欧洲知名的品牌声誉造成了负面影响。”尽管隆格伦的管理团队在谈判投票中获胜,但还是受到了影响。投票后的几周里,易捷航空的首席财务官芬德利表示有意辞职,分析人士猜测,除了疫情造成的压力,哈吉-约安努活动的压力也是重要原因。“总是挑动股东找管理层麻烦并没有什么帮助。”晨星的分析师科策指出。芬德利只是表示,在易捷航空工作近六年之后,“现在适合把财务控制权交给有助于帮易捷航空进入下一篇章的人,”隆格伦则称“(芬德利)离开让他很遗憾。”

去年6月,易捷航空找到了巧妙的方法,可以同时缓解现金短缺和哈吉-约安努带来的压力,公司发行了相当于已发行股本15%的新股,筹集到超过6.31亿美元帮助公司挺过疫情。此举也将哈吉-约安努的持股比例从2019年年初的超过34%稀释到略低于30%,之后易捷航空董事会想无视这位爱发牢骚的创始人也就更容易。这并不是说要赶走他。事实上,哈吉-约安努还在不断施压,指称空客合同暗藏腐败,还说7月和12月的易捷航空股东大会上将提出问题。但与此同时,哈吉-约安努和家人卖掉了一部分股份,到2020年5月持有股份总数不到27%。从实际角度来看,他对隆格伦构成的威胁已经消退。

挤出来的旅行

击退了哈吉-约安努之后,隆格伦和易捷航空的管理层面临着其他无法控制的敌人。2020年5月中旬,公司透露遭到黑客攻击。攻击者窃取了900多万名客户的邮件地址和旅行详细信息,还“访问”了2200多名客户的信用卡和借记卡详细信息。更糟糕的是,公司早在1月就发现了黑客攻击,却直到4月才通知信用卡信息泄露的人,现在才通知其他客户。隐瞒行为导致易捷航空面临着更大的风险,既有英国主要数据保护监管机构的巨额罚款,也有客户的集体诉讼。如今,易捷航空宣布泄露事件已经一年,却仍然笼罩在种种风险中。

最大的风险还是新冠病毒。2020年6月15日,易捷航空恢复飞行,仅限英国和法国航线。像各家复工的航空公司一样,易捷航空规定了新流程,加大清洁力度、强制乘客和机组人员戴口罩、不提供餐食。公司希望种种措施能够让公众重新乘坐飞机充满信心。公司宣布,计划到8月,逐步提高到正常运力的75%。

事实证明,公司并没有办法增加航班。依赖休闲市场的廉价航空公司大部分利润集中在4月到8月。然而在2020年里的这几个月中,情况相当糟糕。英国政府决定对所有抵英的人强制实行两周隔离期,2020年夏初恢复的希望破灭了。在航空公司的压力下,后来英国取消了对欧洲一些国家的隔离政策,但随着西班牙和法国的感染率再次飙升,隔离政策重新启动。从2020年6月15日易捷航空恢复飞行开始到9月,载客人数为950万人次,而之前一年同期为3710万人次。

隆格伦并未完全沮丧。在允许预订以及隔离规定不受限制的地方,还是有不少乘客。随着新的也更具传染性的变异新冠病毒在欧洲迅速蔓延,10月英国很多地区,从赫尔辛基到特拉维夫都重新实施隔离政策。易捷航空宣布,截至2020年9月的12个月,公司已经损失10亿美元。之后一个季度也没有好多少。11月,英国在全境禁飞,临近圣诞时短暂放松管控后,12月末再次收紧限制。易捷航空运力仅为2019年的18%。对饱受打击的易捷航空来说,恨不得2020年赶快过去。

摆脱廉价航空的形象

要了解易捷航空的前景,重要的是要了解其战略定位。虽然易捷航空与位于都柏林的瑞安航空和新兴的匈牙利航空公司维兹航空通常被分类为“欧洲廉价航空公司”,但易捷航空与其他几家存在一些关键区别。“易捷航空一直是低成本航空公司,肯定不是最便宜的廉价航空。”Liberum的分析师邱在谈到易捷航空时说,“易捷航空的定位是物有所值,而不是拼命变成市场上最便宜的一家。”

瑞安航空和维兹航空基本上只服务休闲旅客,往返二级甚至三级机场,在小机场里控制多数登机口,也可以在机场费、地勤人员和行李人员工资方面费劲地谈判价格。主要开拓东欧新市场,一直努力降低座位成本。而另一方面,易捷航空的航线较少但更多在较大型机场,重点放在西欧。易捷航空还提供乘客更多额外服务,例如免费在机场办理值机手续(瑞安航空向不在线值机的乘客收取手续费),还有能够享受优先登机权的忠诚度计划。如此一来,易捷航空的直接竞争对手更偏向欧洲传统航空公司。

隆格伦表示,希望易捷航空在入驻的每家机场市场份额都可以跻身第一或第二。他积极采取行动,在认为重要的市场上抢占更多机会。当2017年竞争对手欧洲廉价航空公司柏林航空(Air Berlin)破产时,隆格伦斥资4800万美元收购了其在德国几家机场的业务,还购买了25架飞机。“我一直说,英国、德国、法国和意大利是我们重点关注的四个核心市场。”收购柏林航空的交易之后不久,他在2018年的世界旅游市场会议(World Travel Market conference)上表示。

不过,西欧主要机场的费用要贵一些。因此,不管是定价还是成本,易捷航空在欧洲航空公司里采取了中间定位。2019年不算燃料和固定汇率的话,易捷航空的座位公里成本为4.45欧分,这是业内关键的成本指标。瑞安航空为2.25欧分,而英国航空公司约为5欧分,法国航空和荷兰皇家航空为5.37欧分。券商Raymond James & Associates的航空公司分析师萨凡提·赛斯称,易捷航空用飞机抵押贷款以撑过疫情,意味着一旦将债务纳入计算范围,成本基础将升高:“公司是用未来飞机成本上涨换取当下的流动性。”

实际上,这意味着易捷航空几乎没有机会在航线和定价上击败瑞安航空或维兹航空。但易捷航空有可能从传统提供全面服务的航空公司手里抢走越来越多的市场份额。业内领先的德世国际航空咨询公司(Alton Aviation Consultancy)的董事总经理莉亚·瑞恩表示,不少传统航空公司靠着政府资助苦苦支撑,债务可能永远还不清。

易捷航空相较于服务全面的竞争对手还有其他优势。因为传统航空公司更依赖商务旅行,多位分析师预测,2024年之前可能都无法完全恢复,甚至可能永远没法恢复。波士顿咨询公司的莫勒纳表示,很多全面服务型航空公司深陷枢纽辐射的飞行网络中,限制了调整的灵活性。而易捷航空之类的经济型航空公司主营点对点飞行,能够通过降价促销和广告,然后调整航班时间表处理新预订,更容易刺激需求。“举个例子,廉价航空可以轻易将运力从西班牙转移到希腊,从而应对新的旅行限制。”他说。

隆格伦之前在领先的欧洲包价旅游公司德国途易集团(TUI Group)工作,后来入职易捷航空,希望将业务拓展到包价旅游。2019年12月,就在新冠疫情爆发之前的几个月,易捷航空的新度假部门刚刚成立。然而隆格伦表示仍将推进相关策略,他告诉贸易刊物《旅行周刊》(Travel Weekly),“度假将引领旅游业复苏。”Liberum的分析师邱指出,进入包价度假业务具有战略意义。“之前几乎没有做过这块,很有机会从零开始做出点成绩。”他谈到假期旅游时说。但他也表示,之前多数廉价航空公司的执行力较低,才妨碍包价度假推动利润增长。

隆格伦的恢复计划取决于欧洲整体的感染情况,很多地方仍然不太乐观,而且欧洲大部分地区的疫苗接种率严重落后于美国、英国和以色列等。1月底,易捷航空宣布,通过5年期贷款又获得了19亿美元担保,贷款抵押物还是飞机。该笔贷款能够帮助易捷航空再多撑一段时间。公司也继续坚持,在旅游业大屠杀中看到了获胜的机会,毕竟欧洲的传统航空公司损失比易捷航空还糟,所以折扣航空公司在巴黎、米兰、伦敦盖特威克和日内瓦等主要机场有机会争取新航班。

跟几乎所有航空公司一样,易捷航空对2021年夏季的希望寄托在疫苗接种上。英国进展良好,去年12月已经批准两款疫苗,分别来自辉瑞制药(Pfizer)和阿斯利康(AstraZeneca),1月初又批准了Moderna进口的第三种疫苗。到5月中旬,至少68%的成年人已经注射一剂。瑞安航空甚至想在营销中将疫苗接种与旅行联系起来,今年1月推出了“打完疫苗就出发”的广告语,由于没有倡导负责任行为遭到英国广告标准局(Britain’s Advertising Standards Authority)的反对,之后不得不撤回。不过,二者关联对航空公司来说至关重要。“复苏的速度将取决于疫苗接种率。”德世国际航空咨询公司的瑞恩说。

易捷航空面临的问题是,几乎所有航线都涉及欧洲,而欧洲大陆在疫苗接种方面远远落后。5月中旬,多数欧洲国家只有三分之一成人注射了一剂疫苗,主要因为疫苗供应严重短缺,而且有人担心阿斯利康和强生(Johnson & Johnson)的疫苗会导致罕见但十分危险的凝血副作用。

如果不加快接种疫苗,欧洲可能出现第三波感染。与此同时,英国宣布了5月17日恢复国际旅行,但将按照“红绿灯系统”操作,来自红色、黄色或绿色国家的旅客须遵守不同的要求。在热门度假目的地中,只有葡萄牙和直布罗陀被列入第一批绿色名单,回国后无需隔离。欧洲大部分地区都是黄色,回国需要隔离10天,而且英国政府仍然不建议休闲旅行。至少有一个重要度假地土耳其列入了红色名单,也就是说前往旅游的人回国后必须在酒店隔离10天。

综合来看,种种限制意味着2021年夏季的旅游前景越发难测。

隆格伦抱怨称,英国政府的旅行规定仍然过于严格。英国甚至要求从“绿色”国家返回的人登机前以及返回的两天内都要接受核酸检测。政府还表示,第二次必须是更精确的PCR检测,每位乘客可能要多花219英镑(302美元)。隆格伦对英国广播公司(BBC)说,这意味着只有富人才能够度假,因为检测费用“远远超过易捷航空机票平均费用”。易捷航空与一家医保公司达成协议,以正常成本的一半的费用提供检测,每次60英镑。费用确实可以减少,但对四口之家来说仍然是很大的负担。由于不确定性太多,休闲旅客推迟预订夏季航班,易捷航空仍然在泥潭中挣扎。

忧郁曲调

在易捷航空大枢纽之一盖特威克机场郊区的巨大机库里,有一排五个先进的吊舱,上面涂着易捷航空标志性的橙色和白色。每个吊舱都装在液压腿上,登几级金属楼梯便可以钻到门里。这些飞行模拟器都是空客A320的仿真驾驶舱。易捷航空的飞行员在此练习和保持技术。即使在疫情期间,模拟机也几乎24小时不停忙碌,因为易捷航空一直努力让飞行员获得必要的认证,为重新飞行做好准备。

不过,培训中心是易捷航空在盖特威克唯一仍然在运行的部门。距离模拟机不远的停机坪上,十几架真正的A320闲置着。往常引擎轰鸣声、机场摆渡车和行李车隆隆作响,如今只有呜呜吹过的风声。

不管哪家航空公司的首席执行官,看到这一幕都难免沮丧。1月接受伦敦媒体《标准晚报》(Evening Standard)采访时,隆格伦声音低沉,他承认很想念经常去西班牙马略卡岛旅行,他在那有栋房子,跟朋友还有一间录音室。他之前是长号手,还受过正统训练,曾经表示之所以经商,只是因为没由考进伦敦皇家音乐学院(London’s Royal Academy of Music),但最近好久没有演奏过,“因为没有灵感。”他说最近在重读海明威的《老人与海》(The Old Man and the Sea),希望提升自己的坚韧精神,也许是在主人公类似约伯的命运和自己的困境之间找到了相似之处。隆格伦告诉记者:“书中讲述了老人面对一个又一个挑战,但他总能调整情绪重新站起来。要记住,尽管无法控制遭遇,但总能控制自己的反应,这点很有帮助。感觉无能为力是最糟糕的感觉之一,不仅商界如此。”

易捷航空面临的困境堪称全行业的典型范本。公司用尽努力抵御新冠疫情造成的压力,让乘客相信飞行的安全性,前路却依然风雨飘摇,不知还要应付多少意外和动荡。(财富中文网)

译者:冯丰

审校:夏林

Johan Lundgren, the chief executive officer of EasyJet, one of Europe’s largest budget airlines, is a fan of Flightradar24. The website features a map of the world that displays a small airplane icon for every flight in the air, based on radar and transponder data. Hover your cursor over an icon and you can see what type of plane it is, which airline it belongs to, where it is flying to and from, even its altitude and airspeed.

Lundgren says he likes the site because it keeps airlines honest: When customers can see that their inbound aircraft hasn’t even taken off from its previous destination yet, there’s no point in feeding them the bad news with an eyedropper, as airlines traditionally had done, gradually announcing slightly longer delays. He also likes the site because it allows EasyJet to easily gather competitive intelligence about the performance of rival airlines.

Still, Lundgren could not have been happy with the Flightradar24 map on a Tuesday morning in late April. Just two EasyJet aircraft were in the air, one en route from London’s Gatwick Airport to Lyon in France; another from Belfast to the English Channel island of Jersey. Normally there would have been close to 100. But nothing has been normal for EasyJet since March 23, 2020. That’s the day the U.K. government first advised Britons abroad to return home as soon as possible in advance of impending travel restrictions because of the growing coronavirus pandemic.

Now, more than a year later, with the pandemic still raging, and with many countries, including the U.K., having toughened travel restrictions in response to new strains of the virus, the airline industry’s hopes for an early recovery are descending faster than an Airbus A320 on final approach to EasyJet’s home base at Luton Airport. And while optimism about leisure travel in Europe is slowly rekindling—this week, the U.K. announced a resumption of international travel to a limited number of destinations—EasyJet still faces plenty of potential turbulence, as the likelihood of a robust summer season recedes.

Airlines in general are already coming off their worst year on record: Thanks to the coronavirus pandemic, the industry collectively lost $118 billion in 2020, according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA). The carriers were expected to pare their loses to about $38 billion this year, as vaccines are rolled out across the world. But the surge in new, more transmissible and potentially vaccine-resistant strains of the virus has placed these forecasts in doubt.

EasyJet came into the pandemic in better shape than many airlines: It was profitable and had a strong balance sheet, with relatively low levels of debt. As a budget airline focused exclusively on short-haul flights within Europe, it had more flexibility than long-haul carriers to adjust its flight schedule, canceling flights without worrying about losing connections or violating alliance agreements. Still, it wasn’t spared from the industry’s general carnage. EasyJet’s revenues in 2019 were $8.9 billion, on which it made $600 million in profit. In 2020, sales cratered more than 50% to $4.2 billion, and the airline recorded its first ever annual loss: a jumbo jetliner-size blast of red ink totaling nearly $1.8 billion before tax. (EasyJet's fellow European budget carrier, Ryanair, announced last week that it had lost about $1 billion in the preceding 12 months.)

The crisis has also posed complications for the 54-year-old Lundgren that his competitors don’t face, including some particularly unwelcome excess baggage in the form of Stelios Haji-Ioannou. Haji-Ioannou founded EasyJet in 1995, eventually using it as a springboard to create of an Easy-branded empire that extended from car rentals and pizza delivery to a hemp business. The 54-year-old Greek-Cypriot entrepreneur hasn’t had a formal management role in the airline since he stepped down as chairman in 2002, but he remained a major shareholder, owning more than a third of the company before the pandemic hit. And he was not a happy shareholder: For a decade, he had sparred with a succession of EasyJet CEOs and boards—faulting them for overly ambitious and costly expansion plans and for ordering too many new aircraft from manufacturing giant Airbus. When the pandemic struck, Haji-Ioannou decided to renew his pressure to convince the airline to abandon the purchase—ultimately mounting a proxy campaign to remove directors from the board.

Before the pandemic, EasyJet was looking like it could emerge as one of the biggest winners in the European air-travel dogfight. The airline had become Europe’s equivalent of Southwest in the U.S. Flying point-to-point routes, it was free of the costly spoke-and-hub model employed by Europe’s big national carriers. At the same time, it was wooing at least some business travelers by differentiating itself from no-frills rivals like Ryanair and Wizz, offering some perks and serving first-tier airports. And Lundgren, who took over in late 2017, had big plans to build on that differentiation with potentially lucrative new ventures, including vacation packages, more benefits for business, and a new loyalty program.

The pandemic, of course, wiped out business and leisure travel alike. Lundgren has pulled every financial lever available to him to keep EasyJet aloft. Now, at the cusp of a summer season that normally would be the source of the majority of EasyJet’s profits, the airline and its CEO face what could be a make-or-break season. If COVID doesn’t ease more quickly, and leisure travel doesn’t rebound as hoped, EasyJet’s hole will only get deeper, and its plans to grow could be spiked indefinitely. What happens to EasyJet, which had been one of the strongest players in the airline industry before COVID-19, could presage the entire sector’s fate: If EasyJet can’t come back strong, what airline can?

Grounding planes, borrowing money

“We need to focus on the things we can control. Reducing the cost, managing the cash burn, and getting access to liquidity,” Lundgren told CNBC in November. To accomplish that, Lundgren has taken drastic steps. At the end of March 2020, EasyJet grounded its entire fleet. None would fly again until June 15. The company has announced plans to reduce its 15,000-person workforce by 30%. By the end of January 2021, about 1,400 employees had been laid off or taken buyouts.

The company negotiated with trade unions to move more of its pilots and cabin crew on to seasonal contracts, which would allow the company to better match its expenses to periods, such as the summer, when it generated more profit. It moved aircraft maintenance at three of its U.K. airports, which had been contracted out, back in-house. It renegotiated contracts with ground handling firms at several airports helping to lower costs.

These moves enabled EasyJet to reduce its operating costs, excluding fuel, by about 31% in the year through Sept. 30, 2020. The airline also managed to reduce its fuel cost per seat flown by 2.9% through a series of small changes: instructing pilots to use only one engine when taxiing, for example, and to climb to cruising altitude as fast as possible, since level, higher-altitude flying is more fuel-efficient. But these savings barely stanched the arterial bleed of cash gushing from the company’s coffers: In 2019, the airline’s operations had generated more than $1 billion in cash. In 2020, it hemorrhaged the same amount.

Some wondered if Lundgren, who has a reputation for being a nice guy, had the stomach for the kind of aggressive cost cutting that running a budget airline, especially during a pandemic, demanded. “At a budget carrier, you need to be aggressive and ruthless and abrasive,” says Joachim Kotze, an airline industry analyst for financial research firm Morningstar. Kotze compared Lundgren to his rival CEO, Michael O’Leary, who runs Ryanair and has a reputation for being merciless at containing expenses and being generally combative. “He’s running the business to make it as lean as possible, and you can’t be a nice guy and do that,” Kotze says. (Lundgren declined to comment for this article.)

Given EasyJet’s cash burn, it needed to raise more money—and quickly. Many of EasyJet’s competitors in Europe are national flag carriers: Air France, KLM, Lufthansa, SAS, Iberia, TAP Air Portugal, Swiss Air, and British Airways. Although mostly private now, many of these airlines were once state owned, and some still have not insignificant government stakeholdings. There is national pride, not to mention jobs and pension payments, resting on their wings. So when the industry was slammed by COVID-19, government was responsive to pleas for help. Since March 2020, European governments have provided more than $32.2 billion in bailouts to the airline industry, through a mix of grants, loans, and debt-for-equity deals, according to a report from HSBC. “These large airline groups are so big and so important for so many economies that the national governments will do whatever they can to keep them alive,” says Dirk-Maarten Molenaar, a travel and tourism industry consultant at Boston Consulting Group.

For an independent carrier like EasyJet, finding money was more complicated, especially since the U.K. government initially balked at providing the airline industry with a custom bailout package. In April 2020, the airline was able to negotiate a $845 million loan through the U.K. government’s COVID Corporate Finance Facility for large U.K. employers. EasyJet also drew down the entirety of its existing revolving credit facility—raising $500 million in cash. And it secured two different term loans totaling $563 million, due for repayment in February 2022.

Finally, in February 2021, the company took advantage of a sudden uptick in investor confidence on the news that vaccinations in the U.K. might allow international travel to return by late summer. EasyJet raised $1.5 billion by selling seven-year bonds, with a 1.875% annual interest rate. In a sign of faith in EasyJet’s prospects, the bond sale was almost six-times oversubscribed. The company benefits from being one of just four airlines globally that currently have an investment-grade credit rating, according to Gerald Khoo, a transportation analyst with brokerage firm Liberum. (The others are rival budget airlines Ryanair and Wizz Air, as well as Southwest Airlines in the U.S., on which EasyJet originally based its business model.)

Compared to some of its low-cost rivals, EasyJet also owned more of its planes outright. Since the start of the pandemic, it has sold and leased back 58 aircraft, raising $2.1 billion. It now owns just over half its fleet, down from 70% in 2019—and six of every 10 planes it does own have been pledged as collateral against its loans. But the disposition of EasyJet’s fleet would soon reignite a long-simmering feud between EasyJet and its founder.

A fight with the founder

At the same time that it was offloading planes to raise cash and placing others into long-term storage in “boneyards,” the company still took delivery of 14 brand new Airbus A320 and A321 Neos. As a result, it finished 2020 with more aircraft in its fleet than it had at the beginning of the year, despite the pandemic-induced travel doldrums. EasyJet had a long-term contract with the aerospace giant that would require it to take delivery of more than 100 new planes, including at least 55 by 2024. Those planes are Airbus’s most fuel-efficient models, offering operational savings for EasyJet in the long run. But EasyJet’s contract required it to pay the aircraft maker at least $6 billion through 2023—a sum considerably greater than the airline’s entire current market capitalization.

The purchases rankled Haji-Ioannou, who had opposed EasyJet’s tie-up with Airbus ever since it had been signed in 2013. The airline founder’s misgivings had only mounted after the aircraft maker agreed in January 2020 to deferred prosecution agreements with the U.S., France, and the U.K. and to pay billions of dollars in fines stemming from charges that it had for years routinely bribed airline executives to secure contracts.

When the pandemic struck, the aggrieved founder saw an opportunity to force EasyJet to abandon the deal. In March 2020, he wrote to EasyJet’s chairman, John Barton, and demanded the company terminate the contract, citing force majeure. If it failed to do so, he threatened to call a vote to remove one director from the board every seven weeks, until the board acquiesced. He also threatened to sue the airline if its payments to Airbus pushed it toward bankruptcy.

Lundgren and the board were frustrated. The CEO told the Financial Times that Haji-Ioannou’s campaign was “highly undesirable,” “unhelpful,” and a “distraction.” EasyJet pointed out that the contract contained no force majeure clause. What’s more, it included maintenance and avionics support for EasyJet’s existing fleet. The airline couldn’t simply abandon it without jeopardizing any chance of a quick recovery when the crisis ended.

Lundgren also thought the contract made long-term strategic sense. The fuel-efficient jets could help EasyJet reduce its carbon footprint at a time when consumers and governments seemed increasingly likely to hold airlines accountable for their climate impact. Lundgren had been an industry leader in trying to position EasyJet for this new world. The airline began purchasing carbon offsets for the CO2 of all its flights in 2019. “The minute consumers start to make a choice based on this, and I think they will, an emphasis on sustainability will pay off,” says BCG consultant Molenaar, “and EasyJet has been out front in preparing for this.”

When EasyJet’s board did not accede to his demands, Haji-Ioannou carried through on his threat—requesting a special meeting to vote on the removal of board member Andreas Bierwirth, a former Austrian Airlines and Lufthansa executive who Haji-Ioannou termed “a friend of Airbus.” When the board tossed out this request on a technicality, Haji-Ioannou resubmitted his call and asked for the removal of the chief financial officer, Andrew Findlay, too. This time, he succeeded in scheduling a showdown vote for May 22, 2020.

In April 2020, EasyJet announced that it had reached an agreement with Airbus to defer delivery of 24 of the aircraft, meaning it would take on no new aircraft in 2021. It’s not clear what role Haji-Ioannou’s pressure played in this decision. But it was not the same as canceling its contract, and unsurprisingly, Haji-Ioannou was not satisfied. Noting that EasyJet had failed to say exactly how the deferral affected EasyJet’s cash burn, the founder said that EasyJet might have engaged in “market manipulation” by failing to disclose such details and by using overly optimistic forecasts for when the company’s revenues and profits might recover. He added Barton and Lundgren to the list of “scoundrels” he wanted to oust.

Haji-Ioannou kept upping the stakes. He offered a $7 million reward to any “whistleblower” who could provide him “useful information” leading to the cancellation of the Airbus contract. He said he had discovered a secret meeting in Switzerland, arranged by Airbus, between top EasyJet executives and a lawyer who, according to documents revealed in the Panama Papers leak, may have helped clients evade international sanctions through offshore shell companies. Haji-Ioannou insinuated that this was evidence of the corruption he’d long alleged. EasyJet denied this dinner took place. Haji-Ioannou also alleged three large minority EasyJet shareholders—the asset management companies Invesco, Phoenix Asset Management, and Ninety One—were “straw men,” secretly controlled by Airbus, since all three companies manage some of the aerospace giant’s employee pension assets.

But, in the end, Haji-Ioannou’s campaign failed to catch fire with other investors. The three most prominent firms that advise shareholders on how to cast ballots in proxy votes—ISS, Glass Lewis, and Pirc—all recommended against backing his proposals. In the May showdown vote, the disgruntled founder’s effort was roundly defeated, with 99% of the shares not held by the entrepreneur and his family casting ballots against removing the directors. Haji-Ioannou said the result was rigged, arguing that the fund companies with Airbus pension business should have been ineligible to vote.

Barton, EasyJet’s chairman, tried to put the episode behind the company, saying publicly that he hoped EasyJet could reengage constructively with its founder, but that “the negative headlines and publicity has placed unnecessary pressure on a dedicated management team and negatively impacted the reputation of this great British and European brand.” Indeed, though Lundgren’s management team had won the showdown, there were signs of damage. Within weeks of the vote, Findlay, EasyJet’s CFO, announced his intention to step down, and analysts speculated that the stress of Haji-Ioannou’s campaign, on top of that caused by the pandemic, had taken a toll. “It is not helpful to have a shareholder barking up management’s neck the whole time,” Morningstar analyst Kotze says. Findlay said only that after almost six years with EasyJet, “it will be the right time to pass the financial reins to someone who will help take EasyJet into its next chapter,” and Lundgren said he was “sorry to see [Findlay] leave.”

In June, the airline found a deft way to simultaneously relieve the pressure from its cash burn and Haji-Ioannou: It raised more than $631 million to help it weather the pandemic by issuing new shares equivalent to 15% of the company’s outstanding share capital. That move also diluted Haji-Ioannou’s stake in the company’s stock from more than 34% at the beginning of 2019 to just under 30%, making it easier for EasyJet’s board to ignore the demands of its querulous founder. Not that he was going away. In fact, Haji-Ioannou continued to press his allegations that corruption underpinned the Airbus contract, raising the matter at EasyJet’s general meetings in July and December. But at the same time, Haji-Ioannou and his family sold off a portion of their shares, bringing their total holdings to less than 27% of the company by May 2020. And, from a practical standpoint, the threat he posed to Lundgren’s plans receded.

Just a trickle of travel

Having fought off Haji-Ioannou, Lundgren and EasyJet’s C-suite faced other foes they couldn’t control. In mid-May 2020, the company revealed it had been hacked. The attackers stole more than 9 million customers e-mail addresses and travel details and also “accessed” credit and debit card details of more than 2,200 customers. Worse, the company had discovered the hack back in January but hadn’t notified people whose credit card details had been accessed until April, and was only now letting other customers know. That delay exposed EasyJet to greater risk of both hefty fines from Britain’s chief data protection regulator and class-action lawsuits from customers. Today, a year after Easy Jet’s announcement, those perils still hang over the airline.

Front and center was the existential risk of the coronavirus. The airline resumed flying on June 15, 2020, with limited routes within the U.K. and to France. Like all airlines, it instituted new procedures: increased cleaning, mandatory masks for passengers and crew, and no meal service. It hoped these measures allow the public to feel confident flying again. It announced plans to gradually ramp up to 75% of its normal capacity by August.

As it turned out, it wouldn’t need those flights. Budget airlines that rely on the leisure market make most of their money from April to August. In 2020, those months were grim. Hopes for an early summer 2020 recovery were dashed when the U.K. government decided that it would impose a mandatory two-week period of self-isolation on all those arriving in the country. Under pressure from airlines, it later lifted this policy for some European destinations, only to reimpose it as infection rates soared again in Spain and France. From June 15, when EasyJet resumed flying, through September 2020, it carried 9.5 million passengers, compared to 37.1 million in the same period the year before.

Lundgren wasn’t completely despondent: Where bookings were allowed and quarantine rules not restrictive, passengers were coming back. But with new, more infectious variants of COVID-19 spreading rapidly in Europe, in October renewed lockdowns were imposed across many parts of the U.K. and from Helsinki to Tel Aviv. EasyJet announced it had lost more than $1 billion in the 12 months through September 2020. The next quarter was not much better: A U.K.-wide national lockdown was imposed in November and, after a brief easing of restrictions in the run-up to Christmas, again in late December. EasyJet was able to operate at only 18% of its 2019 capacity. For the battered airline, 2020 couldn’t end soon enough.

Beyond budget flying

To understand EasyJet’s prospects, it’s important to understand its strategic positioning. While it is often lumped into the same “European budget airline” category as Dublin-based Ryanair and upstart Hungarian carrier Wizz Air, there are some key differences between EasyJet and those other airlines. “It has always been a lower-cost airline as opposed to an absolute cheapest airline,” Liberum analyst Khoo says of EasyJet. “It has been a value-for-money proposition rather than trying to be the cheapest in the market.”

Ryanair and Wizz Air cater almost exclusively to leisure travelers. They fly into second- and even third-tier airports, where they control a dominant share of the gates and can drive tough bargains on any airport fees and charges for ground crews and baggage handlers. They have focused on expanding into new markets in Eastern Europe. And they are relentlessly focused on keeping per-seat costs down. EasyJet, on the other hand, flies fewer routes but operates from many more primary airports, with a heavier focus on Western Europe. It also offers passenger a few more extras, such as allowing them to check in at the airport without charge (Ryanair charges passengers who don’t check in online) and a loyalty program that confers priority boarding privileges. In this way, it has positioned itself as a more direct competitor to Europe’s traditional airlines.

Lundgren says he wants EasyJet to be the No. 1 or No. 2 airline by market share for each airport it serves. And he’s moved aggressively to grab additional takeoff and landing slots in markets he sees as important. When rival European budget carrier Air Berlin went belly up in 2017, Lundgren spent $48 millionto buy its operations at several German airports and take on 25 of its airplanes. “I’ve always said the four core markets are where we want to put our focus on U.K., Germany, France and Italy,” he told the World Travel Market conference in 2018, shortly after the Air Berlin deal concluded.

But flying to those primary airports in Western Europe is more expensive. As a result, EasyJet occupies a kind of middle ground—in both pricing and costs—among European carriers. In 2019, excluding fuel and in constant currency, it cost EasyJet 4.45 European pennies per available seat kilometer, a key industry cost metric. The same figure for Ryanair was 2.25 pennies, while it was about 5 for British Airways and 5.37 for Air France and KLM. EasyJet’s decision to use its aircraft as collateral for loans it needed to get through the pandemic means that its cost base will be higher going forward, once debt service is included in the calculations, says Savanthi Syth, an airline analyst for brokerage Raymond James & Associates: “They’ve traded liquidity for today in exchange for their aircraft ownership costs going up in the future.”

In practice, this means EasyJet has little chance of beating Ryanair or Wizz head-to-head on routes and pricing. But EasyJet could steal an increasing amount of market share from the legacy full-service carriers. Many of those airlines are limping along on government funding they might never be able to repay, says Leah Ryan, managing director of Alton Aviation, a leading industry consultant.

EasyJet has other advantages over its full-service rivals too. Those airlines are more dependent on business travel, which many analysts forecast might not fully recover from the pandemic until 2024—if it ever recovers at all. Many full-service airlines are locked into hub-and-spoke flight networks that limit their scheduling flexibility, BCG’s Molenaar says. Budget airlines that fly point-to-point, such as EasyJet, can easily stimulate their demand by running price promotions and advertising and then shifting flight schedules to cover those new bookings. “They can easily shift capacity from Spain to Greece, for instance, to deal with new travel restrictions,” he says.

Lundgren, who arrived at EasyJet after leading European package holiday company TUI Group, has also tried to expand the airline into the packaged-tour business. EasyJet’s new holiday division launched in December 2019, just months before the pandemic took hold. Yet Lundgren says his strategy is still valid, telling trade publication Travel Weekly that “holidays are going to lead the recovery.” Liberum analyst Khoo says the move into packaged holidays made strategic sense. “Given that they were doing almost nothing before, there is a big opportunity to move from zero to something,” he says of the holiday tours. But in the past, he says, most budget airlines have fallen down on execution, unable to make package holidays a profit-driver.

Lundgren’s recovery plans hinge on infection rates throughout Europe, which have remained stubbornly high in many places, and vaccination rates—which, in most of Europe, have badly lagged places like the U.S., U.K., and Israel. At the end of January, EasyJet announced that it had secured another $1.9 billion through a five-year loan, secured against its aircraft. That loan would buy EasyJet some more time. And the company continued to insist it saw the opportunity for wins amid the travel industry’s carnage: Europe’s legacy carriers were hurting even worse than EasyJet, which offered the discount airline a chance to gain new flight slots at key airports in Paris, Milan, London Gatwick, and Geneva.

The airline’s hopes for summer 2021, like those of almost all airlines, rest on vaccinations. The U.K. is doing well: It had approved two vaccines—one from Pfizer and one from AstraZeneca—in December and a third, from Moderna, in early January; by mid-May it had given 68% of the adult population at least one shot. Ryanair had even tried to capitalize on this connection between vaccinations and travel in its marketing, rolling out at “jab and go” advertising slogan in January, which it had to withdraw after objections from Britain’s Advertising Standards Authority that it was not promoting responsible behavior. Still, the connection was critical for airlines. “The pace of recovery will be determined by vaccination rates,” Alton Aviation’s Ryan says.

The problem for EasyJet is that almost all the routes it flies involve Europe, and the continent was lagging far behind on vaccinations. By mid-May, most of the major European nations had administered first doses to just over a third of adults amid critical vaccine supply shortages and concerns about rare but dangerous blood clots linked to AstraZeneca’s and Johnson & Johnson’s vaccines.

Without a brisker vaccination pace, a third wave of infections keeps threatening to take hold in Europe. Meanwhile, the U.K. has announced international travel will resume as of May 17, but will operate according to a “traffic light system,” with arrivals from red-, yellow-, or green-designated countries subject to different requirements. Of popular holiday destinations, only Portugal and Gibraltar were put on the initial green list, with no requirement to self-isolate upon return. Most of Europe was in the yellow category, requiring 10 days of self-isolation when coming back, and with the U.K. government still advising against leisure travel. And at least one key holiday locale—Turkey—wound up on the red list, meaning those traveling there would have to quarantine in a hotel for 10 days.

Taken together, those restrictions mean that summer 2021 is looking increasingly in doubt.

Lundgren complains that the British government’s travel rules remain too onerous. The U.K. requires even those returning from “green” countries take COVID-19 tests before boarding a plane to return to the U.K. as well as within two days of returning. And the government has said the second of these has to be a more accurate PCR test, which can cost as much as £219 ($302) per passenger. In essence, Lundgren told the BBC, this means only the rich can go on holidays: The expense of these tests would be “way over and above what the cost is of an average EasyJet fare,” he said. The airline cut a deal with a health care company to provide the test at half the normal cost, or £60 per test. That’s better, but still a big burden on, say, a family of four. With so much uncertainty, leisure travelers are holding off on booking summer flights, prolonging easyJet’s pain.

Playing the blues

In a vast hangar on the outskirts of Gatwick Airport, one of EasyJet’s big hubs, sit a row of five space-age pods, painted in EasyJet’s trademark orange-and-white colors. Each stands elevated on hydraulically controlled legs, with doors reached by a short metal staircase. These are flight simulators that recreate the exact cockpit of an Airbus A320 aircraft. It is here that EasyJet’s pilots practice and maintain their skills. And the simulators have been kept busy virtually around the clock, even during the pandemic, as EasyJet has sought to keep its pilots properly certified so they will be ready when flying returns.

But the training center is the only part of EasyJet’s operation at Gatwick still humming. Out on the tarmac, a short distance from the simulators, almost a dozen real EasyJet A320s sit idle. Where normally there would be the roar of engines and the trundling rumble of buses and baggage carts, the whistling wind is often the only sound.

It was enough to make any airline CEO play the blues. In an interview with London’s Evening Standard newspaper in January, Lundgren sounded down, admitting he missed frequent trips to the Spanish island of Majorca, where he owns a house and where he and a friend also own a recording studio. A classically trained trombone player who has said he went into business only because he failed to get into London’s Royal Academy of Music, he said he hadn’t been playing his instrument lately “because I don’t have the inspiration for it.” He said he’d been trying to draw lessons in resilience by rereading Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea, finding perhaps parallels between the Job-like fate of its protagonist and his own plight. “It is about a man who faces challenge after challenge but he keeps his mood and rises up again,” Lundgren told the newspaper. “It helps to remember that while you can’t control what happens to you, you can always control your response. Feeling powerless is one of the worst feelings, not just in business.”

EasyJet’s powerless plight is typical of the entire industry’s. As hard as it has tried to inoculate itself against the pressures of the pandemic and to convince passengers it will be safe to fly, its fate remains up in the air, subject to unexpected and unwelcome turbulence.

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