立即打开
没有人比他更懂经济衰退 |《财富》专访霍尼韦尔前CEO

没有人比他更懂经济衰退 |《财富》专访霍尼韦尔前CEO

Shawn Tully 2020-04-04
高德威曾成功带领霍尼韦尔渡过大衰退。关于如何应对新冠病毒危机,听听他怎么说。

很少有首席执行官能像高德威(Daivd Cote)一样成功应对大衰退。如今,他为陷入新冠病毒危机的企业领导者提供经验之谈。

高德威是霍尼韦尔公司前任董事长兼首席执行官,他曾在通用电气公司工作23年,历任一系列金融、制造和营销职位,晋升为家电部门负责人。2002年初,高德威出任霍尼韦尔首席执行官。霍尼韦尔主营业务是航空航天和特种化学品,与通用电气合并后举步维艰。2017年3月高德威卸任首席执行官。执掌公司的15年中,霍尼韦尔的股价从22美元升至128美元,市值达到600亿美元。

高德威现年67岁,执掌公司中期成功应对了始于2008年的大衰退,带领霍尼韦尔稳健增长。现在他担任Vertiv Holdings的执行主席,Vertiv Holdings是数据中心基础设施和电力产品生产商。

最近高德威接受了《财富》杂志采访,恰逢他的新书《现在赢,以后赢》即将出版,他谈到了为确保霍尼韦尔以强大实力走出危机采取的策略,避免犯竞争对手犯过的错误,也包括前东家通用电气犯过的错。

高德威还曾在所谓的辛普森-鲍尔斯委员会任职,该委员会于2010年召开会议,对遏制美国政府债务和赤字急剧增长大胆提出建议,但遭到国会忽视。本次采访中,高德威就美国脆弱的财政状况可能影响应对下一轮严重衰退发表了鲜明观点。

以下是高德威采访节选,为篇幅和简明起见,本文经过编辑。

关注领导力,而不是共识

高德威:总体来说,首席执行官并没想清楚如何应对经济衰退。

令人惊讶的是,领导者也会如此频繁地惊慌失措。惊慌的首席执行官只会呆坐着不知如何是好,然后努力达成共识。独立思考其实比聪明难得。令人惊讶的是,很多聪明人并不会独立思考,只是非常了解别人的想法。

2019年高德威出席一场会议。高德威曾带领霍尼韦尔成功度过大衰退。图片来源:Christinne Muschi/Bloomberg via Getty Images

身处危机中,我总是想起鲁德亚德·吉卜林著名的诗《如果》,诗的开头是“如果你能在所有人失去理智时保持清醒”,很多领导者在艰难时期只会寻求共识。他们的想法是,如果所有人想法一致,就能降低做错事的风险。为了赢得认可而不断做出让步,让所有人都参与,其实错误至极。重要的是向所有人征求反馈,然后做出正确的决定。与其浪费时间寻求众人同意的解决方案,不如用说服力来激励人们执行决定。

确保收集所有人的意见,不能只听喊得最响的人

做出明智决定不能仅凭直觉,不理会团队的意见。管理者和领导者的区别在于管理者执行,领导者要收集事实和意见并做出决定。有些领导者喜欢根据自身感受做出武断决定,但仅凭直觉并不一定明智。要花时间跟人们相处,像马赛克一样拼出全景,真实情况不会像画一样漂亮,也不会像素描一样简略,却能告诉你具体发生了什么。

不是所有员工愿意公开讲话。有内向的人,也有外向的人,外向的人总在挥着手,好像在喊:“来问我啊!”

我的经验是要去找安静的人。让他们说话就是赋予他们权力。我总会确保房间里每个人都有讲话的机会,“乔治,你觉得怎么样?”乔伊斯,你这么想?”突然之间,保持沉默的人说起话来感觉更自由。非常内向又聪明的人在别人说话时不会露出任何表情。没法知道他在想什么。但只要问起观点,他会提供非常有用的事实和思考过程。人与人的参与方式各有不同。如果意识不到这一点,只听爱表达意见的人,可能会做出错误的决定。

抱最大的希望,做最坏的打算

展望未来时,特别是在经济衰退时期,太多领导者倾向于依赖我说过的“找希望”,即研究可能发生的一切后选择相信最积极的前景。我的信条是抱的最大的希望,做最坏的打算。设想会发生什么最坏的情况,然后做好计划并开始执行。如果依赖“找希望”,六个月后要是出现最坏的情况,你会想:“真希望当时按照最差情况选择策略。”按照最困难的情况制定成功蓝图不仅有助于度过危机,也能帮公司应付很多麻烦。领导者总是不愿相信事情会像有些人说的一样糟糕,直到为时已晚。

经济衰退中,最重要的事跟经济强劲时一样:照顾好客户。客户会记得经济低迷时期得到的善待。如果不能按承诺交付或推出新产品和服务,将影响全公司和员工。要先照顾好客户,再考虑对员工和投资者的影响。不过尽管从财务上来看客户第一,保障员工的健康和安全也很重要,遇上冠状病毒爆发等危机更是重中之重。

在动荡时期,继续为未来投资也至关重要。经济衰退中最先削减的支出通常是新产品投资。但只有推出新产品才能让公司不断成长且充满活力,应该得到保护。霍尼韦尔之所以能安然度过大衰退,就是因为我们一直在投资。

衰退期间多考虑经济复苏

深陷经济衰退的深渊中,大多数人不想考虑未来。他们实在太沮丧,只想挺过本周。人们变得短视,不愿考虑未来。他们应该问,“经济复苏时该怎么做,到时会是什么样,如何充分利用复苏的过程?”

大衰退时期,很多金融界人士和经济学家都说经济复苏将呈L型。经济增长很缓慢或永远不会再增长。我的观点是,可能说得没错,但很可能不会那么严重。当时有位经济学家说的话让我心头一震。他的观点是,你是怎样步入衰退的,就能怎样走出困境。对我来说,这句话很有启发。

如果某个业务部门的销售额在经济衰退中下降了2%到3%,弥补损失的销售额时可能以2%到3%的速度增长。此等规模的反弹并不难。如果某个部门的收入下降幅度达25%,规划未来就有很大问题。之前那位经济学家提到的规则在此也适用。可以预测业务将以“V”型大幅回升。如果降幅达25%,这已经是棘手的问题,但在复苏过程中,为了弥补之前损失的销售额要达到33%的增长,这也不是容易应付的情况。

在霍尼韦尔,业务降幅曾达到30%到40%。所以金融危机期间,我们的想法与别人不一样。我们假设业务会出现V型复苏,并计划如何适应。设想是,如果下跌是V型,那么回升也会是V型。航空零部件业务中,2008年大衰退开始时销售额立即下降了25%。商业建设方面降幅小得多,所以正如我们计划的一样,涨幅也没达到10%。

所以,我们必须制定两套计划。首先尽可能降低成本以度过衰退。第二,确保战略性地削减开支,最大限度地增强复苏期的实力。

休假比裁员强

来看看如何以不同的方式处理两类费用,人工和材料。根据业务是逐渐下滑还是意味着V型复苏即将到来的急剧下滑,处理的方式也各有不同。员工方面,我们很少裁员,也没减薪。主要的措施是休假。航空零部件等业务大幅下滑时,我们要求员工每季度在家呆一两周甚至更长时间。受创没那么严重的部门休假可能会少一些。休假相当于减薪,但员工在没有工作的几周内可以获得失业保险。

为什么用休假代替裁员?因为这种方法很灵活。不用预测经济衰退多严重,可以每周调整成本。裁员需要很多成本,抵消省下的大部分资金,也会影响灵活性。根据《劳工调适与再培训通知法案》和遣散费(一般为每工作一年加一周),裁员会导致六个月不包括福利的费用。要节省六个月才能覆盖相关费用。最后还得花三到六个月找人填补空缺职位,要培训新人。

等到开始复苏,如果公司裁掉了10%的员工,得拼命招聘新人上岗。然而其他公司也在招聘。我很信任行业知识积累。员工掌握很多一线知识,但很多人都离职了,只得培训新人。极少有公司跟我们用一样的方式。很多公司靠大裁员抑制经济衰退中的成本。通用电气就是这样,但我认为没必要。裁员省下来的钱很少,之后还得在紧缩的劳动力市场中重新招聘。

关键在于我们的员工一直都在霍尼韦尔。休假不是裁员,工作岗位还在。等到开始复苏,员工可以带着满身技能返回岗位。我们没把痛苦甩给10%的人,而是让所有人分担比较小的痛苦。

休假还能避免许多公司另一种策略,即全员减薪,比如减10%。减薪不符合人性。人们不喜欢做同样工作收入却更少。他们认为减薪要比休假消极得多。人骨子里就憎恨正常上班但少挣10%。

另一方面,大衰退时期我们确实减少了全员福利,包括减少管理层的奖金以压低成本。401(k)养老金减少了50%,主要为了避免降低实得工资。但经济复苏后的几年里,近90%的削减都成功弥补。

我在人事方面也犯过错误。有几次,某块业务遭到重创时,业务每个部门都全员休假。我当时的想法是要团结渡过难关,每个人都要平等对待。但有一次,受创业务在印度的部门表现良好,却也安排了强制休假,他们当然很愤怒。我从错误中吸取了教训,后来根据不同业务部门的表现调整休假。

多亏休假政策,经济复苏开始时员工能全力以赴返回工作。比起努力招聘的竞争对手,公司优势很明显,因为提升产能速度更快、更平稳,能满足客户订单激增。

不要用乐观的预测麻痹员工

作为首席执行官,一定要跟员工坦诚交代当前情况,但不要觉得有必要给出所有答案。千万不要说“我们预期销售额下降不超过5%”之类。人们听到含糊不清的回答摸不清头脑,然后要求给出明确的答案。他们会想,如果你连现状持续多久都搞不清,还当什么领导?最好直言不讳,别怕说员工不想听的话,比如承认根本不知道要休假多少周。

正确的做法是确保最重要的目标,即照顾好客户的前提下,尽可能将对员工的影响降到最低。如果有人说员工第一客户第二,就是不顾现实。如果想为员工和投资者创造未来,首先要照顾好客户。下个问题是,经济低迷时期如何分担投资者和员工的痛苦?

首席执行官要保持平衡。员工会说,现状很惨,但起码将来我在这还有工作。最好直截了当,不要弄糖衣炮弹。如果所有人工作更努力收入却更少,那不是派对,而是衰退。

向供应商提供支持

2008年初开始,霍尼韦尔的商用飞机、军用飞机和货运飞机零配件销售出现大幅下滑。航空公司飞行时间下降了6%,但霍尼韦尔的零配件订单下降了25%,因为航空公司使用库存零配件节省现金。业务下滑直接影响到供应商,导致产量大幅下降。我们发现订单减少25%之后,对供应商的订单减少了40%。生产链条里越靠后,问题就越严重。

供应商少了50%的业务。我们认为,随着经济复苏势头增强,订单将大幅回升,零部件销量将与经济衰退前持平。要做到的话就得超高速加速。

如果经济复苏了再去找产量缩水50%的供应商,要求一夜之间产量翻番,那是不可能的。工厂可能已经关了一半楼层。如果因为订单下降导致供应商陷入衰退,等到我们的客户开始下订单时,供应商不可能立刻开工满足新需求。经济衰退期间就要认真思考如何解决问题。

当时我们去找航天零部件供应商,问他们:如果经济复苏,现在要付你们多少钱才能确保恢复生产时优先拿货?我们想了解他们最重视什么,然后提供相应的好处,争取将来的供应。其他人都逃跑时,我们要争取达成协议。某些情况下,我们还为将来交货预付款。在其他国家,我们买入的量比当时实际需要多,但作为交换要以优惠条件争取长期合同。开会的时候,最应该高兴的部门是采购。我拼命催采购人员,我说现在出手买实惠的好时机,去发挥实力吧。他们确实这么做了。

等复苏来临时,我们在零部件交货方面比竞争对手强得多,销售增长也快得多。

也许你以为经济衰退时每家公司都会采取同样的供应商战略。实际上很少。这是我们自己想出来的。劳动力方面也一样。对其他制造商来说,裁员这种做法简直根深蒂固,已经变成下意识的逃避反应。

最大的储蓄来源

所有费用包括付给供应商和工人的钱。但最大一块也最容易被忽视的成本是所谓的“间接材料”,包括一大堆并不用于制造航空零部件或化学品的产品和服务。包括纸张、打印机、拖把和传单,以及清洁、法律和害虫防治等服务。听起来有些小题大做,但这些成本在大衰退之前占到销售额13%。经济衰退期间,我们将相关负担削减到7%。如果能让所有人未雨绸缪减少间接供应和服务,成本下降快得惊人。

危机中不要拿奖金

还有个很容易犯的大错。当时我的做法没问题,但没做到及时沟通,影响了跟员工分享的善意。2009年初春,我发现情况越来越糟,于是决定当年不拿奖金。当时我担心,如果告诉员工会被说规避治理规则,因为严格来说奖金是董事会的决定,如果我单方面决定放弃,可能有人说董事会只是个摆设。所以员工问我2009年拿不拿奖金时,我回答说取决于董事会。面临休假忧心忡忡的员工听到这个回答可不开心,大家都在困境中挣扎,管理者还要拿奖金肯定让人不快。其实我应该告诉他们,当年不会拿奖金。但我什么也没说。这是个大错。

面对新型冠状病毒危机,我建议现在首席执行官们不要拿奖金。员工希望听到这样的消息。如果2009年我早点宣布不要奖金就好了。

赤字增长的危险

有时生活中会遇到两个糟糕的选择。任务是挑选其中没那么差的选项。2万亿美元的救助法案方面,我也希望能第三种方案既能刺激经济又不会大幅增加债务。然而这个选项不存在。当年奥巴马总统提出经济刺激法案时,我曾站在前排最中间支持,花钱是对的。

尽管如此,面对庞大的赤字和债务,还有新方案增加的负担,战胜未来危机所需的力量将遭到削弱。如果10年前美国就采取必要措施抑制福利增长,现在处境会好得多。由于国债规模庞大,想从未来的衰退中完全复苏越来越难。国债规模已然达到21万亿美元,这次还要加上2万亿美元。

10年后,随着婴儿潮一代退休,按当前增速计算,债务将达到GDP的130%。下次再想借几万亿美元,全世界和美联储还能买入支持且不产生任何影响的机会能有多大?或许可以指望世界其他国家购买美国国债,但大规模救援的可能性不断降低。现在美国需要更稳健的资产负债表,才能确保避免灾难。

总有一天问题能解决。但两党都不会让步,除非出现巨大的财政冲击迫使双方出手。毕竟两党都不想告诉老年人要调整当前系统。共和党和民主党都在等待影响全国的危机。但谁知道财政大瘟疫何时会到来?我们可以抱最好的希望,但还是做最坏的准备为好。(财富中文网)

译者:Feb

很少有首席执行官能像高德威(Daivd Cote)一样成功应对大衰退。如今,他为陷入新冠病毒危机的企业领导者提供经验之谈。

高德威是霍尼韦尔公司前任董事长兼首席执行官,他曾在通用电气公司工作23年,历任一系列金融、制造和营销职位,晋升为家电部门负责人。2002年初,高德威出任霍尼韦尔首席执行官。霍尼韦尔主营业务是航空航天和特种化学品,与通用电气合并后举步维艰。2017年3月高德威卸任首席执行官。执掌公司的15年中,霍尼韦尔的股价从22美元升至128美元,市值达到600亿美元。

高德威现年67岁,执掌公司中期成功应对了始于2008年的大衰退,带领霍尼韦尔稳健增长。现在他担任Vertiv Holdings的执行主席,Vertiv Holdings是数据中心基础设施和电力产品生产商。

最近高德威接受了《财富》杂志采访,恰逢他的新书《现在赢,以后赢》即将出版,他谈到了为确保霍尼韦尔以强大实力走出危机采取的策略,避免犯竞争对手犯过的错误,也包括前东家通用电气犯过的错。

高德威还曾在所谓的辛普森-鲍尔斯委员会任职,该委员会于2010年召开会议,对遏制美国政府债务和赤字急剧增长大胆提出建议,但遭到国会忽视。本次采访中,高德威就美国脆弱的财政状况可能影响应对下一轮严重衰退发表了鲜明观点。

以下是高德威采访节选,为篇幅和简明起见,本文经过编辑。

关注领导力,而不是共识

高德威:总体来说,首席执行官并没想清楚如何应对经济衰退。

令人惊讶的是,领导者也会如此频繁地惊慌失措。惊慌的首席执行官只会呆坐着不知如何是好,然后努力达成共识。独立思考其实比聪明难得。令人惊讶的是,很多聪明人并不会独立思考,只是非常了解别人的想法。

身处危机中,我总是想起鲁德亚德·吉卜林著名的诗《如果》,诗的开头是“如果你能在所有人失去理智时保持清醒”,很多领导者在艰难时期只会寻求共识。他们的想法是,如果所有人想法一致,就能降低做错事的风险。为了赢得认可而不断做出让步,让所有人都参与,其实错误至极。重要的是向所有人征求反馈,然后做出正确的决定。与其浪费时间寻求众人同意的解决方案,不如用说服力来激励人们执行决定。

确保收集所有人的意见,不能只听喊得最响的人

做出明智决定不能仅凭直觉,不理会团队的意见。管理者和领导者的区别在于管理者执行,领导者要收集事实和意见并做出决定。有些领导者喜欢根据自身感受做出武断决定,但仅凭直觉并不一定明智。要花时间跟人们相处,像马赛克一样拼出全景,真实情况不会像画一样漂亮,也不会像素描一样简略,却能告诉你具体发生了什么。

不是所有员工愿意公开讲话。有内向的人,也有外向的人,外向的人总在挥着手,好像在喊:“来问我啊!”

我的经验是要去找安静的人。让他们说话就是赋予他们权力。我总会确保房间里每个人都有讲话的机会,“乔治,你觉得怎么样?”乔伊斯,你这么想?”突然之间,保持沉默的人说起话来感觉更自由。非常内向又聪明的人在别人说话时不会露出任何表情。没法知道他在想什么。但只要问起观点,他会提供非常有用的事实和思考过程。人与人的参与方式各有不同。如果意识不到这一点,只听爱表达意见的人,可能会做出错误的决定。

抱最大的希望,做最坏的打算

展望未来时,特别是在经济衰退时期,太多领导者倾向于依赖我说过的“找希望”,即研究可能发生的一切后选择相信最积极的前景。我的信条是抱的最大的希望,做最坏的打算。设想会发生什么最坏的情况,然后做好计划并开始执行。如果依赖“找希望”,六个月后要是出现最坏的情况,你会想:“真希望当时按照最差情况选择策略。”按照最困难的情况制定成功蓝图不仅有助于度过危机,也能帮公司应付很多麻烦。领导者总是不愿相信事情会像有些人说的一样糟糕,直到为时已晚。

经济衰退中,最重要的事跟经济强劲时一样:照顾好客户。客户会记得经济低迷时期得到的善待。如果不能按承诺交付或推出新产品和服务,将影响全公司和员工。要先照顾好客户,再考虑对员工和投资者的影响。不过尽管从财务上来看客户第一,保障员工的健康和安全也很重要,遇上冠状病毒爆发等危机更是重中之重。

在动荡时期,继续为未来投资也至关重要。经济衰退中最先削减的支出通常是新产品投资。但只有推出新产品才能让公司不断成长且充满活力,应该得到保护。霍尼韦尔之所以能安然度过大衰退,就是因为我们一直在投资。

衰退期间多考虑经济复苏

深陷经济衰退的深渊中,大多数人不想考虑未来。他们实在太沮丧,只想挺过本周。人们变得短视,不愿考虑未来。他们应该问,“经济复苏时该怎么做,到时会是什么样,如何充分利用复苏的过程?”

大衰退时期,很多金融界人士和经济学家都说经济复苏将呈L型。经济增长很缓慢或永远不会再增长。我的观点是,可能说得没错,但很可能不会那么严重。当时有位经济学家说的话让我心头一震。他的观点是,你是怎样步入衰退的,就能怎样走出困境。对我来说,这句话很有启发。

如果某个业务部门的销售额在经济衰退中下降了2%到3%,弥补损失的销售额时可能以2%到3%的速度增长。此等规模的反弹并不难。如果某个部门的收入下降幅度达25%,规划未来就有很大问题。之前那位经济学家提到的规则在此也适用。可以预测业务将以“V”型大幅回升。如果降幅达25%,这已经是棘手的问题,但在复苏过程中,为了弥补之前损失的销售额要达到33%的增长,这也不是容易应付的情况。

在霍尼韦尔,业务降幅曾达到30%到40%。所以金融危机期间,我们的想法与别人不一样。我们假设业务会出现V型复苏,并计划如何适应。设想是,如果下跌是V型,那么回升也会是V型。航空零部件业务中,2008年大衰退开始时销售额立即下降了25%。商业建设方面降幅小得多,所以正如我们计划的一样,涨幅也没达到10%。

所以,我们必须制定两套计划。首先尽可能降低成本以度过衰退。第二,确保战略性地削减开支,最大限度地增强复苏期的实力。

休假比裁员强

来看看如何以不同的方式处理两类费用,人工和材料。根据业务是逐渐下滑还是意味着V型复苏即将到来的急剧下滑,处理的方式也各有不同。员工方面,我们很少裁员,也没减薪。主要的措施是休假。航空零部件等业务大幅下滑时,我们要求员工每季度在家呆一两周甚至更长时间。受创没那么严重的部门休假可能会少一些。休假相当于减薪,但员工在没有工作的几周内可以获得失业保险。

为什么用休假代替裁员?因为这种方法很灵活。不用预测经济衰退多严重,可以每周调整成本。裁员需要很多成本,抵消省下的大部分资金,也会影响灵活性。根据《劳工调适与再培训通知法案》和遣散费(一般为每工作一年加一周),裁员会导致六个月不包括福利的费用。要节省六个月才能覆盖相关费用。最后还得花三到六个月找人填补空缺职位,要培训新人。

等到开始复苏,如果公司裁掉了10%的员工,得拼命招聘新人上岗。然而其他公司也在招聘。我很信任行业知识积累。员工掌握很多一线知识,但很多人都离职了,只得培训新人。极少有公司跟我们用一样的方式。很多公司靠大裁员抑制经济衰退中的成本。通用电气就是这样,但我认为没必要。裁员省下来的钱很少,之后还得在紧缩的劳动力市场中重新招聘。

关键在于我们的员工一直都在霍尼韦尔。休假不是裁员,工作岗位还在。等到开始复苏,员工可以带着满身技能返回岗位。我们没把痛苦甩给10%的人,而是让所有人分担比较小的痛苦。

休假还能避免许多公司另一种策略,即全员减薪,比如减10%。减薪不符合人性。人们不喜欢做同样工作收入却更少。他们认为减薪要比休假消极得多。人骨子里就憎恨正常上班但少挣10%。

另一方面,大衰退时期我们确实减少了全员福利,包括减少管理层的奖金以压低成本。401(k)养老金减少了50%,主要为了避免降低实得工资。但经济复苏后的几年里,近90%的削减都成功弥补。

我在人事方面也犯过错误。有几次,某块业务遭到重创时,业务每个部门都全员休假。我当时的想法是要团结渡过难关,每个人都要平等对待。但有一次,受创业务在印度的部门表现良好,却也安排了强制休假,他们当然很愤怒。我从错误中吸取了教训,后来根据不同业务部门的表现调整休假。

多亏休假政策,经济复苏开始时员工能全力以赴返回工作。比起努力招聘的竞争对手,公司优势很明显,因为提升产能速度更快、更平稳,能满足客户订单激增。

不要用乐观的预测麻痹员工

作为首席执行官,一定要跟员工坦诚交代当前情况,但不要觉得有必要给出所有答案。千万不要说“我们预期销售额下降不超过5%”之类。人们听到含糊不清的回答摸不清头脑,然后要求给出明确的答案。他们会想,如果你连现状持续多久都搞不清,还当什么领导?最好直言不讳,别怕说员工不想听的话,比如承认根本不知道要休假多少周。

正确的做法是确保最重要的目标,即照顾好客户的前提下,尽可能将对员工的影响降到最低。如果有人说员工第一客户第二,就是不顾现实。如果想为员工和投资者创造未来,首先要照顾好客户。下个问题是,经济低迷时期如何分担投资者和员工的痛苦?

首席执行官要保持平衡。员工会说,现状很惨,但起码将来我在这还有工作。最好直截了当,不要弄糖衣炮弹。如果所有人工作更努力收入却更少,那不是派对,而是衰退。

向供应商提供支持

2008年初开始,霍尼韦尔的商用飞机、军用飞机和货运飞机零配件销售出现大幅下滑。航空公司飞行时间下降了6%,但霍尼韦尔的零配件订单下降了25%,因为航空公司使用库存零配件节省现金。业务下滑直接影响到供应商,导致产量大幅下降。我们发现订单减少25%之后,对供应商的订单减少了40%。生产链条里越靠后,问题就越严重。

供应商少了50%的业务。我们认为,随着经济复苏势头增强,订单将大幅回升,零部件销量将与经济衰退前持平。要做到的话就得超高速加速。

如果经济复苏了再去找产量缩水50%的供应商,要求一夜之间产量翻番,那是不可能的。工厂可能已经关了一半楼层。如果因为订单下降导致供应商陷入衰退,等到我们的客户开始下订单时,供应商不可能立刻开工满足新需求。经济衰退期间就要认真思考如何解决问题。

当时我们去找航天零部件供应商,问他们:如果经济复苏,现在要付你们多少钱才能确保恢复生产时优先拿货?我们想了解他们最重视什么,然后提供相应的好处,争取将来的供应。其他人都逃跑时,我们要争取达成协议。某些情况下,我们还为将来交货预付款。在其他国家,我们买入的量比当时实际需要多,但作为交换要以优惠条件争取长期合同。开会的时候,最应该高兴的部门是采购。我拼命催采购人员,我说现在出手买实惠的好时机,去发挥实力吧。他们确实这么做了。

等复苏来临时,我们在零部件交货方面比竞争对手强得多,销售增长也快得多。

也许你以为经济衰退时每家公司都会采取同样的供应商战略。实际上很少。这是我们自己想出来的。劳动力方面也一样。对其他制造商来说,裁员这种做法简直根深蒂固,已经变成下意识的逃避反应。

最大的储蓄来源

所有费用包括付给供应商和工人的钱。但最大一块也最容易被忽视的成本是所谓的“间接材料”,包括一大堆并不用于制造航空零部件或化学品的产品和服务。包括纸张、打印机、拖把和传单,以及清洁、法律和害虫防治等服务。听起来有些小题大做,但这些成本在大衰退之前占到销售额13%。经济衰退期间,我们将相关负担削减到7%。如果能让所有人未雨绸缪减少间接供应和服务,成本下降快得惊人。

危机中不要拿奖金

还有个很容易犯的大错。当时我的做法没问题,但没做到及时沟通,影响了跟员工分享的善意。2009年初春,我发现情况越来越糟,于是决定当年不拿奖金。当时我担心,如果告诉员工会被说规避治理规则,因为严格来说奖金是董事会的决定,如果我单方面决定放弃,可能有人说董事会只是个摆设。所以员工问我2009年拿不拿奖金时,我回答说取决于董事会。面临休假忧心忡忡的员工听到这个回答可不开心,大家都在困境中挣扎,管理者还要拿奖金肯定让人不快。其实我应该告诉他们,当年不会拿奖金。但我什么也没说。这是个大错。

面对新型冠状病毒危机,我建议现在首席执行官们不要拿奖金。员工希望听到这样的消息。如果2009年我早点宣布不要奖金就好了。

赤字增长的危险

有时生活中会遇到两个糟糕的选择。任务是挑选其中没那么差的选项。2万亿美元的救助法案方面,我也希望能第三种方案既能刺激经济又不会大幅增加债务。然而这个选项不存在。当年奥巴马总统提出经济刺激法案时,我曾站在前排最中间支持,花钱是对的。

尽管如此,面对庞大的赤字和债务,还有新方案增加的负担,战胜未来危机所需的力量将遭到削弱。如果10年前美国就采取必要措施抑制福利增长,现在处境会好得多。由于国债规模庞大,想从未来的衰退中完全复苏越来越难。国债规模已然达到21万亿美元,这次还要加上2万亿美元。

10年后,随着婴儿潮一代退休,按当前增速计算,债务将达到GDP的130%。下次再想借几万亿美元,全世界和美联储还能买入支持且不产生任何影响的机会能有多大?或许可以指望世界其他国家购买美国国债,但大规模救援的可能性不断降低。现在美国需要更稳健的资产负债表,才能确保避免灾难。

总有一天问题能解决。但两党都不会让步,除非出现巨大的财政冲击迫使双方出手。毕竟两党都不想告诉老年人要调整当前系统。共和党和民主党都在等待影响全国的危机。但谁知道财政大瘟疫何时会到来?我们可以抱最好的希望,但还是做最坏的准备为好。(财富中文网)

译者:Feb

Few CEOs navigated the Great Recession as skillfully as David Cote. Now he's offering hard-won advice for corporate leaders caught in the tumult of the coronavirus crisis.

Cote, former chairman and CEO of Honeywell, spent 23 years at General Electric, where he rose through a series of finance, manufacturing, and marketing roles to head the appliance division. In early 2002, Cote became chief of Honeywell, an aerospace and specialty chemicals conglomerate that was reeling in the aftermath of a botched merger with GE. In the 15 years through his retirement as CEO in March 2017, Cote lifted Honeywell's share price from $22 to $128 and created $60 billion in market value.

Cote, now 67, set Honeywell on a trajectory for robust growth by skillfully navigating the Great Recession that struck in the middle of his tenure. He now serves as executive chairman of Vertiv Holdings, producer of infrastructure and power products for data centers.

In an interview with Fortune this week, Cote, author of the forthcoming book Winning Now, Winning Later, talked about the strategies he deployed to ensure that Honeywell would avoid the mistakes of its competitors, including his alma mater, and emerge from the crisis stronger than ever.

Cote also served on the so-called Simpson-Bowles commission, a panel convened in 2010 that made daring recommendations on curbing the mountainous growth in U.S. government debts and deficits—recommendations that Congress ignored. In this interview, Cote shared strong views about how America's fragile finances may hamper our ability to fight the next deep downturn.

The following are excerpts from Cote's interview, edited for length and clarity.

Focus on leadership, not consensus

DAVID COTE: In general CEOs don't think through the recession playbook well.

It's surprising how often a leader will panic. A CEO who panics will just sit there, not knowing what to do, and try to build consensus. Independent thinking is a lot more rare than being smart. It's amazing how many smart people you run into who don’t think for themselves; they just have a really good understanding of what other people are thinking.

In a crisis, I always recall the lines from Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem “If,” which begins, "If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs." Many leaders just seek consensus in tough times. Their view is, if everybody thinks the same thing, it reduces the risk they're doing the wrong thing. It's a big mistake to keep making concessions to win acceptance, to get everyone onboard. What matters is getting feedback from all of your people, and then making the right decision. Instead of wasting time trying to find a solution everyone agrees with, use your powers of persuasion to motivate them to implement the decision.

Get input from everyone, not just the loudest voices

Making good decisions doesn't mean relying on your gut and ignoring the views of your team. The difference between a manager and a leader is that a manager implements, while the leader get facts and opinions and makes a decision. Some leaders are very decisive based on what they feel, but relying on your instincts isn't the best way to go. You need to spend time with the people to build a mosaic that's not as pretty as a painting nor as sketchy as a sketch, but tells you what's going on here.

Not everyone on your staff will openly talk. You'll have introverts and extroverts, and the extroverts will wave their hands as if to shout, "Call on me!"

What I learned is that you have to call on the quiet folks. When you call on them, it gives them authority. I make sure every single person in the room is pinpointed by me to speak up, "George, what do you think?" "Joyce, what's your point of view?" Suddenly, the people who'd stay silent felt freer to speak. One very introverted, brilliant guy would show no facial expressions when others were talking. You had no idea what he was thinking. Then I'd ask for his viewpoint, and he’d have all these facts and thought processes that were very useful to us. People participate differently. If you don’t realize that, you'll make bad decisions only listening to the people who speak out.

Hope for the best, plan for the worst

In looking forward, especially in recession, too many leaders tend to rely on what I call the "Hopecast." That's looking at the panoply of what could occur and picking the outlook that's most positive. My credo is to hope for the best but plan for the worst. Pick a plan and start executing it as if you expect the worst to happen. If you rely on the Hopecast, and six months from now, the worst happens, you'll tell yourself, "I wish I'd picked a worst-case strategy back then. The company would be in a lot better shape today." Setting a blueprint for success in the most difficult scenario doesn't just apply to a crisis, but to any kind of trouble a company faces. Leaders don’t want to believe it will be as bad as some people are saying—until it’s too late.

The first priority in a recession is the same as in a strong economy: Take care of your customers. Customers remember how they got treated in a downturn. If you don’t deliver as you promised or introduce the new products or services you promised, you’ll hurt the entire company and the workers. The impact on employees and investors comes after customers are taken care of. Although customers come first financially, nothing is more important than safeguarding the health and safety of employees, absolutely the top priority in crises such as the coronavirus outbreak.

It's also critical in turbulent times to keep investing for the future. Among the first things to get cut in a recession is usually investment in new products. But it's those products that create a growing and vibrant company, and they need to be protected. Honeywell roared out of the Great Recession because we kept investing.

During a recession, think about the recovery

Deep in a recession, most people don’t want to think about the future. They're so beaten-down that they're just trying to get through this week. They keep a short-term focus as opposed to thinking about what happens further out. They should be asking, "How can I handle recovery and what will it look like, and how do I capitalize on the recovery?"

In the Great Recession, a lot of finance guys and economists were saying we'd have an L-shaped recovery. We'll have slow growth or no growth forever. My view was, that may happen, but likely not. I was struck by what an economist said. His view was, the way you go into a downturn is the way you'll come out. To me, that made a huge amount of sense.

If sales in a business unit fell 2% to 3% going into the recession, it's likely that the business will come out growing at 2% to 3% as it recaptures lost sales. That size bounce-back isn't difficult to handle. The big problem in planning for the future happens when, say, a division's revenues drop 25%. That economist's rule applies there too. You can forecast that business will snap back in a sharp "V." A 25% decline is tough to manage. But the 33% jump in sales in the recovery that simply recoups what you've lost is also hard to manage.

At Honeywell, we had situations with 30% to 40% declines. So during the financial crisis, we thought differently from the crowd. We assumed we'd have V's out there, and planned on what to do to accommodate those V's. Our assumption was that if it's a V in, it's a V out. In our aerospace spare-parts business, we suffered an immediate 25% drop in sales at the start of the Great Recession in 2008. In commercial construction, we saw a much smaller drop, so as we planned for recovery, we didn't see a 10% increase there.

Hence, we had to make two sets of plans. First, to reduce costs as much as possible to weather the recession. Second, to ensure that we placed the cuts strategically to maximize our strength entering the recovery.

Keep workers employed for the rebound

Let’s look at how we handled the two categories of expenses, labor and materials, in different ways. And we handled them in different ways depending on whether the business declined gradually, or steeply, meaning a V was coming in the recovery. On the worker side, we did very few layoffs and no cuts in salaries. Instead, we relied on furloughs. In the businesses suffering huge declines such as aerospace parts, we told workers to stay home for a week or two a quarter, or even more. In less-stricken areas, it might be less. That amounted to a reduction in pay, but they could get unemployment insurance for the weeks they missed.

Why did we use furloughs instead of layoffs? The method was flexible. We didn't need to predict how bad the recession would get. We could adjust our costs week by week. Layoffs require a lot of costs that offset most of the savings, and limit flexibility. With the WARN Act and severance (generally one week per year of service) you incur costs with no benefits for six months. It takes you six months of savings to recoup those costs. Your return is the three to six months when you then try hard to hire for all the open positions and have to train new people.

Now the recovery starts. You've laid off 10% of your people, and now you're scrambling to find workers to replace them. Everyone else is also hiring, too. I'm a believer in the industrial knowledge base. Your people provide that knowledge, and many of them are gone. You need to train the new people. Very few companies used our approach. Instead, they relied on big layoffs to curb costs in a recession. That was the policy at GE, and it never made sense to me. The savings were minimal, and you had to hire people back in a tighter labor market.

The key was that our people never stopped being Honeywell employees. These weren't layoffs; their jobs were waiting for them. They were waiting to return, skills intact, when the recovery began. Instead of concentrating pain on 10% of our people, we spread lesser pain to everyone.

I used furloughs to avoid another tactic many companies adopt, cutting pay across the workforce, say by 10%. It denies human nature. People don’t like being paid less for working the same amount. They view pay cuts much more negatively than furloughs. Showing up to work and getting 10% less they view as an abomination to human nature.

On the other hand, we did use reductions in benefits to everyone, [including reducing] bonuses to all management, to lower costs in the Great Recession. We reduced the 401(k) match by 50%, specifically to avoid reducing take-home pay. But we were able to restore almost 90% of those cuts in the years following the recovery.

I also made mistakes on the personnel side. A couple of times when a business was hit hard, I'd impose a blanket furlough for every part of that business. The idea was that it's a matter of solidarity, that everyone is being treated equally. But in one case, the division's unit in India was doing fine. They rightfully resented being penalized. I learned from that error and imposed different furloughs, that depended on how each part of a business was faring.

Thanks to the furlough policy, our employees were ready to spring into action at full force when the recovery began. That gave us a big edge over rivals that struggled to rebuild their workforces, because we raised output much more quickly and smoothly, meeting the surge in orders from customers.

Don’t patronize employees with sunny predictions

As a CEO, make sure you talk to employees about what’s happening. But don’t feel the need to give them all the answers. Never say things like, "We fully expect no more than 5% decline in sales." People don’t handle ambiguity well, so they push you for a definite answer. They're thinking, what kind of leader are you if you can’t tell me how long this will last? But being forthright includes telling what they don't want to hear, such as saying you simply don't know how many weeks of furlough are coming.

The right approach is pledging to do all you can to minimize the impact on employees while we meet the goal that comes first, taking care of customers. Saying employees should come before customers ignores reality. If you want a future for employees and investors, take care of customers first. The next issue is, How do I allocate pain between investors and employees in a downturn?

The CEO needs to strike a balance. Employees will say, this sucks, but I’ll have a job here in the future. It's better to be direct and not sugarcoat anything. When everyone is working harder for less, you don't call it a party, you call it a recession.

Make deals to support suppliers

Starting in early 2008, Honeywell suffered a tremendous decline in sales of spare parts for commercial, military, and freight aircraft. For the airlines, flight hours fell 6%, but the orders for Honeywell's spares dropped 25%, as the carriers used spares in inventory to preserve cash. The fall in business cascaded to suppliers, who faced gigantic reductions in output. Seeing that 25% decline in orders, we reduced our orders to suppliers by 40%. The further down the production chain, the worse the problem became.

Suppliers were seeing 50% of their businesses disappear. We believed that orders would surge back as the recovery gained traction, so that we'd be selling just as many parts as before the downturn. But to make that happen, we'd have to ramp up at warp speed.

That couldn't happen if we simply turned to suppliers who'd lowered their production by 50% and now asked them overnight to double production. Half of their factory floors could have shut down. If we let their production crater in the recession, they couldn't possibly scale fast enough for us to meet the new demand when the customers began refilling our order books. We thought hard about how to solve that problem in the middle of the recession.

We went to our aerospace spares suppliers and asked, What do we need to pay you today to get first dibs on your production when the recovery comes? We tried to figure out what mattered the most to them and provide the carrot so that they'd commit future production to us. We cut deals when everyone else was running away. In some cases, we made payments in advance for future deliveries. In others, we bought more than we needed at the time, but in exchange we secured long-term contracts on good terms. In meetings, I'd say, the only organization that should be happy is the sourcing organization. I pushed the purchasing people like you can't believe, I said now is the time to get great buys, to really show your stuff. And they did.

When the recovery came, we did much better than our competitors in shipping spares and grew sales a lot faster than they did.

You’d think every company would pursue that supplier strategy in a recession. But they seldom do. We came up with it on our own. It was the same on the labor side. For other manufacturers, the idea of layoffs was so ingrained, it was a knee-jerk reaction that we shunned.

The biggest sources of savings

All costs consist of money paid to suppliers and money paid to workers. But one of the biggest, most overlooked costs is what's called "indirect materials." That category consists of a crazy quilt of products and services that aren't used to make aerospace components or chemicals. It's things like paper, printers, mops, and fliers, and such services as cleaning, legal, and pest control. That sounds like piddling stuff, but it equaled 13% of sales before the Great Recession. During the downturn, we cut that burden to 7%. When you get everyone to batten down the hatches on indirect supplies and services, it's amazing how fast the costs evaporate.

In a crisis, don’t take a bonus

Here's another big mistake. It's a case where I did the right thing, but my failure to communicate foiled the goodwill I wanted to share with employees. In the early spring of 2009, I saw that things were really getting ugly. I decided to take a zero bonus for the year. I was worried that if I told our workers, I'd be accused of circumventing our governance rules, since my bonus was technically the board's decision, and the board could be accused of being just a rubber stamp. When workers asked me if I intended to take a bonus for 2009, I'd say that it was up to the board. That was not the answer the audience of worried workers facing furloughs wanted to hear. Employees don't like bonuses for managers when they're suffering. I should have told them that it's my intent to take no bonus for the year. But I just stayed silent. And that was a big mistake.

I would advise today's CEOs in light of the coronavirus crisis to do the same, and take no bonus. Employees want to hear that from their leaders. I wish I had sent that message earlier in 2009.

The perils of growing deficits

Sometimes in life you're presented with two bad options. Your job is to pick the least bad. In the case of the $2 trillion rescue bill, I’d love a third option that stimulates the economy but doesn't require a huge increase in debt. That option doesn't exist. When President Obama proposed his stimulus act, I was front and center supporting it, saying, spend the money.

Still, our gigantic deficits and debt, and the added burden of the new package, will sap the strength needed to conquer future crises. If the U.S. had done what was needed to curb the growth of entitlements 10 years ago, we'd be in a much better position now. The size of our national debt will make it tougher and tougher to fully recover from future downturns. This time, we're adding $2 trillion to the tab when we're already $21 trillion in debt.

In 10 years, debt to GDP, at this rate, will explode to 130% as the baby boomers retire. What are the chances we can borrow trillions the next time, and that the world and the Federal Reserve will still support it by purchasing our debt with no ramifications? We can probably count on the rest of the world to buy our Treasuries, but we keep reducing the odds that we can make a big rescue happen. We need a much better balance sheet as insurance that we can escape catastrophes.

We will someday tackle the problem. But the two parties won't budge until a seismic fiscal shock forces their hand. Neither wants to tell seniors we need to revamp the system. The Republicans and Democrats will wait for a crisis that galvanizes the nation. But who knows when that fiscal pandemic will arrive? We can hope for the best, but it's better to prepare for the worst.

热读文章
热门视频
扫描二维码下载财富APP