宝万大战正酣，影子银行风险凸显

围绕中国顶尖房地产公司万科的收购争夺揭示了影子贷款产品怎样让地方银行面临越来越大的国内股市高波动风险。这些影子贷款产品并不安全，而且掩盖了自身资产质量的不断下降。

为了在经济放缓之际追逐较高的投资回报，同时抵消坏账不断增多的影响，中国国内银行正在把储户存款投入所谓的资产管理计划。这种产品以股票为抵押，目的是让企业获得贷款。

打算敌意收购万科的宝能集团买下了前者25%的股份，所用资金中有260亿元即是通过资管计划从五、六家银行筹集而来，其中包括一直都较为谨慎的中国建设银行。

建设银行拒绝发表评论。

虽然银行通过影子贷款渠道持有多少股票并无官方数据，但摩根大通估算，截至今年3月底，资管计划总额为32万亿元，和一年前相比翻了一番。

尽管并不违法，但银行越来越多地使用这些影子贷款技术可能会让它们在追逐利润的过程中失去对风险的恰当把握。在中国，影子贷款经常借助一些不透明的金融工具，后者就是人们所知的理财产品。

惠誉评级联席董事袁牧指出：“资管计划和理财产品本质上处于模糊区域，存在一定程度的监管套利，而且显然是（银行）避开审慎经营规则的途径。”

“这种活动的规模不断扩大令人担心，而且对此缺乏有效的监管。”

在几乎所有情况下，影子贷款都不会进入银行的资产负债表，因而很难估算这种形式的融资或贷款占银行业务的确切比重。由于中国商业银行的贷款违约率处于2009年全球金融危机以来的最高点，这种情况特别让人忧虑。

更广泛地来说，中国的债务水平正在节节攀升。去年，个人、企业和政府债务总额已经达到中国经济产出的2.5倍。

了解情况的人士透露，参与宝能资管计划的银行承诺的回报率高达7.5%，而中国10年期国债的收益率为2.8%。

传染风险

行业分析师指出，大多数投资股票的资管计划合同都包含一些风险控制条款，具体内容是如果资管计划单位净值跌破预先设定的水平，就会强行平仓。

但对银行来说，风险在于大多数情况下银行都不清楚资管计划背后的借款公司财务情况如何，或者杠杆有多高。

《财富》杂志曾请中国银监会发表意见，但后者没有立即做出回应。本月初，银监会督促银行把风险管理提升到“更重要”的位置，并采取措施来控制不良贷款的快速上升。

分析师称，一些银行还推出了自己的资管计划，用潜在高收益吸引个人投资者，进而筹集资金，然后再将这些资金投入股票、房地产以及其他资产。

他们指出，银行还向顾客销售理财产品，这是影子银行活动的最主要源泉之一，而且在某些情况下，这些资金也会直接投入股市，或者通过资管计划进行股票投资。

资管计划和理财产品等金融产品几乎不受监管，其运作方式也几乎没有透明度。由于缺乏二级市场，进而可能使用高杠杆，如果它们进入下行通道，就很难变现。

分析师表示，因此，如果投资失误，这些产品不仅会成为投资银行的坏账，还会给出资银行带来感染风险。

一位不愿被提及姓名的行业追踪者指出：“随着这些产品的规模变得越来越大，银行要管理它们可能引发的风险也会变得越来越难。” （财富中文网）

译者：Charlie

审校：詹妮

The takeover tussle embroiling top Chinese developer China Vanke has unveiled how local banks are increasingly exposed to highly volatile domestic stock markets through risky shadow lending products that mask their worsening asset quality.

In their hunt for higher investment returns in a slowing economy and to offset the impact of rising bad loans, Chinese banks are putting their depositors’ money into so-called asset management plans (AMPs), products set up for the purpose of lending to companies and backed by shares as collateral.

Baoneng Group, which is attempting a hostile takeover of Vanke, used 26 billion yuan ($3.9 billion) of such instruments from about half a dozen banks – including traditionally cautious China Construction Bank Corp to partly finance buying 25% of the property developer.

CCB declined to comment.

While there is no official data on banks’ overall exposure to shares through shadow lending channels, JPMorgan estimated that AMP funds stood at 32 trillion yuan at the end of March, double a year earlier.

Although not illegal, banks’ growing use of such shadow-lending techniques, which often make use of opaque instruments known in China as wealth management products (WMPs), could be sacrificing proper risk management in the pursuit of profit.

“The whole nature of WMPs and AMPs is that it’s a murky area. There is a degree of regulatory arbitrage there and it’s clearly a way for (the banks) to get around the prudential rules,” said Jack Yuan, associate director at Fitch Ratings.

“It’s concerning that the scale of this sort of activity is widening, and there is no effective regulation around this.”

In almost all cases, shadow lending is kept off the banks’ balance sheets, making it difficult to gauge the true extent of the banks’ exposure to this form of fund raising or lending – which is of particular concern as Chinese commercial banks’ loan defaults are at their highest since the global financial crisis in 2009.

More broadly, debt levels in the country are mounting, with the overall level of private, corporate and government debt reaching 250% of the country’s economic output last year.

People familiar with the matter said the banks involved in the Baoneng AMPs have been promised a return of as high as 7.5%, compared with China’s 10-year treasury bond yield of 2.8%.

CONTAGION RISKS

Most of the AMPs that invest in shares have some risk-control provisions in the contract that triggers liquidation of the stocks if they fall below a pre-agreed threshold, industry analysts said.

However, what makes it risky for the banks is that in most cases they don’t have a clear understanding of the financial health and existing leverage of the borrower company behind the AMPs.

The China Banking Regulatory Commission did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Earlier this month, the regulator urged banks to elevate risk management to a “more prominent” place and take measures to rein in the rapid rise of non-performing loans.

Some banks also float their own AMPs, raising money from retail investors lured by the prospects of high yields. The funds generated through these AMPs are then used to invest in shares, real estate and other assets, analysts said.

Chinese banks also sell WMPs to clients, one of the biggest sources of shadow banking activities, and in some cases those funds are also used to invest in shares directly or through AMPs, they said.

Schemes such as the AMPs and WMPs, with little regulatory oversight or transparency in the way they operate, are difficult to turn into cash in a downturn since they lack a secondary market and can in turn be highly leveraged.

So if investment bets through these schemes go bad, it would not only add to the investing banks’ bad loans but also create contagion risks for banks that finance that investment, analysts said.

“As the scale of these entire products becomes larger and larger, it would be harder and harder for the banks to manage the risks it can trigger,” said an industry tracker, who declined to be named.