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新闻集团之乱:股东集体沉默酿成大祸

新闻集团之乱:股东集体沉默酿成大祸

Eleanor Bloxham 2011年10月18日
新闻集团窃听丑闻爆发,公司领导层遭遇重创,但公司股东们闻讯却并未采取任何行动。这到底是怎么回事?

    今年夏天,窃听丑闻被曝光,新闻集团(News Corp)遭遇重创,甚至动摇了公司的根基。时至今日,这个传媒帝国仍未能走出阴影。与此同时,一个重大的问题也日益突出:公司深陷危机,新闻集团的股东们都到哪里去了?

    实际上,业内对新闻集团窃听丑闻的关注已有数年之久。然而,最近的详细调查显示,新闻集团9月2日收到的代理委托书中竟然没有一份与此相关的股东提案。公司股东的集体沉默在管理界几乎达到了登峰造极的地步。

    美国基督教兄弟投资服务公司(Christian Brothers Investment Services)领导的投资者联盟计划在该集团于10月21日召开的股东年度大会上提交议案,分离集团的CEO和董事会主席职位。窃听丑闻令新闻集团举步维艰,同时也暴露出这个传媒巨头独立管理的缺失;相形之下,这份提案以及没有出现其它相关提案这一事实表明,股东对事态的反应相当无力。

    最近几天,很多股东呼吁通过投票来反对某些董事会成员的连任。同时,代理顾问服务公司ISS建议新闻集团股东在今年的股东大会上改选几名董事会成员,包括新闻集团董事长兼CEO鲁伯特•默多克和他的两个儿子。

    但奇怪的是,为什么新闻集团股东却迟迟没有回应?

    难道目睹窃听丑闻曝光以及董事会独立性的明显缺失,股东依然选择袖手旁观? 又或者在过去几年中,新闻集团的一错再错早已耗尽了他们的精力?我倒希望真的是这样!

    据悉,2010年,新闻集团收到的代理委托书中只包括两份股东提案。一项提案源于对中国新闻自由的关注,建议在新闻集团建立人权委员会;另一项提议是建立“薪酬话语权”制度,美国国会同年通过的《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)强制要求执行这项制度。但不幸的是,两项提案无一例外均被否决。

    另外,2010年,英国 F&C资产管理公司以及内森•卡明斯基金会(Nathan Cummings Foundation)曾提议投票反对董事会审计委员会主席罗德•埃丁顿继续连任,因为新闻集团曾分别向共和党州长协会(Republican Governors' Association)和主要为共和党选举服务的美国商会(Chamber of Commerce)捐赠了100万美元。

    尽管董事会疏于对该公司政治献金的监督让集团投资者极为不满,但是埃丁顿并没有因此出局,反而以53,900万支持票对4,100万反对票的绝对优势再次当选。

    2009年的情况又如何呢?股东们没有任何提案。2008年呢?也没有。

    2007年呢?当年共有两项股东提案。一项提案建议董事会成员选举每年举办一次。而这项提案在2008年又被作为新闻集团公司的提案出现。

    另一项提案建议取消双重股权机构,采取单一股权制。虽然该提案对公司有利,但仍然被众多股东否决,惨遭搁置。

    毋庸置疑,要改变鲁伯特•默多克领导的传媒帝国实非易事。目前,鲁伯特•默多克掌握着约四成甚至更多有投票权的股份,与2007年约30%相比有所增长。

    然而,股东们甚至鲜有尝试,这才是问题的症结所在。而新闻集团的法人股东通常只关心管理方面的问题。

    如今,一切都已尘埃落定,股东们终于按捺不住了,纷纷向法院提起诉讼,矛头直指董事会办事不力。然而我们依然要问:他们早干嘛去了?为什么没有尽早采取行动?

    事实上,新闻集团所呈现出的这种现象并非特例:例如,一些董事会不懂受托监督公司的业务,甚至有些久经世故的大股东们连他们投资的基础何在都不甚了解——知道一切难以挽回。

    实际情况是,法人股东的力量一般较为分散,显得过于薄弱,导致他们最终无法有效工作。拨乱反正需要集中法人股东的集体力量,就像在一家企业中众多证券分析师所做的那样。公司的股东们必须团结起来,共同决定如何划分各投资者分管公司的“势力范围”;之后,职责分明的股东们必须统帅各自分管的公司及其业务,有效行使股东会赋予的权力。

    现在,虽然一些股东们确实对资源进行了小规模的整合,但是投资(当然还包括管理活动)本身就存在竞争性,而这种竞争性必然会阻碍有效合作的形成。一些公司治理评级机构试图以咨询代理的身份建议投资者采取有效的行动,但最终都以失败告终。

    试想,如果投资者自己不关注,不采取行动,出现公司治理不善的局面又何足为奇?即便导致金融危机也在意料之中,因为金融危机就是众多公司管理者管理不善的产物。投资者必须提高意识,采取更加积极的态度,才能真正有效地促进资本市场体系的繁荣,并充分发挥资本市场体系的作用,而不是在事后依靠法律诉讼解决问题。

    本文作者爱丽诺•布洛斯罕现任董事会咨询机构价值联盟和公司治理联盟(The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance)(http://thevaluealliance.com)的首席执行官。

    译者:李淑玉/汪皓

    As News Corp continues to endure the after effects of a hacking scandal that shook the company to its core this past summer, one question in particular still looms large: Where have the company's shareholders been all this time?

    Concerns related to the hacking scandal at News Corp (NWS) have spanned several years, but amid all the recent scrutiny, the company's latest proxy, filed on September 2, did not include a single proposal from shareholders. In the governance world, that's about as silent as shareholders can be.

    One shareholder group, Christian Brothers Investment Services, plans to bring a proposal to the annual meeting on October 21 calling for the separation of the CEO and chair positions. But that single proposal -- and the lack of others -- is a very tepid response to the scandals roiling the company and the lack of independent governance at the media giant.

    Some shareholders in recent days are now calling for votes against the reelection of certain members of the board. And proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services recently recommended that News Corp shareholders not reelect several board members, including chairman and CEO Rupert Murdoch, and his sons.

    But why has any response from shareholders been so long in coming?

    Have shareholders of News Corp just stood by as the hacking issues were revealed and the lack of board independence was evident? Or is their current silence just weariness from repeated failed activism in prior years? If only.

    In 2010, there were only two shareholder proposals on News Corp's proxy filing. One proposal was to establish a human rights committee at News Corp, arising out of concerns related to freedom of the press in China. The second related to establishing a vote on "say on pay," which had already been mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act for the following year. Both shareholder proposals were voted down, in any case.

    In addition, in 2010, there were also calls by British asset manager F&C and by the Nathan Cummings Foundation to vote against the reelection of the board's audit committee chair, Sir Rod Eddington based on concerns related to the $1 million donation News Corp. made to the Republican Governors' Association and another $1 million to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

    The investors were displeased with the lack of board oversight of political spending. But Eddington sailed through his reelection, with 539 million votes in his favor and 41 million against.

    What about 2009? No shareholder proposals. 2008? No shareholder proposals.

    2007? There were two shareholder proposals that year. One was to elect directors annually. News Corp itself put forth this proposal in 2008.

    Another shareholder proposal to eliminate the dual class of shares and create a single class of stock was also on the docket that year, which might have been helpful but was defeated by shareholders.

    Yes, the bar is set high when it comes to making changes at News Corp. Rupert Murdoch holds around 40% or more of the company's voting class shares now, up from around 30% in 2007.

    But the lack of trying is the conundrum in this case. Institutional shareholders of News Corp are those who often concern themselves with governance matters.

    Now, after all that has transpired, shareholder lawsuits are under way. While these suits take aim at the passive board, the question remains: where were the shareholders before and why did they not take action sooner?

    While the News Corp case is one example, it is not unique: like some boards of directors who do not understand the business of the companies they have been entrusted to oversee, often even large, sophisticated shareholders remain unaware of the underpinnings of their investments -- until it's too late.

    The fact is that, as a general matter, institutional shareholders are spread too thin – and fail to do their jobs effectively. To right the ship would require large institutional shareholders to organize much like securities analysts do within a single firm. They would have to come together to agree which investor would "cover" a certain set of companies and then stay on top of governance and other business practices for those particular companies.

    While some funds do pool their resources on a small scale, investing (and governance activism, for that matter) is competitive by nature – and that presents an obstacle to effective cooperation. Governance rating services, some of which have attempted to act as information agents, have also failed to effectively rouse investors to action.

    But If investors do not pay attention or take action, who can be surprised at poor governance -- or financial crises which are the product of governance issues at multiple companies? To truly be effective in influencing the prosperity and accountability of the capital markets system, investors must be aware and active -- rather than rely on lawsuits after the fact.

    Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com), a board advisory firm.

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