巴菲特接班人之外：伯克希尔将如何前行？

    随着大卫•索科尔从伯克希尔哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）辞职，以及他在伯克希尔计划收购路博润（Lubrizol）前购入后者股票之事被披露，有一点已变得明确，即投资者需要考虑的不仅仅是谁会接替沃伦•巴菲特担任公司董事长和首席执行官，他们还需要认真考虑伯克希尔哈撒韦董事会的更替和治理事宜。

    伯克希尔的治理问题对于其股票投资者而言应该不是什么新闻。任何新的或潜在投资者看过伯克希尔3月11日递交的投票委托书也应对伯克希尔的治理情况一清二楚。

    随着美国证交会（SEC）对索科尔事件调查的推进，我们将拭目以待除了近期对伯克希尔会计处理的质疑之外，是否还有其他问题已引发监管部门的警惕。

    伯克希尔可能会在哪些方面出问题呢？

    以上述投票委托书来看，伯克希尔董事会的风险监督看来非常薄弱。委托书关于风险监督通篇只有寥寥三句话，包括董事会至少每年两次“获得”关于公司所面临风险的“报告”，至少每年一次“获得”关于公司各项业务的“报告”。另外，委托书写道，审查委员会负责“讨论”风险评估和风险政策。

    但委托书的审查委员会章节并未详细阐述风险相关讨论，只是说审查委员会“协助董事会监督”“企业遵守法律和监管要求”。

    我们希望审查委员会对公司的内部控制流程有严格的审查——不仅是美国证交会提到的会计问题，还有与索科尔股票交易相关的问题。

    与大多数公司分设薪资、提名和治理委员会的做法不同，伯克希尔将三个委员会合并成了一个。为什么不呢？合并的委员会去年只开了两次会，而委员们出席会议是没有报酬的，这说明伯克希尔并没有赋予这些活动以重要价值。

    审查委员会开了五次会，在当今企业界这是个很低的数字。这能说明问题，特别是鉴于伯克希尔近期与美国证交会的会计之争，美国证交会质疑伯克希尔对所持某些证券减记不足。

    上述投票委托书显示，伯克希尔董事会去年只开了三次全体会议。

    委托书中关于董事会行为的描述说明董事会对伯克希尔现状的了解可能日益脱节，这令人不安。委托书写道，“2010年的董事会行为包括一次董事会年会……和两次特别会议，以及两次形成了董事会一致同意的书面决议”。

    一年总共三次会？似乎不是个很活跃的董事会。而且，非审查委员会委员的董事每出席一次董事会获得900美元报酬（数额有些微不足道），全年共计2,700美元，这样的报酬对于董事职务根本算不上什么。这也很能说明巴菲特是如何看待他从董事会所获的建议和监督的价值。

    委托书对于很多投资者关注的问题也采取了不以为然的态度。

    在分离首席执行官和董事长职责这一问题上：“巴菲特先生认为，一名积极参与业务的控股股东——过去40年来以及现在巴菲特先生都一直是这样做的——应当身兼二职[董事长和首席执行官]。这也是伯克希尔董事会全体成员的共同观点。董事会尚未任命一位首席独立董事。”

    在董事任命问题上，委托书写道，“在进行董事提名时，治理、薪酬和提名委员会不寻求多样性，不管是何种定义的多样性。”当然，年龄组成上也没有什么多样性：董事会由12位成员构成，其中半数在79岁至87岁之间，最年轻的董事是48岁。

    关于股东决定薪酬（say on pay）的投票：伯克希尔建议尽可能降低频率，每三年一次——而不是投资者及委托投票顾问更倾向于的每年一次。

    因此，是的，伯克希尔的公司治理问题已经说得很明白了，但投资者的问题是关于未来。

    如果巴菲特离开，会发生什么？那时的投资者能接受这种老式的公司治理模式吗？基于这样缺乏作为的董事会以及高层态度，巴菲特的接班人将继承怎样的企业文化？公司治理将如何实施？一个开会次数如此稀少、疏于行动的董事会能帮助伯克希尔迈向未来吗？针对这些问题的质询，伯克希尔未做出回应。

    伯克希尔不仅需要一个足可胜任的沃伦•巴菲特接班人来引领公司向前发展，还需要一个健全的董事会行使监督职能，以促进公司未来发展。这些是长期股东现在应考虑的问题，因为这些问题将对后巴菲特时代的伯克希尔做出最终的考验。

    In the wake of David Sokol's resignation from Berkshire Hathaway and the revelation of his stock purchases ahead of Berkshire's planned acquisition of Lubrizol (LZ), it has become clear that investors need to consider more than just who will succeed

    Warren Buffett as chair and CEO. They will also need to seriously consider succession and governance practices on Berkshire Hathaway's board.

    The issues with Berkshire's (BRKA) governance should not be news to investors in Berkshire stock. Any new or prospective investor reading the company's March 11 proxy filing should have received the message about Berkshire's governance loud and clear.

    As the SEC's investigation of the Sokol matter moves forward, it will be interesting to see whether issues beyond its recent accounting inquiries at Berkshire have caused the regulator any alarm.

    What were some of the signposts of an accident waiting to happen at Berkshire?

    Using the proxy as a guide, the Berkshire board's risk oversight appears to be very weak. Devoting just three sentences to risk oversight, the proxy says the board "receives reports" at least twice a year about risks that the corporation faces and at least once a year about the company's business segments. It also says the audit committee "discusses" risk assessment and risk policies.

    The proxy's section on the audit committee doesn't elaborate on its risk-related discussions. The section does say that the committee "assists the Board with oversight of" the "Corporation's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements."

    Let's hope the audit committee is undertaking a serious review of the internal controls process at the firm -- not only the accounting issues cited by the SEC, but also the issues surrounding Sokol's trades.

    Unlike most firms with separate committees for compensation and nominating and governance, Berkshire combines the committees into one. And why not? The combined committee only met twice last year and the directors earn no fees for attending those meetings, which suggests that the company does not place significant value on these activities.

    The audit committee met five times, a low figure in today's corporate world. It's telling, especially in light of the company's recent accounting run-in with the SEC in which the regulator questioned the lack of write-downs of certain Berkshire securities.

    According to the proxy, the board as a whole only met three times last year.

    The proxy's descriptions of the board's actions suggest that it is disconcertingly disconnected from the goings on at Berkshire. "Board of Directors' actions were taken in 2010 at the Annual Meeting of Directors … and at two special meetings and upon two occasions by directors' unanimous written consent," the proxy states.

    Three meetings in all? Not a very active board, it seems. Then again, the $900 in payments per meeting (a paltry sum) for the non-audit committee members, for a grand total of $2,700 each, isn't much compensation for serving on the board. This could very well be a reflection of how Buffett values the advice and oversight he receives from the board.

    The proxy also takes a dismissive tone toward issues that many investors care about.

    On separation of the CEO and chair roles: "It is Mr. Buffett's opinion that a controlling shareholder who is active in the business, as is currently the case and has been the case for Mr. Buffett for over the last 40 years, should hold both roles [of Chair and CEO]. This opinion is shared by Berkshire's full Board of Directors. The Board of Directors has not named a lead independent director."

    On board nominations: "In identifying director nominees, the Governance, Compensation and Nominating Committee does not seek diversity, however defined," the proxy notes. Certainly, there isn't much diversity in age: the board consists of 12 members, half of whom range in age from 79 to 87. The youngest member is 48.

    On say on pay: Berkshire recommends say on pay as infrequently as possible -- every three years -- versus the annual basis investors and their proxy advisors generally prefer.

    So yes, the governance issues at Berkshire are clearly spelled out, but the question for investors should be about the future.

    What will happen if and when Buffett exits? Will the old style governance model work for investors then? What kind of culture will his successor inherit based on this disengaged board and the tone at the top? How will governance operate? Will a board who meets so infrequently and does so little be able to help Berkshire bridge to the future? Berkshire did not respond to a request for comment on these issues.

    It is not just Warren Buffett's successor who will need to navigate the company forward capably. Berkshire will also need the right kind of board to oversee and promote its future. These are the questions that long-term shareholders ought to consider now, as they will serve as the ultimate tests of Buffett's legacy.