摩根大通可作大行分拆探路先锋

    摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）应该一分为二，就像花旗集团（Citigroup）前董事长桑迪•威尔对所有大银行做出的建议那样。事实上，摩根大通应该先行一步。但在此之前，该行董事会需要解决好治理问题，分拆才能顺利进行。

    过去几周，摩根大通一波不平，一波又起。种种事件让人继续质疑公司声明的可靠性以及其动机和行为的正当性。上周，美国联邦能源监管委员会（FERC）根据能源操纵调查提交的文件列出了“基于电子邮件的详细总结”，证明“摩根大通多次明知故犯，将非特许保密邮件列为特许保密邮件。”

    将这项调查推上风口浪尖的是英国《金融时报》（Financial Times）。该报最近报道，摩根大通这样的华尔街银行正在越来越深地插手石油交易和向炼油厂供应原油等事务。

    摩根大通首席执行官杰米•戴蒙在公司第二季度业绩电话会议上不愿回答有关伦敦银行同业拆借利率（Libor）操纵的问题，但据《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）报道，摩根大通一些交易员因涉嫌串通操纵利率，正在接受调查。

    上上周，美国参议员卡尔•列文和商业铜用户直言，反对摩根大通和Blackrock提议的铜ETF，担心会推高铜价。

    这只是近期突出的一些问题，但并非全部。新的诉讼和调查正在展开。

    7月13日，两位银行分析师提出摩根大通太大了，难以管理。那么，摩根大通应该听从威尔的建议，还是把脑袋埋进沙子里，希望一切最终都会过去？

    为了避免走不必要的弯路，监管部门需要发话，摩根大通董事会应该着手解决自己的治理问题，而且正如桑迪•威尔所建议的那样，这家银行应该一分为二。

第一步：清理摩根大通董事会

    一个正常运转的审计委员会绝不会允许杰米•戴蒙在4月13日的第一季度业绩电话会议上对交易损失规模做出“大错特错”的描述。如今从7月13日的分析师会议上我们已经了解到，虽然4月份时戴蒙说损失不大，但蒙在鼓里的投资者所不知到的是，第一季度的数据已包含了7.18亿美元的首席投资办公室损失。前些年董事会就曾收到关于首席投资办公室的警告，4月初的很多新闻报道也发出了警报。

    一个功能正常的审计委员会本应询问第一季度数据中的交易损失状况。他们本应有例行的预先审批业绩报告的程序，不该让管理层在不进行交易损失披露的情况下，在4月13日业绩演示的第12页中进行解释。或者，如果4月13日委员会已经知道了这笔交易损失，仍然保持沉默，这也是错误。不管是哪一种，首席执行官和首席财务官都没有获得有价值的协助。

    此外，还有其他的内部控制问题。如果审计委员会监督充分，原本可以阻止这家公司对风险水平的不实陈述，阻止其第一季度交易损失重述（翻番至14亿美元）。摩根大通说过，其首席投资官办公室的程序要比投行部门薄弱；标准的内部审计调查本应发现这一点。

    是不是说，摩根大通太大了，难以监管？审计委员会的成员们有没有投入必要的时间和精力来做好这份工作？他们真的具有独立思考吗？

    交易巨亏后有些经理的高额奖金将被追回，但薪酬委员会选择对其他人高抬贵手。对最高管理层和中下层实施两套双重标准，这种行为传递了错误的信号。

    一个正常运转的薪酬委员会本应实施最高层奖金递延计划，就像监管部门建议的那样。他们不应依赖奖金追回——和奖金递延不同，奖金追回发生在事后。另外，他们不应当将业绩或股价指标作为明里暗里的薪酬基础。把业绩（金融服务公司的业绩非常易受影响）和股价（反映股东对不透明的财务报表的看法）作为指标根本不合适。

    J.P. Morgan should split in two, as former Citigroup chair Sandy Weill has recommended for all big banks. In fact, it should go first. But before it does, the bank's board needs to address its own governance issues so the split goes well.

    It has been another tumultuous couple of weeks for J.P. Morgan (JPM). Events continued to raise questions about the veracity of company statements and the propriety of its motives and actions. Last week, a FERC filing in an energy manipulation investigation provided a "detailed, email-by-email summary" to back up its assertions that "J.P. Morgan repeatedly and deliberately insisted that unprivileged emails were privileged."

    Bringing the investigation into sharper focus, the Financial Times recently reported that Wall Street banks like J.P. Morgan are becoming more heavily involved in the oil trading businessand supplying oil to refiners.

    CEO Jamie Dimon would not answer questions about Libor manipulation during the bank's second quarter earnings call, but the Wall Street Journal has reported that its traders are now under investigation for conspiring to rig the rates.

    Last week, Senator Carl Levin along with commercial copper consumers spoke out in oppositionto a J.P. Morgan and Blackrock (BLK) proposed copper exchange traded fund on worries it would raise copper prices.

    While this just offers a flavor of recent concerns, it hardly represents the full story. New lawsuits and investigations are underway.

    On July 13, two bank analysts suggested the bank was too big to manage. So will J.P. Morgan heed Weill's recommendation or just put its head in the sand and hope it all goes away?

    To save needless suffering, regulators need to speak out, the J.P. Morgan board should address its governance problems, and, as Weill recommends, the company should be split in two.

First step: Cleaning up J.P. Morgan's board

    A well run audit committee would never have allowed Jamie Dimon to be "dead wrong" about the importance of the trading losses on April 13. As we now know from the July 13 analyst meeting, while Dimon was saying the losses were insignificant in April, unbeknownst to the investing public, embedded in the April 13 numbers were $718 million in losses from the chief investment office (CIO). The board had received warnings about the CIO in prior years and had the benefit of news reports in early April.

    A functional audit committee would have asked about the level of trading losses in the first quarter numbers. They would have had practices in place to review and approve earnings releases in advance and never would have allowed management to show the explanation onpage 12 of the April 13 earnings presentation without a trading loss disclosure. Alternatively, if the committee knew of the loss on April 13 and remained silent, this would be wrong as well. Either way, valuable assistance was kept from the CEO and CFO.

    Then there are the other internal controls issues. Sufficient audit committee oversight could haveprevented the company from misstating its risk levels and prevented restatement of its first quarter trading losses, which doubled to $1.4 billion. J.P. Morgan has said its procedures in the CIO office were weaker than those in its investment bank; a standard internal audit review should have unearthed this.

    Is the company just too big to oversee? Did the audit committee members put in the time and attention required to do their jobs well? Are they truly independent-minded?

    While some managers will have substantial clawbacks in the wake of the trading debacle, the compensation committee is punting on others. Having two sets of standards – one for top management and another for those down the line -- sends the wrong message.

    A well-run compensation committee would have implemented meaningful top management bonus deferral programs, as regulators have recommended. They would not rely on clawbacks -- which, unlike bonus deferrals, occur after the fact. They would also not be using earnings or stock price metrics as implicit or explicit bases for rewards. Earnings, which are highly malleable at a financial services firm, and stock price, which represents feedback from shareholders on opaque financial statements, are hardly relevant measures.