康卡斯特-时代华纳合并预示传媒业未来

    上周四上午，康卡斯特（Comcast）与时代华纳有线（Time Warner Cable）宣布合并。对于这笔交易，有一个很好的问题：康卡斯特CEO布莱恩•罗伯茨为什么没有收购维亚康姆（Viacom）？没有收购福克斯（Fox）？也没有收购时代华纳公司【Time Warner，目前还是《财富》杂志（Fortune）的母公司】？

    相反，康卡斯特却决定斥资450亿美元，合并美国排名前两位的有线电视公司。

    多年前，罗伯茨给外界留下的印象似乎是，康卡斯特正在向内容公司转变，或者会加大向这方面的倾斜。早在2004年，罗伯茨就曾经出价660亿美元，计划收购迪士尼（Disney）。虽然最后遭到了拒绝，但这并不能阻止罗伯茨。2011年，康卡斯特以300亿美元获得NBC环球（NBCUniversal）51%的股份，后来又斥资170亿美元，完成了对NBC环球的收购。

    但有这样一个事实：虽然罗伯茨做了许多表面文章，也进行了几宗大型交易，但康卡斯特实际上从来没有出现过向内容公司转变的迹象。下面是笔者从康卡斯特最新年报中摘录的图表。

    Here's a good question to ask about the Comcast-Time Warner Cable deal that was announced Thursday morning: Why isn't Comcast (CMCSA) CEO Brian Roberts buying Viacom (VIA)? Or Fox (FOXA)? Or Time Warner (TWX) (the owner of Fortune, for now)?

    Instead, Comcast is spending $45 billion to combine the nation's No. 1 and No. 2 cable providers.

    A few years ago, the story Roberts seemed to be selling was that Comcast was transforming itself into a content company, or that it would lean more heavily in that direction. Back in 2004, Roberts offered $66 billion to buy Disney (DIS). He was rebuffed. But that didn't stop Roberts. In 2011, Comcast spent about $30 billion to buy 51% of NBCUniversal, and another $17 billion to fully complete the merger in 2011.

    But here's the thing: Despite Roberts' lip service and big deals, Comcast never really was ever all that close to making the transition to being a content company. Here's a group of charts I took out of Comcast's most recent annual report.

    这家公司63%的收入来自有线通信，其中包括电视和宽带通信的销售。这次与时代华纳有线的交易将使康卡斯特的业务进一步向发行业务倾斜，内容的比重将进一步减少。合并后的公司将有72%的销售来自传输业务。

    它预示着康卡斯特将走上与竞争对手截然不同的方向。最明显的例子就是时代华纳的杰夫•贝克斯。两年前，贝克斯决定放弃有线业务，于是拆分了时代华纳有线公司。现在，罗伯茨却接手了当初被贝克斯抛弃的业务。

    但“内容为王”是已经得到大多数人接受的一种观点。而且，这种趋势不仅涉及有线业务，还波及在线甚至无线领域。许多人认为，iTunes和苹果（Apple）应用商店的简单和深度才是iPhone手机热销的原因。

    但还有另外一个事实：虽然各家公司的高管和硅谷初创公司们一直在宣扬内容为王，但华尔街似乎并不买账。即使没有这次交易推动股价上涨，时代华纳有线的市盈率也在20倍左右。时代华纳的电影与电视业务（包括目前的杂志）市盈率为17倍。康卡斯特的市盈率高达21倍。迪士尼也达到了21倍的高市盈率。而同样对时代华纳有线公司感兴趣的另外一家有线电视公司——约翰•马龙的自由传媒集团（Liberty Media），市盈率则高达32倍。卫星与有线电视提供商Dish Corp的市盈率更是达到了36倍。所以，华尔街明显更看好发行业务。

    世界上没有放之四海而皆准的模式，但康卡斯特与时代华纳的交易表明，摇摆不定的大型传媒公司可能将重新选择基础设施，而不是内容。与往常一样，华尔街对这种转变产生了重要影响。

    尽管如此，这笔交易中也涉及到部分与内容有关的方面。一家单纯的有线电视公司将面临被内容供应商“绑架”的难题。所以，罗伯茨最初对NBC环球感兴趣的原因或许并不是为了谋求改变，而是为了保护康卡斯特。

    时代华纳有线拥有极少的内容，一直在与内容供应商争执不休，结果引发了激烈的谈判，同时还导致许多频道停播。或许，这次并购意味着，时代华纳有线已经意识到，没有内容就独木难支。反正，不管怎样，它单枪匹马闯江湖的日子也不多了。（财富中文网）

    译者：刘进龙/汪皓

    The company generates 63% of its revenue from its cable communications, which includes sales of both television and broadband access. The Time Warner Cable (TWC) deal will tip the mix of business at Comcast even further over to the distribution business and away from content. The combined company will get 72% of its sales from delivery.

    This is the opposite direction in which many of Roberts' rivals are going. The starkest example is Jeff Bewkes at Time Warner. Bewkes decided to get out of the cable business two years ago, spinning out Time Warner Cable. Now Roberts is picking up what Bewkes cast aside.

    But pretty much everywhere it seems, King Content has become the conventional wisdom. And it's not just in the cable business but also online and even in wireless. Many people say the simplicity and depth of iTunes and Apple's app store are what really sells iPhones.

    But here's the thing: While corporate executives and Silicon Valley startups have been talking up content, Wall Street never really seems to have bought the story. Time Warner Cable, even before the deal pushed up its shares, had a price-to-earnings multiple of around 20. Time Warner, the movie and television business (and magazines for now), has a P/E of 17. Comcast also has a P/E of 21. Disney also gets a higher multiple of earnings of 21. But John Malone's Liberty Media (LMCA), another cable company that was also interested in Time Warner Cable, gets a P/E of 32. And Dish Corp. (DISH), the satellite cable provider, gets a P/E of 36. So clearly Wall Street thinks distribution remains the better business.

    There won't be a one-model-fits-all, but the Comcast-Time Warner deal suggests that the pendulum of big media may be swinging back to infrastructure and not what flows through the pipes. And like always, Wall Street could be influencing that shift.

    That being said there is a content angle to the deal. Part of the problem of being a pure cable play is that you are hostage to the content providers. So the real reason Roberts might have been interested in NBCU in the first place was not to transform his company but just to protect it.

    Time Warner Cable, which has very little content, has continually found itself in fights over content that have resulted intense negotiations and a number of channel blackouts. The merger could be a realization that Time Warner Cable could no longer go it alone with no content. Either way, Time Warner Cable won't be alone for very much longer.