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专栏 - 从华尔街到硅谷

四问二级市场

Dan Primack 2011年05月13日

Dan Primack专注于报道交易和交易撮合者,从美国金融业到风险投资业均有涉及。此前,Dan是汤森路透(Thomson Reuters)的自由编辑,推出了peHUB.com和peHUB Wire邮件服务。作为一名新闻工作者,Dan还曾在美国马萨诸塞州罗克斯伯里经营一份社区报纸。目前他居住在波士顿附近。

    11日晚些时候,我在旧金山由SecondMarket组织的Capitalyze会议上主持一场小组讨论。这场讨论距离SharesPost在门洛帕克组织的类似讨论还不到24个小时。继10日发问后,我为11日的讨论准备了四问:

    1. 可能鼓励辞职:10日围绕创始人股票的流动性预设有很多讨论。比如,一旦公司的财务指标满足某种标准,如现金流为正,就允许创始人在二级市场出售约2%的股份。频率可以是一年一次。这听起来很不错——创业者和投资者的大多数利益仍保持一致——但有个很大的担忧是:二级市场这样会不会“鼓励”一些级别相对低的雇员辞职?毕竟,一旦辞职,很多股票限售规定都会失效——而且,也很少有公司希望被外界视为优先购股权恪守者 (这会让其难以招到新的人才)。

    2. 有限合伙人压力:如果我是风险投资基金的有限合伙人,我会就创始人股票的流动性提出下述问题:“为什么我们不也卖一点?”一个大学捐赠基金与一个希望在硅谷购房的26岁负债者之间显然有很大差别,但当创业者到了30岁,已不止一次出售持股后,两者差别已有所缩小。这里我要说的是风险资本——特别是种子/早期风险投资——可能很快就会面临有限合伙人压力,要求和创始人一起卖出一些股票。

    3. 诉讼纷争: 到一定时候,二级市场会产生大量诉讼,可能包括集体诉讼。设想如果一家二级市场交易活跃的公司IPO价格比二级市场交易价低30%,会怎样?设想二级市场卖家是内部人士会怎样?买家很可能提起诉讼,指控卖家应早已知晓股票被高估 (须知,买家对公司财务状况可能毫不知情)。我不认为这样的诉讼会赢或者应该赢(买入者都应该知道,无数据支持的买入就是在闭着眼向前冲),但律师们会争着接这些诉讼案。标的非常可观,外加一些有钱的原告……

    4. 设立标杆:当几家投行在为一家二线市场交易公司的IPO项目争得不可开交时,他们会把二级市场的交易价格作为IPO价格基准吗?我说不好,但可以设想他们可能不得不这样做。投行人士在定价方面蒙蔽非上市公司首席执行官的情况并不少见,但很难设想他们会说,“我知道你在非公开市场上值200亿美元,但在公开市场上我们只能做到150亿美元。”

    Later today I'll be moderating a panel at the Capitalyze conference in San Francisco, which is being organized by SecondMarket. This comes less than 24 hours after rival SharesPost held an its own event in Menlo Park. Some questions after yesterday, and in preparation for today:

    1. Incentive to leave: There was lots of talk yesterday about preemptively structuring founder liquidity. For example, letting founders sell 2% or so of their shares on a secondary market once the company hits some sort of financial milestone like cash-flow positive. Maybe make it an annual event. That's all well and good – most interests between entrepreneurs and investors remain aligned – but there is a much larger concern: Are the secondary markets incentivizing lower-level employees to leave? After all, many share restrictions are removed once no longer on a company's payroll – and few companies want to be known as ROFR sticklers (makes it hard to recruit new talent).

    2. LP pressure: If I'm a limited partner in VC funds, here would be my question about founder liquidity: "Hey, why don't we get a little too?" Now there obviously are huge differences between a university endowment and a debt-laden 26 year-old hoping to afford a house in the Valley, but that difference is minimized a bit when the entrepreneur is now 30 and has tapped the founder liquidity well more than once. What I'm getting at is the notion that VCs – particularly seed/early-stage VCs – could soon face LP pressure to also liquidate some shares alongside founders.

    3. Downside litigation: At some point, the secondary markets are going to produce a large number of lawsuits, possibly class-action ones. Imagine one of the heavily-traded companies goes public at 30% lower than where it traded on the secondary market. And imagine the secondary market sellers were insiders. The buyers may well sue, arguing that the sellers should have known the shares were overvalued (remember, buyers almost never know the actual company financials). I don't think these suits will – or should be – successful (anyone buying without the data should know they're flying blind), but lawyers will line up to bring them. Very rich target, plus some wealthy plaintiffs (by definition)…

    4. Setting the bar: When investment banks compete in a bake-off to lead the IPO of a secondary-traded company, are they using the secondary trading values as baselines for what they're promising on the public markets? I can't say, but would imagine they almost have to be. I-bankers are known for blowing smoke on pricing to private company CEOs, and it would be hard to imagine them saying, "I know you're getting $20 billion on the private markets, but I think we can only bring you out at $15 billion."

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