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专栏 - 从华尔街到硅谷

KKR如何跻身《财富》美国500强

Dan Primack 2011年05月09日

Dan Primack专注于报道交易和交易撮合者,从美国金融业到风险投资业均有涉及。此前,Dan是汤森路透(Thomson Reuters)的自由编辑,推出了peHUB.com和peHUB Wire邮件服务。作为一名新闻工作者,Dan还曾在美国马萨诸塞州罗克斯伯里经营一份社区报纸。目前他居住在波士顿附近。

    上周四,Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.成为了跻身《财富》美国500强(Fortune 500)榜单的首家私募股权公司,排名第256。该公司公布2010年营收96.7亿美元,位列The Williams Cos.之前、Liberty Global之后。

    意外吗?我们很意外。不仅意外于其庞大的营收数据,也意外于KKR如何能超越竞争对手黑石集团(Blackstone Group)做到这一点。

    下面是我的《财富》(Fortune) 同事艾伦•斯隆的点评:

    KKR成为首家上榜的私募股权公司,是因为一项古怪的会计规则令其营收达到了通常计算法的3倍,而且去年该公司从根西岛转战纽约证交所(New York Stock Exchange),这意味着公司现在向美国证券交易委员会(SEC)提交财务报告。

    艾伦说的没错(他往往都是对的)。这是一项古怪的会计规则,没有虚增营收的花招,KKR去年业绩也没有突飞猛进。

    为了解究竟是怎么回事,且看KKR的两大营收来源:

    1. 收费,包括旗下各个基金的私募投资者(所谓的“有限合伙人”)支付的年度管理费。 2010年收费约为4.35亿美元。

    2. 投资收益,包括实现收益和未实现收益(或损失,如2008年)。2010年投资收益近91.8亿美元。

    《财富》将这两项数据加起来,外加约5,300万美元的利息费用,得到96.7亿美元的数据。

    但这里开始变得有点麻烦:就像大多数私募股权公司一样,KKR事实上并不享有其公布的全部投资收益。它只获得约20%——所谓的“附带权益”——其他都归有限合伙人(公共养老基金、大学、主权财富基金等) 所有。这就像是绩效奖金,有助于更好地实现利益一致。有些KKR雇员也对公司旗下基金进行投资,但这些投资回报也属于80%里(即便由于一些再投资条款,不完全是这样)。

    不过,为遵守一般公认会计原则(GAAP),KKR认为必须将大多数基金并表(包括所有的私募股权基金)。换言之,91.8亿美元的投资收益包括归KKR所有的(20%)和不归其所有的 (80%)。

    相比之下,黑石集团未将私募股权基金并表。假如它这样做的话,它很容易就能跻身《财富》美国500强。

    那么,KKR和黑石集团孰对孰错?又或者它们都是对的,是因为公司和基金结构的差异?

    坦白讲,如果没有能更好说明经济利益和控制权问题的原始基金文件,很难断论。在这方面,10-K文件不能提供多少帮助。

    但我知道的是:不管是KKR,还是黑石集团,都不应跻身《财富》美国500强。至少不是凭借其2010年业绩。

    KKR甚至也认同我的观点。该公司在一项声明中称:“虽然入选这样一个受人尊敬的榜单是一种荣耀,我们对过去几年公司的成长也非常欣慰,但我们认为这没有正确地反映我们的公司业绩,因为统计数据也包括了我们管理的第三方资本的收益。”

    这样说并不是批评我们的方法,或者是说《财富》在对待私募股权公司时应不同于零售公司或大型医药公司。区别对待可能导致一边倒,最终产生偏倚,丧失可信度。《财富》决定根据每家上市公司公布的总营收数据进行排名,我认为这是恰当的。

    事实上,我认为现在是时候了,美国财务会计准则委员会(FASB)应运用常识、赶上私募股权公司的上市潮。不能再让基金结构的细微差异掩盖重要的归属权事实。FAS 167(并表规定)等现有法规令公开市场投资者很难将KKR、黑石和Apollo Global Management等公司的GAAP财务数据进行比较。虽然名称听起来非常类似,但这些数据反映的都是不同的事情。

    这就是为何上市的私募股权公司往往采用“经济净收益”指标——有些人认为这个非传统的会计指标更能代表此类公司实际产生的股东价值多少(去年,KKR的经济净收益为21.4亿美元,而黑石集团为14亿美元)。我几乎能肯定,如果有更合适的/标准化的GAAP规定,两家公司定将弃用经济净收益或至少降低经济净收益指标的重要性。

    说真的,我绝非夸大美国财务会计准则委员会在这方面有多落后。不久前,有传言称,美国财务会计准则委员会将要求私募股权公司将组合投资的公司收入并入自身营收。在这样荒谬的会计准则下,黑石集团将跻身《财富》美国20强。

    在编制无端令人困惑的财务报告方面,私募股权公司自身也要承担一些责任。我知道此类文件并非有意成为斯蒂芬妮•梅耶的小说,但有些文件比詹姆斯•乔伊斯的小说还要难懂,如果没有一个翻译帮忙,投资者要了解这些公司会不会太麻烦了?

    因此,恭喜KKR上榜。但希望近期内不要再有这种事了。

    Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR) today became the first private equity firm ever listed on the Fortune 500, slotting in at No. 256. It reported $9.67 billion in 2010 revenue, which puts it just above The Williams Cos. (WMB) and just below Liberty Global (LBTYA).

    Surprised? So were we. Not only at the mammoth revenue number, but also at how KKR made the cut while rival The Blackstone Group (BX) did not.

    Here's what my Fortune colleague Allan Sloan wrote:

    KKR is the first buyout firm to make the list, thanks to an accounting oddity that tripled its revenues from what they'd otherwise be, and because its move last year to the New York Stock Exchange from Guernsey means it now files financial reports with the SEC.

    Allan's right (as he usually is). This is an accounting oddity. Not a trick to inflate revenue, or an indication that KKR had a blowout year.

    To understand what happened, let's take a look at KKR's two primary sources of revenue:

    1. Fees, which include annual management fees paid by private investors (called "limited partners") in its various funds. In 2010, this worked out to around $435 million.

    2. Investment income, which includes both realized and unrealized gains (or losses, such as in 2008). In 2010, this was nearly $9.18 billion.

    So Fortune added together these two numbers, tacked on around $53 million in interest expenses and came out with $9.67 billion.

    But here's where it gets troublesome: KKR, like most private equity firms, is not actually entitled to all of the investment income it reports. Instead, it only gets around 20% -- a so-called "carried interest" -- while its limited partners (public pensions, universities, sovereign wealth funds, etc.) receive the remainder. Consider it like a performance bonus that helps better align everybody's interests. Certain KKR employees also invest in its funds, but returns from those investments are included in the 80% (even though it's not exactly the same, due to some reinvestment provisions).

    To comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), however, KKR believes that it must consolidate the majority of its funds (including all of its private equity funds). In other words, that $9.18 billion of investment income includes both the money to which KKR is entitled (the 20%) and the money to which it is not (the 80%).

    Blackstone Group, on the other hand, does not consolidate its private equity funds. Were it to do so, it easily would have made the Fortune 500.

    So is KKR correct and Blackstone is wrong? Or vice versa? Or are they both right, due to differences within their firm and fund structures?

    Honestly, it's impossible to tell without access the the original fund documents that better elucidate issues of economic interest and control. The 10-Ks are not really of much use in this endeavor.

    But here's what I do know: Neither KKR nor Blackstone should be on the Fortune 500. At least not based on their 2010 financial results.

    KKR even agrees with me. In a statement, the firm said: "While it's an honor to be on such a respected list and we are pleased by our growth the past few years, we don't think this accurately measures our firm results because the methodology used also includes the income on third party capital that we manage."

    This is not to bash our methodology, or suggest that Fortune should treat private equity firms differently from retailers or big pharma. To do so would lead to a slippery slope that could end with charges of favoritism and the loss of credibility. Fortune has decided, properly in my opinion, to base its rankings on the top-line revenue figures reported by each public company.

    Instead, I mean it's time for the FASB to play common sense catch-up with the slow wave of private equity firms going public. Stop allowing minor differences in fund structures to obscure the larger truths of ownership. Current regulations like FAS 167 -- which governs consolidation -- has created a situation in which public market investors are hard-pressed to compare GAAP financials from firms like KKR, Blackstone and Apollo Global Management (APO). They all are measuring different things, often with very similar sounding names.

    This is the reason that publicly-traded private equity firms often tout "economic net income" (ENI) -- an unconventional accounting measure that some feel is more representative of how much shareholder value such firms are actually generating (KKR's ENI last year was $2.14 billion, compared to Blackstone's $1.4 billion). I can almost guarantee that both firms would give up -- or at least downplay -- ENI were they to have more relevant/standardized GAAP rules.

    Seriously, I am not overstating how backward FASB has been on all of this. Not too long ago, there was rumbling that the group would effectively require private equity firms to include underlying portfolio company revenue as its own revenue. Under such ridiculous accounting, Blackstone would be a Fortune 20 company.

    The private equity firms themselves also bear some responsibility, in creating financial reports that are needlessly confusing. I know that such documents aren't meant to be Stephanie Meyers novels, but some of them make James Joyce look explicit by comparison. Would it be too much trouble to let your investors know what they own without a translator?

    So congrats to KKR for making the list. Let's hope it doesn't happen again any time soon.

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