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网飞的启示:如何避免被“网飞”厄运

网飞的启示:如何避免被“网飞”厄运

Saul Kaplan 2011年10月14日
网飞(Netflix)也可以当动词用,意思是颠覆曾经大获成功的商业模式。现在的麻烦在于,网飞公司自己看来也很可能难免被“网飞”的宿命。

    核工业用半衰期来衡量放射性物质保持放射性的时间。这个概念说明的是放射性物质的放射性衰减一半所需的时间。比如,铀235的半衰期是7亿年。在工业时代,商业模式的半衰期通常按世代(约30年)来计算。一旦某个公司确定了如何创造价值,交付价值并获取价值回报的基本规则,这些规则就会变得根深蒂固,由各职能部门予以强化,并通过巩固公司文化加以维系。

    这样的时代已经终结。工业时代已经一去不复返了。商业模式的半衰期正在缩短。今天的商界领袖要么得在运营现行商业模式的同时,学习如何改变这一模式,要么就得做好被“网飞化”的准备。

    网飞不是个动词,但它应该包含以下含义:

    1. 扰乱现有商业模式,或给它带来混乱。

    2. 破坏曾大获成功的商业模式。

    3. 颠覆现行的价值创造、交付及获取模式。

    电影出租巨头百视达公司(Blockbuster)以一套引人瞩目的商业模式起家。其价值主张清晰明了,即让消费者在家中舒适地观赏大片。依靠遍布各地的便捷店铺,百视达建立了庞大的价值交付网络。1985年,百视达第一家店开张,很快就发展到超过5,000家零售店,拥有60,000名员工。在获取价值方面,该公司还拥有一套堪称高明的融资模式。消费者发现,与外出看电影的花费相比,它的大片租赁价格颇具吸引力。与制片商合作的常规模式是向其支付大笔的预付费(每部作品高达65美元),而百视达另辟蹊径,采取了与制片方分享收入的合作模式,这样每部大片就只需支付少许预付费,甚至可以分文不付。这种模式给它带来了巨大优势,让它实现了飞速增长。百视达一路走来可谓顺风顺水。2002年,它达到了发展顶峰,市值高达50亿美元。但到了2010年,它却突然申请破产。原因何在?原来它被“网飞”了。

    百视达并不是对网飞公司的诞生视而不见。他们只是过于执着于自己的实体商业模式,无法跳出这个框框。换言之,他们困在固有的商业模式中,不知变通。DVD技术出现后,该公司并未将其视为对自身商业模式的威胁,也没有将它看成是一种破坏性的技术。相反,在他们眼中,DVD有利于其业务发展,可以改善其实体商业模式的业绩。然而,1997年,里德•哈斯汀(网飞公司首席执行官——译注)对百视达的服务大为光火,之后,局面就开始为之一变。那年,他因为没有按期归还《阿波罗13号》(Apollo 13)这部影片而被百视达要求交滞纳金。事实证明,他并不是唯一一个讨厌支付滞纳金的顾客。然而,百视达当时一心一意拓展既有的商业模式,对自己即将被“网飞”掉几乎毫无意识。

    网飞公司并没有发明任何新技术。DVD光盘存储技术早已问世了。它所发明的是一种全新的商业模式。

    1999年,网飞公司摒弃了百视达的“每片付租”(pay-per-rental)模式,转而采用了一种订阅模式:用户只需要支付固定费用,就能尽情租片观赏,免去了到期还片日、滞纳金、运费和手续费等一系列麻烦。这一模式允许用户每月只需支付固定费用,就能在家中舒适地无限量观赏大片。新模式一经推出就引发市场热捧:推出的第一年,公司销售额从100万美元猛增至500万美元。创立5年后,网飞的销售额就达到了5亿美元,到了第8年,这个数字就变成了10亿美元。2002年,网飞公司的订阅用户有100万人;2006年,增至500万;,2010年,就达到了1,400万人。这还真不是个小众买卖!

    百视达犯下了多数公司都会犯的错误,即低估了新技术和新商业模式的破坏性威胁,直至一切为时已晚。百视达固守自己的实体商业模式,天真地将网飞公司视为可以忽略不计的小众市场开拓者。因为轻视网飞公司,他们付出了惨重的代价。等到他们试图有所反应时,大势已去。积重难返,他们既有的商业模式限制重重、压力巨大,已难以逾越和克服。于是,百视达就这么遭遇了被“网飞”的命运。

    The nuclear industry measures how long a radioactive material will retain its potency by its half-life -- the time it takes for the material to lose half of its radioactivity. The half-life of Uranium-235 is 700 million years, for example. During the industrial era the half-life of a business model was typically measured in generations. Once the basic rules for how a company creates, delivers, and captures value were established, they became etched in stone, fortified by functional silos and sustained by reinforcing company cultures.

    Those days are over. The industrial era is not coming back. The half-life of a business model is declining. Today's leaders are either going to learn how to change their business models while pedaling the bicycle of the current one or they are going to be "netflixed."

    If netflix isn't a verb it should be.

    net-flix

    1. to cause disruption or turmoil to an existing business model

    2. to destroy a previously successful business model

    3. to displace the way value is currently created, delivered, and captured

    Blockbuster started out with a compelling business model. Its value proposition was clear, enabling consumers to watch hit movies in the comfort of their homes. Blockbuster established an extensive value delivery network with stores conveniently located on every corner. Its first store opened in 1985 and it quickly grew to have over 5,000 retail outlets and 60,000 employees. It also had a smart financing model to capture value. It rented hit movies at a price consumers found attractive relative to the price of going out to the movies. Instead of paying a large upfront fee to buy videos from the studio (up to $65 per video) Blockbusters entered into a revenue sharing model with the movie studios including little to no upfront costs per video which gave them a huge advantage fueling explosive growth. Blockbuster started out on a roll. At its peak in 2002 Blockbuster's market cap rose to $5 billion. In 2010 in filed for bankruptcy. So what happened? Blockbuster was netflixed.

    It wasn't as if Blockbuster didn't see Netflix (NFLX) coming. They were just so committed to their bricks and mortar business model they couldn't see or act beyond it. They were stuck in their current business model. Blockbuster didn't see the emergence of DVD technology as a threat to their business model. They didn't see it as a disruptive technology. They saw DVDs as a sustaining technology to improve the performance of their current brick and mortar business model. That all changed in 1997 when Reed Hastings got pissed off because he was charged a late fee by Blockbuster after failing to return the movie, Apollo 13, by the due date. Turns out, Reed Hastings was not alone in hating paying late fees. Blockbuster was so focused on expanding its current business model it had no clue it was about to be netflixed.

    Netflix didn't invent any new technology. DVD optical disc storage technology had already been invented. What Netflix invented was a new business model.

    In 1999, Netflix moved away from Blockbuster's pay-per-rental model and introduced a subscription model where customers paid a flat-fee for unlimited rentals without due dates, late fees or shipping and handling fees. Netflix's business model story was to enable consumers to watch as many movies as they want in the comfort of their home for a fixed monthly price. The new business model caught fire with annual sales going from $1 million to $5 million in its first year. Within five years Netflix was a $500 million business and within eight years it had reached $1 billion in sales. In 2002, Netflix had one million subscribers growing to over 5 million in 2006 and over fourteen million in 2010. Hardly a niche business!

    Blockbuster made the mistake most companies make in underestimating the disruptive threat of new technologies and innovative business models until it is too late. Blockbuster remained stuck in their bricks and mortar business model, naively treating Netflix as a niche player that they could ignore. They underestimated Netflix at their own peril. They attempted to react but too late. The constraints and pressures of their existing business model proved too great to overcome. Blockbuster was netflixed.

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